Hello?

Good morning, Mr. President.

Hi, Jack.

We need guidance this morning, sir, on how much weight to give press reports from Seoul. A Seoul, South Korean newspaper, sir—

Guidance? Is that all you want?

Yes, sir.

No quotation?

That’s right.

No attribution? No connection?

That’s right.

Give it absolutely none.

Absolutely none.

Your press is lying like drunken sailors every day. First thing I waked up this morning, was trying to figure out after seeing CBS, the two Kalbs [Bernard Kalb and Marvin L. Kalb], watching the networks, reading the morning papers, was how can we win—possibly win—and survive as a nation and have to fight the press’s lies.[note 1] Bernard Kalb was an international affairs reporter for CBS, NBC, and the New York Times. Marvin L. Kalb was a television news journalist and chief diplomatic correspondent for CBS and NBC. I watched both Kalbs on CBS. Both of them were totally inaccurate. I watched the Kalb out at Korea. It just hasn’t happened—not one goddamn thing to it. The—I assume that what you’re talking about is the agreement on prisoners. There is no agreement. [Horner acknowledges.] All it does, it looks like that we are leaking, which would [unclear]—infuriate a man. It’s just exactly like my asking you if I could marry your wife. Now, you know about how much you have decided I could do that as of now. [Horner chuckles.] You’ve made no decision whatever. You have heard of it, because I mentioned it. Now, that’s about all that’s happened in these conferences. [Horner acknowledges.] We have told them very strongly how we feel about this thing. They have not given us any response that can go beyond my press conference statement the other day. The other is just pure invented out of the big, free air.

Mm-hmm. Well, that is very helpful, because I understand the [Washington] Post in its final edition put a banner headline on a story that they’d agreed in principle.[note 2] Neither of the Washington Post‘s two front-page stories said anything about an agreement in principle. Richard Hailoran, “Seoul to Ask for Role at Panmunjom,” and Warren Unna, “Pueblo Was Not Intruding on Day of Capture, U.S. Says,” both in the Washington Post, 6 February 1968.

They have not agreed at all. [Horner acknowledges throughout.] Now, they might do it any moment. And what you’ve got is, you all have charged credibility so much that everybody here thinks that in order to keep from being assassinated by the [Joseph R.] McCarthys of the press, he’s got to admit a little error.[note 3] Joseph R. McCarthy was a U.S. senator [R–Wisconsin] from January 1947 to May 1957. That’s the cheapest insurance he can take.

Yes, sir.

[Robert S. “Bob”] McNamara does it yesterday.[note 4] Robert S. “Bob” McNamara was president of Ford Motor Company from November 1960 to January 1961; U.S. secretary of defense from January 1961 to February 1968; and president of the World Bank from April 1968 to July 1981. Others do it. [William P.] Bill Bundy did it this morning.[note 5] William P. “Bill” Bundy was an intelligence analyst; U.S. deputy assistant secretary for international security affairs from 1961 to 1963; U.S. assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs from 1963 to 1964; U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs from 1964 to 1969; and editor of Foreign Affairs from 1972 to 1984. All of them want to side in a little bit enough with the enemy or with the critic or with the prober to buy himself just a little insurance, [Horner acknowledges throughout] and it’s a damn disgrace to the country, and I don’t know whether we’re going to survive if we keep on doing that. I don’t know. It’s just the most difficult thing I have ever dealt with.

Now, we have had two or three meetings there, but we are not off of dead center at all. That’s like Drew Pearson this morning says about [William C.] Westmoreland.[note 6] Drew Pearson was an investigative reporter and longtime syndicated columnist who wrote the “Washington Merry-Go-Round” column. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, often referred to as “Westy,” was commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from 1964 to 1968, and chief of staff of the U.S. Army from 1968 to 1972. They’re—to say that Westmoreland was considering being replaced and fired would be just as sensible as my saying I went to Crosby [S.] Noyes and said I’d like to get Jack Horner removed, or he’s been here a long time, or he oughtn’t to be here, or something else.[note 7] Crosby S. Noyes was a foreign affairs correspondent for and editor of the Washington Star from 1947 to 1974. That’s just as untrue as it could be. There’s nobody works for me that’s been more satisfactory all the time, 100 percent of the time, than Westmoreland and his wife and his children and his family. I’ve never mentioned him in my life to [L. Mendel] Rivers [D–South Carolina] or [J. Strom] Thurmond [R–South Carolina].[note 8] L. Mendel Rivers was a U.S. representative [D–South Carolina] from January 1941 to December 1970. J. Strom Thurmond was a U.S. senator [D–South Carolina] from December 1954 to April 1956 and November 1956 to September 1964, and [R–South Carolina] from September 1964 to January 2003. Westmoreland was a South Carolina native, the state represented by Rivers and Thurmond. I’ve never discussed the subject with either one of them. I want him to stay there just as long as he can, just like [Dean] Rusk.[note 9] Dean Rusk was U.S. secretary of state from January 1961 to January 1969.

Yes.

Unless I promote him to something else. I’d be glad to see Rusk president. And I might make Westmoreland, someday, chairman of the Joint Chiefs or Chief of Staff of the Army. All of them’s term[s] come up, these—[Earle G. “Bus”] Wheeler’s comes up in four years, and [Harold K. “Johnny”] Johnson comes up at four years, and all that’s June 30th.[note 10] Gen. Earle G. “Bus” Wheeler was chief of staff of the U.S. Army from October 1962 to July 1964, and chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1964 to July 1970. Harold K. “Johnny” Johnson was chief of staff of the U.S. Army from 1964 to 1968. So that could be. So they scare you by saying you’re getting ready to fire him, either to make you keep him there or to keep—make you bring him in here, and then they’ll say you’re incredible.

Mm-hmm.

And it’s just a hell of a thing. Now, the truth of the business is, he has done an expert job. Anybody that can lose 400 and get 20,000 is pretty damn good.[note 11] President Johnson is referring to rough estimates of casualties resulting from the Tet Offensive.

Yes, sir.

And I don’t admit that this is a Communist victory, and I don’t think anybody but a goddamn Communist admits it. [Horner acknowledges throughout.] That’s what I think. And I just think they’re using us, just playing games around us. And nearly everybody I talk to tries to find out what’s wrong with our boys, our country, our leadership, our men. Our president’s a liar; Westmoreland’s no good; anybody that differs with them. When McNamara leaves, why, he becomes a hero! He was the goddamnedest screwball you ever saw as long as he’s in there.

[chuckling] Yeah.

And that’s just what’s wrong. So you can just be sure from me that I’ve read every dime’s worth of report that’s come in here. There’s not one thing to it. We are talking. [Horner acknowledges.] We are telling them [North Korea] that they ought to release these people, and then we’ll go into any collateral matter they want to go into. But they have not agreed to one damn dime thing or have we agreed to anything.

Yes, sir.

And this South Korean doesn’t know what he’s doing. And, furthermore, Park [Chung-hee]—well, just to give you an illustration, and this is very much off the record, but purely for your guidance—I wrote Park a letter, and I said to him, “I deeply resent these goddamn Communists trying to assassinate you and trying to assassinate the American ambassador and his family.”[note 12] Park Chung-hee was president of South Korea from December 1963 to October 1979.

Yes, sir.

“And I just want you to know we’re trying to get our men back, and we are also going to put—we’ve already answered them, as far as you’re concerned. We’re putting the planes there to defend you, so we’re not going to throw it around and put it in the newspaper and raise hell, because they’ll say I’m bellicose and impetuous and overreacting, and all that stuff. [Horner acknowledges.] But we want you to know it.”

They said that the tears came to his eyes. They’d never seen a man so emotionally grateful and just thought that Johnson stayed with [Harold E.] Holt and Johnson stays with his man.[note 13] Harold E. Holt was prime minister of Australia from January 1966 until his presumed death from drowing in December 1967.

Then I read this son of a bitch Kalb that ought to be shot. I wish [Russell B.] Long [D–Louisiana] would just take a pistol and work on him.[note 14] Russell B. Long was a U.S. senator [D–Louisiana] from December 1948 to January 1987, and the son of former Louisiana governor and senator Huey P. Long. He ought to. He gets out here and says the South Koreans, by God, are recalling their troops, and they’re doing this and they’re doing that. Now, that’s the Communist purpose. They want to divide us from our allies. They want to divert us from the Khe Sanh attack. Now, we’re not going to be either.

Yes, sir.

But to this little son of a bitch that never got in four miles of a front in his life is out here on CBS saying things. Now, how can I correct him? I just—I hate the president to be denying something like that, but it’s just outrageous. Now, to say that the South Koreans are disturbed about the assassination of their president, that’s all right! [Horner acknowledges.] And to say that they’re mad at the North Koreans, that’s all right! But to come along and say they’re pulling their troops out on account of Johnson—now, there’s no question but what there are going to be great efforts to make them do it! And it could be that Park would do it! But I sure as hell don’t think so. Just like it could be that I’d pull out, but I sure don’t think so. And could be I’d pull out of Germany with [Michael J. “Mike”] Mansfield [D–Montana] raising hell.[note 15] Michael J. “Mike” Mansfield was a U.S. senator [D–Montana] from January 1953 to January 1977, and Senate Majority Leader from January 1961 to January 1977. And I don’t want to say I’m incredible if I did, but I just sure don’t think I’m going to. And it’s not at that stage now, and all they do is just help the enemy, because every Communist in this town—[Anatoly] Dobrynin is just sitting here collecting this stuff and calling in [J. William] Bill Fulbright [D–Arkansas] and calling in [Joseph S.] Joe Clark [D–Pennsylvania] and calling in [Robert F.] Bobby Kennedy [D–New York] and just spreading it every day.[note 16] Anatoly Dobrynin was Soviet ambassador to the United States from January 1962 to May 1986. J. William “Bill” Fulbright was a U.S. senator [D–Arkansas] from January 1945 to December 1974, and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from January 1959 to December 1974. Joseph S. “Joe” Clark Jr. was the Democratic mayor of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, from January 1952 to January 1956, and a U.S. senator [D–Pennsylvania] from January 1957 to January 1969. Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy was U.S. attorney general from January 1961 to September 1964, and a U.S. senator [D–New York] from January 1965 until his assassination in June 1968. I saw an old bitch on television yesterday that the Soviet Embassy’s been giving money to, and we’re just sitting here like damn dumbbells. And if I get out and say something about it, I’m a McCarthy.

Mm-hmm.

And if I don’t say something about it, my country is in a hell of a shape. So that’s the picture.

Now, there are three things you can be sure of: One, we are pursuing not only the 83 boys, but we deeply resent their trying to kill our ambassador and trying to kill Park. Now, they are the criminals; they are the outlaws; they are the ones that ought to be tried, although I haven’t heard of—haven’t seen one bad editorial on the president or prime minister of North Korea. They’re all defending—making us defend ourselves, and we’re trying to protect them. We’re their agent. It’s just like a quarterback on a football team playing for your side, and you getting out and whipping hell out of him with a rope. I’m trying to protect my country, and they’re all whipping me. Not a son of a bitch said a word about Hồ Chí Minh.[note 17] Hồ Chí Minh was president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from September 1945 until his death in September 1969.

Mm-hmm.

Not a—he hasn’t been elected to nothing. He’s a dictator if there ever was one. Nobody ever elected him like I went—was elected, by a convention and by the people. But he hasn’t—you haven’t ever heard an ugly speech by him—not even Strom Thurmond said anything against Hồ Chí Minh. Nothing—nobody said anything about North Korea. They talk about us bombing, yet these sons of bitches come in and bomb our embassy and 19 of them tried a raid on it—all 19 get killed—and yet they blame the embassy! [President Johnson chuckles and Horner joins in.] I don’t understand it.

Neither—

So I just want to make it emphatic enough that I’ll make an impression on at least one, honorable, fair man, whose copy will stand up 50 years, and they won’t be looking at him and say, “Why were you a[n] agent?” This Panmunjom conference has not proceeded to the point where anybody in this government can say it is, as of now, at all successful. That’s number one. Now, that is the honest truth.

Yes, sir.

And we—I don’t know when we’re going to meet. The last time we met was night before last. At that night-before-last meeting, they met and exchanged views, but came to no resolution of any kind. They didn’t imply that they’d do anything, and we didn’t imply they’d do anything. We’re just hoping. We’re putting pressure every place we can. The Soviets don’t want a confrontation out there. We don’t want one. We had to get over this rash statements about, you know, Rivers saying let’s blow up a city, and others saying these other things. But now we’ve got Korea in it, and the South Koreans say, “Well, if we can keep the heat on a little more, and we can have the cooperation of Marvin Kalb and CBS network, and we can make the world think that South Korea is going to pull out these troops,” and maybe South Korea will pull them out. So why do we give them back quick?

Sure.

They just play into their hands. [Horner acknowledges.] So that’s the prisoner thing. On the South Vietnamese thing, we think we’ve killed 20,000; we think we’ve lost 400. We think that, of course, it’s bad to lose anybody—any one of the 400—but we think that the Good Lord has been so good to us that it is a major, dramatic victory. And I think, what would have happened if I’d have lost 20,000 and they’d lost 400? I ask you that.

Oh, [chuckling] it would have been terrible.

Well, you just don’t—they try to approach it differently, though, you see.

Yes, sir. [Voices are audible in the background.] Like the Post story on Secretary McNamara’s remarks yesterday just seemed to me to go—put too much emphasis on the negative.[note 18] The Washington Post‘s front-page banner headline on 5 February 1968 read, “U.S. Concedes Pueblo Might Have Intruded.” Warren Unna, “McNamara, Rusk Modify Positions,” Washington Post, 5 February 1968.

It certainly does. Now, what McNamara was saying on his—we don’t—ain’t no human being, Jack—I don’t know whether you ever robbed a bank or not. I can’t say positively you never did. I can say that you haven’t robbed any with me, when you were on the pool [slight chuckle] traveling with me. Now, we can say this boy had orders not to go in those waters or not to get close to them, and we believe he carried them out, or he’d be court-martialed if he didn’t.

Yes.

We know that when he was captured—when they said he was in them—that he wasn’t, because of his fix. And we know that we read their communication—we were busting it—and we know that they identified him as being a mile further out than we did. We said 15; they said 16. Now, we know that, but to say that the boy didn’t violate him when he was nine years old or didn’t masturbate or something else, we can’t say it. But if I’d have been McNamara and testifying, I’d say I can’t speculate on a poor man that’s behind prison bars on what he might have done, except to announce in the strongest terms I can that I do not believe he would do it. It would be absolutely violation of his orders. It would subject him to a court martial. He knew how to avoid it. We have no evidence he ever did. There’s not anything in all of his career that would indicate it. I don’t believe he did now, and I know damn well he didn’t when he was caught, and that’s that, and I’m not going to speculate.

Yes, sir.

But he and Rusk—he said that, and then Rusk kind of went along enough. And my guess is they were doing it in the hope that they could get the men released and prove that they didn’t!

Yes, sir.

You see?

Yes, sir.

But the Times lede—the New York Times lede, which I have, too, is that “the United States is unable to rule out the possibility that the ship entered North Korean waters at some point before she was captured, two senior officials said.”[note 19] “Ship’s Course Uncertain,” New York Times, 5 February 1968.

Yes, sir.

“The U.S. is uncertain.” Well, now, I’m not a goddamn bit uncertain. I’m as positive as I know that they arrested me and hauled me into jail while I was sitting, talking to my wife and daughters for doing nothing.

Yes, sir.

Now, it could have been when I was 18 years old, I did something. But I don’t think we ought to be speculating on that and implying that and indicating we’re uncertain.

Sure.

Because that puts the boy behind the water, and they go to him then, and say, “Well, hell, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense thinks you might have.” Now, how would you feel? How’s his wife feel? How do the other 83 men feel?

I certainly agree, and I certainly thank you from the bottom of my heart for taking this call. I—

Jack, I always take a call from you on anything. Ain’t nobody I respect more and that I believe to be more honorable and fair and call them as you see them. When they’re for me, all right. If they’re against me, you do the same, but you’re honest and everybody knows that. And you call me anytime day or night you want to and you’ll get received.

Well, thank you very much, Mr. President.

And I wouldn’t trade that kind of reputation for all the goddamned bylines and headlines [Horner chuckles softly] and sensational stories in the country.

Well, thank you immensely.

Bye.

Bye.