Transcript
Edited by Ken Hughes, with Kieran K. Matthews and Marc J. Selverstone
President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger discuss the timing of the South Vietnamese military’s departure from Laos as it concludes Lam Son 719, a ground offensive to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh Trail undertaken with U.S. air support.
I don’t give a goddamn if they leave tomorrow. [Unclear exchange.]
The PR case—about PR, we don’t have to worry much. In fact, we can make it very positive.
Yeah. We all know what the future holds—the future is [unclear]. Let me say this . . . thank God we did Laos.
Oh—
Thank God we did it.
Without Laos—
[Unclear] we know what these people can or can’t do. It’s going to be—it’s going to be close. They’re going to take some raps, but we’ve got to get the hell out of there. That’s for sure.
No question.
And because it’s quite clear that—and it’s good for them to learn how strong they are and how weak. But I’m not going to allow their weakness and their fear of the North Vietnamese to—to—to delay us. The only—the other thing I was going to say, though . . . you see, we’ve been thinking all along [unclear] Vietnamization and all that—what will work, what will not. Now we know. We’ve tried everything. We’ve done everything the military wanted. We have—we’ve done everything to our own satisfaction in order to bring the war to a successful conclusion.
I think it’s going to work. I think it will. I think—I think—I really view—there’s a 40 to 50 percent chance, maybe 55—and that could fall apart—that we might even get an agreement. But lacking an agreement, I think if they were—in other words—I just think—in other words, the forces will—there’ll still be war out there back and forth. But the South Vietnamese are not going to be knocked over by the North Vietnamese—not easily.
Not easily. [speaking over President Nixon] And that’s all we could bring about.
And that’s all we can do.
I think, Mr. President, if we can keep the announcement in April substantial [unclear] that we have a good chance to establish—
Chance for a bargaining position. You see, Bob, that is why—
To hit it out of the ballpark.
That is why—I know you’re concerned—what is it, you know, everybody says, “Oh, shit, you’ve got to worry about—about public opinion now,” and so forth. Well, you did. By being restrained now, we have—even if—if we even have—look, I think it’s a little better than that. If there’s only a 25 percent chance or a 20 percent chance that we may at least have it settled in the late fall, my God, it’s worth it! [Unclear exchange.]
[Unclear.] I think the less you take—the less you announce in April, the better.
[Unclear.]
You see, we can have the whole—
The argument is: whatever you do in April, do it early in April.
Yeah.
Don’t wait [unclear], because this other stuff—
Cite as
“Richard Nixon, H. R. ‘Bob’ Haldeman, and Henry A. Kissinger on 11 March 1971,” Conversation 466-012 (PRDE Excerpt A), Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [Fatal Politics, ed. Ken Hughes] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL: http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4006732