Hello?

Dr. [Henry A.] Kissinger returning your call, sir.[note 3] Henry A. Kissinger was U.S. national security adviser from January 1969 to November 1975, and U.S. secretary of state from September 1973 to January 1977.

Hello?

There you are.

Hello, Henry?

Mr. President.

I had a couple of thoughts on this . . . one which, with regard to the [David K. E.] Bruce thing, which it seems to me may pose for them a difficult problem because of his being so directly involved in the Vietnam negotiations.[note 4] That is, by appointing Bruce, the chief U.S. negotiator at the Paris peace talks, as the special envoy to China, Nixon might be sending confusing signals to the Chinese about his intention. On the other hand, there were positive benefits to such an appointment, as noted later in the conversation. David K. E. Bruce was U.S. ambassador to France from May 1949 to March 1952; U.S. under secretary of state from 1952 to 1953; U.S. ambassador to Germany from April 1957 to October 1959; U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom from March 1961 to March 1969; and chief of the U.S. liaison office to the People’s Republic of China from May 1973 to September 1974. That’s something we have to think about. Now, we may, [Kissinger acknowledges] we may want it that way. The second point is that I’ve been trying to think of whether there is something else. And let me just throw a real wild one out. How about Nelson [A. Rockefeller]?[note 5] Nelson A. Rockefeller was the Republican mayor of New York from January 1959 to December 1973, and vice president of the United States from December 1974 to January 1977.

No.

Can’t do it, huh?

Well, he wouldn’t be disciplined enough. [President Nixon acknowledges.] Although he’s a possibility.

You see, the point is that it’s a way to really engulf him in—completely in a big deal, and then, of course, an absolute . . . you know, if he—

Well, let me think about this.

He’s outside of government, you see.

I might be able to hold him in check [President Nixon acknowledges] for a—

And the idea being that he’s not there to love the Chinese, but for the purpose of getting something done for us. I mean, the war and all—

It’s—

See?

I, on second thought, Mr. President, [President Nixon acknowledges] I’d like to—

It’s intriguing.

But don’t—

I thought about [Elliot L.] Richardson.[note 7] Elliot L. Richardson was U.S. under secretary of state from January 1969 to June 1970; U.S. secretary of health, education, and welfare from June 1970 to January 1973; U.S. secretary of defense from January to May 1973; and U.S. attorney general from May to October 1973. He’d—

Well—

He wouldn’t be the right one.

It—No, well, it’s—and it’s still too close to us. [Kissinger acknowledges.] I mean, if we’re going to go close, then you have the [William P.] Rogers problem.[note 8] William P. Rogers was U.S. secretary of state from January 1969 to September 1973. Rogers had not been fully informed about all of Nixon’s secret efforts to contact the Chinese, and the Department of State’s regional experts tended to be highly skeptical of Nixon and Kissinger’s tactics to improve relations with the PRC.

Yeah.

On Nelson, just thinking it out loud, you have a man who’s, you know, I mean, that the Chinese would consider him important. And he would be. And he . . . it could do a lot for us in terms of what could happen, you know what I mean, in terms of the domestic situation. Of course, [chuckles] we know Nelson’s sort of a wild hare when he gets running around, and he’d get some silly staff with him. That’s the problem that I see with him.

Well, I’d think for one operation I could keep him under control. [President Nixon acknowledges.] And he has the advantage—I mean, to them, of course, a Rockefeller is a tremendous thing.

That’s right. Well—

And—

Let’s just put it in the back of your head and keep it—

Now, that I think actually now—

See?

I think . . .

Nelson has possibilities.

He’s a possibility, yeah, yeah. That, of course, [chuckles] that would drive [the Department of] State up the wall, but they couldn’t really complain a hell of a lot about that.

Well, he’d have to take someone from State along, but he despises them so much, he’d take [President Nixon acknowledges] our direction.

Yeah. Well, we’d have to find somebody to go along with him, to tell him. I mean—

Well, I’d get somebody from my staff to go along with him.

[Laughs.] I’d send [Alexander M.] Haig [Jr.].[note 10] Alexander M. Haig Jr. was military assistant to the president from January 1969 to June 1970; U.S. deputy national security adviser from June 1970 to January 1973; Army vice chief of staff from January to May 1973; and White House chief of staff from May 1973 to August 1974.

Yeah. That’s what I think.

You know. Really. Really. And, you know, somebody like that. I mean, real tough.

That’s right.

But—

That’s right. And he knows Haig.

All in all, of course, the whole thing that you can take some comfort in, you know, we talk about how this happened, it wouldn’t have happened if you hadn’t stuck to your guns through this period, too, you know, you—

Well, Mr. President, you made it possible. It’s—

We have played a game, and we’ve gotten a little break here. We were hoping we’d get one, and I think we have one now. If we—

Well—

—play it skillfully, and we’ll wait a couple of weeks and then—

But we set up [President Nixon acknowledges] this whole intricate web over—when we talked about linkage, everyone was sneering.[note 11] The doctrine of linkage promoted by Nixon and Kissinger held that progress in superpower relations, to be real, had to be made on a broad front; events in different parts of the world, and elements of the military balance, were related to others. If the United States separated those issues into distinct compartments, it would encourage Soviet leaders to believe they could benefit from cooperation in one area while striving for unilateral advantages elsewhere. Critics of linkage argued that to make U.S.–Soviet progress in one area contingent upon progress in another meant it would be difficult to make progress anywhere.

Yeah, I know.

But we’ve done it now.

That’s right.

We’ve got it all hooked together.

And—

I mean, we’ve got Berlin hooked to SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], we’ve—and [President Nixon acknowledges] now, I think—Nelson might be able to do it.[note 12] In other words, the United States would condition progress in the Four Power Talks on Berlin, where the Soviets seemed anxious for an agreement, on Moscow’s willingness to agree to movement in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

You see?

He might follow—particularly if I send Haig along.

Oh, we’d have to have Haig. Yeah. I agree.

He might follow my script—

Haig and a State guy. I wouldn’t let that fellow [Marshall] Green go, of course.[note 13] Marshall Green was U.S. ambassador to Indonesia from June 1965 to March 1969; assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from May 1969 to May 1973; and U.S. ambassador to Australia from 1973 to 1975. Green had taken the position that China should indicate some prior willingness to meet U.S. concerns on bilateral issues before the United States sent an envoy to Beijing.

No, no, one could send Green, because Nelson—[President Nixon acknowledges] I think, if Nelson goes at all—

Yeah. If he were to go, well, maybe—

—because on foreign policy, he would take my advice.

Yeah. On that you could have a Green go along and warble around and . . . but that is a special envoy, in a sense. He’s—

Well, that’s, actually, Mr. President—

You see?

—a very original idea.

You see? [Chuckles.] It’s—

And he’s tough.

And we—well, I think so, and particularly if—you just have to get him right in on the mountaintop and say, “Now, look here, this is going to make or break you, boy. This can’t be like Latin America or anything else.[note 14] Rockefeller had long been interested in Latin American affairs and held positions in the Roosevelt and Eisenhower administrations dealing with that region. In April–May 1969, at Nixon’s request, he headed a team of advisers who visited Latin America extensively to review the state of U.S.–Latin American relations. This is a one where everything is in the balance.” You see?

Oh, he’d do what I tell him on this. For one operation, you know. For a long period, he’d be hard to keep under control.

That’s right.

But for one operation [President Nixon acknowledges] he’d follow his script.

Uh-huh. Well . . . if [Thomas E.] Dewey were alive, he could do it.[note 15] Thomas E. Dewey was mayor of New York from January 1943 to December 1954. When the notion of a special presidential envoy to China had first been broached in 1970, Nixon and Kissinger considered Dewey for the assignment. Dewey died on 16 March 1971. You know, he’d—but—

I think Nelson [President Nixon acknowledges] actually would be a little better.

But he’s—Dewey’s not alive, so we consider—

And they dodged off Dewey. That was given to them. [President Nixon acknowledges.] And—

Mm-hmm. Well, they’ve opened that up, that it is not to be just Taiwan, haven’t they?[note 17] Zhou Enlai had indicated that the Chinese government would be open to discussing a wide range of topics with the presidential envoy, not just the future status of Taiwan. Nixon and Kissinger had been concerned that the Chinese would demand major American concessions in its policy towards Taiwan before Beijing would engage on other substantive matters.

Well, they’ve given one of these very ambiguous formulations, but we could fix that. We could make that clear in the exchange and in the announcement.

Mm-hmm. [Pause.] Yeah, I suppose their reply is one that, well, we’ll come over and talk about Taiwan. Well, that we can’t do.

No.

We—that—there’s [unclear] limit to that, there isn’t going to be any meeting, you know? [Chuckles.]

Well, Mr. President [President Nixon acknowledges] these—the difference between them and the Russians is that if you drop some loose change and try to pick it up, the Russians step on your fingers and fight you for it; the Chinese don’t do that. And I’ve reviewed all the communications with them. And all of it has been on a high level. I mean, if here you look at the summit exchange, they haven’t horsed around like the Russians.[note 18] This presumably refers to the difficulties that the Soviets had put in the way of a proposed U.S.–Soviet summit meeting intended for the fall of 1971 in Moscow.

No, they haven’t.

And compared to what the game was, the Russians squeezing us on every bloody move [President Nixon acknowledges] has been just stupid.

Yeah.

And so I think that they probably figure they cannot trick us out of Taiwan; they have to have a fundamental understanding.

Yeah. Well, we’ll put Nelson in the back of our minds as one possibility.

That’s right.

Incidentally, what did Haig think of this?

Oh, he thinks this is one of the great diplomatic breakthroughs.

Does he really? Yeah?

Oh, yeah. And he thinks if we play it coolly and toughly and with the same subtlety [President Nixon acknowledges] we’ve shown up to now, we can settle everything now.

He thinks you go—he goes that far? Oh, really?

Oh, yeah. I have absolute—I’ve never said this before. I’ve never given it more than one in three. I think if we get this thing working, we’ll end Vietnam this year. [Pause. President Nixon exhales.] The mere fact of these contacts is one of—

Another thing, of course, that is important is [chuckles], you know, we do have a little problem of time in terms of wanting to announce something in this period of time. And—

Yeah, but we ought to be able to announce this by the end of the first week of June anyway.

Well, we’d have to, if you’re going to be there in June.

And—

If we could—

If we have the SALT—

If we could get it earlier—now, the thing is, is SALT going turn them off? No. No?[note 19] Nixon and Kissinger were expecting progress in SALT, due to Kissinger’s back-channel negotiations with Soviet ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin. The President and Kissinger hoped soon to exchange letters with the Soviet leadership setting out a new negotiating framework for SALT that would lead to an arms control agreement or treaty, ideally in 1971. (Nixon announced the progress in SALT in a nationally televised statement on 20 May 1971.) Nixon and Kissinger were concerned that the Chinese government might conclude that a U.S.–Soviet SALT agreement would somehow compromise the PRC’s interests. They planned to reassure Beijing on this point.

No.

No, particularly—yeah. But I must say, we’re going to drag our feet on that summit with the Russians, though. They’re—

Well, nothing can happen on that for a while now.

No. No. They—that’s—the ball’s in their court and [Kissinger acknowledges] they’re sitting there piddling around. All right, they can piddle. And—

They won’t move fast [President Nixon acknowledges] and they’ll be confused by the protest in this country.[note 20] Large-scale anti–Vietnam War demonstrations took place in Washington and other American cities in April and May of 1971. I told you, Mr. President, that the most sophisticated analysis of the World Report was made by Zhou Enlai.[note 21] In February 1971, the White House released its second annual “State of the World Report,” prepared by Kissinger and his staff, which set out an integrated account of U.S. foreign policy. Zhou Enlai was premier of the People’s Republic of China from October 1949 to January 1976. You remember, [President Nixon acknowledges] I said that two months ago. He’s the only fellow who’s understood it.

Yeah. Mm-hmm. Well, his analysis, in effect, realized what we were doing, yeah.

That’s right. But it was a very subtle analysis of the international situation.

Mm-hmm. [Pause.] Well, anyway, there’s another player we can keep in. Bruce is a possibility, too. I mean, Bruce is a possibility. It would be quite dramatic, you know. It would have a hell of an effect on the South—North Vietnamese, if you were to pull Bruce out of Paris and send him to Peking. [Laughs.] [Kissinger acknowledges.] You know? Boy, just that very move—

That’s right.

—that’d just shake the living bejeezus out of them. And—

For that reason, they might not take him. But I think they would take almost anyone.

Mm-hmm.

As long as he’s very senior.

Yeah, well, we’d say he is—

Especially Rockefeller.

You could put it in terms of, if he were Bruce, he’s our senior career ambassador. He’s been to—ambassador to, you know, dih-dih-dih-did-dih, all this, and we feel he’s the best-qualified man to participate in this. He has our complete confidence, and so forth. Then—

And they’d jump at Rockefeller, which is another—[President Nixon acknowledges] that’s, of course, a high visibility one.

Visibility? Oh, boy. The visibility there would be enormous. However, what that would do to the libs in this country would be absolutely—[laughing] wouldn’t that do them in? Oh, God! [Kissinger acknowledges.] Send a Rockefeller over there, you know, Jesus Kee-rist. I mean—

That has really great possibilities—

See?

—the more I think of it, Mr. President.

You see, it shows that here’s Rockefeller. He is lined up with us all the way. It nails him in on the foreign policy thing all the way.

That’s right.

And . . . well, anyway, that’s something to think about, too.

It’s a good problem to have.

Yeah, we got a little more luxury than we usually have.

[chuckling] That’s right.

Normally, we haven’t got much to move with, but—

Well, Mr. President, once this thing [President Nixon acknowledges] gets going, though, this is one of those occasions where everything is beginning to fit together.

Well, we hope so. We hope so. And—

We’ll have to hold hard on Vietnam on Thursday. That’s the—

Oh, hell, don’t worry, I plan to. I don’t plan to give a goddamn inch.[note 22] Nixon was scheduled to hold a press conference on Thursday, 29 April, during which he anticipated numerous questions on his Vietnam policy as well as on China.

Because [President Nixon acknowledges] [unclear]—

Did you think of anything to do on the prisoners?[note 23] President Nixon had asked for public negotiating proposals for the release of American prisoners of war from Hanoi. “We better get a position on that so we keep the wives in line,” the President told Kissinger. “‘Cause those poor gals are in one hell of a spot” (Conversation 477-004, 12 April 1971, 12:42–12:46 p.m., Oval Office). The proposals were intended for public consumption, because both Nixon and Kissinger realized that Hanoi would not release American prisoners of war from North Vietnam until he withdrew the last American troops from South Vietnam. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger was willing to do that until sometime between July 1972 and January 1973, a range of dates chosen to guarantee that Saigon would not fall before Election Day 1972 (Conversation 471-002, 19 March 1971, 7:03–7:27 p.m., Oval Office; Conversation 476-007, 9 April 1971, 8:52–9:58 a.m., Oval Office). The decision to prolong the war until shortly before or after the election had the effect of prolonging the POWs’ captivity.

Yes, we have three proposals, which I’m writing up for you.

Right. Right. Well, I’ll look at them tomorrow. Don’t—no hurry.

They’re releasing a thousand and they’re opening their camps for a foreign inspection and call—which they’ve never done before in South Vietnam—and calling on the North Vietnamese to do the same. [President Nixon acknowledges.] And a proposal to move all prisoners to neutral countries.

Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Now, that’s good. That’s a good move.

Those are three big steps.

Yes, and that should be announced—

That would be announced by Bruce in the morning.

That’s right.

And you could pick it up in the evening.

That’s right. That’s good. That’s good. And then he hits that and I could hypo it in the evening if they don’t give it the play. Although they’re likely to give that a play if we build it up a bit.

Right.

But we’d build it up by saying that—by having it announced that, you know, indicate that Bruce is going to make a major proposal at the—they’ll all think it’s about bugging out and it’ll be on prisoners.

But actually, Mr. President, with this thing cooking, these doves can go out on a limb now as much as they want to. I think we’re beginning to hold the cards.

Yep. That’s true. True, it’s—except that, as you know, we’ve got the—well, we’ll—we’re going to hold and we shall see. The demonstrators may overplay their hand, too.

Well, John [W.] Chancellor, with whom I had lunch today, said he thought that the tide had turned.[note 24] John W. Chancellor was a television news journalist who anchored the NBC Nightly News from 1970 to 1982.

Did he really?

Yeah.

What turned it?

Well, he [President Nixon acknowledges] said he didn’t think that the demonstration on Saturday was all that spectacular.

Yeah.

And he said what’s happening this week is going to ruin it completely.[note 25] Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) had held a series of demonstrations in Washington in April 1971. The veterans received respectful news coverage. In May, the Mayday Tribe attempted to shut down the federal government by blocking traffic and otherwise disrupting life in the nation’s capital. It failed.

They’re, you know, overplaying, huh?

Yeah.

Uh-huh. Well, Chancellor loves the China thing, doesn’t he?

Oh, he’s absolutely crazy about it.

Yeah.

And he’s beginning to think that you’ve set up—he said he doesn’t quite know yet what you’re doing, but you’ve got some great ploy up your sleeves. You’re much too cool, he said.

Mm-hmm. Well, we’re going to play it awfully cool on Thursday night. I’m just going to just—and I’m not going to—and incidentally, I’m not going to say anything about China policy. [Kissinger acknowledges.] I’m just going to say, “No, this matter is now in a very sensitive stage, and I don’t intend to comment further on it. I mean, we’re doing—our goal has been set forth, we have begun this, and I’m not going to discuss it any further. What’s the next question, gentlemen?”

Right.

I mean, just not say much about it. Don’t try to—that’s the way to handle that one.

Right.

Rather than to get into the business of—see, I don’t want to get into the business of, well, what are we going to do about “two Chinas” and what are we going to do about the U.N. and what are we going to do about Taiwan and do we still stand by Taiwan, et cetera, et cetera.[note 26] Any U.S. rapprochement with the PRC immediately called into question the diplomatic status of the government of Taiwan (Republic of China), which considered itself to be the legitimate representative of China and which held China’s seat on the U.N. Security Council and in the General Assembly. The United States had heretofore staunchly supported Taipei’s position. I’m just going to finesse all questions on China by saying this: “There have been some developments here that are significant and that I don’t think the interests of the nation would be served by commenting publicly on them at this time.” Just—

Right.

Just—what do you think? Don’t you think just—

I think that’s right. That would be the best—

Just be enigmatic as hell.

That would be the best possible position to take, Mr. President.

And let them thump around and squirrel and squeal as they will. [Pause.] OK. Yeah, so Haig was pretty pleased, was he?

Oh, yes. Well, this isn’t—it’s—if anyone had predicted that two months ago, Mr. President, we would have thought it inconceivable.

Yeah, yeah. That’s what I mean. What is really intriguing about this is that after Laos, when these bastards were all saying, “Well, this broke it off with the Chinese and their—"[note 27] The President is referring to Lamson 719, a cross-border offensive into Laos earlier in 1971 by South Vietnamese troops backed by American air support. The purpose was to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Cambodia, they were saying the same thing.[note 28] Kissinger refers to the President’s April 1970 decision to send American ground troops into Cambodia to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Yeah. But here comes Laos, though. Let’s look at that one, where, after Laos, when the people over two-to-one think it failed and all of that, you know, they’ve had all the polls show that, and so forth, and we know that. And yet, here comes a Chinese move, the ping-pong team, and now something that is so much more significant, that that looks—pales into nothing.

Exactly.

And that’s the kind of thing that if we can play it cool, can be—have an enormous significance. An enormous significance. And, well, look, I’m sure, too, that it is not any accident that Mao Tse-tung [Mao Zedong] made that statement to Edgar Snow.[note 29] Mao Tse-tung was chair of the central committee of the Communist party of China from June 1945 to September 1976. In a December 1970 interview, Mao had told journalist Edgar Snow that he would be happy to talk to Nixon as a tourist or as president. Nixon and Kissinger were not made aware of that remark until several months later. I mean—

Of course.

Yeah. Now, there’s a couple of other things. We got to get the [Mike] Mansfield [D–Montana] thing turned off some way or other.[note 30] Michael J. “Mike” Mansfield was a U.S. senator [D–Montana] from January 1953 to January 1977, and Senate Majority Leader from January 1961 to January 1977. Mansfield had expressed the desire to travel to China if invited by the Chinese government. Such a visit, in the view of the White House, would upstage that of the President. I don’t know how we can do it, but . . . One way we could do it would be to . . . if we get this game going, is to, you know, you could invite him to go along.

No.

He would not do it?

Why give this to him?

Hmm?

Why give this to him?

I know. I know. I’m not speaking—

But they go along with you when you go.

Oh, that’s what I mean.

Oh, but not when your emissary goes.

Oh, Christ, no. No, no, no, no, no, no, no. I mean, that is that invite him and maybe [Hugh] Scott [R–Pennsylvania], see?[note 31] Hugh D. Scott was a U.S. senator [R–Pennsylvania] from January 1959 to January 1977, and Senate Minority Leader from September 1969 to January 1977. See my point?

Right.

If it helps.

If you want to share it with the Democrats.

You don’t have anything to share. [Laughs.] Doesn’t mean a thing. They’ll just be—I mean, the Chinese will treat them very well, but they’ll know where the power is. [Kissinger acknowledges.] We know that. When it comes.

Yeah, that could be done, Mr. President, at that point.

The only thing is that the Chinese seem to be grabbing so much, now, that—

Yeah, but they haven’t actually invited anyone yet.

Mansfield—well, to an extent, haven’t they really, through that—

Well, I think I can get some oral message to them together with that reply.

Well, but that’s two weeks away, Henry. I just wonder if they’ll move on Mansfield—

I doubt it.

You don’t think so.

But they may. They may do that.

Well, could you get the message on—could you get that message out now? What I was thinking of was just as a temporary delaying action is to say that the President is in California or something like that and that we will be replying in—

That I’ve already said, that [President Nixon attempts to interject] there’ll be a constructive reply in two weeks.

In two weeks? Oh, you’ve told—you told that [Kissinger acknowledges] to the—yeah. Well, if you could add to that reply is that in the meantime that I—that we feel that any other . . . visits, I mean, any other visits should be held in abeyance until they hear our reply. Will you do that?

I’ll get something like that across to him, yes.

—that any other visits should be held in abeyance until, you know, any other—there’ll be many requests and that we feel that other visits by political people, by representatives of this government or the Congress, and so forth, should be held in abeyance until we are ready, and that they will have a constructive reply in a matter of a couple of weeks.

Right.

Good idea.

Right, Mr. President.

All right, fine.

I’ll get that done tomorrow.