—this year. Paul [H.] Nitze could present it.[note 1] Paul H. Nitze was U.S. assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs from 1961 to 1963; secretary of the U.S. Navy from November 1963 to June 1967; and U.S. deputy secretary of defense from July 1967 to January 1969. Clark [M.] Clifford could present it.[note 2] Clark M. Clifford was a Washington lawyer; an adviser to presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson; a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1961 to 1968; chair of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from April 1963 to February 1968; and U.S. secretary of defense from March 1968 to January 1969. The service secretaries could appear. Or I could do it. It would be hard for Paul to do it if I were gone and Clark were here for two reasons: A) he ought to be here when Clark’s here so he can help him get adjusted; B) Paul’s only been in the job six months and really wasn’t at the heart of the budget preparation or defense structure [report] preparation [unclear].

My reaction, Bob, is twofold. One, my personal reaction: from my standpoint, and the country’s standpoint, is that you ought to do it. Second, I have some hesitancy because of what one or two of them have indicated to me, that it might be a little blood for you. Now, I know you don’t give a damn, but I do. I wanted to pursue that further. Now, one of the men, in talking to me about Clifford [McNamara acknowledges] said that he just didn’t think we could have a finer record and a better man there, but he said, “Now, I think it’d be better—McNamara’s indicated he wants to present this statement, and I think it’d be better that—if he didn’t, because you’ll get in some arguments, and you get cut up, and he’s in perfect shape now. And what I’d do is take the information he has and, after Clifford gets confirmed, let us come along here. And while he will be new, he can take—bring secretaries with him, and he can get through it. And I think that you won’t have—you won’t hurt him, and you won’t hurt McNamara.” Now, I had rather you do it because whatever arguments got to go on, I think, first, you can take them on better, you know more about it, and so forth. On the other hand, I don’t want to ask you to go—

Mr. President—

—give your arm just before you leave.

Mr. President, the answer is then, on that basis, I definitely should do it. I sensed a little uncertainty in your mind, both when we talked last week and also [unclear]—

Well, very frankly, I don’t want to decide at this second. [McNamara acknowledging throughout.] But the reason I did is [Richard B. “Dick”] Russell [Jr.] [D–Georgia] told me, said, “Now, McNamara, I know how much you think of him and like him and so forth.”[note 3] Richard B. “Dick” Russell Jr. was a U.S. senator [D–Georgia] from January 1933 to January 1971; chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee from January 1951 to January 1953 and January 1955 to January 1969; and chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee from January 1969 to January 1971. I told him you were going to finish up there, and when I wanted to wait a little bit till Clifford could get in, I thought it’s better for you to do it. He said, “That’s wrong.” He said, “I think that he’ll get cut up, and you oughtn’t to do that now that he’s leaving.” And I said, “Well, let me talk to you about it later.” I—

Mr. President?

Yeah.

I would be badly cut up by [John L.] McClellan [D–Arkansas] on the F-111B, and goddamn it, I’m just not going to do that.[note 4] John L. McClellan was a U.S. senator [D–Arkansas] from January 1943 to November 1977; chair of the Senate Government Operations Committee from 1949 to 1953 and 1955 to 1972; chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee from 1972 to 1977; and chief sponsor of the Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor and Management Field. McClellan had recently warned that the Congress might cut off funding for the Navy’s F-111B, calling it a waste of taxpayer money that “can result in a national defense tragedy.” “McClellan Calls F-111B ‘Flop;' Sees Fund Cut-Off,” New York Times, 23 January 1968. And I’ve been trying to figure a way out of that portion of it. I know that’d be a serious problem, and I just can’t take it psychologically at this point, and I’ll be goddamned if I’m going to take it. So I’ve got a way out. [Chuckles.] And it’s the—some of Russell’s committee members objected to holding the two hearings together. McClellan’s on the Subcommittee for Defense Appropriations, but not on the Armed Services Committee. I, with a little—I gave them a little assist in this, and they have overridden Russell’s desire to hold a joint hearing. And, at the moment, he’s—by this pressure from his committee members—been forced into agreeing to hold separate hearings. The Armed Services Committee hearing, of course, would come first. The Appropriations in the Senate would follow by weeks, normally even a couple of months. I would not plan myself to handle the Appropriations hearing. McClellan would turn it into an absolute inquisition of the worst possible kind. It was bad enough last year, and it’d be far worse this year. And it’s really a personal vendetta by him against me, and there’s no reason why we have to take it or will my successor be exposed to it. So that part I could put aside. Apart from that being cut up, the rest of it is just routine to me. I don’t care, I can handle it, and I really think, quite frankly, it’s the only way to do it.

Let me call you back—

Sure.

—after I check with him—

The reason I—the only reason for my call—to bother you at the moment is that I haven’t said a word to [L. Mendel] Rivers [D–South Carolina] or [George H.] Mahon [D–Texas], [President Johnson acknowledges] and I don’t want to until you decide what you want me to do.[note 5] L. Mendel Rivers was a U.S. representative [D–South Carolina] from January 1941 to December 1970. George H. Mahon was a U.S. representative [D–Texas] from January 1935 to January 1979, and chair of the House Appropriations Committee from April 1964 to January 1979.

Yeah. Well, now, when is this supposed to take place?

Well, normally it would start next week, roughly a day or two after your budget message goes up, and that would be, let’s say, just Thursday. Russell’s ready to start on Thursday, and I would be prepared to start on Thursday if you want me to. If you don’t want me to, we’ll make some other arrangements, and there would be some delay because others would have to take time to get prepared. But I’ve got all the work in, I think, damn good shape, with this coming—going to press tonight and being off the press in the morning in classified form. The next step is to get an unclassified version of it, about 180 pages long. We’ll have that by Monday or Tuesday next week, and then everything’s done as far as putting on paper the program, the thoughts, the justification, and so on.

I think that—I’ll call you back shortly, but—sometime this morning—but I think that that’s my feeling, unless I change—unless I—it does create more of a problem than I hope it will, that’s the way we’ll go—

It’d be my strong recommendation.

The next thing: I think you ought to try to see that the Armed Services are fully briefed. Their statement’s awfully wild on this other thing, [McNamara acknowledges] and I don’t know how much you know. I’m rather disappointed we don’t know more, and I don’t quite understand this fellow’s [Lloyd M. “Pete” Bucher] action.[note 6] Lloyd M. “Pete” Bucher was commander of the USS Pueblo. And I was concerned with all the radio reports this morning: He called for help, and we wouldn’t respond, although we had airplanes a half hour from there. Now, that’s Russell and folks like that—

We got—I think we’ve got that turned around. The newspapers this morning are very good, Mr. President. [President Johnson acknowledges throughout.] And the radio reports I heard at seven o’clock were good. We turned it around last night. You called Walt [W. Rostow], and Walt called me about 8:30, and we had it turned around in half an hour after that.[note 7] Walt W. Rostow was an MIT economist; deputy national security adviser from January 1961 to November 1961; counselor of the State Department and chair of the Policy Planning Council from 1961 to 1966; and national security adviser from February 1966 to January 1969. On the AP [Associated Press]—it was the AP wire that caused the initial problem, and the reporter here got the information in the Pentagon. I think he got it right, but any case, he wrote it wrong. And whether we gave it to him wrong, or he misunderstood it, we changed it within half an hour.

Mm-hmm.

And I think we’re all right on that front—

Well, now, to answer, on half an hour, those were armed, and we couldn’t—[speaking over McNamara] they weren’t available, is that right?

No, no. My point was within half an hour after 8:30 last night—

No, no, I mean Russell’s statement. He doesn’t—Russell, in effect, said this morning, and they’ve [McNamara acknowledges throughout] been repeating it twice on TV and a half a dozen times on the radio since 5:30. I’ve been listening to it. I started to call you at seven [o’clock]. I said, “Well, now, he’ll be late five minutes and that’ll embarrass him [McNamara laughs] that he’s been here seven years, and I’ve never missed him, and I don’t want to take any chances on it—"

[both laughing] I was here at five after seven [o’clock] this morning.[note 8] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary.

But Russell said that what he could not understand, that from the time the man got in trouble [McNamara acknowledges throughout] until he was towed in—there is two hours that he did ask for help, we didn’t respond, although we had planes in a half hour from him. Now, as I understand it, the planes that we had close by South Korea were loaded and couldn’t be unloaded in time. Is that a correct statement?

That's—that’s absolutely correct.

Now, second, the man never did ask for help.

Sure.

Is that a correct statement?

Correct.

Now, third, do you have any—what’s your speculation on what happened to him?

Mr. President, I honestly don’t know, and I called [Nicholas deB.] Nick [Katzenbach] this morning, and later Walt, and said, “I think we need a Cuban Missile Crisis approach to this.”[note 9] Nicholas deB. “Nick” Katzenbach was assistant U.S. attorney general from 1961 to 1962; deputy U.S. attorney general from April 1962 to January 1965; acting U.S. attorney general from September 1964 to January 1965; U.S. attorney general from February 1965 to October 1966; and U.S. under secretary of state from October 1966 to January 1969. [President Johnson acknowledges.] And goddamn it, we ought to get locked in a room, and you ought to keep us there, insist we stay there until we come up with answers to three questions: What was the [North] Korean objective? Why did they do it? Secondly, what are they going to do now? Blackmail us? Let it go? You know, what? And thirdly, what should we do now? And there are a whole series of things we’ve thought of here: quarantine them, steal one of their ships, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. But we just have got to act quickly. I don’t think we can let the day go by before reporting to you our at least tentative views on those three questions.[note 10] End of 2021 revisions.

I told Walt that I thought we ought to have done that beginning two o’clock night before last—

Well, I think—

—and yesterday—

I think you’re right.

—and then today, too.

I think you’re right—

And I just hope that they will, quickly as you can. I don’t want to get any—confuse it, but I’m ready anytime any of you’re avail—

We’re meeting at 10:30 this morning. We’ll have [Richard M.] Dick Helms, [Earle G.] Bus Wheeler, Nick, Paul Nitze, Paul [C.] Warnke, Walt, [President Johnson acknowledges] [Samuel D.] Sam Berger—[note 11] Richard M. “Dick” Helms was deputy director for plans at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from February 1962 to April 1965; deputy director of the CIA from April 1965 to June 1966; and director of the CIA from July 1966 to February 1973. Gen. Earle G. “Bus” Wheeler was chief of staff of the U.S. Army from October 1962 to July 1964, and chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1964 to July 1970. Paul C. Warnke was general counsel to Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara in 1967, and U.S. assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs from 1967 to 1969. Samuel D. “Sam” Berger was U.S. ambassador to South Korea from 1961 to 1963; U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs from July 1965 to February 1968; and U.S. deputy ambassador to South Vietnam from 1968 to 1972.

If Clifford’s got any time, I’d call him in there—

Sure.

—because he’ll be trying—he ought to learn it—

Sure.

—because it’s going to be heavy. OK.

Fine.

I’ll call you.

Thank you.