Lyndon B. Johnson, Buford Ellington, and Juanita Roberts on 18 March 1965


Transcript

Edited by Kent B. Germany, with Kieran K. Matthews and Marc J. Selverstone

Almost five hours earlier, President Johnson, White House emergency planning director E. Buford Ellington, and Attorney General Nicholas “Nick” Katzenbach had a serious, but seemingly amicable, exchange with Alabama governor George C. Wallace Jr. over the need for the governor to do his duty to maintain law and order, ideally through calling out the Alabama National Guard to protect civil rights marchers. Wallace’s cordial demeanor masked his intention to escalate the antifederal rhetoric and try to blame the White House for the problems in Alabama.[note 1] See Conversation WH6503-09-7094-7095-7096.

Just before this conversation with Ellington, Johnson learned that Wallace had given an inflammatory speech to a joint session of the Alabama legislature, railing against the cost of paying for the protection of the marchers. Wallace called on the White House to take care of the mess that he claimed it had created in the first place. A clearly agitated Johnson believed that he had been “double-crossed” by a man who “ran like a goddamn rabbit!”

The next day, 19 March, Wallace further abdicated his obligation to maintain law and order, invoking his argument that the state of Alabama could not afford the cost of protecting marchers. Johnson complied on 20 March by federalizing the Alabama National Guard and offering the use of military police units.[note 2] “Statement by the President in Response to a Telegram from the Governor of Alabama,” 18 March 1965, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1966), doc. 114; “President’s News Conference at the LBJ Ranch,” 20 March 1965, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1966), doc. 117; “Excerpts from Wallace’s Speech on the Alabama March,” New York Times, 19 March 1965.

Muffled office conversation precedes the call.
President Johnson

[E.] Buford [Ellington]?[note 3] E. Buford Ellington was the Democratic governor of Tennessee from January 1959 to January 1963 and January 1967 to January 1971, and became director of the Office of Emergency Planning in 1965.

Buford Ellington

Yes, sir. I’m sorry I left. I thought you were through.

President Johnson

I thought so, too, but you’re dealing with a very treacherous guy, and you all just must not even come in quoting him anymore.

Ellington

All right.

President Johnson

Because he’s a no-good son of a bitch. [Pause.] And I think you know it. But he announced tonight he would ask Johnson to provide sufficient officers to protect the Negroes. He appeared before the joint session, and he says that the . . . federal government—[reading aloud] “‘They say our courts are too slow,’ [George C.] Wallace [Jr.] said.[note 4] George C. Wallace Jr. was the Democratic, and later American Independent, governor of Alabama from January 1963 to January 1967, January 1971 to January 1979, and January 1983 to January 1987. ‘Therefore, we must now submit to mob rule. It’s a tragedy and a sorrow beyond words, but the federal judge compounds anarchy by ordering the state to protect the Army.’” [Ellington acknowledges.] He said tonight that he would ask Johnson to provide protection for Negroes marching from Selma to Montgomery. “‘I intend to call on the President of the United States to provide sufficient officers to guarantee the safety and the welfare of citizens in and around the route. The federal government has created this matter. They can help protect it,’ Wallace told televised”—

Juanita Roberts

No. No. Can you get that open?

President Johnson

[speaking to Roberts, who mistakenly comes on the line] Juanita, please get off the phone, honey. [to Ellington, continuing to read aloud] He said, “It would take 6,171 law enforcement personnel working eight-hour shifts to possibly guard the marchers.”

Ellington

Well, I’m not going to talk to him anymore now. I’m through with him.

President Johnson

Well, you better tell him you’re not. Tell him you’re not. Tell him you read it on the ticker. And I’ve been [unclear] since 3:30, messing with that son of a bitch, and he is absolutely treacherous.

Ellington

[speaking over President Johnson] I know it, I know it. Well, you know, I told you when you first—[note 5] On 8 March, the day after Bloody Sunday, Ellington had told Johnson that “you can’t trust him” and that “it is an element of danger there in talking with George.” See President Johnson and Buford Ellington, 8 March 1965, Conversation WH6503-03-7031.

President Johnson

[reading] “‘Tonight, I should ask the people of Alabama for restraint. I ask you to stay away from tension. I ask you not to play in [to] their hands. I ask you to stay home. I hope that when this march takes place you will stay there.’ He did not immediately specify whether he had asked Johnson for troops or marshals. Wallace began his speech after a fistfight, the arrest of 90 civil rights advocates, and a countermarch by segregationists, deepening racial tensions in Montgomery.”

Ellington

Well, I told Burke [Marshall] and Lee [C. White] all the way through that I didn’t trust him and everything.[note 6] Burke Marshall was U.S. assistant attorney general for civil rights from 1961 to December 1964. Lee C. White was assistant special counsel to the president from 1961 to 1963; associate counsel to the president from 1963 to 1965; special counsel to the president from 1965 to 1966; and chair of the Federal Power Commission from 1966 to 1969. White was the chief aide on civil rights matters. So I’m just not going to answer any calls to him or talk to him. Not till after—

President Johnson

I’d answer one and just tell him, “Now, listen, George, I offered you—I went over to the President today and told the President that I had talked to you and you wanted help.”

Ellington

Yeah.

President Johnson

“He called you and offered to give it to you.”

Ellington

Right.

President Johnson

“You ran like a goddamn rabbit! Then you ran down to the television and told them that we had created it, therefore, you’re going to ask it. Now, why in the hell didn’t you stand up like a man and say what you were going to do to begin with?”

Ellington

Well, I’ll tell you, if it’s all right with you, I’m not going to answer his call. If he keeps calling me, I’ll wait till in the morning where I can record it, see, because I told him all the time, I [unclear]

President Johnson

Come over here. You can record it anytime.

Ellington

Well, I can record it from here. That’s where I been doing it, from my apartment.

President Johnson

That’s [unclear].

Ellington

Just went through the, you know . . .

President Johnson

White House.

Ellington

Yeah.

President Johnson

I would do it. I would do it. And I’d talk to him—

Ellington

What I mean, now, he’ll start calling me in a few minutes, and I’m just not going to answer him until the morning—

President Johnson

No. I don’t think—I don’t think—I think you ought to. I think you ought to answer him tonight and just say, “Now, let me tell you, George, I just want this for the record.”

Ellington

Good.

President Johnson

“You called me up, asked for help. I offered to give it to you. You ran like a rabbit.”

Ellington

That’s right. That’s right.

President Johnson

“Now, then, you went publicly and you said this. Now, I want to know whether you mean it or whether you don’t, and if you do you, why, you come out there and put it on the record because I’ve got the record, and I won’t—I’m not going to be double-crossed this way.”

Ellington

I will do.

President Johnson

I’m going to issue a statement here that kind of burns his tail, and I’ll ask them to call you and give it to you.

Ellington

OK.

President Johnson

[softly] Fine.

Ellington

Good.

White House Operator

Waiting. Waiting.

Cite as

“Lyndon B. Johnson, Buford Ellington, and Juanita Roberts on 18 March 1965,” Conversation WH6503-10-7124, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [Lyndon B. Johnson and Civil Rights, vol. 2, ed. Kent B. Germany] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL: http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4005109