This is Dick Nixon.
I just wanted you to know that I got a report from Everett Dirksen with regard to your call. And I just went on Meet the Press and I said that—on Meet the Press—that I had given you my personal assurance that I would do everything possible to cooperate both before the election, and if elected, after the election. And that if you felt, the Secretary of State felt, that anything would be useful that I could do, that I would do it. That I felt Hanoi—I felt that Saigon should come to the conference table, that I would—if you felt it was necessary—go there, or go to Paris, anything you wanted. I just wanted you to know that I feel very, very strongly about this, and any rumblings around about [scoffing] somebody trying to sabotage the Saigon's government's attitude there certainly have no—absolutely no credibility as far as I'm concerned.
That's—I'm very happy to hear that, Dick, because [Nixon attempts to interject] that is taking place. Now, here's the history of it. I didn't want to call you, but I wanted you—
That China Lobby thing is something that is—[note 1] The China Lobby referred to Chinese Nationalists and American politicians and activists who blamed the 1949 Communist revolution on the policies of the Truman adminsitration. Johnson, and now Nixon, used the term to refer to Chinese-born Anna C. Chennault.
I wanted you to know what happened.
The UPI ran a story [Nixon acknowledges] quoting I guess it was Fink.[note 2] The President mispronounced the name of Nixon’s political ally, Lt. Gov. Robert H. Finch [R-California] on this occasion, but not on others. [It] said, “a highly placed aide to Nixon said today the South Vietnamese decision to boycott the Paris talks did not jibe with the assurances given to the major presidential candidates by Johnson.” Then it says, "Nixon said the adviser felt that Saigon's refusal to attend the expanded negotiations could jeopardize the military and diplomatic situation in Vietnam and domestically reflect [on] the credibility of the administration's action to halt the bombing in North Vietnam."[note 3] The White House received United Press International and Associated Press dispatches when they “moved across the wire” to news organizations around the world, so the President had access to multiple versions of the same story. The final version published in the Washington Post read: “A highly placed adviser to the GOP presidential nominee said Mr. Johnson had privately assured Nixon and the other two major presidential candidates Thursday that the Saigon government would go along with the bombing cessation and would not object to sitting across the conference table from the Vietcong.” The source, later identified as Lt. Gov. Finch, memorably added, “We had the impression that all the diplomatic ducks were in a row.” United Press International, “Halt Seen by Nixon as Hastily Contrived,” Washington Post, 3 November 1968, http://www.proquest.com (accessed 4 December 2012). Now, I went back. I want to give you the dates of these things. This has been going on, as I told you before, since June on this three-point basis.[note 4] Johnson had briefed Nixon on his three demands at the White House in July and the LBJ Ranch in August. In return for a bombing halt, Johnson insisted that the North Vietnamese (1) respect the demilitarized zone dividing Vietnam, (2) accept South Vietnamese participation in the Paris peace talks, and (3) stop shelling civilian populations of Southern cities. Number one, [Nixon acknowledges throughout] that they take the GVN into the conference and two and three, that they not shell the cities and that they not abuse the DMZ. We knew we could never get them to agree to it. You asked me one time, “Do they have to agree to all three?” And I said, "I don't want to put it that way but they have to know that if they do it, we'll resume the bombing.”
Now, I don't know what led them to this, but in the early part of October, they came in and said, "Now, if we would let the GVN come in, would you need anything else? What else would you need?" Well, of course, we came back with these other points.
They ran off then to Hanoi. I thought it was because they had heard some speeches made in this country that indicated that that was to their interest and that they just wouldn't take it up.
I told y’all that, in effect, in the October the 15th talk.[note 5] The earlier conversation took place on 16 October 1968, contrary to the President’s recollection. See Johnson to Nixon, Humphrey and Wallace, 16 October 1968, WH6810-04-13547-13548. These three points.
Now, the other day, we had talked to [Nguyen Van] Thieu on October the 13th, and stressed that we had to have these points, and he agreed.[note 6] Nguyen Van Thieu was president of South Vietnam from June 1965 to April 1975. On October the 15th, we reviewed it with him again, and he bought a 36-hour period between stopping the bombing and the conference. On October the 23rd, he agreed to a three-day delay.
On October the 28th, we agreed to the communiqué, that we would both make a joint announcement—
—when and if we could clear it with them, get them signed on.
Then the traffic goes out that Nixon will do better by you.[note 7] The National Security Agency intercepted messages from the South Vietnamese embassy in Washington, D.C., to Saigon. Now, that goes to Thieu. I don't—I didn't say, as I said to you the other day, I didn’t say that it was with your knowledge. I hope it wasn't.
[laughing] Ah, no.
Well, as a matter of fact, I'm not privy to the—what you were doing, of course, with this thing, but—
The whole point is this. I think one thing we have to understand here is that, you know, and I know, that within the—there's a hawk-dove complex out there as there is here, and that everybody's been saying, "Well, now, after the election, what will happen?" And of course there is some thought that Hanoi would rather deal now than deal later.
They think Nixon will be tougher, and I understand that. And I think that's one of the reasons you felt you had to go forward with the pause. But my point that I'm making is this: that my God, I would never do anything to encourage Hanoi—I mean, Saigon not to come to the table, because, basically, that was what you got out of your bombing pause, that, good God, we want them over in Paris. We've got to get them to Paris or you can't have a peace.
Well, I think if you take that position, you're on very, very sound ground and—
That’s what I said on—
I think it's very much in the interest of your—
I said that the major thing that the President insisted upon and got was the right of Saigon to be at that conference table. [President Johnson attempts to interject.] And they must be at the conference table and I believe they should be, and then that's why I said that—I just felt that I ought to emphasize it—I said that I know that nobody knows who's going to win this, but if I do, I said, if I’m president-elect, I personally pledge to President Johnson I would do anything, and I want to amplify that by—emphasize it by saying that I will do—if he and Secretary [Dean] Rusk indicate that my presence in Paris or Saigon, and, incidentally, I want you to know I'll do that.[note 8] Dean Rusk was secretary of state from January 1961 to January 1969. I'd go out there and talk to Thieu if it's necessary.
Well, I think that—I—
[Unclear] or whatever you want. [Unclear]—
My judgment is now that from what I see and hear, I want—let me read you what I said to you the other day, though, because apparently—I don't know whether you remember it or not: “While this was going on,” talking of these moves on these three points, “we had gone out and talked to all of our allied countries.”
“And they tentatively agreed. Now, since that time, with our campaign going on here, [Nixon acknowledges] we have had some minor problems develop. First, there have been some speeches that we ought to withdraw troops or that we should stop the bombing without obtaining anything in return.”
I remember that.
“Or, some of our folks, even including some of the old China Lobby, [Nixon attempts to interject] are going around and implying to some of the folks that they might get a better deal out of somebody that was not involved in this. Now, that's made it difficult on me and it's slowed things down some. I know that none of you candidates are responsible for it, because I'm looking at what you said to me when we talked last October 15th.”[note 9] See Johnson to Nixon, Humphrey and Wallace, 31 October 1968, 13618. Now, that's what I said. And I thought the Fink remark was very much out of place, saying that I had left a wrong impression, because I thought, and I think now, that Thieu will come to the conference. But I had a firm agreement with him two or three times on the joint communiqué and everything else [Nixon acknowledges] until he got this word.
Well, I asked him [unclear]—
And when I talked to you, I still thought that we could get him and I think we can yet. But I did tell you we had problems.
That was the impression I had when the three of us talked. The impression I had when you talked to three of us that you were confident he was going to come, you know, that Thieu was going to come. And of course, that was what the backgrounder in Washington that they reported indicated, too. And I just assumed he would come. But—
Well, we knew we had problems, Dick.
You still think he's going to come?
Well, we don't see what else he can do. If we stay together, [Nixon acknowledges] we just think that no people are going to support an effort where a man will not talk to anybody.
Yeah. Well, one thing I said, and I thought you'd be interested in this. I made this point, which I feel very strongly about that, let’s suppose that I should win. Now, all right, then, you've got—if Johnson and Nixon, and I pointed out that I have stood fairly close to you on this, as I said in answer to Larry Spivak.[note 10] Lawrence E. “Larry” Spivak was an American broadcaster and host of Meet the Press. I said I’ve disagreed with the conduct of the war, but I agree that—and then I used this term—that I think President Johnson's gotten a bad rap on terms of the commitment. I said we're there to try to stop aggression and start—and avoid another war. And I said, now—then I went onto say—I said the critical period could be the 60 days before the inauguration, and at that point, if we can present a united front, it seems to me that we might make the breakthrough that couldn't be made later, and I honestly believe that.
You see what I’m getting at? These people, I think you will agree—well, I think you've told me earlier, that these people over in Hanoi, to a certain extent, hold on because they think we're divided in this country. Now, once we've had an election, and you have a Republican, if it's Nixon, and you have a Republican and Johnson, a Democrat, it seems to me that's an awful strong, strong case.
I just want you to know, I'm not trying to interfere with your conduct of it. I mean, I'll only do what you and Rusk want me to do, but I'll do anything, because anything—
Well, that's good, Dick. I—
We've got to get this goddamned war off the plate, and I also want you to know this. I’ve said this to our mutual friend George [A. Smathers] today.[note 11] George A. Smathers was a U.S. senator [D-Florida] from January 1951 to January 1969, and a member of the Finance Committee. I was talking to him. You know I'm going down to Florida after the thing, and I really feel this, that—and I feel this very deeply, that I think you've gotten a bad rap on this thing. I don’t think—I think the war apparently now is about where it could be brought to an end, and if we can get it done now, fine, that's what it ought to do. Just the quicker the better, and the hell with the political credit. Believe me, that's the way I feel about it.
Well, that's fine, Dick, and we'll talk about it right after. I don't think they're going to do anything now. The important thing is for your people [Nixon attempts to interject] not to tell the South Vietnamese—if they'll tell them just what you tell me, why, it’ll be the best for all concerned.
I said publicly on Meet the Press today, I said, "Look,” and that's the only thing; I don't talk to [chuckles] anybody else. I said publicly, I said that South Vietnam ought to come to the conference table and that if the President feels that I could be helpful in getting them to come, I'll go there.
Yes, well, that's fine.
I mean that.
Now, you tell brother Fink that I told all of you the other day that we did have problems with these folks.
And just what I said, because I didn't mislead y’all. I told you that we had—
You didn't mislead me. I told the press today—I said that I felt that I got the impression that they were coming [unclear].
We all want them to come and hope they'll come and really believe they'll come.
I rather thought that way.
I just don't think they can, but I—
And it's really a question of when they'll come.
That's right. I said, “Now, this has made it difficult and it's slowed things down a bit. [Nixon acknowledges.] I don't—I know that none of you candidates are responsible for it because I'm looking at the transcript.” And then I said—the Vice President said, when I asked for comments, "Thanks much." Mr. Nixon said, "Well, as you know this is consistent [with] my position. I made very clear I'll make no statements [to] undercut the negotiation. So we'll stay right on that and hope that this thing works out." Then Mr. [George C.] Wallace said, quote, "Mr. President, that's my position all along. You've stated it, and I agree with you that we shouldn't play politics so it might foul up the negotiations." Unquote. [note 12] George C. Wallace was governor of Alabama from January 1963 to January 1967, January 1971 to January 1979, and January 1983 to January 1987. And—
Incidently, Wallace has been very good on this.
Yes, he has. Both of you. I gave you the three quotes—
[Curtis E.] LeMay has popped off, but Wallace has been good.[note 13] Curtis E. LeMay, the former Air Force chief of staff, was also a candidate for vice president as the running mate of independent George C. Wallace.
Well, I didn't want—when they said, “Nixon, said the adviser, felt that Saigon's refusal to attend would jeopardize the diplomatic situation and reflect [on] the credibility on the administration's action—”
That's his point [unclear].
“—that his highly placed aide said the South Vietnamese [Nixon attempts to interject] decision to boycott did not jibe with the President's assurances.”
I hit that right on the nose today. Herb Kaplow of NBC asked me the question.[note 14] Herbert E. “Herb” Kaplow was a correspondent with NBC News. I wish you could have seen the program [President Johnson acknowledges] because most of them thought it was pretty good.
Good, good, Dick. Well, you just—
You know how it is. Good God, you've got people on your own staff, over there [chuckling] that don’t—you know, George Ball, some of those guys are saying some god-awful things.[note 15] George W. Ball was under secretary of state from January 1961 to September 1966 and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in May and June of 1968.
Well, George Ball's [laughing] not on my staff.
Now, you know what I mean.
[laughing] Yeah, but what I've got, I've got both sides. Hanoi will look at one statement [Nixon acknowledges throughout] and the South Vietnamese look at the other. You just see that your people don't tell the South Vietnamese that they're going to get any better deal out of the United States government than a conference.
Yeah, and also, we’ve got to make sure that Hanoi knows they’re not going to get a [unclear]—
Yeah, that's exactly right, and I'm doing that.
—[unclear]. And the main thing that we want to have is a good, strong, personal understanding. I mean, after all, I trust you on this and I've told everybody that and that when we—and that once this thing is over, there's nothing I would rather do, if I win the election, than to do anything that you think we have to do [unclear].
Well, Dick you noticed—you must—you must have noticed that when we proposed the date, the date was not November the 2nd, as suggested, but November the 6th—
Yeah, yeah, I know.
—before any meeting occurs.
Yeah. Incidently, we—I—
Smathers understands that.
I visited Austin for the first time—
Well, yes, you—
—and it's a beautiful city, [Johnson attempts to interject] I must say. We spoke in that new auditorium there, the circular thing, and I didn't get over to your library, though, and—[note 16] Nixon held a midday rally at the Austin Civic Auditorium. Don Irwin, “Nixon Returns to Southland, Predicts He Will Carry State,” Los Angeles Times, 3 November 1968, http://www.proquest.com (accessed 6 December 2012).
Well, we haven’t got—
That’s where your library is, isn’t it?
We haven't got it built yet, but you have to—
We’re just starting on it.
That’s what you talked about, about the [unclear]. I thought the—oh, you’re building it later?
We're building it now.
I get it, I get it. But it is in Austin?
I see. I see.
Well, I'll be in touch with you after Tuesday [Nixon acknowledges] and you just see that your people that are talking [Nixon attempts to interject] to these folks make clear your position.
You understand, of course, [unclear] will be—that there’s this business, you know, some of [Hubert H.] Humphrey's people have been gleeful and they said the bombing pause is going to help them and so forth, and our people say it hurts and—
Well, I'll tell you what I say. I say it doesn't help—doesn't affect the election one way or the other—
I don’t think it does.
—because I've asked all the candidates to please support me, and the other day all three of them said—you led it off—but all three of them said we'll back you, Mr. President.
So I say it oughtn’t affect the election one way and I don’t think it’ll change one vote.
Well, anyway, we'll have fun. [Laughs.]
Thank you, Dick.
“Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon on 3 November 1968,” Conversation WH6811-02-13710, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [Chasing Shadows, ed. Ken Hughes] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL: http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4006126