Find anything new?

Nothing on the additional film, sir. We have a much better readout on what we had initially.

There’s good evidence that there are back up missiles for each of the four launchers at each of the three sites, so that there would be twice the number, for a total of eight which could eventually be erected. This would mean a capability of from 16 or possibly 24 missiles.

We feel, on the basis of information that we presently have, that these are solid propellant, inertial guidance missiles with 1,100-mile range, rather than the oxygen propellant [and] radar controlled [type]. Primarily because we have no indication of any radar, or any indication of any oxygen equipment. And it would appear to be logical from an intelligence estimate viewpoint that if they are going to this much trouble, that they would go ahead and put in the 1,100 miles because of the tremendously increased threat coverage. I’ll let you see the map.

What is this map?

That shows the circular range capability.

When was this drawn? Is this drawn in relation to this information?

No, sir. It was drawn in some time ago, I believe. But the ranges there are the nominal ranges of the missiles rather than the maximum. That’s a 1,020 [mile] circle, as against 1,100.

Well, I was just wondering whether . . . San Diego de los Baños is where these missiles are?

Yes, sir.

Well, I wonder how many of these [maps] have been printed out.

The circle is drawn in red ink on the map, Mr. President.

Oh, I see. It was never printed?

No, that’s on top.

I see. It isn’t printed.

It would appear that with this type of missile, with the solid propellant and inertial guidance system, that they could well be operational within two weeks, as we look at the pictures now. And once operational they could fire on very little notice. They’ll have a refire rate of from four to six hours, for each launcher.

What about the vulnerability of such a missile to bullets?

Highly vulnerable, Mr. President.

They’re vulnerable. They’re not nearly as vulnerable as the oxygen propellant, but they are vulnerable to ordinary rifle fire.

We have no evidence whatsoever of any nuclear warhead storage near the field launchers. However, ever since last February we have been observing an unusual facility which now has automatic antiaircraft weapon protection. This is at Bejucal. There are some similarities but also many points of dissimilarity between this particular facility and the national [nuclear] storage sites in the Soviet Union. It’s the best candidate for a site, and we have that marked for further surveillance. However, there is really totally inadequate evidence to say that there is a nuclear storage capability now.

These are field-type launchers. They have mobile support, erection, and check-out equipment. And they have a four-in-line deployment pattern in launchers which is identical, complexes about five miles apart, representative of the deployments that we note in the Soviet Union for similar missiles.

General, how long would you say we had before these, at least to the best of your ability for the ones we now know, will be ready to fire?

Well our people estimate that these could be fully operational within two weeks. This would be the total complex. If they’re the oxygen type, we have no . . . it would be considerably longer, since we don’t have any indication of oxygen refueling there, nor any radars.

This wouldn’t rule out the possibility that one of them might be operational very much sooner.

Well, one of them could be operational much sooner. Our people feel that this has been being put in since, probably, early September. We have had two visits of a Soviet ship that has an eight-foot hold capacity sideways. And this, about so far, is the only delivery vehicle that we would have any suspicion that they came in on. And that came in late August, and one in early September.

Why would they have to be sideways though?

Well, it’s just easier to get them in, I guess.

Well, that’s fine.

The total readout on the flights yesterday will be ready tonight, you think?

It should be finished pretty well by midnight.

Now wasn’t that supposed to have covered the whole island? Was it?

Yes, sir. In two throws [flight paths].

Except for . . .

But part of the central and, in fact, much of the central and part of the eastern [portions of Cuba] was cloud covered. The western half was in real good shape.

I see. Now what have we got laying on for tomorrow?

There are seven, six or seven—

I just left General Carroll.[note 2] General Joseph Carroll, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. We’re having ready seven U-2 aircraft: two high-altitude U-2s, five lesser-altitude U-2s; six equipped with an old-type film, one equipped with a new type, experimental film, which hopefully will increase the resolution.

We only need two aircraft flying tomorrow if the weather is good. We will put up only two if the weather is good. If the weather is not good, we’ll start off with two and we’ll have the others ready to go during the day as the weather improves. We have weather aircraft surrounding the periphery of Cuba, and we’ll be able to keep track of the weather during the day over all parts of the island. Hopefully, this will give us complete coverage tomorrow. We are planning to do this, or have the capability to do this, every day thereafter for an indefinite period.

This is a field-type missile. And from collateral evidence, not direct, that we have with the Soviet Union, it’s designed to be fielded, placed, and fired in six hours.

It would appear that we have caught this in a very early stage of deployment. It would also appear that there does not seem to be the degree of urgency in getting them immediately in the position. This could be because they have not been surveyed. Or it could also be because it is the shorter-range missile, and the radars and the oxygen have not yet arrived.

There isn’t any question in your mind, however, that it is an intermediate-range [actually medium-range] missile?

No. There’s no question in our minds at all. These are all the characteristics that we have seen with live ones.

You’ve seen actual missiles themselves and not just the boxes, have you?

No, we’ve seen . . . in the picture there is an actual missile.

Yeah. Sure there is [tone is serious, not sarcastic].

Yes. There’s no question in our mind, sir. And they are genuine. They are not a camouflage or covert attempt to fool us.

How much do we know, Pat? I don’t mean to go behind your judgment here, except that there’s one thing that would be really catastrophic, [which] would be to make a judgment here on a bad guess as to whether these things are . . . We mustn’t do that.

How do we really know what these missiles are, and what their range is?

Only that from the readout that we have now, and in the judgment of our analysts, and of the Guided Missile and Astronautics Committee which has been convening all afternoon, these signatures are identical with those that we have clearly earmarked in the Soviet Union, and have fully verified.[note 3] The Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) was another interagency committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board.

What made the verification? That’s really my question. How do we know what a given Soviet missile will do?

We know something from the range firings that we have vetted for the past two years. And we know also from comparison with the characteristics of our own missiles as to size and length and diameter. As to these particular missiles, we have a family of Soviet missiles for which we have all accepted the specifications.

I know that we have accepted them, and I know that we’ve had these things in charts for years. But I don’t know how we know.

Well, we know from a number of sources, including our IRONBARK sources, as well as from range firings which we have been vetting for several years, as to the capabilities.[note 4] The word IRONBARK was a codeword for information passed to the United States by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, an officer in Soviet military intelligence. Penkovsky had already fallen under suspicion and was arrested six days later (on 22 October, Washington time). He was later executed by the Soviet government. But I would have to get the analysts in here to give you the play-by-play account.

Pat, we don’t know of any 65-foot Soviet missile that has a range of, say, 15 miles, do we?

Fifteen miles? No, we certainly don’t.

In other words, if they are missiles this size, they are missiles of considerable range, I think.

I tried to prove today—I am satisfied—that these were not MRBMs. And I worked long on it. I got our experts out, and I could not find evidence that would support any conclusion other than that they are MRBMs. Now, whether they’re 1,100 miles, 600 miles, 900 miles is still a guess in my opinion. But that they are MRBMs seems the most probable assumption at the moment.

I would apparently agree, given the weight of it.

Is General Taylor coming over?

He is, Mr. President.

Have you finished, General?

Yes, sir. I think that’s it.

Mr. President, we’ve had some further discussions with people this afternoon and we’ll be working on it, probably this evening. But I might mention certain points that some of us are concerned about.

The one is the chance that this might be the issue on which Castro would elect to break with Moscow if he knew that he were in deadly jeopardy. Now this is one chance in a hundred, possibly. But in any event we are very much interested in the possibility of a direct message to Castro, as well as Khrushchev, [which] might make some sense here before an actual strike is put on. Mr. Martin, perhaps you would outline the kind of message to Castro that we had in mind.

This would be an oral note, message through a third party, first describing just what we know about what exists in the missile sites, so that he knows that we are informed about what’s going on.

Second, to point out that the issues this raises as far as U.S. security is concerned: It’s a breach of two of the points that you have made public. First the ground-to-ground missile and, second, and obviously, it’s a Soviet-operated base in Cuba.

Thirdly, this raises the greatest problems for Castro, as we see it. In the first place, by this action the Soviets have threatened him with attack from the United States, and therefore the overthrow of his regime— used his territory to put him in this jeopardy. And secondly the Soviets are talking to other people about the possibility of bargaining this support and these missiles against concessions in Berlin and elsewhere, and therefore are threatening to bargain him away. In these circumstances, we wonder whether he realizes the position that he’s been put in and the way the Soviets are using him.

Then go on to say that we will have to inform our people of the threat that exists here, and we mean to take action about it in the next day or so. And we’ll have to do this unless we receive word from him that he is prepared to take action to get the Soviets out of the site. He will have to show us that, not only by statements—privately or publicly— but by action. That we intend to keep close surveillance by overflights of the site to make sure, to know, what is being done. But we will have to know that he is doing something to remove this threat, in order to withhold the action that we intend, we will be compelled, to take.

If Castro feels that an attempt by him to take the kind of action that we’re suggesting to him would result in serious difficulties for him within Cuba, we at least want him to know that, ask to convey to him and remind him of the statement that you, Mr. President, made a year and a half ago, to the effect that there are two points that are nonnegotiable. One is the Soviet tie and presence. And the second is aggression in Latin America. This is a hint, but no more than that, that we might have sympathy and help for him in case he ran into trouble trying to throw the old-line Communists and the Soviets out.

Yes.

And give him 24 hours to respond.

The disadvantage in that is, of course, the advance notice if he judges that . . . We would not, in this approach here, say exactly what we would do. But it might, of course, lead him to bring up mobile antiaircraft weapons around these missiles themselves, or take some other action that will make the strike there more difficult. But there is that move.

There are two other problems that we are concerned about. If we strike these missiles, we would expect, I think, maximum Communist reaction in Latin America. In the case of about six of those governments, unless the heads of government had some intimation requiring some preparatory steps from the security point of view, one or another of those governments could easily be overthrown. I’m thinking of Venezuela, for example, or Guatemala, Bolivia, Chile, possibly even Mexico. And therefore the question will arise as to whether we should not somehow indicate to them, in some way, the seriousness of the situation so they can take precautionary steps, whether we tell them exactly what we have in mind, or not.

The other is the NATO problem. We would estimate that the Soviets would almost certainly take some kind of action somewhere. For us to take an action of this sort without letting our closer allies know of a matter which could subject them to very great danger is a very far reaching decision to make. And we could find ourselves isolated, and the alliance crumbling, very much as it did for a period during the Suez affair, but at a moment of much greater danger over an issue of much greater danger than the Suez affair for the alliance.

I think that these are matters that we’ll be working on very hard this evening. But I think I ought to mention them because it’s necessarily a part of this problem.

Can we get a little idea about what the military thing is? Well, of course, [number] one, is to suggest taking these out.

Yes, Mr. President. General Taylor has just been with the Chiefs, and the unified commanders went through this in detail.

To take out only the missiles, or to take out the missiles and the MiG aircraft and the associated nuclear storage facilities, if we locate them, could be done in 24 hours warning. That is to say, 24 hours between the time of decision and the time of strike, starting with a time of decision no earlier than this coming Friday [October 19] and with the strike therefore on Saturday [October 20], or anytime thereafter with 24 hours between the decision and the time of strike.

General Taylor will wish to comment on this, but the Chiefs are strong in their recommendation against that kind of an attack, believing that it would leave too great a capability in Cuba undestroyed. The specific number of sorties required to accomplish this end has not been worked out in detail. The capability is for something in excess of 700 sorties per day. It seems highly unlikely that that number would be required to carry out that limited an objective, but at least that capability is available in the Air Force alone, and the Navy sorties would rise on top of that number. The Chiefs have also considered other alternatives extending into the full invasion. You may wish to discuss [that] later. But that’s the answer to your first question.

That would be taking out these three missile sites, plus all the MiGs?

Well, you can go from the three missile sites, to the three missile sites plus the MiGs, to the three missile sites plus MiGs plus nuclear storage plus airfields, and so on up through the potential offensive.

Just the three missiles [sites], however, would be—

Could be done with 24-hours notice, and would require a relatively small number of sorties. Less than a day’s air attack, in other words.

Of course, all you’d really get there would be . . . what would you get there? You’d get the, probably, you’d get the missiles themselves that have to be on the . . .

You’d get the launchers and the missiles on the—

The launchers are just what? They’re not much, are they?

No. They’re simply a mobile launch device.

This is a point target, Mr. President. You’re never sure of having, absolutely, getting everything down there. We can certainly do a great deal of damage because we can whip [unclear]. But, as the secretary says here, there was unanimity among all the commanders involved in the Joint Chiefs that, in our judgment, it would be a mistake to take this very narrow, selective target because it invited reprisal attacks and it may be detrimental.

Now if the Soviets have been willing to give nuclear warheads to these missiles, there is just as good reason for them to give a nuclear capability to these bases. We don’t think we’d ever have a chance to take them again, so that we’d lose this first strike surprise capability.

Our recommendation would be to get complete intelligence, get all the photography we need, the next two or three days—no hurry in our book. Then look at this target system. If it really threatens the United States, then take it right out with one hard crack.

That would be taking out some of those fighters, bombers, and—

Fighters, the bombers. IL-28s may turn up in this photography. It’s not at all unlikely there are some there.

Think you could do that in one day?

We think that [in] the first strike we’d get a great majority of this. We’ll never get it all, Mr. President. But we then have to come back day after day, for several days. We said five days, perhaps, to do the complete job. Meanwhile we could then be making up our mind as to whether or not to go ahead and invade the island.

I’m very much impressed with the need for a time, something like five to seven days, for this air purpose, because of the parachute aspect of the proposed invasion. You can’t take parachute formations, close formations of troop carrier planes in the face of any air opposition, really. So the first job, before there is any land attack including parachutes, is really cleaning out the MiGs and the accompanying aircraft.

Mr. President, could I outline three courses of action we have considered and speak very briefly on each one?

The first is what I would call the political course of action, in which we follow some of the possibilities that Secretary Rusk mentioned this morning by approaching Castro, by approaching Khrushchev, by discussing with our allies. An overt and open approach politically to the problem, attempting to solve it. This seemed to me likely to lead to no satisfactory result, and it almost stops subsequent military action. Because the danger of starting military action after they acquire a nuclear capability is so great, I believe we would decide against it, particularly if that nuclear capability included aircraft as well as missiles, as it well might at that point.

A second course of action we haven’t discussed, but lies in between the military course we began discussing a moment ago and the political course of action, is a course of action that would involve declaration of open surveillance: A statement that we would immediately impose a blockade against offensive weapons entering Cuba in the future and an indication that, with our open surveillance reconnaissance which we would plan to maintain indefinitely into the future, we would be prepared to immediately attack the Soviet Union in the event that Cuba made any offensive move against this country.

Attack who?

The Soviet Union. In the event that Cuba made any offensive move against this country. Now this lies short of military action against Cuba, direct military action against Cuba. It has some major defects.

But the third course of action is any one of these variants of military action directed against Cuba, starting with an air attack against the missiles. The Chiefs are strongly opposed to so limited an air attack. But even so limited an air attack is a very extensive air attack. It is not 20 sorties or 50 sorties or 100 sorties, but probably several hundred sorties. We haven’t worked out the details. It’s very difficult to do so when we lack certain intelligence that we hope to have tomorrow or the next day. But it’s a substantial air attack. And to move from that into the more extensive air attacks against the MiGs, against the airfields, against the potential nuclear storage sites, against the radar installations, against the SAM sites, means—as Max suggested—possibly 700 to 1,000 sorties per day for five days. This is the very, very rough plan that the Chiefs have outlined, and it is their judgment that that is the type of air attack that should be carried out.

To move beyond that, into an invasion following the air attack, means the application of tens of thousands, between 90 and over 150,000 men, to the invasion forces.

It seems to me almost certain that any one of these forms of direct military action will lead to a Soviet military response of some type, some place in the world. It may well be worth the price. Perhaps we should pay that. But I think we should recognize that possibility and, moreover, we must recognize it in a variety of ways.

We must recognize it by trying to deter it, which means we probably should alert SAC, probably put on an airborne alert, perhaps take other alert measures. These bring risks of their own associated with them.

It means we should recognize that by mobilization. Almost certainly, we should accompany the initial air strike with at least a partial mobilization. We should accompany an invasion following an air strike with a large-scale mobilization, a very large-scale mobilization, certainly exceeding the limits of the authority we have from Congress, requiring a declaration therefore of a national emergency.

We should be prepared, in the event of even a small air strike and certainly in the event of a larger air strike, for the possibility of a Cuban uprising, which would force our hand in some way. [It] either forces us to accept an unsatisfactory uprising, with all of the adverse comment that would result, or would force an invasion to support the uprising.

Mr. President, may I make a very brief comment on that?

I think that any course of action involves heavy political involvement. It’s going to affect all sorts of policies, positions, as well as the strategic situation. So I don’t think there’s any such thing as a nonpolitical course of action. I think also that we have to consider what political preparation, if any, is to occur before an air strike or in connection with any military action. And when I was talking this morning, I was talking about some steps which would put us in the best position to crack the strength of Cuba.

I think the difficulty, it seems to me, is . . . I completely agree that there isn’t any doubt that if we announced that there were MRBM sites going up that that would change . . . we would secure a good deal of political support after my statement. And that the fact that we indicated our desire to restrain, this really would put the burden on the Soviets.

On the other hand, the very fact of doing that makes the military . . . we lose all the advantages of our strike. Because if we announce that it’s there, then it’s quite obvious to them that we’re gonna probably do something about it, I would assume.

Now, I don’t know that. It seems to me what we ought to be thinking about tonight is: If we made an announcement that the intelligence has revealed that there are . . . If we did the note, message, to Khrushchev . . . I don’t think that Castro has to know we’ve been paying much attention to it, any more than . . . Over a period of time it might have some effect, [but] he’s not going to suddenly back down, change. I don’t think he plays it that way.

So having a note to Khrushchev. It seems to me my press statement was so clear about how we wouldn’t do anything under these conditions, and under the conditions that we would. He must know that we’re going to find out. So it seems to me he just . . .

That’s, of course, why he’s been very, very explicit with us in communications to us about how dangerous this is—

That’s right.

—in the [September 11] TASS statement and his other messages.

But he’s initiated the danger, really, hasn’t he? He’s the one that’s playing God, not us.

So we could—

And his statement to Kohler on the subject of his visit and so forth, completely hypocritical.[note 5] The U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Foy Kohler, had met with Khrushchev earlier in the morning of 16 October (Moscow time). His report on their long conversation had arrived in Washington during the afternoon (Washington time), so Rusk and others would have read the report just before this meeting. In the initial summary report of that conversation (Moscow 970, 16 October 1962), Khrushchev promised that he would not do anything to worsen relations until after the U.S. congressional elections in early November. He planned to visit New York later in November for a meeting of the U.N. General Assembly and would then renew the dialogue on Berlin and other matters. Khrushchev said the Americans “could be sure he would take no action before meeting which would make situation more difficult.”

There is a great possibility they can place them in operational conditions quickly unless, as General Carter said, the system may have a normal reaction time, set up time, of six hours. Whether it has six hours or two weeks, we don’t know how much time has started.

Nor do we know what air-launch capabilities they have for warheads. We don’t know what air-launch capability they have for high explosives. It’s almost certainly a substantial high explosive capability, in the sense that they could drop one or two or ten high-explosive bombs some place along the East Coast. And that’s the minimum risk to this country we run as a result of advance warning, too.

I’d like to stress this last point, Mr. President. We are very vulnerable to conventional bombing attack, low-level bombing attacks, in the Florida area. Our whole air defense has been oriented in other directions. We’ve never had low-level defenses prepared for this country. So it would be entirely possible for MiGs to come through with conventional weapons and do some amount, some damage.

We’re not, talking overall, not a great deal of damage. If they get one strike.

No. But it certainly is [unclear]—

What if they carry a nuclear weapon?

Well, if they carry a nuclear weapon . . . you assume they wouldn’t do that.

At minimum, I think we could expect some conventional bombing.

I would not think that they would use a nuclear weapon unless they’re prepared for general nuclear war. I just don’t see that possibility.

I would agree.

That would mean that—you know we could be just utterly wrong—but we’ve never really believed that Khrushchev would take on a general nuclear war over Cuba.

May I ask a question in that context?

We certainly have been wrong about what he’s trying to do in Cuba. There isn’t any doubt about that. Not many of us thought that he was going to put MRBMs on Cuba.

No. Except John McCone.

Mr. McCone.

Yeah.

But the question that I would like to ask is, quite aside from what we’ve said and we’re very hard locked on to it, I know: What is the strategic impact on the position of the United States of MRBMs in Cuba? How gravely does this change the strategic balance?

Mac, I asked the Chiefs that this afternoon, in effect. They said: “Substantially.” My own personal view is: Not at all.

Not so much.

And I think this is an important element here. But it’s all very . . .

The reason our estimators didn’t think that they’d put them in there, is because of—[note 7] Carter was referring to the Special National Intelligence Estimate, “The Military Buildup in Cuba,” of September 19, which had concluded that the Soviet Union “could derive considerable military advantage” from deploying MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba but that such a development was incompatible with Soviet practice and policy because “it would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in U.S.-Soviet relations than the U.S.S.R. has displayed thus far. . . .” in CIA Documents, McAuliffe, document 33.

That’s what they said themselves in [the] TASS statement.

That’s what they said themselves. But then, going behind that—

But why? Didn’t they think they’d be valuable enough?

Doesn’t improve anything in the strategic balance.

Doesn’t improve anything. That was what the estimators felt, and that the Soviets would not take the risk.[note 8] Carter was partly in error. In fact, as indicated in the previous note, the estimators thought the deployment would improve the Soviet military position. This was a unanimous view in the intelligence community. Every lower-level expert, whether in State, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the armed forces, or the CIA, all believed (and separately wrote) that MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba would materially improve the Soviet position in the strategic balance of power.

Mr. McCone’s reasoning, however, was: If this is so, then what possible reason have they got for going into Cuba in the manner in which they are, with surface-to-air missiles and cruise-type missiles? He just couldn’t understand why the Soviets were so heavily bolstering Cuba’s defensive posture. There must be something behind it. Which led him then to the belief that they must be coming in with MRBMs.

I think from a cold-blooded point of view, Mr. President, you’re quite right in saying that these are just a few more missiles targeted on the United States. However, they can become a very, rather important, adjunct and reinforcement to the strike capability of the Soviet Union. We have no idea how far they will go.

But more than that, these are, to our nation it means a great deal more, as we all are aware, if they have them in Cuba and not over in the Soviet Union.

Oh, I ask the question with an awareness of the political . . . [chuckles]

Well, let’s say . . . I understand, but let’s just say that they get these in there. And then you can’t . . . They get sufficient capacity, so we can’t . . . with warheads. Then you don’t want to knock them out because that’s too much of a gamble.

Then they just begin to build up those air bases there, and then put more and more. I suppose they really . . . Then they start getting ready to squeeze us in Berlin. Doesn’t that . . . ?

You may say it doesn’t make any difference if you get blown up by an ICBM flying from the Soviet Union or one from 90 miles away. Geography doesn’t mean that much. . . .

We would have to target them with our missiles and have the same kind of pistol pointed at the head situation as they have in the Soviet Union at the present time.

No question. If this thing goes on, an attack on Cuba becomes general war. And that’s really the question: Whether . . .

That’s why it shows the Bay of Pigs was really right. If we had done it right. That was [a choice between] better and better, and worse and worse.

I’m impressed with this, Mr. President. We have a war plan over there for you. [It] calls for a quarter of a million American soldiers, marines, and airmen to take an island we launched 1,800 Cubans against, a year and a half ago. We’ve changed our evaluations about it.

Of course, the other problem is in South America a year from now. And the fact that you’ve got these things in the hands of Cubans here, and then, say, some problem arises in Venezuela. And you’ve got Castro saying: “You move troops down into that part of Venezuela; we’re going to fire these missiles.” [Unclear interjection by Douglas Dillon.] I think that’s the difficulty, rather than the [unclear]. I think it gives the [unclear] image.

It makes them look like they’re coequal with us. And that . . .

We’re scared of the Cubans.

We let the . . . I mean, like, we’d hate to have it in the hands of the Chinese.

I agree with that sort of thing very strongly.

It’s a psychological factor. It won’t reach as far as Venezuela is concerned.

Well, that’s—

It’ll reach the U.S., though. This is the point.

Yeah. That is the point.

Yeah. The psychological factor of our having taken it.

Taken it. That’s the best [way of putting it].

Well, and the fact that if you go there, we’re gonna fire it.

What’s that again, Ed? What are you saying?

Well, it’s a psychological factor that we have sat back and let them do it to us. That is more important than the direct threat. It is a threat in the Caribbean. . . .

I said we weren’t going to [allow it].

That’s something we could manage.

Last month I said we weren’t going to [allow it]. Last month I should have said that we don’t care. But when we said we’re not going to, and then they go ahead and do it, and then we do nothing, then I would think that our risks increase.

I agree, what difference does it make? They’ve got enough to blow us up now anyway. I think it’s just a question of . . . After all, this is a political struggle as much as military.

Well, so where are we now? Where is the . . . ? I don’t think the message to Castro’s got much in it.

Let’s just try to get an answer to this question: How much . . . ? It’s quite obviously to our advantage to surface this thing to a degree before . . . first to inform these governments in Latin America, as the Secretary suggests. Secondly, let the NATO people who have the right to some warning: Macmillan, de Gaulle. How much does this diminish . . . ? Not [telling them] that we’re going to do anything, but the existence of them, without any say about what we’re gonna do.

Let’s say, 24 hours ahead of our doing something about it, we inform Macmillan. We make a public statement that these have been found on the island. That would be a notification, in a sense, of their existence and everybody could draw whatever conclusion they wanted to.

I would say this, Mr. President. That I would . . . that if you’ve made a public statement, you’ve got to move immediately, or you’re going to have a [unclear] in this country.

Oh, I understand that. We’ll be talking about . . . Say we’re going to move on a Saturday. And we would say on a Friday that these MRBMs, that the existence of this, presents the gravest threat to our security and that appropriate action must be taken.

Could you stick planes over them? And say you made the announcement at six, Saturday morning? And at the same time, or simultaneously, put planes over to make sure that they weren’t taking any action or movement and that you could move in if they started moving in the missiles in place or something. You would move in and knock . . . That would be the trigger that you would move your planes in and knock them out. Otherwise you’d wait until six or five that night. I don’t . . . is that . . . ?

I don’t think anything like that [would work]. I can’t visualize doing it successfully that way. I think that anything that shows our intent to strike is going to flush the airplanes and the missiles into concealment. These are really mobile missiles.

They can just put them—

They can be pulled in under trees and forest and disappear almost at once, as I visualize it.

And they can also be readied, perhaps, between the time we, in effect, say we’re going to come in and the time we do come in. This is a very very great danger to this coast. I don’t know exactly how to appraise it, because I don’t know the readiness period, but it is possible that these are field missiles. And then in that case they can be readied very promptly if they choose to do so.

These are field missiles, sir. They are mobile-support type missiles.

About a 40-minute countdown. Something like that’s been estimated.

So you would say that the strike should precede any public discussion?

I believe so, yes. If you’re going to strike. I think, before you make any announcements, you should decide whether you’re going to strike. If you are going to strike, you shouldn’t make an announcement.

That’s right.

What is the advantage of the announcement earlier? Because it’s to build up sympathy, or something, for doing it. But you get the simultaneous announcement of what was there, and why you struck, with pictures and all—I believe would serve the same [purpose].

Well, the only advantage is it’s a kind of ultimatum in which there is an opportunity of a response which would preclude it [the strike]. I mean it’s more for the appearance than for the reality. Because obviously you’re not going to get that kind of response.

But I would suppose that there is a course which is a little different, which is a private message from the President to the prime . . . to . . .

To Macmillan and to de Gaulle.

And that you’re going to have to do this. You’re compelled, and you’ve got to move quickly, and you want them to know it. Maybe two hours before the strike, something like that, even the night before.

Well, that’s different.

But it has to be kept on that basis of total secrecy. And then the question of what you do with these Latin American governments is another matter. I think if you notify them in advance, it may be all over.

That’s right. They could take . . .

The Congress would take; [we would have to take] the Congress along.

I think that’s just not right.

I’m not completely . . . I don’t think we ought to abandon just knocking out these missile bases, as opposed to . . . That’s a much more defensible [and] explicable, politically, or satisfactory in every way, action than the general strike which takes us into the city of Havana, and it is plain to me, takes us into much more hazardous . . . shot down . . .

Now, I know the Chiefs say: “Well, that means their bombers can take off against us.” But . . .

Their bombers take off against us. Then they have made a general war against Cuba of it, which then becomes much more their decision.

We move this way and the political advantages are very strong, it seems to me, of the small strike. It corresponds to “the punishment fits the crime” in political terms. We are doing only what we warned repeatedly and publicly we would have to do. We are not generalizing the attack. The things that we’ve already recognized and said that we have not found it necessary to attack, and said we would not find it necessary to attack . . .

Well, here’s . . . Let’s look, tonight. It seems to me we ought to go on the assumption that we’re going to have the general, number two we would call it, course number two, which would be a general strike and that you ought to be in position to do that, then, if you decide you’d like to do number one.

I agree.

Does that encompass an invasion?

No. I’d say that’s the third course.

Let’s first start with, I’d just like to first find out, the air, so that I would think that we ought to be in position to do [options] one and two, which would be:

One would be just taking out these missiles and whatever others we’d find in the next 24 hours.

Number two would be to take out all the airplanes.

And number three is to invade.

Well, they’d have to take out the SAM sites also, Mr. President.

OK, but that would be in two, included in number two. Of course, that’s a terrifically difficult—

Well, that may be [option] three and invasion [is option] four.

In order to get in to get the airfields, there’s a certain number we’d have to get.

Well, isn’t there a question whether any of the SAM sites are operational?

We’re not sure yet.

OK. Well, let’s say we’ve decided we’re going the whole way. So let’s say that number two is the SAM sites plus the air.

It’s actually to clear the air, to win the air battle.

Yeah, well, whatever.

Now, it seems to me we ought to be preparing now, in the most covert way, to do one and two, with the freedom to make the choice about number one depending on what information we have on it. I don’t know what kind of moves that requires, and how much is that going to . . . ?

Mr. President, it requires no action other than what’s been started. And you can make a decision prior to the start, Saturday or any time thereafter.

Well, where do we put all these planes?

You recall we have this problem, Mr. President. We’re going to get new intelligence that will be coming in from these flights and that’s gonna have to be cranked into any strike plans we’re preparing. So there is that factor of time. The Secretary has given you the minimum time to make a decision now, so that we can brief the pilots and then crank in the new intelligence. I would point out that—

If I may, Max, to answer the question you asked: As I understand it, we don’t have to decide now we’re going to do it. All we have to decide is if we want Sweeney to be prepared to do it.[note 9] General Walter Sweeney, commander of USAF Tactical Air Command. Sweeney had earlier been placed in charge of all tactical strike planning under the relevant operational CINC, which was CINCLANT (Admiral Dennison).

That’s correct.

And Sweeney has said that he will take the tape that comes in tomorrow and process it Thursday and Friday [October 18 and19] and prepare the mission folders for strikes on Saturday [October 20] or earlier, every day thereafter.

Yes. The point is that we’ll have to brief pilots. We’re holding that back. And there’ll be, I would say, 400 pilots will have to go to be briefed in the course of this. So I’m just saying this is widening the whole military scope of this thing very materially, if that’s what we’re supposed to do at this time.

Well, now, when do we start briefing the pilots?

They’ll need at least 24 hours on that, when this new intelligence comes in.

In other words, then, until tomorrow. All I was thinking of—at least until—

Can they be briefed in such a way that they’re secure? They have no access to—

Let’s go back just a second, now. The President does not have to make any decision until 24 hours before the strike, except the decision to be prepared. And the process of preparation will not, in itself, run the risk of overt disclosure of the preparation.

Doesn’t it imply briefing, the preparation?

It does, but—

It implies the preparation of mission folders.

Say, 24 hours before they go, they start a briefing.

I’d like to say this, Mr. President, the more time you can give, the better. Because they can then do a lot more rehearsing and checking out of all these pilots. So, while I accept the time cycle, I—

Well, now, let’s say you give a pilot . . . I mean, how does he find his way down to a SAM site off of one of those things?

Well, they’ll give him a target folder with all the possible guidance, and so on, to hit the target.

They know how to do that.

Yes, sir. They’re well trained in that procedure.

Mission folders have already been prepared on all the known targets. The problem is that we don’t have the unknown targets, specifically these missile launchers and the nuclear storage, and we won’t have that until tomorrow night at the earliest. And it’ll be processed photographically on Thursday, interpreted Thursday night, turned into target folders on Friday, and the mission could go Saturday. This is Sweeney’s estimate of the earliest possible time for an air strike against the missiles. Decision by the President on Friday, strike on Saturday.

As General Taylor pointed out, if we could have either another day of preparation, which means no strike till Saturday, and/or alternatively more than 24 hours between the time of decision and the first strike, it will run more smoothly.

Right. Well, now, what is it, in the next 24 hours, what is it we need to do in order, if we’re going to do, let’s first say, one and two by Saturday or Sunday? You’re doing everything that is . . .

Mr. President, we need to do two things, it seems to me.

First, we need to develop a specific strike plan limited to the missiles and the nuclear storage sites, which we have not done. This would be a part of the broader plan, but I think we ought to estimate the minimum number of sorties. Since you have indicated some interest in that possibility, we ought to provide you that option. We haven’t done this.

OK.

But that’s an easy job to do.

The second thing we ought to do, it seems to me, as a government, is to consider the consequences. I don’t believe we have considered the consequences of any of these actions satisfactorily. And because we haven’t considered the consequences, I’m not sure we’re taking all the action we ought to take now to minimize those.

I don’t know quite what kind of a world we live in after we have struck Cuba, and we’ve started it. We’ve put, let’s say, 100 sorties in, just for purposes of illustration. I don’t think you dare start with less than 100. You have 24 objects. Well, you 24 vehicles, plus 16 launchers, plus a possible nuclear storage site. Now that’s the absolute minimum that you would wish to kill. And you couldn’t possibly go in after those with less than, I would think, 50 to 100 sorties.

And you’ll miss some.

And you’ll miss some. That’s right.

Now after we’ve launched 50 to 100 sorties, what kind of a world do we live in? How do we stop at that point? I don’t know the answer to this. I think tonight State and we ought to work on the consequences of any one of these courses of actions, consequences which I don’t believe are entirely clear to any of us.

At any place in the world.

At any place in the world, George. That’s right. I agree with you.

Mr. President, I should say that the Chiefs and the commanders feel so strongly about the dangers inherent in the limited strike that they would prefer taking no military action rather than to take that limited first strike. They feel that it’s opening up the United States to attacks which they can’t prevent, if we don’t take advantage of surprise.

Yeah. But I think the only thing is, the chances of it becoming a much broader struggle are increased as you step up the . . . Talk about the dangers to the United States, once you get into beginning to shoot up those airports. Then you get into a lot of antiaircraft. And you got a lot of . . . I mean you’re running a much more major operation, therefore the dangers of the worldwide effects, which are substantial to the United States, are increased. That’s the only argument for it [the limited strike].

I quite agree that, if you’re just thinking about Cuba, the best thing to do is to be bold, if you’re thinking about trying to get this thing under some degree of control.

In that regard, Mr. President, there is a combination of the plans which might be considered, namely the limited strike and then the messages, or simultaneously the messages, to Khrushchev and Castro which would indicate to them that this was none other than simply the fulfilling of the statements we have made all along.

Well, I think we . . . in other words, that’s a matter we’ve got to think about tonight. I don’t . . .

Let’s not let the Chiefs knock us out on this one, General, because I think that what we’ve got to be thinking about is: If you go into Cuba in the way we’re talking about, and taking all the planes and all the rest, then you really haven’t got much of an argument against invading it.

It seems to me a limited strike, plus planning for invasion five days afterwards to be taken unless something untoward occurs, makes much more sense.

Well, I would be . . . personally Mr. President, my inclination is all against the invasion, but nonetheless trying to eliminate as effectively as possible every weapon that can strike the United States.

But you’re not for the invasion?

I would not be, at this moment. No, sir. We don’t want to get committed to the degree that shackles us with him in Berlin.

This is why I say I think we have to think of the consequences here. I would think a forced invasion [an invasion forced the United States], associated with assisting an uprising following an extensive air strike, is a highly probable set of circumstances. I don’t know whether you could carry out an extensive air strike of, let’s say, the kind we were talking about a moment ago—700 sorties a day for five days— without an uprising in Cuba. I really—

Based on this morning’s discussion we went into this, talked to some of your people, I believe, a little bit. And we felt an air strike, even of several days, addressed to military targets primarily, would not result in any substantial unrest. People would just stay home and try to keep out of trouble.

Well, when you’re talking about military targets, we have 700 targets here we’re talking about. This is a very damned expensive target system.

That was in that number [unclear], Mr. Secretary. But that’s not the one I recommended.

Well, neither is the one I’d recommend.

What does that include? Every antiaircraft gun? What does that include?

This includes radar and all sorts of things.

Radar sites, SAM sites, and so on. But whether it’s 700 or 200, and it’s at least 200 I think—

More in the order of 200, I would say.

It’s at least 200. You can’t carry that out without the danger of an uprising.

Mr. President, while we’re considering this problem tonight, I think that we should also consider what Cuba’s going to be a year from now, or two years from now. Assume that we go in and knock these sites out. I don’t know what’s gonna stop them from saying: “We’re going to build the sites six months from now, and bring them in [again].”

Nothing permanent about it.

Where are we six months from now? Or that we’re in any better position? Or aren’t we in a worse position if we go in and knock them out, and say: “Don’t do it”? I mean, obviously, they’re gonna have to do it then.

You have to put a blockade in following any limited action.

Then we’re going to have to sink Russian ships. Then we’re going to have to sink Russian submarines.

Right. Right.

Now, [think] whether it wouldn’t be the argument, if you’re going to get into it at all, whether we should just get into it, and get it over with, and take our losses. And if he wants to get into a war over this . . .

Hell, if it’s war that’s gonna come on this thing, he sticks those kinds of missiles in after the warning, then he’s gonna get into a war over six months from now, or a year from now on something.

Mr. President, this is why I think tonight we ought to put on paper the alternative plans and the probable, and possible consequences thereof, in a way that State and Defense could agree on. Even if we disagree, then put in both views. Because the consequences of these actions have not been thought through clearly. The one that the Attorney General just mentioned is illustrative of that.

If it doesn’t increase very much their strategic strength, why is it—can any Russian expert tell us—why they . . . ? After all Khrushchev demonstrated a sense of caution over Laos. Berlin, he’s been cautious—I mean, he hasn’t been . . .

Several possibilities, Mr. President. One of them is that he has given us word now that he’s coming over in November to the U.N. He may be proceeding on the assumption, and this lack of a sense of apparent urgency would seem to support this, that this isn’t going to be discovered at the moment and that, when he comes over, this is something he can do, a ploy—that here is Cuba armed against the United States.

Or possibly use it to try to trade something in Berlin, saying he’ll disarm Cuba if we’ll yield some of our interests in Berlin and some arrangement for it. I mean that—it’s a trading ploy.

I would think one thing that I would still cling to is that he’s not likely to give Fidel Castro nuclear warheads. I don’t believe that has happened or is likely to happen.

Why does he put these in there, though?

Soviet-controlled nuclear warheads.

That’s right. But what is the advantage of that? It’s just as if we suddenly began to put a major number of MRBMs in Turkey. Now that’d be goddamn dangerous, I would think.

Well, we did, Mr. President.

We did it. We did it in England.

Yeah, but that was five years ago.[note 10] In late 1957, in the wake of fears arising from the Soviet Sputnik flight and concerns about Soviet missiles targeted at Europe, the United States had publicly offered to deploy intermediate-range ballistic missiles, Jupiters, on the territory of its European allies. The Jupiters were not actually deployed to Turkey (and Italy) until 1961–62. A similar type of missile, the Thor, was deployed to England; those are the ones Johnson is talking about.

That’s when we were short. We put them in England too when we were short of ICBMs.

But that was during a different period then.

But doesn’t he realize he has a deficiency of ICBMs vis-à-vis our capacity perhaps? In view of that he’s got lots of MRBMs and this is a way to balance it out a bit.

I’m sure his generals have been telling him for a year and a half that he was missing a golden opportunity to add to his strategic capability.

Yes. I think you look at this possibility that this is an attempt to add to his strategic capabilities.

A second consideration is that it is simply a trading ploy, that he wants this in so that he can—

It’s not inconsistent. If he can’t trade then he’s still got the other.

—political impact in Latin America.

We are now considering these, then, Soviet missiles, a Soviet offensive capability.

You have to consider them Soviet missiles.

It seems to me that if we go in there lock, stock, and barrel, we can consider them entirely Cuban.

Ah, well, what we say for political purposes and what we think are not identical here.

But, I mean, any rational approach to this must be that they are Soviet missiles, because I think Khrushchev himself would never, would never, risk a major war on a fellow as obviously erratic and foolish as Castro.

His second lieutenant.

Well, I want to say, can I say that one other thing is whether we should also think of whether there is some other way we can get involved in this, through Guantánamo Bay or something. Or whether there’s some ship that . . . you know, sink the Maine again or something.[note 11] A reference to the mysterious explosion that sank the USS Maine while it was visiting Havana harbor during a period of tension between the United States and Spain over the conditions of Spanish rule in Cuba. Robert Kennedy is echoing the belief that this incident precipitated the U.S. declaration of war that began the Spanish-American War in 1898.

We think, Mr. President, that under any of these plans we will probably get an attack on Guantánamo, at least by fire. They have artillery and mortars easily within range, and with any of these actions we take we’ll have to give air support to Guantánamo and probably reinforce the garrison.

Well that’s why, it seems to me, that if we decide that we are going to be in a position to do this, either [strike options] one and two, Saturday or Sunday, then I would think we would also want to be in a position, depending on what happens, either because of an invasion, attack on Guantánamo, or some other reason, to do the inva— to do the eviction.

Mr. President, I personally would just urge you not to set a schedule such as Saturday or Sunday—

No I haven’t.

—until all the intelligence that could be . . .

That’s right. I just wanted, I thought, we ought to be moving. I don’t want to waste any time, though, if we decide that time is not particularly with us. I just think we ought to be ready to do something, even if we decide not to do it. I’m not saying we should do it.

All of this is moving, short of the briefing. We’ve held back, we’ve restricted people. . . .

I understand.

What about, now, this invasion? If we were going to launch that, what do you have, what do we have to be doing now so that ten days from now we’re in a position to invade, if that was the need?

I would say that my answer would be largely planning, particularly in the field of mobilization, just what we will want to recreate after we earmark these forces to Cuba.

I might say that air defense measures we’re starting to take already. We moved more fighters into the southeastern United States and are gradually improving some of our patrol procedures, under the general guise of preparations for that part of the country. We don’t think there’d be any leaks there that might react against our military planning. But I repeat that our defenses have always been weak in that part of the country.

Mr. Secretary, is there anything that, or any of these contingencies, if we go ahead, that . . . the next 24 hours . . . We’re going to meet again tomorrow on this in the afternoon. Is there anything . . .

No, sir. I believe that the military planning has been carried on for a considerable period of time and is well under way. And I believe that all the preparations that we can take without the risk of preparations causing discussion and knowledge of this, either among our public or in Cuba, have been taken and are authorized. All the necessary reconnaissance measures are being taken and are authorized.

The only thing we haven’t done, really, is to consider fully these alternatives.

Our principal problem is to try and imaginatively to think what the world would be like if we do this, and what it will be like if we don’t.

That’s exactly right. We ought to work on that tonight.

This may be incidental, Mr. President, but if we’re going to get the prisoners out, this would be a good time to get them out.[note 12] Sorensen was referring to long-standing negotiations between the Kennedy administration and Castro, carried on by intermediaries, to obtain the release of Cuban exiles imprisoned after the failed landing at the Bay of Pigs. The most recent intermediary, lawyer James Donovan, had persuaded Castro to accept some exchange of food and drugs rather than money, but his negotiations were still in progress at the time of the crisis. The negotiations eventually succeeded, and the released prisoners arrived in the United States at the end of 1962.

I guess they’re not gonna get . . . Well . . .

You mean, take them out. [Laughs.]

No. What I meant was, if we’re gonna trade them out . . .

They’re on the Isle of Pines, these prisoners?

No, some of them are. They’re split up.

If you can get them out alive, I’d make that choice.

There’s no sign of their getting out now, is there? The exchange?

No, but they will take a few weeks.

A few weeks.

Yeah. You know they’re having that struggle between the young Cuban leaders and the [unclear] . . .

We have a list of sabotage options, Mr. President. It’s not a very loud noise to raise at a meeting of this sort, but I think it would need your approval. I take it you are in favor of sabotage.

The one question which arises is whether we wish to do this in naval areas, international waters, or in positions which may—mining international waters or mining Cuban waters may hit . . . Mines are very indiscriminate.

Is that what they [the Special Group-Augmented that dealt with covert action against Castro] are talking about? Mining?

That’s one of the items. Most of them relate to infiltration of raiders, and will simply be deniable, internal Cuban activities.

The question that we need guidance from you on is whether you now wish to authorize sabotage which might have its impact on neutrals, or even friendly ships.

I don’t think we want to put mines out right now, do we?

Should wait for 24 hours at least before any [unclear].

Well, let’s put the others into action then in Cuba, the internal ones, not the other ones.

Mr. Vice President, do you have any thoughts? Between [strike options] one and two?

I don’t think I can add anything that is essential.

Let’s see, what time are we going to meet again tomorrow? What is it we want to have by tomorrow from the . . .

We want to have from the Department [of State] tomorrow, in a little bit more concise form, whether there is any kind of a notification we would have to give. How much of a [unclear]?

And, number two, what do you think of these various alternatives we’ve been talking about.

Three, whether there is any use in bringing this to Khrushchev in the way of, for example . . . Do we want to, for example . . . Here is Dobrynin now, he’s repeated . . .[note 13] Anatoly Dobrynin was Soviet ambassador to the United States.

I’ve got to go to see Schroeder. Let’s meet at . . . why don’t we meet at twelve? What time do I get back tomorrow night [from Connecticut]?[note 14] President Kennedy was scheduled to see West German foreign minister Gerhard Schroeder on Wednesday morning, 17 October. He was then scheduled to take a brief campaign trip after lunch to Connecticut and return late on Wednesday evening.

Reasonably early. Get back about 7:45.

Can we meet here at nine?

Mr. Secretary, some of us are in trouble with the dinner for Schroeder tomorrow night.

OK. Well, why don’t we . . . I don’t think we’ll have anything by noon tomorrow, will we?

Do you want to wait until Thursday morning [October 18], Mr. President?

Looks to me like we might as well. Everybody else can meet if they want to, if they need to. Well, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, can call [meetings]—

I think it’d be very useful to meet, or else stay afterwards tonight for a while.

It would be a great improvement not to have any more intense White House meetings. The cover will grow awfully thin. If we could meet at the State Department tomorrow . . .

All right. Then I could meet you, Mac, when I get back tomorrow and just as well, whatever the thing is. And then we can meet Thursday morning.

The question is whether . . . I’m going to see Gromyko on Thursday and I think the question that I’d really like to have some sort of a judgment on is whether we ought to do anything with Gromyko, whether we ought to say anything to him, whether we ought to indirectly give him sort of an ultimatum on this matter, or whether we just ought to go ahead without him.[note 15] Andrei Gromyko, foreign minister of the Soviet Union, had just arrived in the United States for a series of meetings. It seems to me that he said we’d be . . . The ambassador [Dobrynin] told the attorney general, as he told Bohlen the other day, that they were not going to put these weapons there. Now either he’s lying, or he doesn’t know.

Whether the Attorney General saw [might see] Dobrynin, not acting as if we had any information about them, [and] say that: “Of course, they must realize that if this ever does happen that this is going to cause this . . .” Give a very clear indication of what’s going to happen.

Now I don’t know what would come out of that. Possibly nothing. Possibly this would alert them. Possibly they would reconsider their decision, but I don’t think we’ve had any clear evidence of that, and it would give them . . . We’d lose a week.

You mean tell them that . . .

Well, not tell them that we know that they’ve got it. But merely, in the course of a conversation, Dobrynin, having said that they would never do it . . . The Attorney General, who sees Dobrynin once in a while, would . . .

How would we lose a week?

What?

How would we lose a week?

Oh, we would be . . . what Bobby would be saying to them, in short, is: “If these ever come up, that we’re going to do . . . the President stated that we would have to take action. And this could cause the most far reaching consequences.” On the possibility that that might cause them to reconsider their action.

I don’t know whether he [Dobrynin] is, they are, aware of what I said. I can’t understand their viewpoint, if they’re aware of what we said at the press conferences [of September 4 and 13]. As I say, I’ve never . . . I don’t think there’s any record of the Soviets ever making this direct a challenge ever, really, since the Berlin blockade.

We have to be clear, Mr. President, that they made this decision, in all probability, before you made your statements. This is an important element in the calendar.

They didn’t change it.

No, indeed they didn’t change it. But they . . . It’s quite a different thing.

There was either a contravenance on one . . .

My, I wouldn’t bet a cookie that Dobrynin doesn’t know a bean about this.

You think he does know.

He didn’t know. He didn’t even know [unclear], in my judgment.

Oh, yes. There’s evidence of sightings in late August, I think, and early September, of some sort.

It seems to me, Mr. President, in your public presentation simultaneous or subsequent to an action, your hand is strengthened somewhat if the Soviets have lied to you, either privately or in public.

I’ll agree to that.

And therefore, without knowing, if you ask Gromyko, or if Bobby asks Dobrynin again, or if some other country could get the Soviets to say publicly in the U.N.: “No, we have no offensive . . .”

But TASS, of course, said they wouldn’t.

What did TASS say?

That was a while back.

—said that they wouldn’t send offensive weapons to Cuba.

Yeah, the TASS statement I read this morning. . . . No, the TASS statement. It’s . . .

We don’t know if Khrushchev’s in control [unclear].

No, we don’t have any detail on that.

Well, what about my . . . the question would be therefore what I might say to Gromyko about this matter, if you want me to just get in the record, by asking him whether they plan to do it.

Putting it the other way around, saying that we are putting great weight upon the assurance of his.

Well, I think what you get is to call their attention to the statement that you’ve made on this. And that this is your public commitment and you are going to have to abide by this, and you just want assurances from him that they’re living up to what they’ve said, that they’re not going to . . .

Well, let’s say he said: “Well, we’re not planning to.”

[reading from TASS statement of September 11] “The government of the Soviet Union also authorized TASS to state that there is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression for a retaliatory blow to any other country, for instance, Cuba. Our nuclear weapons are so powerful in their explosive force, the Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads, that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union.”

What date was that?

September 11th.

When they were all there.

Or certainly on the way.

But isn’t that . . . But, as I say, we haven’t . . . really ever had a case where it’s been quite this. . . . After all, they backed down in [supporting the] Chinese Communists in ’58. They didn’t go into Laos. Agreed to a cease-fire there.[note 16] President Kennedy was referring to the most recent of several confrontations in the Taiwan Straits, in 1958, when China shelled offshore islands under Taiwan’s control and threatened to invade Taiwan, then linked by a mutual defense treaty with the United States. He was also referring to a Communist insurgency against a pro-Western government in Laos that became the recipient of significant U.S. aid. Heading off the threat of direct U.S. intervention, a negotiated cease-fire in Laos took effect in May 1961, followed by negotiations about neutralizing the country. We haven’t had [unclear].

I was troubled before by the absence of a nuclear storage site. That’s very queer.

What?

I’m as puzzled as Bob is by the absence of a nuclear storage site.

We don’t know enough about it yet, and we [unclear] . . .

I understand that. We may learn a lot overnight.

Isn’t it puzzling, also, there are no evidence of any troops protecting the sites?

Well there are troops there. At least there are tents, presumably they have some personnel.

But they look like [unclear]. It’s as if you would walk over the fields and into those vans.

Well it’s a goddamn mystery to me. I don’t know enough about the Soviet Union, but if anybody can tell me any other time since the Berlin blockade where the Russians have given us so clear a provocation, I don’t know when it’s been. Because they’ve been awfully cautious, really. The Russians . . . I’ve never . . .

Now, maybe our mistake was in not saying some time before this summer, that if they do this we’re going to act. Maybe they’d gone in so far that it’s . . .

Yeah, but then why did they put that [TASS] statement in?

This was following my statement, wasn’t it?

September 11th.

When was my statement?

[From the] ground up. Well, I was asking Pat [Carter] if they had any way of getting quick intelligence. That means somebody in there and out of there so we can really take a look at the ground.

No, this [TASS statement] is two days before your statement [but seven days after the White House statement of September 4].

We can try it. Your problems about exfiltration and your problems with training an individual as to what to look for are not handled in 24 hours.

A better way would be to send in a low-flying airplane, and we have today put those on alert. But we would recommend against using the low-flying planes until shortly before the intention to strike.

That was considered by the commanders today, and they’re all of the opinion that the loss of surprise there was more serious than the information we’d get from that.

I would think it would be very valuable to have them go in shortly before the strike, just to build the evidence. I mean, then you’ve got pictures that really show what was there. . . .

Now with these great demonologists, did Bohlen and Thompson, did they have an explanation of why the Russians are sticking it to us quite so . . . ?

I wonder what we’re going to say up in Connecticut. We expect the domestic [unclear]. [Chuckles.] Don’t care for the . . .

We’re going to be discussing [unclear] budget [in a Cabinet meeting on October 18].

What about Schroeder? Do I have anything we want to say to Schroeder?[note 17] The principal subject at the forthcoming meeting with Schroeder was to be the contingency that the Soviets or East Germans might require formal visas for entry to East Germany or East Berlin. For the West Germans this prospect skirted too close to diplomatic recognition of the East German regime.

We haven’t a lot on that, Mr. President, which we’ll have for you early in the morning. I don’t think it’s very complicated. The big issue that has come up is Schroeder makes a very strong case for refusing visas on the ground that he thinks that that would undermine morale in Berlin in a very dangerous way. I think that’s the principal issue that’s between us.

I wonder if we could get somebody to give me something about what our position should be on that.

You want that? Yeah, very happy to. You want it tonight?

No, no. Just in the morning.

That’s very good, General. Thank you.

Mr. McCone is coming in tonight.

I would suggest that we get into this hot water partly because of this.

Yeah. I want to talk to him in the morning. I’d like to just debrief [unclear] Mr. McCone [unclear] General Eisenhower.

He won’t be . . . Does he get back tonight?

Coming in tonight, yes, sir.

Could you have him come in in the morning?

I’m going in to meet him in the morning.

Could he come in then at 9:30?

Sure.

Could we agree to meet, midafternoon?

Any time you say, Bob.

And then guide our work tonight and tomorrow on that schedule? Why don’t we say three? This’ll give us some time to cover what we’ve done, and then do some more tomorrow night if necessary [unclear].

Would it be disagreeable to make it a little earlier? I ought to get to a four [o’clock] meeting with Schroeder.

I thought he said two, I think. We have really plenty of time between now and then. At two p.m.. we’ll do it at State.

Now, could we agree what we’re gonna do? I would suggest that—

Max, I would suggest that we, and I don’t . . . In fact, I know [unclear]. [Taylor replies.]

I would suggest that we divide the series of targets up by, in effect, numbers of DGZs and numbers of sorties required to take those out, for a series of alternatives starting only with the missiles and working up through the nuclear storage sites and the MiGs and the SAMs, and so on, so we can say: “This target system would take so many aiming points, and so many objects would take so many sorties to knock out.”[note 18] The DGZs are Designated Ground Zeros, the precise aim points for explosives.

Not because I think these are reasonable alternatives—

They’re not really going to be realistic, even, but they give—

—but they give us an order of magnitude to [give to] the President, to get some idea of this. And this we can do, and this can be done very easily.

But the most important thing we need to do is this appraisal of the world after any one of these situations, in great detail.

Sure, that’s right.

And I think probably this is something State would have to do, and I would strongly urge we put it on paper. And we, I’ll, be happy to stay now or look at it early in the morning, or something like that, in order that we may inject disagreement if we—

What I would suggest is that someone be deputied to do a piece of paper which really is: What happens?

I think the margin is between whether we [do the] take out the missiles only strike, or take a lot of air bases. This is tactical, within a decision to take military action. It doesn’t overwhelmingly, it may substantially, but it doesn’t overwhelmingly change the world.

I think any military action does change the world. And I think not taking action changes the world. And I think these are the two worlds that we need to look at.

I’m very much inclined to agree, but I think we have to make that point: Within the military action [there is] a gradation.

I agree, I agree. Oh, many gradations. And it can have major effects. I don’t mean to exaggerate that now.

The question is: How to get ahead with that, and whether . . . I would think, myself, that the appropriate place to make this preliminary analysis is at the Department of State. I think the rest of us ought to spend the evening, really, to some advantage separately, trying to have our own views of this. And I think we should meet in order, at least, to trade pieces of paper, before 2:00. Tomorrow morning, if that’s agreeable.

Why don’t we meet tomorrow morning? And with pieces of paper, from State, and—maybe you don’t feel this is reasonable, but I would strongly urge that, tonight, State—

Well, who is State’s de facto [person in charge for this]? Are you all tied up tonight? Or what?

No, no. The situation is that the only one who’s tied up tonight is the Secretary, and he is coming down at eleven from his dinner to look at what we will have done in the meantime.

Alex [Johnson] is back waiting for him.

Oh, good. We’ll have Alex; we’ll have Tommy [Llewellyn Thompson]. Well, we’ve kept this to our . . . this has been . . .

But you have Tommy? I . . .

I talked to him this afternoon some.

Do you have any . . . ? I’d be fascinated by this, the first sense of how he sees this.

Well the argument was really between Hilsman’s demonologists, who were already cut in because they [unclear], who thought this was a low-risk operation.[note 19] Roger Hilsman was assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research. A demonolo-gist is a Kremlinologist, or an expert on the Soviet Union. Tommy thought it was a high-risk operation by the Soviets, in other words, that they were taking real chances. The other people rather thought that they probably had miscalculated us and thought this wasn’t a risky operation. You know, from the way they were going at it, either impatient like the SAM sites hadn’t been set up to protect it—the various factors which suggest to them that they didn’t think anything was going to happen. Tommy leaned the other way.

Could I suggest that tonight we actually draft a paper, and it start this way:

Just a paragraph or two of the knowns. The knowns are that the SAMs are here. Let’s say, the probable knowns, because we’re not certain of any of them. The probabilities are the SAM system isn’t working today. This is important. The probabilities are that these missiles are not operational today. The probabilities are that they won’t be operational in less than x days, although we can’t be certain. Pat said two weeks. I’m not so sure I’d put it that far. But there’s just two or three of these knowns.

I would put in there, by the way, the number of [unclear] they’re unprotected. Another known I’d put in is that they have about 50x MiG-15s, -17s, and -19s. That they have certain crated—I’ve forgotten—say 10x crated MiG-21s, only one of which we believe to have been assembled. That they have x crated IL-28s, none of which we believe to have been assembled. This is, in a sense, the problem we face there.

You should state, or the [Central Intelligence] Agency should state the military knowns.

Well, we can do this in just ten seconds, a very, very simple statement, I think. But then I would follow that by the alternatives, not all of them, but the more likely alternatives that we consider open to us. And I would hope we could stay just a second here and see if we could sketch them out now.

I’d like to throw one in of a military kind—shall we get them in order, and you [unclear]?

I would like to throw one in that I do not think the army and the Chiefs would normally consider. And that is the possibility of genuinely making a quite large-scale strike, followed by a drop, followed by a recovery of the people dropped to get these things, and not simply to increase the chance that we’ve hit most of them. There’s always incompleteness in a military, in an air, operation. But if these things are what the pictures show, you could drop a battalion of paratroopers and get them. Now what you do with a battalion, I grant you, is a hell of a problem.

I think there’s an enormous political advantage, myself, within these options, granted that all the Chiefs didn’t fully agree, to taking out the thing that gives the trouble and not the thing that doesn’t give the trouble.

This, as opposed to an air attack on them?

This would be supplementary to an air attack. I mean, how are you gonna know that you’ve got them? And if you haven’t got them, what have you done?

Well this, of course, raises the question of: Having gotten this set, what happens to the set that arrives next week?

Oh, I think . . . Let me answer Mac’s question first. How do we know we’ve got them? We will have photo recon, military, with the strike. Sweeney specifically plans this and—

Proving a negative is a hell of a job.

Pardon me?

Proving a negative is a hell of a job.

Yeah, but the [unclear] on the ground very well [unclear], Mac.

It’s true.

Terrible risk to put them [paratroopers] in there.

I agree, I think it’s probably a bad idea, but it troubles me [unclear].

I think the risk troubles me. It’s too great in relation to the risk of not knowing whether we get them.

Well . . .

But, in any case, this is a small variant of one of the plans.

That’s right, it’s a minor variant of one of the plans.

It seems to me that there are some major alternatives here. I don’t think we discussed them fully enough today. And I’d like to see them laid out on the paper, if State agrees.

The first is what I still call the political approach. Let me say it: a nonmilitary action. It doesn’t start with one and it isn’t going to end with one. And I, for that reason, call it a political approach. And I say it isn’t going to end with one because, once you start this political approach, I don’t think you’re going to have any opportunity for a military operation.

It becomes very difficult.

But at least I think we ought to put it down there.

You’re right.

And it should be worked out. I mean, what is the maximum—

Your ride is waiting downstairs.

Very good, thank you.

Yeah, it should definitely be worked out. What, exactly, does it involve? And what are the chances of success of it? They’re not zero. They’re plus, I think.

We did an outline this morning along these lines.

All right. That’s [alternative] one, anyway.

But, do you see, it’s not just the chances of success. It ought to be examined in terms of the pluses and minuses of nonsuccess, because there is such a thing as making this thing pay off in ways that are of some significance, even though we don’t act, or go with that.

I completely agree with that. And this is my second alternative, in particular, and I want to come to in a moment. But the first one, I completely agree it isn’t . . . I phrased it improperly. It’s not the chances of success. It’s the results that are following this [unclear].

Following this. Yep.

Now, the second alternative, I’d like to discuss just a second because we haven’t discussed it fully today, and I alluded to it a moment ago.

I’ll be quite frank. I don’t think there is a military problem there. This is my answer to Mac’s question—

That’s my honest [opinion?] too.

—and therefore, and I’ve gone through this today, and I asked myself: “Well, what is it then if it isn’t a military problem?”

Well, it’s just exactly this problem: that if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive actions against the U.S., the U.S. would act.

That’s right.

You can’t get around that one.

Now it’s that problem. This is a domestic political problem. In the announcement we didn’t say we’d go in and not [that] we’d kill them. We said we’d act. Well, how will we act? Well, we want to act to prevent their use. That’s really the [unclear].

Now, how do we act to prevent their use? Well, first place, we carry out open surveillance, so we know what they’re doing. At all times. Twenty-four hours a day from now and forever, in a sense, indefinitely.

What else do we do? We prevent any further offensive weapons coming in. In other words, we blockade offensive weapons.

How do we do that?

We search every ship.

There are two kinds of blockade: a blockade which stops ships from coming in; and simply a seizure—I mean simply a search.

A search, that’s right.

Yeah.

Well, it would be the search and removal, if found.

You have to make the guy stop to search him. And if he won’t stop, you have to shoot, right?

And you have to remove what you’re looking for if you find it.

Absolutely. Absolutely. And then an ultimatum. I call it an ultimatum. Associated with these two actions is a statement to the world, particularly to Khrushchev, that we have located these offensive weapons. We’re maintaining a constant surveillance over them. If there is ever any indication that they’re to be launched against this country, we will respond not only against Cuba, but we will respond directly against the Soviet Union with a full nuclear strike.

Now this alternative doesn’t seem to be a very acceptable one. But wait until you work on the others.

That’s right. [Laughter.]

This is the problem, but I’ve thought something about the others this afternoon.

Bob, let me ask you one thing that seems slightly irrelevant. What real utility would there be in the United States if we ever actually captured one of these things and could examine it and take it apart?

Not very much. No, no.

Would we learn anything about the technology that would be meaningful?

No, no. I don’t . . . Pat may disagree with me. . . .

No.

Well, in any case, that’s an alternative [the blockade]. I’d like to see it expressed and discussed.

If it takes two hours to screw a [war]head on, as a guy [Sidney Graybeal] said this morning, two to four hours. . . .

Oh, by the way, that should be one of the knowns in this initial paragraph.

Yeah. They’ve got all night. How are we gonna surveil them during the night? I think because there are some gaps in the surveillance.

Oh, well, it’s really . . . yes. It isn’t the surveillance, it’s the ultimatum that is the key part in this.

Yeah.

And really, what I tried to do was develop a little package that meets the action requirement of that paragraph I read. Because, as I suggested, I don’t believe it’s primarily a military problem. It’s primarily a domestic political problem.

Well, as far as the American people are concerned, action means military action, period.

Well, we have a blockade. Search and removal of offensive weapons entering Cuba. Mac again, I don’t want to argue for this because I don’t—

No. I think it’s an alternative.

—think it’s a perfect solution by any means. I just want to . . .

Which one are [we] still on, would you say?

Still on the second one.

Now, one of the things to look at is whether the actual operation of a blockade isn’t a greater involvement almost than a military action.

Might well be, George.

I think so.

It’s a search, not an embargo.

No.

It’s a series of single, unrelated acts, not by surprise. This coming in there, on a Pearl Harbor [kind of surprise attack], just frightens the hell out of me as to what goes beyond. The Board of National Estimates have been working on this ever since . . .

What goes beyond what?

What happens beyond that. You go in there with a surprise attack. You put out all the missiles. This isn’t the end. This is the beginning, I think. There’s a whole hell of a lot of things . . .

Are they working on a powerful reaction in your [agency]?

Yes, sir. Which goes back to [what] Mr. Secretary—

Good.

Because this is the central point.

Well, that then takes me into the third category of action. I’d lump them all in the third category. I call it overt military action of varying degrees of intensity, ranging . . .

And if you feel there’s any difference in them, in the kind of a world we have after the varying degrees of intensity, you have to divide category three into subcategories by intensity, and probable effect on the world thereafter. And I think there is, at least in the sense of the Cuban uprising, which I happen to believe is a most important element of category three. It applies to some elements, some categories in category three, but not all.

But, in any event, what kind of a world do we live in? In Cuba what action do we take? What do we expect Castro will be doing after you attack these missiles? Does he survive as a political leader? Is he overthrown? Is he stronger, weaker? How will he react?

How will the Soviets react? What can . . . How could Khrushchev afford to accept this action without some kind of rebuttal? I don’t think he can accept it without some rebuttal. It may not be a substantial rebuttal, but it’s gonna have to be some. Where? How do we react in relation to it?

What happens if we do mobilize? How does this affect our allies’ support of us in relation to Berlin? Well, you know far better than I the problems. But it would seem to me if we could lay this out tonight, and then meet at a reasonable time in the morning to go over a tentative draft, discuss it, and then have another draft for some time in the afternoon . . .

One kind of planning, Bob, that we didn’t explicitly talk about today, which is to look at the points of vulnerability around the world, not only in Berlin, not only in Turkey.

Sure. Iran.

Iran and all of them.

And Korea.

What precautionary measures ought to be taken.

Yes, yes.

These are both military and political.

Exactly. And we call it a worldwide alert. Under that heading we’ve got a whole series of precautionary measures that we think should be taken. All of our forces should be put on alert. But, beyond that, mobilization, redeployment, movement, and so on.

Well, would it be feasible to meet at some time in the morning? Mac, what would you think?

I ought to join the President for the meeting with Schroeder, and I’ll be involved in getting started for that from about 9:30 on. I could meet any time before that.

Well, now, the President was going to see Mr. McCone at 9:30.

That’s right.

Well, why don’t we meet at 8:30.

Fine.

Let’s try that.

OK.

Now, there’s not much we can do to help. I’d be happy to, though, if you think of anything we can do. We’ll go to work tonight and get these numbers of sorties, by target systems, laid out. [Admiral] Riley’s up in Mac’s office and I’ll go down there now and get them started on it.

I think Mr. McCone could be helpful to you all in the morning.

Well, I think he should try to stay here at 8:30.

He’s been worrying about this for a heck of a long time.

Sure.