Now, what are you going to do about the Vice President [Spiro T. Agnew]?[note 1] Spiro T. Agnew was vice president of the United States, January 1969 to October 1973.

I talked to [Charles W. “Chuck”] Colson some about that.[note 2] Charles W. “Chuck” Colson was White House special counsel, November 1969 to March 1973. I talked to him going through this whole—he . . . he would do anything he’s told to do—

Yeah. [Unclear.]

—except work for the Vice President.

How about [Peter M.] Flanigan doing it?[note 3] Peter M. Flanigan was consultant to the president on administration staffing, January 1969 to April 1969; assistant to the president, April 1969 to 1973; assistant to the president for international economic affairs, January 1972 to 1974; and executive director of the Council on International Economic Policy, February 1972 to 1974.

We—I did a thing yesterday afternoon—just a matter of curiosity—I walked over and went in the Office of Intergovernmental Relations and walked around. And we still have the same three guys over there running that thing that have been there for the last two years.

Really?

Nils [A.] Boe—

Nils Boe and—

He’s still there?

Yeah.

Still there. And somebody named [Wendell E.] Hulcher and somebody else.[note 4] Wendell E. Hulcher was deputy director of the Office of Intergovernmental Relations, 1969–1971. And so—

I’m sorry, but, you know, I—in personal terms—

But, see—

—you think of a man with a job—I’d like to feel that they’re doing—that for their sakes, they’re doing something. They must know they’re not doing—

Well, they’re sealed off!

They are. See, they’re not—the Office of Intergovernmental Relations has nothing to do with the Vice President’s project for dealing with governors and mayors.

So, I called [unclear]—

[Unclear.]

Sir?

[Unclear.] I tried to build him up—building the Vice President up. I did it with both the sports people and the Young Republicans. I said, “I, as you know, I just hope that all of you—well, I’m sorry the Vice President—” Just to show you, John, he wouldn’t go speak to these—this Young Republican leadership thing. I did it every year as vice president. He wouldn’t go. What’s he thinking about? My God, first, they’re an important group. But second, he should go to any party or ribbon-cutting. [Unclear.]

Exactly.

Right?

Right.

Something’s wrong with this picture. Now, [unclear]. [Ehrlichman attempts to interject.] But anyway, what I said was that I said, “The Vice President’s, you know, he’s very busy. He’s out selling our revenue sharing and he’s”—and I said, “As a matter of fact, he does more in real substance in foreign and domestic policy than any vice president in history.” And I said, “The reason you don’t know it is that the only time he makes news is when he hits the press or hits a golf ball.” [Ehrlichman chuckles.] [Unclear.]

What we’re looking down the throat of here is something that we can’t even discuss beyond any point. We’re looking down the throat of whether or not he is going to be competent enough to stay around. He cannot, in good—and I [unclear]. I really feel that he is strong in some . . . but, you know what I mean—[the phone rings] I’m just really—I—it—look, I wanted . . . I’m . . . Everybody else raises points about Agnew, raises them for reasons that are wrong. I mean, taking on the press is fine, doing his political chores are fine, alliteration’s fine. But goddamn it, [pounding the desk] if he can’t run a staff, he cannot be in this office. [The phone rings again.]

And that’s really what it gets down to. And Bob, it’s a serious problem here!

It is.

He is proving to be—it’s a problem with staff and, let’s face it . . . the staff decision-making and the rest. Whatever the situation, apart from the campaign—campaign-wise, he can be of great assistance or . . . why not, who knows? And if you move, you’ve got to—you have to prepare somebody else so that you don’t get a hell of a runoff from it. But, on the other hand, apart from that, you’ve got to think of the fact that whoever is vice president can be president. And goddamn it, Agnew has got to shape up on some of this. He measures up in many respects, but he doesn’t measure up in respect to the staff, and that’s the biggest part of this damn job: being able to work with people. “I don’t need to work with people.” Is that it? Or is it that he won’t—

No. It’s that he is—

He’s just stubborn.

No, he’s a local politician type when it comes to staffing. He staffs himself, it appears to me, with crony-type people rather than with people who will either challenge him or who are at his or superior level of intellectual and administrative capability. And he’s very buddy-buddy with his staff. He’s very buddy-buddy with the Secret Service agents.

Yeah?

Yeah. He’ll have the agents in for a drink, you know.

Ugh!

They sit around and laugh it up together.

Ugh!

And it’s a funny—

[speaking aside, on the intercom] Miss [Rose Mary] Woods.

—funny combination between that and this sort of arrogance that he also has, versus, like, us or something [unclear]. You know, if I refer to him in a memo as “Agnew” instead of “the Vice President,” [speaking over President Nixon] he sends me half a dozen objections about it.

See, it has to do with, basically, a distorted [phone rings] [unclear]. In other words, he’s concerned about loyalty. You’re his man, and your man, and so forth. [Answers the phone.] Yeah.

We were talking about the Vice President’s thing and I think you’re right. But we’ve got to get another man in there, Bob, and I don’t know—or, either that . . . I don’t know what to do, but we’ve got to get somebody [who] is, you know [unclear] [Bryce N.] Harlow.[note 5] Bryce N. Harlow was special assistant to the president for congressional affairs, 1969–1970; and counselor to the president, 1970–1971 and June 1973–August 1974. Who else was with him in the campaign that could really go—

[William L.] Safire and then Harlow were with him in the campaign.[note 6] William L. Safire was a White House speechwriter.

Well, you can’t spare Safire and you can’t Harlow.

Well, one thing John and I talked about is that we can, I think, and somebody else had raised this, that we can get some substantial help from Harlow in dealing with him. Because he’s got a rapport, and from the outside, Bryce can be very helpful when we’re starting on [unclear]—

Bring Bryce in to see me Monday. And you, and Bryce, and I, and we’ll talk about this problem. And say, “Now, Bryce, will you work it out?” Because really what is involved here is the Vice President’s survival, in my view.

Yeah. It is.

He either is going to start shaping up, or I can’t use him. You understand me there?

Yes, sir.

On the other hand, John and I—

There are serious problems.

And we were going to do it this afternoon, but he’s not available. I think John and I have got to do it—we’ve got to double-team him. But it’s for the two of us to see him without his staff and basically level with him.