[Unclear.]

Well, I’d tell him that he’s [Spiro T. Agnew] doing a great job [unclear].[note 1] Spiro T. Agnew was vice president of the United States, January 1969 to October 1973. I would be very complimentary of his—

Well, I wasn’t being cheap.

—support in his speech last night, over the weekend in his comments. Secondly, and when he starts talking about getting in control, I think you say, “Well, now, look, [Melvin R.] Mel [Laird]‘s coming in, we’re going to announce Bryce [N. Harlow].[note 2] Melvin R. Laird was secretary of defense, January 1969 to January 1973; and counselor to the president for domestic affairs, June 1973 to February 1974. Bryce N. Harlow was special assistant to the president for congressional affairs, 1969–1970; and counselor to the president, 1970–1971 and June 1973–August 1974. For that reason alone I can’t make any decisions on this.” But, in general, I don’t think you should [President Nixon agrees] operationally [unclear].

[Unclear] the operation of that they’re going to get bogged down and so forth and so on. [Unclear exchange.] He needs to understand that if he wants to be president, for heaven’s sakes, you’ve got to make speeches.

Sure, and I’ll say, “You want heavy work on the Hill, there’ll be some farm [unclear] and stuff that I want you to do.” And that [unclear].

[Coughs.] If he says, “Why can’t I have an economic thing?,” say, “It just can’t be done that way.” [Unclear] had that economic meeting in the Quadriad [unclear].

I don’t think he can [unclear].

[Unclear] he didn’t speak at the right time, [unclear] in the right tone. [Unclear.] [aside] Come in.

Good morning [unclear], Mr. President. [President Nixon acknowledges.] Great speech last night. Knew it right away. I [unclear] when you were delivering that—

Delivery [speaking simultaneously] —

[Unclear] tough guys. [Unclear] with the good guys.

Fine, fine. [Unclear exchange.]

They were—

Why don’t we sit down?

—enthusiastic.

[Unclear] sit down.

They were real enthusiastic. [Unclear exchange.] But—

You made a great speech in St. Louis.

Well, I had a lot of good help on that.

It was time. It had to be done. And I don’t watch these hearings. I hope you don’t.

I don’t watch very much. [Unclear exchange.] I’ve read some of the reports.

[Unclear] one thing.

Firstly, one of the—

[Unclear.] Our witnesses should get up there and start [unclear]. [Agnew acknowledges.] That’s what Howard Hughes did. It killed them. We’ve got to start doing, though. Get the—have [J. Fred] Buzhardt get the word to every one of our witnesses.[note 3] J. Fred Buzhardt was White House special counsel during the Watergate trial. [Unclear] our witnesses. They should take on the committee. They should show outrage. They should say, “You’re being unfair. You’re being partisan.” Let the weak sisters like [Howard H.] Baker [Jr.] [R–Tennessee], they don’t speak up.[note 4] Howard H. Baker Jr. was a Republican senator from Tennessee, 1967–1985. When I say Baker’s a weak sister, he is at times; other times he isn’t. [Edward J.] Gurney’s [R–Florida] a strong man.[note 5] Edward J. Gurney was a Republican senator from Florida, 1969–1974.

Yeah.

[Unclear.]

The thing that I liked was one of the points we emphasized, the point that, for example, the audience reaction [unclear] affected the television audience, which showed yesterday, I understand, when [Maurice H.] Maury [Stans] said something and the audience reacted with incredulity.[note 6] Maurice H. “Maury” Stans was secretary of commerce, January 1969 to February 1972; and the chairman of the Finance Committee of the Committee to Re-Elect the President, 1972. And then the next thing [Samuel J. “Sam”] Ervin [D–North Carolina] started to really blast [unclear] and they applauded for Ervin’s, you know, wringing him out on the witness stand.[note 7] Samuel J. Ervin was a Democratic senator from North Carolina, 1954–1974.

Well, let’s see, you got the left-wingers in the [unclear].

Now, I think that helps.

All right.

I think that helps.

Sure.

Particularly since I had mentioned that’s what was happening the day before in that speech. But—

All right, get something out there today [unclear] with partisan Democrats. Get me—ahold of a newsman, Victor Lasky [unclear].[note 8] Victor Lasky was a conservative newspaper columnist. Did you vote for [George S.] McGovern [D–South Dakota]?[note 9] George S. McGovern was a Democratic senator from South Dakota, 1963–1981; and the Democratic U.S. presidential nominee in 1972. Did you vote for Nixon? See my point? That’s the kind of thing we can play. [Unclear exchange.]

Good start.

Well, what I wanted to talk to you about involves the—what’s going on in Maryland. They are out trying to persecute the Maryland party.

Maryland?

Yes. This—

What can we do?

Nothing we can do. I simply want to make you aware of it.

Who’s doing it? Is that [George] Beall?

Well, it’s not Beall. It’s—

Is it a Democrat?

Although Beall blundered into it. There—Beall has on his staff a couple of Democrats. One of them’s a volunteer for [Edmund S.] Muskie [D–Maine].[note 10] Edmund S. Muskie was a Democratic senator from Maine, January 1959 to May 1980. [Unclear exchange.]

[Unclear] if I ever see another Muskie man, he [Unclear] Attorney General.

I think these people are just in there, just doing everything they can possibly do.

Well, let me say that—

Beall’s doing everything he can do to hold a lid on it. But—

Beall is?

Yeah, but the problem is, Mr. President, they’ve—the fellow who was administrative officer [William E. Fornoff] under my predecessor and under me and under my successor has been nailed in some kind of kickback thing. And now, he is—has made a deal. He’s singing about everybody he ever gave anything to and—

Oh, God.

—the previous county got—

[Unclear.]

I’m going to be indicted, it looks like.

For what?

I am not—I’ve never had a transaction with him, fortunately, of any kind. Not even a legitimate campaign contribution.

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

But unfortunately when they get—they’re going to—they’re using this to—

[Unclear.]

—bring every engineer that ever, every architect, everybody that ever had any business with the county [Baltimore County] in. And the Democrat—what’s really happening is the Democratic county executive who has said things thinks that I—this administration is persecuting him and they are going all out to try in some way to get me implicated in that mess. Now, they can’t implicate me with—they can make all kinds of accusations, [President Nixon acknowledges] but they can’t implicate me. [Unclear]—

Look, if you were to start this in New York, [Nelson A.] Rockefeller would be out in five minutes.[note 11] Nelson A. Rockefeller was a Republican mayor of New York, 1959–1973; and vice president of the United States, 1974–1977. You know? And Rockefeller, he’s the one that invented it. They make, they pass the hat around. They can afford that.

Well, this other [unclear]—

How the devil’s he going to [unclear]—you know, the [unclear] in California. [Ronald W.] Reagan taught me a lesson.[note 12] Ronald W. Reagan was governor of California, 1967–1975. I was speaking, and I had a talk with Ron. He had mentioned to me [unclear] but, you know, good heavens [unclear]. It’s always done and it’s not wrong!

But let me tell you how bad it is.

These are the highway people, Al, and the others. They make contributions. And some of them get the contracts and some don’t. Now, what in the hell is wrong with that?

It’s gone on as long as . . . [chuckles] [unclear].

What really bothers me about this—

[Unclear] explain [unclear].

One other thing that’s happening is they see the lynch mob claque—

See, it’s partisan.

A partisan—

[Unclear.]

But this has nothing to do with the federal system. This has to do with—

This is not a federal grand jury.

Yes.

The grand jury at one point somebody told me about.

This is a federal grand jury.

Oh, it is?

What [unclear] is a federal grand jury.

But it’s investigating a state [unclear].

[Unclear.].

Well, there are income tax things, something of that sort.

Oh, boy.

[Unclear] I’m going to tell you about now is something entirely different, to show you the lynch mob psychology that exists over there. And this thing they’re calling a little Watergate. And this is the most ridiculous thing I’ve ever seen.

Well, a little Watergate ought to be very small. What—you look at Watergate and all that was involved. What was it? A crappy little thing. A crappy little thing. There’s nothing there—they didn’t get anything. It hurt us in the election. We would’ve got 3 or 4 percent more. What in the name of good God is this all about?!

Well, look, when you hear this, you’ll see, this—

Yeah.

What happened was there was a—[Leslie T. “Bob”] Hope and [Frank] Sinatra and some people decided that a good way to help Maryland congressional candidates would be to have a night for me, celebrity night.[note 13] Leslie T. “Bob” Hope was an actor, comedian, and USO performer. Frank Sinatra was an actor and singer. [President Nixon acknowledges throughout.] They would come in and entertain. The committee was put together in Maryland.

I read about that.

Including in the District, and—

Including them?

Yes. [President Nixon acknowledges.] The thing was a big success. It made about $125,000. But it was slow starting. And some brilliant guy on one of the committees decided that because the ticket money wasn’t coming in, he would borrow $50,000 from the Committee to Re-elect, and report that as ticket sales so that—as sort of seed money for other ticket sales. Then they paid the $50,000 back. But they have now this morning indicted the campaign guy who falsified the records. In Anne Arundel County, not federally. They’ve indicted him.

Oh, God.

All he did—there’s no money misappropriated.

What’s wrong with that?

There’s no money—

It’s just in Maryland—we were trying to win Maryland, weren’t we?

—[unclear]—

But basically, weren’t we trying to win Maryland?

Yes.

All right.

Everywhere you see this, “Ted Agnew Fund—Agnew Fundraiser Indicted.”[note 14] Spiro Agnew’s nickname was “Ted.” It’s something else.

Well.

It’s just murder. But that’s what’s going on, and I think we ought to brace ourselves, ‘cause this is going to get worse.

A lot. [Agnew acknowledges.] ‘Cause I . . . I hadn’t heard about this. Incidentally, nobody around here—don’t tell anybody. I mean—what I mean—don’t tell anybody the background, other than what’s in the paper. Let’s just let Al [Haig]—I want your only contact on the matter of this to be with Al, and there’s only one other person you should know about that we are going to bring in and we’re going to announce it today. You probably can guess who it is. Bryce. Do you trust him?

Absolutely.

All right. And Bryce, I wanted to give . . . he makes some real smooth plays. What do you think, Al? You think that’s good?

Yes.

But otherwise, I don’t want you to talk with Mel, for example. I don’t—just keep this—things like this, let us handle it. Now, second—

There’s nothing [unclear]—

What the hell can we do?

I don’t know. Because if Beall had better sense—Can you imagine a guy going into, on an in-depth investigation, and going into the county that I was in and beginning a—this . . . ? Well, I’m getting all kinds of subtle information drifting back. They’re trying to put the heat on me to try to interfere. I said, “I couldn’t interfere if I wanted to. What do you want me to do, obstruct justice?” But what I’m afraid’s going to happen: there are going to be some accusations leveled against me before this is over. Nothing that’ll—that can stick in any fashion. But just the accusation’s now—

Well, let me [coughs] let me just give you one assurance, so that you just put your mind to rest. I don’t care what they [unclear]. [The recording becomes garbled.] In these last couple months, three months, as you know, I’ve been accused of every—and that I covered it up. [Unclear] et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. All these things are untrue, and in my office and in yours you cannot deny. But you and I can’t go—you can no more testify before a jury than I can. [Unclear.] But on the other hand, let them squeal. They can do it, and we just, and just hard-line it through. And just say that it’s persecution. Political partisan persecution crap. And I think that’s—what do you think, Al? I don’t know what to say. But I think—I’m getting so tired of these charges all the time. My goodness, you know, the charge that I put a million dollars of campaign funds in my San Clemente house. My God, I’m broke. I haven’t got any money [unclear].

This is the same thing with—

Yeah. You don’t have to [unclear] back about me, and they all know it. [Unclear.]

Well, what should, in your judgment, Mr. President, [speaking over President Nixon] suppose this thing does break. Now, it may not. I mean, maybe these people will have some sense. [President Nixon attempts to interject.] Every damn Democrat in the state is trying—

But they know it isn’t going to break. What do you think they’re going to do? I don’t know. Look, I mean, what about—I’ll frankly be quite candid. Who is the U.S. attorney that’s handling it? Is it Beall?

Beall.

Is he a good boy? Why the hell did we appoint him?

He’s all right. I mean, he just got into this. He went after my successor [N. Dale Anderson], who’s a Democrat, and he caught this guy, this administrative officer, in a dead thing. And the guy came in. And it’s a plea bargain. He took a guilty plea and implicated a whole bloc of engineers. Now these engineers—

Boy, what [unclear]. You know, it’s my belief—

There’s not much the engineers [unclear].

I don’t know about how [unclear], but I think the granting of immunity—I know nothing about criminal law, a little bit—but the granting of immunity and so-called plea bargaining is an incentive to lie. And I think that [Agnew attempts to interject] [unclear] too much. Don’t you agree?

Yes, sir.

Look at what they’re doing with this jackass [John W.] Dean [III].[note 15] John W. Dean III was White House counsel, July 1970 to April 1973.

I like that Times article when they said that anybody who turns Queen’s evidence should be suspicious—to save his own tail should be suspicious.

That’s right.

Or suspected.

Look at Dean. This fellow was there that [unclear] in my office [unclear] February. [Unclear] it was March 1st. My God, with everybody trucking through here, and he hauls out top secret documents! And they’re going to give immunity! Now, what in the name of God is that? I’ll tell you, I had—the press tries to make him out a hero. Now, what in the name of God is this? Huh? Well, let’s talk about what we can do. I don’t want to just talk about what you’ve done.

Well—

Let me say first, don’t—as far as the line is concerned here, it’s going to be hard-nosed [unclear]. There isn’t going to be anything to talk about. [mimicking critics] “Well, we better get a special prosecutor, and we’ve got to look into this,” and [unclear]. Balls. We’ve gone down that road. We’ve made that mistake. No more.

Well, the way—

The more you give them, the more they want.

The way this thing may come out, this—an engineer or somebody may accuse not only me, but the governor—

Your predecessors.

—the governor, the county executive of Anne Arundel County, the mayor of Baltimore city. I mean, it may turn out to be—

Accuse you of what?

Accuse me of—

Putting the pressure on them to make contributions?

No, he may say he gave me a kickback of some kind. Came over here and handed me $50,000. [Unclear exchange.] Totally ridiculous. But—

Oh, God.

I mean, they say it. I don’t know what this guy’s liable to say.

And Ted, they’re [unclear]—

They say he gave a federal judge some money. There are all kinds of rumors.

Good God, isn’t it awful?

But this man is . . .

Well, can we destroy [unclear]?

Well, I don’t think there’ll be much credence if he goes the whole way and says—and implicates every public official in the state of Maryland. But—

He’s an engineer for what? A road company or something?

He’s an engineer for a consulting engineering firm that does contract work for various subdivisions on a negotiated basis. It’s the same thing. And he has contributed to Democrats, everybody. You know how these guys are, Mr. President. They contribute to everybody.

Oh, yes.

But he is trying to threaten, [unclear], everybody, and to—and he’s trying to tell the grand jury—

In order to take the plea.

—that if they let him off, or give him—

Yeah, you’re right.

—immunity, he’ll implicate all these public officials.

When do you think that’ll come up?

Well, it may not. This fellow, Fornoff, a former administrative officer who pleaded guilty about a week ago, and I thought that these fellows, these engineers might run right in and try to make a deal, but they haven’t so far. And there’s so much at stake in the state of Maryland on this thing, with the governor, and with [J.] Glenn Beall [Jr.]‘s campaign and everybody.[note 16] J. Glenn Beall Jr. was a Republican senator from Maryland, 1971–1977.

Is Glenn in office now?

No.

No, he’s not. But in his previous campaign.

Oh, yeah. They’ll probably say he got some money.

Yeah. There’s all kind of money, contributions. It’s the usual thing they’re doing now, this mixing everything together.

Incidentally—

They can’t tell a contribution—

—one curious little thing—I mean, I [unclear]. When Brother [Lowell P.] Weicker [Jr.] [R–Connecticut] questions [H. R. “Bob”] Haldeman about the $350,000, which was free, legal money.[note 17] Lowell P. Weicker Jr. was a Republican U.S. congressman from Connecticut, 1969–1971; and a Republican senator from Connecticut, 1971–1989. Weicker served on the Senate Watergate Committee. H. R. “Bob” Haldeman was White House chief of staff, January 1969–April 1973. In other words, [unclear] where’d that money come from? It’s going to be very interesting, because Haldeman is going to have to say, “Well, Senator, you ought to know, because these are the funds raised in 1970 in cash, and you received $76,000, $60,000, yourself—"

Oh, boy. That son of a bitch, Weicker.

"—which I hope you reported.”

Oh, he is so good, that son of a bitch. [President Nixon acknowledges.] And I went up there and raised money for him. Well, this—

Let’s come back to this. [Unclear exchange.]

Here’s the objective, Mr. President. [Unclear exchange.]

They’re not after you. They’re after the whole government.

Yeah, but here’s the thing that needs to in someway—if he got it, [George] Beall can do it—somehow he’s got to finish out what he’s got on the the burner.

Who’s this now?

Beall, the district attorney.

Beall. Yeah.

He’s got these cases. Now he has to finish them out. And get these damn—he’s got 30 IRS [Internal Revenue Service] people in there snooping around there. They’re looking at everybody, every—

But how can we get that word to him, though? You know—

We’ve gotten it to him.

No, now, you haven’t. See . . . Beall—George Beall—

George Beall.

What about his . . .

Glenn Beall’s the only way to influence this.

The senator?

Yes. And Glenn’s concerned, ‘cause he got a pretty good contribution himself through the [unclear].

Well, has Glenn Beall been talked to?

Yes.

[Pause.] Who’s this? This is his son?

His brother.

Brother? Ah, I see. Well, Glenn Beall better take a real deep—we helped him bury that one in ‘70. Bury him. With [Charles W. “Chuck”] Colson.[note 18] Charles W. “Chuck” Colson was White House special counsel, November 1969 to March 1973.

He’s done every [unclear] thing he could do.

Everything you can imagine.

I know that. [Unclear.]

And he knows it.

Now, let me ask one other question.

But, now, wait a minute. Don’t leave this. What do we do with this?

Well, I don’t think we can do anything at this point—

[Unclear.]

—except somehow get Glenn Beall—George Beall, the brother, to realize that he’s—to get, go in there, finish up what he’s doing—

Indict someone. [speaking over Agnew] Just like we told that jury [unclear] indict [Jeb Stuart] Magruder or whoever is guilty and get the hell out.[note 19] Jeb Stuart Magruder was deputy director of White House communications, August 1969 to May 1971; deputy director of the Committee to Re-Elect the President, May 1971 to November 1972; and director of policy planning in the Commerce Department, 1973–1974.

Get this thing over with and get this guy, [Barney] Skolnik, who’s a Muskie volunteer, the hell out of this office.

See, now, frankly, if all of our enemies were in here investigating us, that’s the [unclear].

Some of them right here in our own bureaucracy. That’s the [unclear].

Boy, I’ll tell you, I feel so strongly on this, I don’t know what to do about it. That’s—

There’s not much you—

Well, let’s stop to think. [Pauses.] Stans is full of crap. I mean, trying to work with that [Unclear] strange thing—there’s a strange thing happening, and it’s happened in the last [unclear]. It was an antagonistic attitude toward Ervin’s involvement, and a sympathy attitude toward the President’s involvement. You know what I mean? Thank God. [Unclear exchange.]

Thank God.

I don’t know. Maybe I’m wrong.

No, I think that’s true.

What do you find?

I’ve been out in the country and it’s out there very strong. They’re very resentful.

How’d they [unclear] your speech in St. Louis?

The Attorneys General, State Attorneys General, were very enthusiastic.[note 20] Agnew gave a speech to the National Association of Attorneys General in St. Louis, Missouri, on 11 June 1973.

Good. Well, [unclear] the God’s truth. You know what, they’re quoting in all [unclear] but one of the good things . . . I just hope they hang John [N.] Mitchell so high.[note 21] John N. Mitchell was Attorney General, January 1969 to 29 February 1972; and chairman of the Nixon reelection campaign, 1 March to 2 July 1972. They’ll never send him to prison. [Unclear] John can’t do it. [Unclear.] You know, it would kill him. He’ll never spend a day behind prison doors, if I know John Mitchell. Don’t you agree?

I would think so.

Poor man. A terrible stretch John has had, a terrible stretch.

I would say that—

His wife [Martha Beall Mitchell] is—

Any man that has that cross to bear—

Well, his wife is sick. It isn’t drunkenness. It’s sickness.

I see.

[Unclear.] And maybe John [unclear].

[Pause.] But these are ripple effects. [Agnew acknowledges.] [Unclear exchange.]

Well, maybe what we ought to do is turn the blowtorch back on these sons of bitches—

Yeah. Well, how do we get them? Well, they’re—now, they have gotten the files on the Democrats now. God, I wish I had one bright guy around here who was digging into their stuff. One bright son of a bitch. See, if he weren’t so visible, what you need is a Murray Chotiner.[note 22] Murray Chotiner was a campaign strategist, adviser, and friend of President Nixon. You need a tough, mean Jew. Let’s face it.

Yeah.

You agree?

Yes.

Just look at this—

That’s what they’ve got. They’ve got this guy, Steve Sachs, of [unclear].

Well, let me tell you. You forget you mentioned it to us, and let Al and me work on it.

All right.

We will. OK, Al?

Yes, sir.

I just had one—

Talk to, incidentally, [unclear]. [Unclear.] Let’s put the heat right on them. I want the blowtorch to go on to these people. We’re going to start fighting back. That’s all there is to it.

There’s one more thing. I had, when I originally caught—got wind of this, talked to Haldeman about it.

Yeah.

And I had—

It was Haldeman you talked to?

Yeah, he suggested I talk to Colson, you see.

To Chuck?

Chuck.

And I’ve been talking to Chuck. As a matter of fact—

What does Chuck say?

Well, Chuck is . . . he feels it may not happen, it may happen. [Unclear exchange.] But Chuck wants me to do something that I’m not going to do, and that is to send a letter protesting my innocence in advance.

No.

It’s wrong.

No.

And—

Whatever you do—

But anyhow, Chuck’s got a young fellow in his office named Jud Best, who’s a very good fellow. Now, he is the one I’ve been dealing with. What worried me when I saw the statement in this morning’s paper. Do you think it would be harmful—

What statement in this morning’s paper?

The statement that Magruder is going to implicate Colson. Do you think it’s harmful that Colson is representing me if it comes out that something . . .

Mmm. God. The way Magruder will implicate Colson. Look, everybody—Magruder is going to implicate, as I understand it, Colson, because he put heat on him to get the stuff, not that he got it. Now, Colson, I [unclear] should give unbearable heat to Magruder, get in there, and [unclear] get something out on [Lawrence F. “Larry”] O’Brien, and so forth and so on.[note 23] Lawrence F. “Larry” O’Brien was special assistant to the president for congressional affairs, 1961–1965; and chairman of the Democratic National Committee, 1968–1969 and 1970–1972.

[Unclear.]

We know. We were in ITT [International Telephone and Telegraph] [unclear]. Haldeman called, and said why can’t you get the tapes of what the Democrats are saying about each other? That seems perfectly all right. Right? How the hell do we run a [unclear]? That’s Magruder. Magruder [unclear]. [Unclear], which is unfortunate. Who else? Dean?

Dean.

‘Cause Dean suborned the perjury. Now, Dean will primarily aim at [John D.] Ehrlichman, whom he hates.[note 24] John D. Ehrlichman was chief domestic adviser, January 1969 to April 1973. Haldeman last. And, to the extent that he thinks it serves his purpose, he’ll aim at the President, because he was in to see me a number of times. Fortunately, we have looked, and I was quite discreet. But my point is, he didn’t see me [unclear]. [Unclear], the 27th, 28th of February, the first time I saw the asshole alone. So we’re—you’ve just looked at all of that, Al. What do you think that Dean’s got? It’ll be bloody when it comes up. But we are not going to build him up. To have a little whippersnapper like that come on in here [unclear].

Ah, it’s this crazy climate because—

It’s all been done.

But I was thinking—

But on Colson, though, you should change lawyers?

My judgment is, sir, that we ought to keep Best, and say that Best is the lawyer, or even Colson. I think it might change now, somebody might find out that he did talk to me, and that would be worse, look like I was trying to get rid of him. My—that is my impression.

No. My offhand object—reaction, is this: We tend to run too quickly. And I think, frankly, with the fellow over at Transportation, it’s too rough. A very nice man.

I tried to fix it.

Yeah. [Egil “Bud”] Krogh [Jr.]?[note 25] Egil “Bud” Krogh was undersecretary of transportation from February to May 1973. Krogh was also head of the Special Investigation Unit, commonly known as the Plumbers.

Krogh.

Threw him out without any grace. Haldeman and Ehrlichman [unclear]. [Haig acknowledges.] [Claude S.] Brinegar [unclear] was a [unclear].[note 26] Claude S. Brinegar was secretary of transportation, 1973–1975. I will not forget. There’s a tendency [unclear]. Why, even George [H. W.] Bush, with all his marvelous qualities, fired Ken Rietz, because Rietz was doing—in charge of doing what he should have been doing, trying to get counter-demonstrators into these darn peace marches.[note 27] George H. W. Bush was U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, February 1971 to January 1973. You remember [unclear]. We had to have a—

Darn right. [Unclear.] What we thought what was going to happen to San Diego, we had to take steps. We’d have been derelict if we—

[speaking over Agnew] That’s right. And that’s going to get out. Let me say on that—

[Unclear] everywhere—

That’s what I’d say on Colson. [Unclear] run away.

I don’t see any—

Colson’s going to be a good witness. In any event, if you run away, then that’s a story, too. [Agnew attempts to interject.] If he’s your former attorney, it looks like you’ve found something wrong with him. Don’t put that on the man. Say your attorney has been [unclear] Best. In Colson’s office? Yes, he’s from Colson’s office, but he’s a damn good criminal attorney. What do you think, Al?

That’s what would be my advice. [Unclear exchange.]

Somebody has got to take the hard-line. And our line here will be very hard on you, you understand? If they raise this, I am going to be so outraged about it. Believe me. This—I’m sick of this business. Absolutely sick of it. Not just for myself but I’m sick of what’s happening to some of our people.

What gets me is that a man who is—turns out to be under indictment, caught red-handed, can then go in and negotiate to accuse somebody [President Nixon acknowledges] of something he can never substantiate, but which, in effect, ruins his reputation.

That’s right. [Unclear exchange.]

Of course, what they’re really at, Mr. President, they’re trying to get both of us at the same time, and get Carl [B.] Albert [D–Oklahoma] as president.[note 28] Carl B. Albert was a Democratic congressman from Oklahoma, 1947–1977; and served as Speaker of the House, 1971–1977.

Oh, God.

[laughing] That’s what it really is.

Let me tell you this.

That’s what they want.

I want to say something here. You’ve seen some of this nonsense about [unclear] try impeachment [unclear] resignation. I know who’s lying [unclear].

[Unclear] be crazy.

If it’s 1 percent—1 percent!—we were elected to do a job. We’re doing the job. And that’s the way it’s going to be. And I think we’ve shaken them a little, in the last three—

I do, too. I do, too, sir.

I think it’s turning around. And [President Nixon acknowledges] it may not happen. I wanted to make it—

Yeah. Let me tell you what I think is very important for you to do. I’ve been thinking and talking to Al a little. I know you’ve been concerned about your role in all of this. I don’t want you to take anything that grinds you down to an 18-hour-a-day, like energy. That’s an 18-hour job. It’s going to be at some point. I want you to be the administration’s prime salesman. I want you to build up—not too often. In other words, you don’t go out every day on the stump. But you’re a big name. You can do—I don’t want you to be a carper. But I think, for example, on selling this economic package, you can sell it. Selling this package on energy, you can sell it. But we’re doing things, and selling what we do. And we have a foreign policy. You could sell it. We’re doing things. Just like last night, that little talk. Interestingly enough, like I was telling Al, a lot of calls. That’s routine, [unclear]. I said, what did you like? They said they liked the first and the last. Well, the first and the last [unclear]. For the first time, we don’t have anybody being killed in Vietnam. For the first time, nobody’s being drafted. [Agnew acknowledges.] Mr. [Leonid] Brezhnev is coming in, this is the chance for peace.[note 29] Leonid Brezhnev was general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1964–1982.

They don’t think about that.

In the middle of it, they didn’t understand. They’d like that, too. You see my point?

I think it was one of the clearest speeches on the economy I’ve ever heard.

It was not bad. We wrote it—it was very well written. I’ve been working on it for a week, but—

Well, there’s another thing I can do and have been doing. Every time I go into a state, I get the party leaders in and sit down.

Right.

And believe me, it really shores the troops up [President Nixon acknowledges] for the time.

We can do this, too.

But I would like—

Get the party leaders shored up. But I think there’s another group that I need you to do, that—and I don’t know how to describe them. It was very helpful to the party—[unclear] Chicago, do the Executives’—not the Executives’ Club, but the more elite one where they wear black ties.

I just did that.

All right, fine. Or, a small group at the [New York] Athletic Club. Do a small group in New York up at the links. In other words, just get the power groups. [Agnew acknowledges.] And you sit in and talk to them, because you’re going to be impressive. And it’s the power groups that matter now. You shift them, that’s going to change. Let me say, forget the editors and the publishers and the rest. They aren’t worth your time. They aren’t. Believe me. Don’t bother. Do [unclear], I mean, do it publicly, let the press see you. Because the editors and the publishers have no guts and are only interested in their money. But, by golly, power groups, party leaders, and—if I could urge again—don’t forget our labor friends. As long as they behave. [Unclear]—

I think it was a great—

You’re a great hero among them.

—great thing, not putting any freeze on wages.

Well, we shouldn’t have put them on. [Unclear.]

It’s good if you selectively [unclear] notice.

And we didn’t put them on, and we won’t put them on, unless they [unclear] get out of line. See, I put a little shot across the bow. I said, as long as they are responsible, there’ll be no freeze. But if this jackass . . .

Well, can I say, Mr. President, what my problem is, is that I’ve got, as I told you when we talked last time—

Yeah, yeah. People [unclear].

The people are keeping, grinding me down, “What the hell are you doing? What [unclear]"—

Well, they used to do that to me. And I [unclear] I wasn’t making speeches.

And I need some visible assignment of foreign policy, anything here that gives me a chance to say, here’s something [unclear] important. Because they won’t accept the fact that it’s important that I’m going to go out and make a speech or sell a program.

Well, they don’t accept the fact that it’s important that you are the man who presides over Cabinet meetings or [National] Security Council meetings, or—

No, they don’t. They just don’t accept it. [Unclear exchange.]

That’s what I used to make the thing out of. I used—Well, the difference was, I suppose, Al, that I should in fairness point out, because Al and I have been talking about this [unclear]. [Dwight D.] Eisenhower was sick so much that I presided a great deal.[note 30] Dwight D. Eisenhower was president of the United States, 1953–1961. As a matter of fact, I’m not sick enough. Maybe I should get sick.

Please don’t. [Laughs.]

Huh?

But, for example, let me tell you what’s—

What can we find now? Can you—

This is an oversight, [President Nixon acknowledges throughout] I’m sure. But we had a meeting on May 2nd, and you said to me, “All right, well, there’s a Quadriad meeting. I want you to get more involved in economics. Be at the Quadriad meeting.”

Oh, yeah.

So I came. It was noted. Then the next economic meeting, I was not in it. [President Nixon acknowledges throughout.] People said, “What the hell is this? Are you in? Are you going to stick with the Quadriad, or aren’t you going to stick with the Quadriad?” That’s the kind of thing that really gives them something to zing in on. And they’re at me every minute about this. “What is your expanded thing in domestic policy? What are you supposed to be doing, Mr. Vice President?”

Al, I see no objection to him sitting in on the Quadriad. Do you? It’s never been done. It’s a terrible—it’s a really—a terrible thing, ‘cause that’s such a highly, highly . . . you know—

Special atmosphere.

You know, [Agnew interjects] it’s not only a specialized thing. And you have the problem that if—that’s where you’ll talk about whether the Fed’s [Federal Reserve] going to [unclear] up or down and so forth, [unclear]. It’s a terribly dull, horrible meeting. [Unclear.] [Long pause.] Well. All right, I’ll tell you what we do: Check with George [P. Shultz], and just say [unclear] that we don’t, see, we don’t have staff [unclear] in the Quadriads.[note 31] George P. Shultz was secretary of labor, January 1969–July 1970; director of the Office of Management and Budget, June 1970–May 1972; and secretary of the treasury, May 1972–May 1974. I don’t have—

Look, Mr. President, I’m not urging—

I know, I know. I’m just trying to see—

I’m just using it as an example.

I’m just trying to see what we can do. You see, now—

I don’t want to—

We’ve got you—you’ve got the Cabinet, the Security Council, the Domestic Council. The Domestic Council is, incidentally, will generally be the Cabinet from now on. Because I like the idea—

I think it’s working well.

Everybody in, you see. Because [unclear] [William P.] Rogers and [Melvin R.] Laird and—not Laird, who’s that fellow—[James R.] Schlesinger in there, they’ll take care of some of these domestic problems.[note 32] William P. Rogers was secretary of state, January 1969 to September 1973. James R. Schlesinger was assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget, July 1970 to August 1971; chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, August 1971 to February 1973; director of the Central Intelligence Agency, February 1973 to July 1973; and secretary of defense, July 1973 to November 1975. Like, if we’re going to cut off the sale of soybeans to France, by golly, the Secretary of State’s got to be in there to know that’s the [unclear]. Incidentally, I think people like that more than anything else, where I said we’re going to put the American consumer first. They want [unclear].

That was a very telling point in the speech. The American people—

You see, we had to, you know, we had to roll the State Department and the NSC staff. Half of them are going to resign. [Laughter.] Al did it for us. Al, I think that the Quadriad post is no problem. But let’s try to . . . the other things I think really . . .

Isn’t there some foreign policy assignment that’s important that I could do?

Yes. Yes, there could be. [Pause.] I don’t want one, though, that looks like it’s froth.

Nah, that’s worse than not having—

No, no, no, no, no, no. You see? ‘Cause then they’ll go out and write it up like they did that Africa trip.

Oh, God.

Where, what was [unclear]? Did you see that?

[Unclear.]

It didn’t hurt you. But I mean, it made me mad, you know, when I saw about the rhinoceroses, or whatever it was. They always wrote those things about me. But you’re not used to it, you see.

I’m getting used to it.

I’ve been beaten and bloodied [unclear]. My God. I’ve been through the [Alger] Hiss case. If you think this is bad, you should have seen Herblock’s cartoons then.[note 33] Herbert L. Block, or Herblock, was a political cartoonist. [Unclear.] Ha!

I thought the—

Caracas.

—the—

Asia?

—the Asian thing [unclear] because of the new agreement. Is there anything on that to be done, or would that just be froth? [Unclear.]

No. I’ll—I think I’ll, as soon as we get Henry [A. Kissinger] settled a bit, we could do that.[note 34] Henry A. Kissinger was national security adviser, January 1969 to November 1975; and secretary of state, September 1973 to January 1977. Now, one other thing. Now, don’t ever suggest this beyond this room, please. Don’t ever suggest it. But I should mention that I don’t see any reason why—we don’t have any names—why the vice president couldn’t go to China. Good God, [Mike] Mansfield’s [D–Montana] going to China.[note 35] Mike Mansfield was a Democratic senator from Montana, 1953–1977; and Senate Majority Leader, 1961–1977. Half the Congress is trying to go to China. [Unclear.] Just go. Now, Henry’s going in August to brief a couple things, but, you know, he can go in September or October or something just to show interest. Russia? Do you know Russian?

No.

By God, you should go to Russia. Now, you should do Russia. Now, what I meant is this: Foreign trips are good. Not in terms of negotiating—don’t worry about the negotiation. I never negotiated a darn thing. But they’re good in terms of meeting the people, getting them to know you, conducting yourself well. And then you can come back and talk about it.

Yeah, but they’re—

Boy, it’s great. All right, let’s consider Russia, China. How many Eastern European countries have you been to?

None.

Communist countries? Have you been to Poland?

No, sir.

Hungary? Rumania?[note 36] It was commonplace at the time for officials to refer to “Rumania” as opposed to “Romania.” All right. There’s a very good—Eastern Europe. See, those are—

I haven’t even been to the NATO countries, except for the Mediterranean side. Most of my travel has been around the Mediterranean area: Italy, Iran, Greece—

Well, we can work the travel thing out.

—Spain.

Let me say that I’ll keep you out of Latin America, ‘cause it’s bound to be bloodthirsty. And there’s no votes down there. And there’s no reason to go to Africa. Let those people eat each other, not us. [Pause.] All right. The only reason Al took this job is I promised that he’d get ambassador to Chad. [Laughter.]

All right, sir. I don’t like to—

How’s that sound to you?

I think that would be—

I’m just saying, don’t mention this to your staff, though, [Agnew acknowledges] ‘cause if it ever got out that we did—we’re considering and then we didn’t do it—it’d be a slap.

Yeah.

But I will—let’s look at China, Russia, and the Eastern European countries. That would be a hell of a swing. In the meantime, though, in the next 60 days, work that darn Congress. Tell them to get—

I’ve been working—

I need that Alaska pipeline bill. I need the extra authority, you know, to control these exports and the trade. And we need the trade bill so they can get rid of the three cents a pound on a thing—on meat. And make the Congress the bogeymen. And the non-inflationary farm bill. This is tough. All of our Republicans are for a farm bill; it’s horrible. [Unclear.] And keep fighting the spending on it.

Well, we have—

I know you have. But let’s start making the Congress the bogeyman. Now is the time. They’re being targeted. Now is the time. I’m not ready to do it. But you can. You agree, Al?

Yes, sir. I don’t think we should do it here.

And also, I think that the time is shortly arriving when the Ervin Committee must be destroyed. It’s been partisan. It’s wrong. New start. And—but—and I think that the flat statement should be made, that the hearings to date have destroyed the chance that any individual can get a fair trial. State it flatly. And that’ll make a hell of a story. And also, it may help if they don’t get a fair trial. And I wouldn’t mind that, would you? You want to see John Mitchell in jail?

No, sir. [Unclear.]

Maury Stans, he’s an honest man.

[Unclear.]

But, you see, you’ll be listened to. You were the first man, I will say it, that really got through. [Hugh] Scott [R–Pennsylvania] got through a bit the week before [unclear].[note 37] Hugh Scott was a Republican senator from Pennsylvania, 1959–1977; and Senate Minority Leader, September 1969 to January 1977. Don’t be defensive about the wiretapping and so forth. Or the Plumbers thing. Get up there. I—the biggest hand I got when I spoke to the POWs, when I said it’s high time that we quit making national heroes out of individuals that steal secret documents and print them in newspapers. And that as long as I’m here, we’re going to take the steps necessary to stop this business of taking secret documents out and jeopardizing peace in the world. That’s the line I’d like for you to be able to hit very, very hard. They’re very sensitive about this line. Now, you should know, too, I’m sure you got Scott’s statement on the [unclear]. The highest amount of bugging was done during John Kennedy’s first year.[note 38] John F. Kennedy was president of the United States, 1961–1963. [Agnew attempts to interject.] This is apart from the fact of the number they stole. [Unclear.] Second point. Newsmen were bugged. Civil rights leaders were bugged. [Unclear.] Politicians were bugged. By [Robert F.] Bobby Kennedy.[note 39] Robert F. Kennedy was Attorney General, 1961–1964; and a Democratic senator from New York, 1965–1968. It is this, you could say—you could say that. You could say I’ve seen—that you know that’s the case. Because we’ve got the names. “Will the President put it out?” “No, it’s not fair to put names out.” [Unclear.] But you ought to say it, right out—

It’s safe to say that newsmen were bugged, that politicians were bugged?

That’s right. And civil rights leaders were bugged.

Civil rights leaders?

Right, Al?

During the Kennedy years?

Exactly! Sure they were. And I— [Agnew attempts to interject] you can say, “I can say, on—with absolute assurance, gentlemen—based on the facts, from the files of the FBI, newsmen were bugged.” We can say that, right?

Sure.

And news organizations. You can say newsmen and news organizations—put it that way—were bugged. [Unclear] politicians, can we say that?

Yes, you can.

Sure, politicians. Politicians were bugged. They’ll ask you, what politicians? Senators and congressmen and so forth. Now, I’m not going to be able—

Political figures.

Huh?

Political figures.

Political fig—political leaders, I would put it. Political leaders were bugged. Civil rights leaders were bugged. And they were! We know it. This administration, the only [unclear] we bugged were for the national security. My God.

Let me do this, too. I’d like to have Bryce, when he comes aboard—he won’t be aboard till July the 2nd—sit down and have a good talk with you about these things. Bryce is a smoothy. And Bryce, then, and you, get me a recommendation on the trips and everything else, with Kissinger. Because I want you to be front-and-center. I’ll keep you front-and-center in that damn Congress, kicking them in the ass. And I know you’ll regurgitate, though, and fight some of the liberal Congress—senators, as well as the others. I mean, never, two or three, you know, that I would never [unclear]. [Unclear] [Charles McCurdy “Mac”] Mathias [Jr.] [unclear].[note 40] Charles McCurdy “Mac” Mathias Jr. was a Republican senator from Maryland, January 1969 to January 1987. He’s the—you know, he has the worst record of any senator in the Senate of supporting the President?

I can understand it. Not only that, but he turned like a cannibal on this state chairman, this poor bastard who’s going to be indicted, and said he ought to resign. Here’s a guy that went out and broke his ass for him. Raising money for him, doing his errands—

Yeah.

—running around [unclear]. Knocked the shit right out of him. The man—

I don’t like disloyalty, turncoats.

No honor.

[Pause.] Well, we’ll have a little fun. And we’re going to beat them, you know that.

Well, all I want to assure you is they have nothing they can—

Oh, I know. [Unclear]—you don’t have to assure me.

But believe me, it’s going to get—

What somebody [unclear]—somebody once asked me [unclear]. [Unclear exchange.] Don’t worry about it. Damn it, I know politics. And I know that you haven’t got a [unclear]. My point is, that I must say . . . one time somebody said, well, have you ever asked John Mitchell whether he made the [unclear]? And I said, of course not. He made a public statement. I would ask John Mitchell something, and you know what he’s going to tell me? [Unclear.]

[Unclear.] This is going to get hot, but I can take the heat.

All right, take the heat, man. There isn’t going to be any give at this level, believe me. Not one bit. But, let me say—now, let’s decide, if it’s all right with you, you’ve got Bryce.

I trust Bryce.

I’m giving him just a few assignments. I don’t mean that you’re an assignment. I mean, he’s going to be the political man, basically. He worked with George on the—he’ll handle all things that require exclusives. So you’ll talk to Bryce and work it out. And use [Patrick J.] Buchanan for speeches.[note 41] Patrick J. Buchanan was special assistant to the president for media analysis and speech writing, January 1969 to August 1974. [Laughter.]

That speech that Bryce worked on [unclear].

[Unclear.] OK.

Thank you, Mr. President.