Mr. Rowe?

Yes?

There you are.

Jim?

Yes, Mr. President.

I don’t want anybody to know that I’ve called you if I can avoid it, [Rowe acknowledges] because it just leads to a lot of complications.

I think only your Secret Service people know.[note 2] At the time of the conversation, Rowe was at a Humphrey campaign rally in Peoria, Illinois, when a Secret Service agent told him the President was on the line. Carl Solberg, Hubert Humphrey: A Biography (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984), 397, 524–25, n397. In some ways, the book’s account of this conversation is the opposite of the tape’s content. For example, Solberg quotes the President as saying, “I want you to tell Hubert we’ve got a problem. I’m not going to work out this Vietnam peace negotiation early enough to help him,” but on tape one can hear LBJ tell Rowe not to mention anything about the conversation to Humphrey at all, and at no point on this recording or any other did Johnson claim to be arranging peace talks to help the Vice President.

All right, just—you just speak on your own now, and not quoting me, or implying, or otherwise.

Yeah.

You just keep the candidate from mentioning Vietnam until Tuesday night.

Yeah. He isn’t talking about it anyway.

Yes, sir. [Rowe acknowledges.] Yes, sir. This is the most explosive thing you’ve ever touched in your life. And . . . well, I can’t go . . . his statement that he would stop bombing Vietnam, period—North Vietnam, period, no comma, no semicolon.[note 3] On the campaign trail Humphrey had called for a bombing halt “period, not comma or semicolon,” but said that as President he would look for evidence “by word or deed” that Hanoi would restore the demilitarized zone. John W. Finney, “Humphrey Taunts Nixon as ‘Chicken,’” New York Times, 16 October 1968.

Mm-hmm.

It took us two weeks to get around that one.

Yeah.

Then [McGeorge] Mac Bundy’s [speech].[note 4] McGeorge “Mac” Bundy was dean of the faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University from 1953 to 1961, and special assistant to the president for National Security Affairs from 1961 to 1966. Bundy, who had been national security adviser when Johnson first deployed U.S. combat troops to Vietnam in 1965, had made a speech at DePauw University on 12 October 1968, calling for the steady and systematic withdrawal of U.S. forces even in the absence of a truce. The speech broke Bundy’s long silence on the war, dating back to his departure from the White House in February 1966. Homer Bigart, “Bundy Proposes Troop Reduction and Bombing Halt; Former White House Aide Alters Stand on Vietnam Policy He Helped Make; Defends ‘65 Decisions; But He Says ‘Burden’ Must Be Lifted ‘From Our Lives’ Beginning Next Year,” New York Times, 13 October 1968.

Mm-hmm.

Then he said, you know, he said he wouldn’t—he’d veto [Nguyễn Văn] Thiệu, so that got Thiệu mad.[note 5] “I believe there is very little bombing [of the North], if any, done by the South Vietnamese, and this matter must be something over which the government of Vietnam—South Vietnam—cannot exercise a veto,” Humphrey said on the CBS News program Face the Nation. South Vietnamese president Nguyễn Văn Thiệu responded that he was cooperating. Harry Kelly, “HHH Bars Thiệu Veto on Bombs,” Washington Post, 21 October 1968; Gene Roberts, “Thiệu Declares He Is Assisting in Peace Efforts,” New York Times, 23 October 1968. Now, [Richard M. “Dick”] Nixon picked up that ball right quick and started going into him through your China Lobby friend.[note 6] Richard M. “Dick” Nixon was a U.S. representative [R–California] from January 1947 to December 1950; a U.S. senator [R–California] from January 1951 to January 1953; vice president of the United States from January 1953 to January 1961; Republican nominee for president in 1960; Republican candidate for governor of California in 1962; and president of the United States from January 1969 until his resignation on 9 August 1974. Johnson is referring to Anna C. Chennault, a prominent Republican fundraiser and figure in the “China Lobby,” a loose collection of Chinese nationalists, American conservative political figures, and activists who blamed the Communist revolution in China on the Truman administration.

Mm-hmm.

So he’s in deep, telling Thiệu and them, and Korea, and all of them, not to go along with me on anything.

Yeah.

Because [Hubert H.] Humphrey [Jr.] said here that he won’t pay a damn bit of attention to him.[note 7] Hubert H. Humphrey Jr. was the Democratic mayor of Minneapolis, Minnesota, from July 1945 to November 1948; a U.S. senator [DFL–Minnesota] from January 1949 to December 1964 and January 1971 to January 1978; Senate Majority Whip from January 1961 to December 1964; vice president of the United States from January 1965 to January 1969; and the Democratic U.S. presidential candidate in 1968.

Mm-hmm.

And so what they better do is wait for him, and he’ll never sell them out, that he’ll stay with them. Hell, he didn’t think they ought to ever [have] sold out China.

Yeah.

And they got your little friend, Mrs. [Anna C.] Chennault, and the whole outfit in it.[note 8] Beijing-born Anna C. Chennault was a prominent Republican fundraiser and member of the China Lobby.

Working at it?

Yes, working at it. [Rowe acknowledges.] So as a result, we had them signed up when Hubert made his last statement about the veto and not . . . going to stop bombing, no comma, no semicolon, just period. That is, without any condition.

Yeah.

So we worked on it two weeks, and we got them back on the ship, again. And, in the meantime, Nixon got them off. So I had to proceed unilaterally last night, which I didn’t want to do because it could be shambles if the President, Thiệu, tonight says he’s pulling his army out, you see. [Rowe acknowledges.] Then we’ve just got to come home and it’s all over. And it’s just so delicate.

Now, all the reporters are saying that Humphrey is being very jubilant and very enthusiastic, and that all the aides are saying that this is the difference in the election. Now, if you do—

No, I—

—you’re going to get a political issue out of it [Rowe acknowledges] , and you’re going to have these folks—they’re getting them answering. You got [Bourke B.] Hickenlooper [R–Iowa], and [John G.] Tower [R–Texas], and all the Republicans.[note 9] Bourke B. Hickenlooper was a U.S. senator [R–Iowa] from January 1945 to January 1969; ranking Republican on Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1963 to 1969; and chair of the Republic Policy Committee from January 1962 to January 1969. John G. Tower was a U.S. senator [R–Texas] from June 1961 to January 1985. Prominent Republicans had attacked the bombing halt, claiming President Johnson had called it to help Vice President Humphrey win the election. “I think it’s tragic that American lives are being played with this way,” said Sen. Hickenlooper, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. “If it can be done now, it could have been done sooner.” In fact, North Vietnam had rejected Johnson’s three conditions for a bombing halt until October, when Hanoi reversed position and accepted all three. Sen. Tower also called the bombing halt “unilateral” and “unconditional.” It was neither. In return for the bombing halt, the President insisted that North Vietnam (1) respect the demilitarized zone dividing Vietnam, (2) accept representatives of the South Vietnamese government at the negotiating table in Paris, and (3) stop shelling civilian populations in South Vietnamese cities. And what I would say is just please bar him from mentioning Vietnam.

I’ll get that done.

If I had to have one statement [Rowe acknowledges] , I’d say, “Like President—like Nixon, and [George C.] Wallace [Jr.], and every other American, I pray for peace every night, period.”[note 10] George C. Wallace Jr. was governor of Alabama from January 1963 to January 1967, January 1971 to January 1979, and January 1983 to January 1987; and a third-party candidate in the 1968 U.S. presidential election. Wallace was a third-party candidate in the 1968 presidential election. That’s all I’d say. [Snorts.]

Yeah.

I’ll do the rest of it if they’ll just—just won’t be enthusiastic, and jubilant, and so forth [Rowe acknowledges] , because if we had to order them back to bombing tomorrow—

Now, we’re in the soup. That’s right.

So I just wanted you to know the facts. [Rowe attempts to interject.] Now, you have to act on your judgment.

Yeah, I’ll get it done. Let me make this one point [President Johnson attempts to interject] on the staff people—

[Dean] Rusk is just scared to death.[note 11] Dean Rusk was U.S. secretary of state from January 1961 to January 1969. [Rowe acknowledges throughout.] He wrote me a memo in longhand, which I read to Hubert, and said, “Tell him not to open his damn mouth.”

Yeah. We’ve got about 150 press, and every one of them are on everybody’s backs. We had—the one thing we did was have a staff meeting and say that, “Play this thing down. You don’t know anything.” They’re only asking us one question. It’s: “What’s the political effect?" We say, “We just don’t know.” [President Johnson acknowledges.] And, hell, when they press too hard, I said, “I haven’t heard anybody make a comment about it except Arthur [M.] Schlesinger [Jr.].”[note 12] Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. was a Democratic Party campaign speechwriter; special assistant to the president from 1961 to 1964; and the Pulitzer Prize–winning author of A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. [Chuckles.] Did you see him on the Today Show?

No, no.

Huh?

No.

Well, he was on this morning, and the first question was, “Are there any politics in this?” In his usual way, he said, “While I’ve had many differences with President Johnson, this is obviously not political.” [President Johnson acknowledges throughout.] And I thought it’s the only comment I’ve heard on the politics of this. And we don’t know. We—And the local politicians are all [unclear].[note 13] Rowe may have said “in” or “hit.” The one thing we can’t control when they hit the local pols, ‘cause they’re saying they think it’s helpful that they don’t, but even they are saying they don’t know how much. Our people are not saying anything except we don’t know and sticking to that pretty damn closely.

Well, I—

Maybe some of them are breaking it, but I don’t think so, and I’ll go around and lecture them again.

I just—it’s for your good. It’s not—another thing, I’m not going to get any votes Tuesday, but I just know, and Rusk knows, and [Clark M.] Clifford knows.[note 14] Clark M. Clifford was a Washington lawyer; an adviser to presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson; a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1961 to 1968; chair of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from April 1963 to February 1968; and U.S. secretary of defense from March 1968 to January 1969. And we have two real explosive things. One, we—if Hanoi . . . invades the DMZ or hits the cities, we’re going back in a minute. Just—they trigger the motion. [Rowe acknowledges throughout.] [Creighton W.] Abrams’s got his orders.[note 15] Gen. Creighton W. Abrams was assistant deputy chief of staff and director of operations at the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations from 1962 to 1963; deputy commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from May 1967 to June 1968; and commander of MACV from June 1968 to June 1972. So that could leave you pretty dry if you’re very jubilant about this move.

Yeah.

The second thing is, we do not know where our allies are. Because as a result of the statement two weeks ago, we’ve lost Thiệu.

Yeah.

Because he thinks that we’ll sell him out.

Mm-hmm.

And Nixon has convinced him. This damn little old woman, Mrs. Chennault, she’s been in on it.

Mm-hmm.

And I—

I wouldn’t doubt it.

Well, I know it. Hell, I know it. [Rowe acknowledges.] I’m not [chuckling] doubting it. I—

[Unclear] get [Thomas G.] Tommy [Corcoran] to pull her out?[note 16] Thomas G. “Tommy the Cork” Corcoran was a legal and political adviser to Franklin D. Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson.

I don’t know. I don’t care, now. [Rowe acknowledges.] I’ve already done it.

Yeah.

I took the action at eight o’clock last night [Rowe acknowledges] , and they pulled the planes out. Now, we have to wait and see what they do.

Yeah.

If they—we can tell in the next 48 hours if they don’t do anything, the people—it’ll be very evident [Rowe acknowledges] that we had a deal that worked.

Yeah.

If they do do it, why, then we’re in trouble.

Mm-hmm. [Snorts.]

But I just got a letter here from Clifford. He’s relieved. He said, “Mr. President, there have been times without number in the past five years when I’ve admired you for fortitude and determination and very unique effectiveness. As of this moment tonight, however, I feel it more deeply than ever before. Your performance on the Vietnam cessation has been magnificent. It was handled with courage, with rare discretion, and the most admirable statesmanship. I was aware of the myriad difficulties that confronted you, and I drew comfort and inspiration from the masterful manner in which you met and you overcame all of them.”

Mm-hmm.

“I have a profound sense of pride in your performance and in your success.” Now—

We’re hearing this—for what it’s worth again—you’re hearing this kind of comment on the street. It ought to please you. They say, “This guy’s been tough. We think he must be getting us a good, tough deal.” You know, they’re saying, “By God, he’s been holding in there.”

If we get it—

This is the man on the street talking.

If we get it, we got three things. They said they would never sit with these puppets. [Rowe acknowledges.] Now, they have said they would. That’s number one. Number two, we’ve told them that there’s no use in coming into the room if they either bomb the cities or abuse the DMZ.

Mm-hmm.

Now, if they don’t do either, we’ve got those two.

Yeah.

If they do do them, we’re right back where we started.

Mm-hmm.

Now, we’re gambling on the latter. We don’t know. The Russians tell us they’ll be all right. We’ve told them 12 times, but I just have a hell of a problem between two candidates and [W.] Averell [Harriman].[note 17] W. Averell Harriman was U.S. assistant secretary of state for far eastern and Pacific affairs from 1961 to 1963; U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs from 1963 to 1965; and ambassador-at-large and chief U.S. delegate to the Paris Peace Talks under President Lyndon B. Johnson. Averell cusses the generals every day [Rowe acknowledges] and, of course, they—everything, they pick it up and their ambassador wires their President and said, “Harriman said today that you’re a bunch of puppet generals.” So, of course, if you were President and you had a million men out there, and you were losing twice as many as the United States, how would you feel about that?

Yeah, mm-hmm.

Then the next day, here comes a flash: Humphrey says you’ll never veto anything he does.

Mm-hmm.

So Nixon just picked that one up and went out the same night, and said, “By God, I won’t veto you. We’ll work closely together.” So then this guy quit me and went to Nixon.

Mm-hmm.

Now, [Ellsworth F.] Bunker’s worked all night for the last two nights trying to clean this thing up.[note 18] Ellsworth F. Bunker was U.S. ambassador to Argentina from March 1951 to March 1952; U.S. ambassador to Italy from May 1952 to April 1953; U.S. ambassador to India from November 1956 to March 1961; U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States from 1964 to 1965; U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam from April 1967 to May 1973; and recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1963 and 1967.

Mm-hmm.

And so . . . I told Hubert last night, in the longhand note that Rusk has written—which I’ll show you some day in my memoirs and let you have a little copy of it—Rusk said, “Tell Hubert please not to brag. Please not to be exuberant. Just say, ‘I pray for peace, period.’”

Yeah.

“And let the others—they’ll know what it does if they just—if we don’t jump up and down about it.” [Rowe acknowledges.] So you watch that.

I will. I think his line has been pretty much, “This is the President that’s handling this,” and so forth. [President Johnson acknowledges.] The only time he showed any jubilation was a little on the—after we were on the plane, I’m afraid a couple of pool reporters saw him in the back.

Yeah, they described him as going up and down the plane being jubilant—exuberant [Rowe acknowledges] and, of course, that just puts the John Towers—let me show you what they’re saying about it, you see.

Yeah.

It’s just—it’s a good excuse for them. [Pause.]

Yeah, that was the only mistake—publicly he didn’t make any, but he did—the pool fellows saw him doing it.

Here’s [Curtis E.] LeMay, he’s talking about the politics of it . . . General [Lewis W.] Walt, he’s put his mouth in it.[note 19] Curtis E. LeMay was a general in the U.S. Air Force; Air Force chief of staff from June 1961 to January 1965; and a candidate for vice president as the running mate of independent candidate George C. Wallace Jr. in 1968. Lt. Gen. Lewis W. Walt was director of the Marine Corps Landing Force Development Center at Quantico from September 1962 to May 1965; commanding general of III Marine Amphibious Force and senior adviser to I Corps in Vietnam from June 1965 to June 1967; and assistant commandant of the Marine Corps from January 1968 to February 1971. [Pause. A recorded voice is audible in the background. President Johnson begins reading aloud.] “One of Nixon’s key advisers and a military expert called for further explanation from Johnson. Tower said, ‘Johnson’s announcement of unconditional cessation raised several questions.’ He is a member of the Armed Services Committee. Richard Nixon has consistently supported the President’s efforts in Paris that would lead to this resolution. But he added, ‘The bombing announcement raised questions concerning what the United States received. Very recently, Abrams said that unconditional cessation would permit the enemy to increase his capability. I believe it’s incumbent on the President to assure America immediately that circumstances changed, that General Abrams’ contention is no longer valid. I think some explanation should be given for the timing of the announcement. It’s understood everyone hopes the bombing halt will lead to peace. Let us be hopeful there will be some reciprocal gesture. It should be adequately understood by the American people that this unilateral action on the part of America to refrain from bombing does not end it,’” and so forth.

[Pause.] Yeah, the only real problem we got, which we can’t handle is, the reporters come off these planes, they come into the rallies, and they don’t pay a bit of attention to Humphrey. They just start looking for local politicians they know. They don’t talk to staff people, because we’re all telling them the same thing, and they realize this is a line now.

You know better than I do. All I know are the facts on two things: I want you to know the Asian allies may dump us any minute.

Yeah.

If we do, we’ve got pandemonium. [Rowe acknowledges throughout.] The second thing, that Hanoi might not go through with it, that’s the second thing. The third thing, I think that he could very properly say, and y’all could say, “All three candidates said the same thing to the President: ‘We’ll back you.’ This is not any politics. This—all of them said, ‘We will back you up.’” And that’s all there is to say about it.

Yeah. He’s been careful [unclear] yesterday, there was a, you know, after the call, [President Johnson acknowledges throughout] which you had already said—I mean, you hadn’t, but you did say later—is that we had a conference call. We’d had one on October 16th. The President informed us. He informed us again.

That was good. [Blows his nose.]

And that—yeah.

That was good.

And then they started pushing. He said, “Well, that’s all.” He said, “That’s all we know, is what he told the three candidates.”

Well, what he ought to do now is you just—

He’s done everything quite well, except that one thing [President Johnson attempts to interject] you’ve got there is he just, you know, he did—he happened to make a good speech and a good crowd, and this thing, too, and he just sort of got a little jubilant about it.

You just tell him on your own to just don’t mention Vietnam, and when he does, just use two things. Say, “All of us said they back the President as every American ought to, [Rowe acknowledges] because if you got them all backing, that helps him.”

That’s right.

“That we all—all candidates told him, each one of them—Wallace, Nixon, Humphrey—we back you up on this.”

Yeah.

That’s number one. “All the Joint Chiefs backed us up.”

You mean to say that he ought to say that publicly?

Yes, he could. I don’t know how public. I don’t think I’d put it in a speech, but I’d tell everybody [Rowe acknowledges] that asked me.

Yeah.

And then I wouldn’t go any further, because I’d say, “I don’t want to comment any further.”

Yeah.

And if I were you and the strategists around him, say, “I don’t know what effect it has. I think that that effect’s when Johnson withdrew in March.” [Rowe acknowledges.] I just think that—because they’re already going to try to see if history says we threw an election. [Snorts.]

That’s right.

OK.

Well, now, let me give you this one other thing the press is saying that—you can put it with your press back there. There’s some kind of a rumor you’re going to Texas on the 3rd, and they’re saying, “Is he going to do it?" I said, “I don’t know if he’s going to do it.” And they say, “Well, now, is he up on the mountain as President or is that old campaign spirit of his coming out?" “Well,” I said, “I think he can do both, you know.”

Well, I’m going home, [Rowe acknowledges throughout] this afternoon, in the next hour. And I’m going to make a television speech Sunday night that I worked on for a week here, and that’s going to be my finale.

You’re not going to go to Houston?

No, no, no, no.[note 20] Johnson did, in fact, wind up appearing with Humphrey at a massive campaign rally in Houston’s Astrodome on the Sunday before the election. I told them that—

I think it might be helpful with all this churning around that that can sort of get out, that he—you know, “the President’s too busy with this problem; he can’t get to Houston.”

No, I’m just—

“He promised to make a television speech. He’ll do that, but he’s not going to turn up at that big rally.” Or something like that.

You see, I went on network night before last, I went on radio the night before that, and I just don’t want to be doing it every night as a kind of a barnstormer. I just think it loses a good deal of the effect. [Rowe acknowledges.] OK.

Yep. All right, sir. Thank you.[note 21] Despite the President’s express wishes, Rowe immediately informed the Democratic nominee of what Johnson had said: “When Rowe gave Humphrey the news, the Vice President asked him to fly back to Washington and pass word through the Corcoran channel that he expected to be elected president, and that the South Vietnamese would shun the Paris talks at their peril.” Solberg, Humphrey, 397. Rowe also put words in LBJ’s mouth that it is clear, from this tape, the President did not utter, such as, “I want you to tell Hubert we’ve got a problem. I’m not going to work out this Vietnam peace negotiation early enough to help him.” Ibid.