—which I think ought to be at night, not during the middle of the day, ‘cause I think, you know, people look at it. I advance a proposition of this type: you say that you have said to the American people that you want this settled by diplomatic means, if possible. You have also said that the ship and crew must be returned, and you adhere to that statement. Now, you are prepared, if the ship and crew are returned promptly, to then submit that we—you would say that we are satisfied on the basis of incontrovertible evidence, which has been now made public, that this ship was in international waters. Nevertheless, you are prepared to submit the entire matter, after the ship and crew are returned, to the International Court of Justice and abide by the results. If our case is not what we said it was, we would make appropriate reparations to them. If our case was as we said it was, they should make appropriate reparations to us.

It would seem to me that such a statement from you—they’ll turn it down, Mr. President. Although in one instance—I’ve been researching the precedents over the weekend—there was a situation in the Corfu Channel case where Britain and Albania got into a problem about intrusion upon international waters, and where the Albanians mined the Corfu Channel. And they agreed at that time it should go to the Court—the British ship was damaged—and the Court ordered the Albanians to pay damages.

Now, there is great virtue—you know, our public and world opinion believes very much in the judicial process. All fair-minded people think, “Submit matters to courts, and courts decide it.”[note 1] Judge Goldberg had served as an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1962 to 1965. A proposition like that, put by you in a solemn declaration to the American people and to world opinion, would, I think, have a tremendous impact. Anybody who would then say that you were not acting with restraint, etc., could not say it. This is a far better proposal than [Michael J.] Mike Mansfield’s [D–Montana] silly proposal that, [President Johnson chuckles] even though the ship was in international waterways, we ought to lie to get our men back.[note 2] Michael J. “Mike” Mansfield was a U.S. senator [D–Montana] from January 1953 to January 1977, and Senate Majority Leader from January 1961 to January 1977.

Mmm.

That’s just asinine.

Mm-hmm.

But for you to put a proposal saying that you return our men and ship; however, we undertake—we will put the case to the International Court. We’re prepared to do it, promptly upon the return, and we will abide the results of that decision. Now, there’s a Russian on the court, so they can’t say the court’s stacked against them, and a Pole. But on the whole, the court is pretty not badly disposed.

How many are on the court?

Now, let me see.

[aside] Give me the number for [unclear].

Fourteen, I think. I haven’t got the exact number, but we could—I can easily get it for you. [President Johnson acknowledges throughout.] Here isn’t bad from our standpoint. It’s got Latin Americans, it’s got the Australians, it’s got British judges, it’s got—we’ve got a good judge in [Philip C.] Phil Jessup.[note 3] Philip C. “Phil” Jessup was a judge on the International Court of Justice from 1960 to 1969. I don’t think we would do badly. And our evidence, the one we have been developing, is good evidence.

Where does this court sit? Geneva?

In Hague, [President Johnson acknowledges throughout] and we would—we’d have to invoke the court. They sit whenever their jurisdiction is invoked. And we would—you could say we would ask the court as a matter of urgency to make this determination.

Mm-hmm. Did you talk to [Dean] Rusk or [Nicholas] Nick [Katzenbach] about it?[note 4] Dean Rusk was U.S. secretary of state from January 1961 to January 1969. Nicholas “Nick” Katzenbach was assistant U.S. attorney general from 1961 to 1962; deputy U.S. attorney general from April 1962 to January 1965; acting U.S. attorney general from September 1964 to January 1965; U.S. attorney general from February 1965 to October 1966; and U.S. under secretary of state from October 1966 to January 1969.

[with President Johnson acknowledging] No, I have not yet talked to anybody, ‘cause I didn’t want to start anything without . . .

Yeah, I think it’s worthy of pursuing. I wish you would talk to him.

All right. [Unclear.]

I’ll talk to him later into the day.

Fine.

I think that would be very good. I think you did well up there.

Yeah.

Now, what do you do tomorrow?

I’m—as far as I’m concerned, if we cannot get some agreement, which I doubt we can get, I’m going to kind of wind up this exercise. [President Johnson acknowledges.] I’m not going to put a resolution forward, which we won’t—you know, would be vetoed. That isn’t going to help us.

Mm-hmm.

And push the Russians to a veto. So that my view would be that I would—we’ve done, I think, what we ought to do down here, and that is, we have stated our case. And now the responsibility is on the [U.N. Security] Council to come out with a . . . some help.

What are they going to do?

Not a damn thing, just between us. [President Johnson acknowledges throughout.] They’ll fiddle around, but I’ll know better today. I’ll see the Russian today, and see if I can get a reading from him that’s any different from what [Llewellyn E.] Tommy [Thompson] has got in Moscow.[note 5] Llewellyn E. “Tommy” Thompson Jr. was U.S. ambassador to Moscow from July 1957 to July 1962 and January 1967 to January 1969, and an ambassador-at-large of the U.S. Department of State from July 1962 to December 1966. I’ll put it straight to him: “Do you fellows want to defuse the situation? Then you ought to put your weight to set a simple”—what I have in mind is to say to him, “Don’t—you don’t have to have a resolution. Let’s get the president of the council to propose that the—there be the ship, and so on, be returned, and say the council will be prepared to carry on further to consider the matter,” and so on. But I know, as I read the telegrams, I doubt that the Russians would agree to anything. And then we’d let it be known that this is the reason why they can’t do anything. I don’t want to risk a resolution. See, we got a good vote on inscription, and I think it’s much better to let it be where everybody is trying to use some—individually, some diplomatic pressure.[note 6] By “inscription,” Goldberg refers to the U.N. Security Council vote on whether to place the Pueblo incident on its agenda.

What’d you lose? Three votes?

On the resolution itself?

On the inscription, yeah.

On the inscription, we just lost three votes: [President Johnson acknowledges throughout] Russia, Hungary, and Algeria. Now, that’s a pretty good posture to leave it in. I wouldn’t want to lose support as we go down the line. So that [President Johnson sighs] —but I’ll have a better reading. I’m going to send all these—

Talk to Nick or Dean. Let them get into this and think. We’re going to have to do something when you get through there, and we sure don’t want to be—we don’t even have our people out there. We couldn’t do anything if we wanted to militarily, so we’re going to have to do something in between.

That’s right, and this would—of course, the best avenue out there—I don’t know whether you saw this. I prodded our people to respond quickly. The best avenue out there to get our boys back is this Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee.

Yeah, they’re working on that carefully.

Yes. We got them working now. Now, they’re—those—that consists of the Swedes, the Swiss, the Poles, and the Czechs . . . and we sent a wire last night to get them working. They—the—see, the—I—it’s very important—if you haven’t seen the message, you might ask Walt [W. Rostow] to get it for you—to see that the North Koreans sent a message through that commission.[note 7] Walt W. Rostow was an MIT economist; deputy national security adviser from January 1961 to November 1961; counselor of the State Department and chair of the Policy Planning Council from 1961 to 1966; and national security adviser from February 1966 to January 1969.

Yeah, we’ve read it, and we’ve replied.

You read it?

Yeah, we replied.

I didn’t know. There was so much traffic.

Yeah, we read it, and we replied.

And you saw the reply?

Yeah, yeah.

Yes. That’s the best avenue—

[speaking over Goldberg] We worked on it. We worked on it all afternoon—

[with President Johnson acknowledging] Yeah, well, I should have realized that you’d be on top of that.

Here’s one they’re just trying to get out to Seoul now, and reply to some of their worries. They just sent it in while you called. “We fully understand the nature of the problem. We believe we can meet all of them with the following approach. It is apparent North Korea has now realized the full possible consequences of their actions. The Soviets have almost certainly told them to defuse the situation. The easiest way for them to immediately ease the acute tension and anger is to return the Pueblo crew, and possibly vessel.”[note 8] President Johnson paraphrases a draft of a “Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea,” 28 January 1968, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Part 1, Korea, ed. Karen L. Gatz (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2000), 29: doc. 237.

Right.

[reading aloud] “It is imperative in ROK [Republic of Korea] and our interest that nothing be done to interfere with this, that we would make it as easy as possible for them to get off the hook. To raise assassination and raider problems, as you suggested at the same meeting, would only complicate and delay solution to all of our problems. The North Koreans will probably talk to us and try to humiliate us and ROK. If they do, we should let them rant and ignore it. The velvet glove approach is the best for their steel fist in it, and the North Koreans know it. We should not call their attention to it or make any threats, or at this juncture even call excessive attention to the gravity of the situation. They know how grave it is. We should be businesslike and noncontentious. We expect the first round of talks will produce the release of the crew. Admiral [John V.] Smith should try to obtain the vessel as well.[note 9] Vice Admiral John V. Smith was assistant chief of naval operations for plans and policy from 1966 to 1967, and a commander of Pacific forces in the 1970s. The North Koreans may ask UNCMAC [United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission, Korea] to sign a receipt for the men, as they did in the helicopter case, on which it is written a confession of guilt that they were engaged in espionage and violated territorial waters. UNCMAC should, repeat, not be drawn into polemics and only state quietly that North Koreans have their view of the matter, and we have ours, but he is not, repeat, not signing any statement of this kind.

“If they insist on apology, we should reply all our data indicate no, repeat, no violation. If after our crew is released, and we talk with [Lloyd M. “Pete”] Bucher and other crew members, we find the vessel was within the territorial waters claimed by North Korea, we’ll make this fact public.[note 10] Lloyd M. “Pete” Bucher was commander of the USS Pueblo.

“As to our further strategy to deal with the vessel if they do not release it, and our ROK problem, we intend to continue with the buildup of air and naval forces, even if the crew is released. Under cover of this, we will ask for further senior-level meeting of UNCMAC to continue the dialogue.

“As soon as the men are released, or if the release is long delayed, an announcement will be made of our intention to keep augmented force in the area in view of North Korean campaign against the ROK. Also, you may tell Park [Chung-hee] we are considering substantial additional MAP [Military Assistance Program] for ROK to strengthen their anti-infiltration and military forces.[note 11] Park Chung-hee was president of South Korea from December 1963 to October 1979. President Johnson says “inflation,” but likely means “infiltration.” This information is for Park alone and must not be published in any way. This will give ample assurance to Park and his military leaders and people of our concern and interest. We’ll also announce that two destroyers be provided to Korea, with date of delivery of the first. President Park is a military man. He is wise and a realist, and the approach to him should be made in these terms: The enemy is about to retreat from one of its exposed positions. When we take that, we will move on the next ones. You can tell Park that we will airlift available counter-infiltration items as practical, and we will give this program prioritiy as we give Vietnam.

“You should see Park soonest to outline our strategy. Admiral Smith’s message should be held for the time being. If Park objects to our approach, we shall send a presidential message back in effort to further prevail on him. On the letter to be sent to MAC [Military Assistance Commission, United Nations Command, Korea] revise paragraph five as follows: ‘It has been suggested that further delays—details could be obtained through direct contact between both sides. I therefore request that the names of the injured and dead be provided to us through the Joint Duty Officers. Further, I request an immediate meeting of the senior members of both sides to discuss the modalities for resolving this matter promptly. We suspect the North Koreans will want a private meeting initially and perhaps throughout, and under cover of that would say, U.S. insisted on private meeting where we confessed our sins. You should make clear in initial contact, we’re prepared to agree to either open or closed sessions, whichever they wish.’”

I think that’s very good. I have—

I see nothing inconsistent with it, though, [Goldberg acknowledges] with what you suggest. Looks like it fits in pretty well.

No, it fits in very well.

You do that, and I’ll be back in touch with you.

Thank you, and—

You talk to them.

—I have the Korean ambassador coming in to see me—

All right.

—and I’ll follow the same line.

Thank you. Bye, now.

Thank you.