Transcript
Edited by Kent B. Germany, Nicole Hemmer, and Ken Hughes, with Kieran K. Matthews and Marc J. Selverstone
A seemingly routine announcement that career diplomat Robert D. “Bob” Murphy would serve as a foreign policy liaison between President-elect Richard M. “Dick” Nixon and the Johnson administration went awry when Nixon gave remarks to the press that alarmed President Johnson. “To make this a viable arrangement,” Nixon declared, “it is, of course, necessary that there be prior consultation on such policy decisions and that the President-elect not only be informed but that he be consulted and that he agree to the courses of action.” The New York Times and other observers interpreted this statement to mean that Nixon was claiming a veto power over President Johnson’s foreign policy decisions.[note 1] The Times story began: “President-elect Richard M. Nixon indicated yesterday that President Johnson had agreed to reach no major foreign policy decisions without the concurrence of Mr. Nixon.” R. W. Apple Jr., “Nixon Says Johnson Gives Him Key Role on Foreign Policies,” New York Times, 15 November 1968.
In response, White House press secretary George E. Christian Jr. offered a carefully worded affirmation of Johnson’s continued control of foreign policy. “Nothing has diluted the President’s authority,” he asserted, “and I don’t think either man would want to do anything to dilute the authority of the President.”
Transcribed below is Johnson’s attempt to gain Nixon’s cooperation in advance of a White House statement publicly affirming that the U.S. would not have “two presidents” at the same time.
Mr. Nixon?
Yes, I’m on.
Thank you, sir. [Long pause.]
[talking on speakerphone] Dick?
Hello.
Dick?
Yeah, I’m on.
We . . . we have some serious problems here resulting from this [Robert D. “Bob”] Murphy announcement.[note 2] Robert D. “Bob” Murphy was U.S. ambassador to Belgium from November 1949 to March 1952; U.S. ambassador to Japan from May 1952 to April 1953; U.S. assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs from July 1953 to November 1953; U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs from August 1959 to December 1959; and an adviser to the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations. At President Johnson’s request, President-elect Nixon had appointed Robert D. Murphy as his personal representative on foreign policy to the Johnson administration during the transition period before Nixon’s administration took office in January 1969. See Conversation WH6811-04-13728. The press—we’re delaying our briefing until I could talk to you, because if we’re not careful, we’ll be answering each other and be making different announcements. They are construing your announcement of Murphy coming here as mine and [Dean] Rusk’s agreement that Murphy and you will have to approve every decision from here on out.[note 3] Dean Rusk was U.S. secretary of state from January 1961 to January 1969.
Well, no, that’s not accurate, because they asked that, and I said that as a matter of fact, that you and Rusk had . . . were . . . had indicated that you wanted to inform me of everything and that where anything major was involved, you wanted to be sure that I was consulted on it and that that’s why Murphy was going to be there. And on the con[trary]—And they said—one of them said, “Well, do you have a veto over the decisions?” I said, “Under no circumstances.” I made it clear that [a telephone receiver is hung up] we have only one president at a time, but that we—obviously that any major policy decision that has to be implemented by the new president, the old—the previous adminis—the present administration would want to clear it with the new administration to be sure it would be implemented. That was exactly the line we were trying to get across.
Well, I think that what we’d better do—what they’re saying is that his agreement would be necessary to the development of any of these decisions.
Now, I think what we ought to say, and what my Secretary proposes to say, is that the other day we stated to you that we hoped you would name a Secretary of State and Defense as soon as you could. We knew the great problems involved. Until you could, we hoped you would designate a liaison man [clears throat] to be in the State Department to review the cables that come in and go out and the decisions that were being made here so you could be informed. That we did not contemplate the other day or today—it was not in our conversation this morning—that Mr. Murphy’s approval would either be asked or required. That we want to keep you informed, and we want the close liaison, but we haven’t got two presidents making these decisions. Now, obviously, just as the bombing halt and others, if there’s something that vitally affects our country, I, of course, want as many people to be aware of it and get their counsel as I can, although I have to make the decision.[note 4] President Johnson had announced a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam on 31 October 1968.
Well, now—
I’m very fearful if we leave the impression in the world that we have to check with Murphy or with you before we make a decision that we’re going to leave the impression we’ve got two presidents operating.
Let’s come to the more—the most precise thing. The precise—the most—the thing everybody’s interested in is on Vietnam, and on that I specifically said that—they said, “Well, what about Vietnam? What about somebody in Paris?” I said, “No, nobody’s going to go to Paris.” I said, “The pres—the policy of the present administration and my policy with regard to the negotiations is in agreement and that for that reason that there—I could speak with complete clarity as I did last Monday, that we presented one united front with regard to Vietnam.”
Now, as far as—I think what—You recall during the con—during the briefing the other day where Rusk had something about NATO, and he said, “Well, now, I don’t want to say anything on NATO—about our position on NATO if you find it would be difficult to—for you to carry out.” And I said, “Go right ahead. It’s all right with me.”
Well, he handed you that prepared statement. I told him in making a public speech [Nixon acknowledges] to the NATO people that I thought that he didn’t want to say something that would obviously be denied or—
Well, that was—
—incur your displeasure.
That was actually what I was referring to in this—when I’d announced Murphy. And on Vietnam, let me make one thing very clear, is that you will note if you read the transcript of the whole thing—on the Vietnam, I said that “the President’s policy has been my policy and that we stand together on it.” And, of course, it’s Murphy’s as well. And I think that’s the main point. The main point is to be sure there’s no question of any difference on Vietnam.
Well, the point they want to make—let’s—they want to make two presidents if they can. They want [Nixon acknowledges] to have a fight back and forth. Now, what [George E.] Christian [Jr.]’s going to say to them—we’ve been trying to get your transcript for some time. We haven’t gotten it down here yet.[note 5] George E. Christian Jr. was White House press secretary from February 1967 to January 1969. Our briefing is due at four o’clock. We’ve delayed it 45 minutes.
Right.
What Christian is going to say [is] that “there’s not been any agreement of any manner, shape, or form that in any way alters what the two presidents said the other day. I’m not going beyond their respective statements, number one.”
Good.
“Number two, at that time the President asked the sec—asked the President-elect if he desired to have someone sit in at the State Department and familiarize himself with the decisions that were being made there, and he, this morning, informed the President he was designating Ambassador Murphy. But the agreements that they have entered, they told you about the other day. They’ve had no further agreements. And the agreement is that from now till January the 20th, we will be President, and from January the 20th on, he’ll be President.”
Right. That’s fine. And then I would—I think he could well point out that, if he hasn’t seen the transcript, somebody specifically asked—well, ‘cause they’re always going to try to draw these distinctions. They said, “Well, do you mean you by reason of Murphy being there and your being consulted and that—his being consulted—that he has to approve everything?” I said, “No, it only means that the administration is, that President Johnson and Secretary Rusk have been very careful to, since the election, to see that I am informed of anything that might have a continuing effect, you know. And that that was—I thought that was altogether proper, be—and that I have given approval,” as I did, you know, like on NATO. I said, “Go right ahead.” Because as far as I’m concerned, I’m not going to interfere at all with your [slight chuckle] conduct of foreign policy. I can—and, as a matter of fact, there’s no disagreement. Even—take the matter of—it isn’t just Vietnam, but take the matter we discussed of the . . . treaty on nonproliferation. You recall you brought that up at the meeting, and I said, “Let me know if you want to bring it one way or the other that I support the treaty.” So there’s—the point is there’s—we’re not—there’s no disagreement at all because there’s no disagreement about policy. [Slight chuckle.] That’s what I want to make clear.
That’s right, but they’re—what we’re going to say, if you agree with it, and I think that it’s the sound way to do it, and I think it’s met with general approbation, is that Christian [Nixon acknowledges throughout] can say, “I have not seen the President-elect’s transcript. The position and the agreements entered into were stated by the respective presidents the other day.”
Right.
“I am informed by President Johnson that no additional agreements have been made. [Nixon acknowledges.] President Nixon spoke the other day and President Johnson. The only thing that’s happened since then is President Nixon called and said that he would desire to designate Mr. Murphy as his liaison with the department, which Rusk had asked him to do.”
And I—right, that’s fine, and I’ll back that up.
OK.
The point—the point—
Thank you.
The point that I just want to make clear is that there’s no intention at all to go beyond that.
Oh, I know that.
I was simply indicating that Murphy would sit there, and he would consult, and—
I know that, Dick, but these papers are going to—
Right.
—they’re going to make it two presidents if they can [Nixon acknowledges] so that the Russians can move or something else during this period, and we—you just must stand on that statement the other day, because you couldn’t improve on it if you spent a year.
Well, we will, and the main thing is that you know with Murphy and with me, you’re not going to have any trouble on this. We just want to be sure that there’s no misunderstanding. I can assure you that we’ll have no problem.
Thank you, Dick.
Waiting, waiting. Waiting.
Cite as
“Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard M. Nixon, and Juanita Roberts on 14 November 1968,” Conversation WH6811-05-13736, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [Johnson Telephone Tapes: 1968, ed. Kent B. Germany, Nicole Hemmer, and Ken Hughes] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL: http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4006514