Hello.

Mr. President?

Yeah.

Dr. [Henry A.] Kissinger would like to talk with you.[note 3] Henry A. Kissinger was U.S. national security adviser from January 1969 to November 1975, and U.S. secretary of state from September 1973 to January 1977.

OK.

Thank you. [Call connects.] The President, Dr. Kissinger.

Hello. [Clears throat.]

Mr. President.

Hi, Henry. How are you?

OK. I just wanted to tell you we just won in the General Assembly.

Oh, good.

A hundred and four to eleven.

[Laughs.] Oh, Christ.

With even Romania voting with us.

I’ll be damned. What was the issue?

Exactly as we wanted it—withdrawal and cease-fire.

And did the Russians vote the other way?

Of course.

And the Indians?

Yes. The Russians, the Indians, and the East European Communists.

Yeah.

And a few border states of India—Bhutan and Nepal.

Oh, what the hell.

They’re practically in the—

Well, they shouldn’t be in the United Nations.

Exactly.

Well, Nepal is all right, but they’re scared to death.

But it’s—

Well, isn’t that a—now, doesn’t that prove something?

Well, we ought to—

I mean, it’s the goddamn, I must say, these [Frank F.] Churches [D–Idaho], Henry, and these [Edward M.] Kennedys [D–Massachusetts], and the New York Times and the rest, and Time, they ought to look at that vote, shouldn’t they?[note 4] Frank Church was a U.S. senator [D–Idaho] from January 1957 to January 1981. Edward M. “Teddy” Kennedy was a U.S. senator [D–Massachusetts] from November 1962 to August 2009, and Senate Democratic Whip from January 1969 to January 1971. Senators Kennedy and Church had criticized strongly the Nixon administration’s foreign policy in South Asia as amoral, and one which supported a military dictatorship over democratic India. They argued that Nixon saw the India–Pakistan crisis through an excessively narrow Cold War prism that did not take into account the overriding regional and humanitarian issues.

Well, Helen [A.] Thomas came up to me [President Nixon acknowledges] this evening and said, “Thank God for what you did at the backgrounder [unclear].”[note 5] Helen Thomas was consecutively the White House correspondent, chief correspondent, and White House bureau chief for United Press International from January 1961 to May 2000. Kissinger had delivered a background briefing to the press that made the administration’s case.

[Laughs.] Did she?

Yeah.

She got the point, huh?

Yeah. She said she’s going to write on it for the next three days.

Good. Well, did she get the point that . . .

She said we should have done it three weeks ago.

Well, [Kissinger attempts to interject] we weren’t in a position to claim it, were we?

No, no, no. We had to—

We weren’t in a position to claim Indian aggression, basically. Well, maybe we could have done all the stuff saying what we’ve done them on Pakistan, of course.[note 6] The Nixon administration took the position that India had long been interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan, first by supporting forces inside East Pakistan (Bangladesh) that sought greater autonomy, and then independence; and then by planning a war of aggression against Pakistan to take advantage of the situation. The Indians argued that they were naturally sympathetic to the plight of the people in East Pakistan, many of whom were ethnic kin with those in India (Bengalis) and who were suffering under the brutal repression of the Pakistani army. New Delhi made little effort to conceal its assistance to the independence movement and its preparations for military intervention. Indira Gandhi’s government argued that this was the only means to stop genocide and pointed out that the war had begun with a preemptive raid by the Pakistani air force.

Yeah, but we—

The refugees. But we’ve been saying it, but nobody really would write it, would they?[note 7] During the past year, a massive flow of refugees had fled into India from East Pakistan in the midst of the fighting between the Pakistani army and those fighting for independence. The Nixon administration emphasized the humanitarian assistance that it had provided and was prepared to provide to the refugees, and argued that the best way to see to their safe return was to stop the war and reach a political settlement, one not dictated by India and the Soviet Union.

Well, we’ve got to keep after it now. I think [unclear] tomorrow. You know, these damn liberals—what can they say? Security Council 11 to 2?[note 8] The Nixon administration had supported two resolutions before the U.N. Security Council, calling for a cease-fire and mutual withdrawal of troops. The resolution passed 11–2, with two abstentions (Great Britain and France), but the Soviet Union exercised its veto in both cases. Nixon regarded the clear majority in favor of the U.S. position to be important diplomatically, as it built up credibility for the U.S. case when the issue was taken up by the General Assembly. And the General Assembly 104 to 11?

Yeah. Well, is anybody questioning whether that vote . . . do they realize that is on the issue we’ve been talking about?

Exactly.

It really con—it really is against India, isn’t it? This vote?

Oh yes. It’s exactly what we’ve recommended.

Uh-huh.

The British and French abstained. I can understand the French. The British—we ought to put it to [Edward R. G.] Heath that if he keeps this up—[note 9] Edward R. G. Heath was prime minister of the United Kingdom from June 1970 to March 1974.

Jesus Christ.

—we’ll have no choice but to treat them like just another country.[note 10] Heath was a staunch advocate of closer ties with Europe, which meant placing much less emphasis on the long-standing “special relationship” with the United States. He made a point of not automatically lining up or consulting closely with the United States on diplomatic issues, which had been the norm since World War II.

Well, we’ll treat them like—just like another country anyway, I think, the way they’re acting. I mean, what the hell? You know, when you come right down to it, why should we stand up for him on something like Rhodesia, which really affects votes in our country, whereas something like Pakistan doesn’t sure as hell affect votes in England?[note 11] Heath’s government was caught in a bind with respect to Rhodesia, still a British colony of record, and the white supremacist government of Ian Smith, which had declared independence while refusing to allow African political participation.

Yeah. And John [B.] Connally told me—gosh, I must have told you—that they were the toughest in Rome.[note 12] John B. Connally was U.S. secretary of the Navy from January 1961 to December 1961; Democratic governor of Texas from January 1963 to January 1969, during which time he was wounded in the assassination of President Kennedy; and U.S. secretary of the treasury from February 1971 to May 1972. The G10 group of industrial nations, including Great Britain, had met in Rome from 29 November to 1 December 1971. The Ministers, including Secretary Connally, discussed the future price of gold and other related issues, part of an ongoing effort to adjust the international monetary system in the wake of President Nixon’s 15 August announcement of his New Economic Policy. Britain had not been generally supportive of Connally’s efforts.

Oh, yes, yes, yes. He told me. I know about that, yeah. They were tougher, more—as I put it, more—to John—I said, “They were more Gaullist than [Charles] de Gaulle—than the French.”[note 13] Charles de Gaulle was president of France from January 1958 to April 1969. And, well, what the hell.

But if they [unclear]—

But this vote is good, though. This is a good vote.

It’s a smashing vote. And, [President Nixon acknowledges] you know, people worried about influence in the U.N.

Yeah.

Of course, the Chinese swung a few votes our way, too, by their [unclear]—

You think they did?

Oh, sure.

Yeah.

I think Albania voted, of course, with us. But . . .

[Chuckles.] Well—

And it’s one of the big victories. You know, it won’t get us anything.

Yeah.

Except give us a basis for squeezing the Indians even more. I mean, we can now take another slice of bait out of them.

Because they said, in effect, withdrawal and . . .

And cease-fire.

Cease-fire and withdrawal?

That’s right. They called on both sides to cease fire and withdraw from each other’s territory.

And the Indians have just said blatantly they will not do that, correct?

That’s right. They disregarded—well, the Security Council was vetoed, so it had no formal standing, but still it was 11 to 2. And those miserable liberals . . .

Yeah.

I had been invited to go to Harvard on Thursday.[note 14] Kissinger, who took a leave of absence from Harvard to join the Nixon administration, had been scheduled to attend a dinner with faculty in Cambridge on 9 December. They were going to give a reconciliation dinner for me.

Oh, is that right? So they changed their minds?

No, no they—[President Nixon chuckles] [John Kenneth] Galbraith gave an interview for the press in which he said the dinner is for me, not in support of your policies, so I canceled the dinner.[note 15] John Kenneth Galbraith was a noted liberal economist and Harvard University professor; U.S. ambassador to India from 1961 to 1963; and president of the American Economic Association (AEA) in 1972.

Oh, for God’s sakes.

It shows how [unclear].

Yeah, good. Oh, well.

But when I called—

Oh, Galbraith, of course, is pro-Indian all the way.

But when I canceled the dinner [President Nixon acknowledges] he said, “Well, you can’t pass moral judgment.” I mean, when it’s Rhodesia or South Africa they pass moral judgment [unclear]—

Oh, is that what he says, we can’t pass moral judgement?

Yes.

You mean he’s speaking about the U.N. or us, or what?

Well, we should just not condemn India, he says. He doesn’t defend them, but why should we get involved by passing moral judgment?

What in the name of God did they do when they—

When we went into Cam—

What about Portugal? What about Cambodia?[note 16] The reference to Portugal is unclear. The military government in Lisbon still held onto several colonies in Africa. The reference to Cambodia is the U.S. and South Vietnamese cross-border offensive in 1970, designed to disrupt North Vietnamese supply lines and bases in that country.

When we went into Cambodia, where we were defending our own troops and American lives—

That’s right. Boy, isn’t that the truth, isn’t that the truth? See, that’s a very good analogy, come to think about it. That we went into Cambodia because we were solely going in for the purpose of defending our own forces.[note 17] Defending American forces was not the sole nor the primary reason President Nixon sent American troops into Cambodia. For a detailed discussion of how his secret bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail destabilized the neutralist Norodom Sihanouk regime, precipitated a right-wing coup, and exacerbated conflict between the Cambodian and North Vietnamese government that threatened to replace Phnom Penh’s pro-United States government with a pro-Hanoi one, see Ken Hughes, Chasing Shadows: The Nixon Tapes, the Chennault Affair, and the Origins of Watergate (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014), 83–92. [speaking over Kissinger] But we were being attacked from there, as a matter of a fact.

And at the invitation of the government.

Yeah. At the invitation of the government. And they can—they have moral judgment. This is diff—[unclear] no, they have a double standard. But, nevertheless, nevertheless, this U.N. vote must have some significance if we can get people to talk about it. Do you think?

And we must have shaken [Leonid] Brezhnev up a bit, too, because he’s canceled—[note 18] Leonid Brezhnev was general secretary of the Communist Party in the USSR from October 1964 to November 1982.

[aside to unidentified person] Come in! [to Kissinger] Yeah.

—he’s canceled his trip to Warsaw—and flown back to Moscow.

Just, just a second. [President Nixon speaks briefly in the background with an unidentified person.] [to Kissinger] Yeah, go ahead. What? He must have what?

He’s canceled his—he’s cut short his stay in Mos—in Warsaw and flown back to Moscow.

Yeah.

I mean, we sent him a real stemwinder of a letter, very polite but . . .[note 19] Nixon to Brezhnev, 6 December 1971, in Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1969–1976: South Asian Crisis, 1971, ed. Louis J. Smith (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 11: doc. 236. Nixon and Kissinger believed that the Soviets, by signing a treaty of friendship and cooperation with India and by supplying them with advanced weaponry, had essentially given the Indian government a green light to attack Pakistan. Kissinger in particular thought that such Soviet recklessness (as he regarded it) had to be challenged directly if he was to successfully implement a policy of détente with Moscow, as well as to improve relations with the PRC. On the following day, 8 December, Kissinger and Nixon discussed the possibility of cancelling the planned May 1972 U.S.–Soviet summit in Moscow. See Conversation 016-064, 8 December 1971, White House Telephone.

Yeah. All right. [Pauses.]

You know, the thing that I like about this is that the moral—and Galbraith said we shouldn’t judge. What did he—with the U.N., does he condemn that, too, I suppose?

Oh, yeah.

The Indian lovers are a breed apart. But, by God, they don’t rule in the U.N., do they?

No. No, if world opinion amounts to anything, which I don’t believe it does—

Yeah. Well, let’s let it amount to something when it’s on our side.

Well, we ought to.

You know like I said, use the U.N. when we can. It’s always being used against us. Now for once, we’re going to use it for us.

Yeah.

Huh?

That’s right.

[Laughs.] I’m glad to hear that. I’m glad to hear that. Well, anyways, I think it’s a good thing you did the backgrounder. I’m sure it had a good effect. It’ll, of course, as you know, as you know—

Only a few people there, but I think they’re [unclear].

Oh, well, the wires are there.[note 20] That is, the wire services, such as United Press International and the Associated Press. Their attendance assured that the White House message would receive broad circulation in newspapers around the country and beyond. But the most important thing is that, as you know, the . . . it raises holy hell with the liberals. That’s a point we have to bear in mind. It’s a funny thing, you know, you can be . . . I don’t know. [speaking over Kissinger] I don’t know—this vote, though, this vote—

I think we ought to go on the attack now against Kennedy and Church.

Yeah.

We’ve tended to—

Or maybe, we ought to not only we, but why in the name of God can’t we get [Hugh D.] Scott [R–Pennsylvania] and some of those guys, [unclear] and others?[note 21] Hugh D. Scott was a U.S. senator [R–Pennsylvania] from January 1959 to January 1977, and Senate Minority Leader from September 1969 to January 1977. They feel that way.

That’s right.

They ought to do it. I’ll get ahold of—tell you what you do: speak to [Charles W. “Chuck”] Colson.[note 22] Charles W. “Chuck” Colson was White House special counsel from November 1969 to March 1973. And tell him to stir up the [Clark] MacGregor crowd.[note 23] Clark MacGregor was a U.S. representative [R–Minnesota] from January 1961 to January 1971; White House congressional liaison from January 1971 to July 1972; and chair of the Committee to Re-Elect the President from July 1972 to November 1972. He’ll know how. By God, they ought to really go on and slice him up. Let [Spiro T.] Agnew crack them.[note 24] Spiro T. Agnew was vice president of the United States from January 1969 to October 1973. [Kissinger acknowledges.] What do you think?

I think we ought to do it. [President Nixon acknowledges.] Because we’ll turn out to be on the right side of this, and the Indians will look worse and worse.

What do you think’s going to happen in the end?

I think they’ll take it. I think there’ll be a massacre.

You mean they will take East Pakistan?

Yeah. I don’t think they’ll leave.

Well, yes, that’s right. Then what’ll they do about West Pakistan? Move troops there, and then do you think they’ll force West Pakis—

No, they may offer a cease-fire in West Pakistan after smashing the army. They’ll smash the West Pakistan army.

They’ll do that, too. . . . Is the fighting going about as—well, as you know—

Yeah, it—well—

Well, it’ll be an interesting morning. OK, Henry. Thank you.

Right.

Bye.