Hello?

Mr. President, I have Dr. [Henry A.] Kissinger calling you.[note 1] Henry A. Kissinger was U.S. national security adviser from January 1969 to November 1975, and U.S. secretary of state from September 1973 to January 1977.

OK.

Thank you. [Call connects.] The President.

Hello?

Mr. President?

Hi, Henry, how are things in California?[note 2] Kissinger’s brief visit to California included his attendance at a benefit for the Motion Picture and Television Relief Fund in Los Angeles. California governor Ronald W. Reagan and his wife Nancy also attended.

Well, I just got here, and I’m going to leave very early in the morning, so I’ll be back in the early afternoon.

Oh, I see. I see.

OK, fine.

The . . . I understand you’ve talked to—

Yeah, [Alexander M.] Haig [Jr.] was—I talked to him about the—[note 3] Alexander M. Haig Jr. was military assistant to the president from January 1969 to June 1970; U.S. deputy national security adviser from June 1970 to January 1973; Army vice chief of staff from January to May 1973; and White House chief of staff from May 1973 to August 1974.

—to Haig already, and I just wanted to—

Yeah, yeah.

—to check in. Actually, things are fairly quiet. We’ve got the casualties now.

Mm-hmm.

And unfortunately, they’re higher than what I told you yesterday. They’re about 23.

Mm-hmm.

But still, that’s a low figure.

Yeah.

That’s just four above what we had.

Yeah.

They must have picked up some missing in action. The trouble with the daily casualties is that they don’t reflect the ones that died that were wounded the previous week.

Yep, yep. Well, on the other hand, my God, Henry, to—19, 23, good heavens.

Oh, yeah.

It’s just . . . just down to nothing.

That’s right.

I mean, it’s . . .

And the more I’ve thought about Lȇ Đức Thọ coming west—[note 4] Lȇ Đức Thọ was a member of North Vietnam’s Politburo and Secretariat, and head of the Central Organizing Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam from 1956 to 1973. He led the most important secret negotiating sessions with Henry Kissinger in Paris.

Mm-hmm.

I’m not saying they’re going to accept it, but if they were just going to kick us in the teeth, they wouldn’t need him there.

No . . . no.

So they’re at least going to explore.

Yeah. Well, I—particularly if our Chinese friends lean on him a little, they will.

That’s right, and he’s stopping in—

And they just might lean on him a little. Yeah.

Well, we’ll get the [President Nixon acknowledges throughout] answer in a day or so.

Well, that’s—Haig was very disturbed by that New York Times thing.[note 5] Nixon is referring to the publication of a classified Defense Department study of the Vietnam War that the Times dubbed “the Pentagon Papers.” I thought that—

Well, Mr. President, I think—

Unconscionable damn thing for them to do.

It is unconscionable [unclear]—

Of course, it’s . . . it’s . . . it’s unconscionable on the part of the people that leaked it. Fortunately, it didn’t come out on our administration.[note 6] The study dealt with Vietnam decision-making before Nixon took office. [Kissinger attempts to interject.] That appar—according to Haig, it’s all relates to the two previous administrations. Is that correct?

That is right.[note 7] That statement is not quite right. The study deals with the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, though in less detail.

But I hope [Kissinger attempts to interject] the—but I—my point is if—are any of the people there who participated in this thing, who—in leaking it? That’s my point. Do we know?

In public opinion, it actually, if anything, will help us a little bit, because this is a gold mine of showing how the previous administration got us in there.

I didn’t read the thing. Tell—give me your view on that in a word.

Oh, well, it just shows massive mismanagement of how we got there. And it pins it all on [John F.] Kennedy and [Lyndon B.] Johnson.[note 8] John F. Kennedy was president of the United States from January 1961 to November 1963. Lyndon B. Johnson was president of the United States from November 1963 to January 1969.

[laughing] Yeah.

And [Robert S.] McNamara.[note 9] Robert S. McNamara was president of the Ford Motor Company from November 1960 to January 1961; U.S. secretary of defense from January 1961 to February 1968; and president of the World Bank from April 1968 to July 1981. So from that point of view, it helps us. From the point of view of the relations with Hanoi, it hurts a little, because it just shows a further weakening of resolve.

Yeah.

And a further big issue.

[Pause.] I suppose the Times ran it to try to affect the debate this week or something.[note 10] Congress was considering legislation that would require the President to withdraw American soldiers from Vietnam by the end of the year.

Oh, yes. No question about it.

Well, it—I don’t think it’s going to have that kind of effect.

No. No, because it’s—in a way, it shows . . . what they’ve tried to do—I think they outsmarted themselves, because they had put themselves—they had sort of tried to make it “Nixon’s War,” and what this massively proves is that, if it’s anybody’s war, it’s Kennedy’s and Johnson’s.

Yeah.

So that these Democrats now bleating about where it went wrong—

Yeah.

—or what we’re doing wrong, this graphically [chuckles] shows that—who’s responsible for the basic mess.

Yeah.

So I don’t think it’s having the effect that they intend.

Well, you know . . . it’s—it may not have the effect they intend. The thing, though, that, Henry, that to me is just unconscionable, this is treasonable action on the part of the bastards that put it out!

Exactly, Mr. President.

Doesn’t it involve secure information, a lot of other things? [Kissinger attempts to interject.] What kind of people would do such things?

It has the most—it has the highest classifications, Mr. President.

Yeah. Yeah.

It’s treasonable. There’s no question it’s actionable. I’m absolutely certain that this violates all sorts of security laws.

What do we do about it? Don’t we ask for an—

I think I should talk to [John N.] Mitchell.[note 11] John N. Mitchell was U.S. attorney general from January 1969 to February 1972; director of Richard Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign; and chair of the Nixon reelection campaign from March to July 1972.

Yeah.

No, I think you should. You tell Mitchell that—

And this is not—an occasional leak [President Nixon acknowledges] is bad enough. But this is everything the Defense Department possessed.

Yeah. Let me ask this: call Mitchell. I think you should talk to Mitchell and ask him about his just calling this—getting this fellow in on the purpose of . . . this was a security leak, and we want to know what does he have, did he do it.

Right.

And put him under oath.

That’s right. I think we ought to do that. I think we ought to wait till after—

Another thing to do would be to have a congressional committee call him in.

I think we ought to do it after Wednesday, Mr. President.

A congressional committee could call him in, put him under oath, you know, and then he’s guilty of perjury if he lies.

But I think we ought to wait till after the vote before they get it all confused.

Oh, I agree. Well, you couldn’t do it before then anyway, but, you know that—to get it all set up.

Because of the investigation.

’Cause you’ve got to have the questions and the investigations and know what it is, but—well, we’re not going to get disturbed. These things happen, you know. [Kissinger acknowledges.] [Clark M.] Clifford pops off and this guy pops off.[note 12] Clark M. Clifford was a Washington lawyer; an adviser to presidents Truman, Kennedy and Johnson; a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1961 to 1968; chair of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from April 1963 to February 1968; and U.S. secretary of defense from February 1968 to January 1969. I would think it would infuriate Johnson, wouldn’t you?

Oh, God. Basically, it doesn’t hurt us domestically. I think—I’m no expert on that—but no one reading this can then say that this president got us into trouble. I mean, this is an indictment of the previous administration. It hurts us with Hanoi because it just shows how far our demoralization has gone.

Good God.

But basically, I think they—the decision they have to make is, do they want to settle with you? They know damn well that you’re the one who’s held firm and no matter how much anyone else is demoralized, doesn’t make any difference.

Yeah. [Pause.] Right. Right. Well, you’ll find things out there pleasant enough.

Well, that’s a long trip for you, but I wouldn’t—that’s—and don’t worry about this Times thing. I just think we got to expect that kind of crap, and we just plow ahead, plow ahead.

Well, Mr. President, [President Nixon attempts to interject] if we succeed in two out of three, as you said [Nixon acknowledges throughout] this summer then this will look like picnic.[note 13] Nixon and Kissinger were hopeful for a major breakthrough in U.S.–Soviet relations (including a major nuclear arms control agreement, SALT, and an agreement over the status of Berlin in the Four Power Talks), which would culminate in a summit meeting in Moscow that Fall; a rapprochement with China, which would involve a future visit by President Nixon to the PRC; and a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam War.

If we can— [Chuckles.] But, boy, you’re right about one thing: if anything was needed to underline what we talked about Friday—or Saturday morning, about . . . about really . . . really cleaning house when we have the opportunity, by God, this underlines it.

Oh, yes.

And people have got to be put to the torch for this sort of thing. This is terrible.

[Freeman F.] Gosden was on that plane with me and he—[note 14] Freeman F. Gosden was an actor famous for his role as Amos in the radio show Amos ‘n’ Andy.

Freeman?

Yeah.

Yeah, he’s a great fellow.

Oh, he worships you. He—

What did he think about all of this stuff?

He said it’s just . . . what you have to put up with, he said, he could never imagine it. And he said, “Well, [John Foster] Dulles”—he blames the State Department, which is wrong in this case, because they had [President Nixon chuckles] [unclear] to do with this one.[note 15] John Foster Dulles was U.S. secretary of state from January 1953 to April 1959.

[Laughs.] No. I know.

But he said Dulles always used to say that he had to operate alone because he couldn’t trust his own bureaucracy.

[laughing] Yeah, I know.

I said, “Well, that was good for Dulles, but we pay for it now, because we’re stuck with the bureaucracy.”

That’s right. That’s right. Well, I just wish that we operated without the bureaucracy.

[laughing] Well, Mr. President.

We do.

[Laughs.] All the good things that are being done [Nixon acknowledges] are done without—

We do. We do. We do. Well, anyway, I’ll tell you what: on the Mitchell thing, I’d just have them—have him examine what the options are.

And the Times will justify it on the basis that it serves the national interest. Is that right?

Of course.

My God! My God, you know, can you imagine the New York Times doing a thing like this ten years ago? Even ten years ago?

Mr. President, if—and then when [Joseph R.] McCarthy accused them of treason, they were screaming bloody murder![note 16] Joseph R. McCarthy was a U.S. senator [R–Wisconsin] from January 1947 to May 1957. This is treason!

That’s right. No, whatever they may think of the policy, it is treasonable to take this stuff out and—

That’s right. Oh, it’s one thing to—

It serves the enemy.

It’s another thing to print ten pages of top secret documents that are only about two or three years old. Well, they have nothing from our administration, so actually, I’ve read this stuff. We come out pretty well in it.

[Chuckles.] Well, somebody over there got the stuff that we got, although we—I asked Haig about that, and he says, “Well, look, our file—as far as the White House is concerned, we’re pretty damn secure.” On the other hand, of course, naturally, whenever I’ve had to call [William P.] Rogers and [Melvin R.] Mel [Laird] in on some of these, on Laos and Cambodia, you can be sure all that’s in some file.[note 17] William P. Rogers was U.S. secretary of state from January 1969 to September 1973. Melvin R. Laird was U.S. secretary of defense from January 1969 to January 1973, and U.S. domestic affairs adviser from May 1973 to January 1974.

But, Mr. President, all the big things you’ve done in the White House, and—those files will leave with you.

Yeah. That’s right.

Go to the Nixon Library—

But what I meant, though—that’s true of the files. But I mean, these guys, of course, will have made in their own records—they’ll indicate what I’ve ordered, you know.

Oh, they indicate what you ordered, but they weren’t in on the reasoning.

Yeah. Well, let’s not worry about that.