What do you expect this question to be raised about here? The points which are going to be of concern?

. . . I think there is one photograph, I think it’s here. See this one?

[as a quieter aside] Should I go now?[note 1] This brief exchange hints that the President and his brother had decided that, on cue, Robert Kennedy would press to hear John McCone’s answer to a politically sensitive question about the discovery of the missiles. They knew McCone could be especially helpful in defusing such inquiries, both through his own contacts with journalists and with more credibility, as a Republican member of the administration. Their concern about what McCone might say was bound to have been sharpened by their knowledge that McCone had warned about Soviet missiles in Cuba since August and had called repeatedly for more surveillance. The Kennedys also might have noted, the day before, the contrast between the loyal, supportive assurances of the “you did all you could” variety that they had heard at midday from the State Department intelligence chief, Roger Hilsman, and McCone’s more reserved stance (“I wouldn’t be too categoric that we had no information. . . .”) at the NSC meeting in the afternoon.

Yeah, you might as well get that over with because I think we’ll probably need John McCone, who’s got [unclear].

[Unclear] one of those downstairs. This is one matter that would interest you. This shows, in last night’s photographs, three of the missiles at the M[R]-1 site, the most advanced medium-range type, have disappeared. We can’t detect where they are, from yesterday’s photography. Also, at other sites, there’s evidence of extensive camouflage. I’d like you to see those pictures, when you get there.

The question that I’ve heard raised rather extensively is why this was not uncovered sooner, when there were some reports about it, to why we didn’t know about it, and therefore why a blockade of some kind was not instituted earlier.

And so that this is the second question, [whether] what we are doing now is, in fact, closing the barn door after the horse is gone. And those questions that will be raised. . . .

Well that ties into Senator Keating’s frequent statements. I’m having Senator Keating’s statements analyzed. Actually they are quite inaccurate. He made a statement two days ago that it was being built there, pads, which would be ready for fire at the United States in six months. So his information was from . . . He had a piece of it, but it was not precise. But nevertheless that is going to be. . . .

Now it seems to me that somebody in a responsible position ought to take up this question. I don’t think that it’s realized how quickly these mobile bases can be set up and how quickly they can be moved. So that I’m just wondering now what is the judgment—the question is getting this point over, in view of the next 24 hours. There will be some spraying all around. Arthur Krock’s just beginning to say.[note 2] Arthur Krock, long a reporter covering Washington, was then a member of the editorial board of the New York Times. Krock had been a friend of Kennedy’s father and a mentor to the young John Kennedy during the 1940s. Like the elder Kennedy, Krock was politically conservative, often sympathetic to the Republican Party, and the relationship between the older columnist and younger president had become wary and ambivalent. Then we’ll just have that problem of . . .

Mr. President, later today, as you will see, I believe I should have an on-the-record press conference. I had an off-the-record, or brief background, briefing for one hour last night with about 125 newsmen and I covered this point at that time; however, I think that we need more than that.

I think we need briefings of congressional personnel, more than were here last night. If necessary, we ought to send some people out, particularly to Jerry Ford,[note 3] Gerald Ford, later President of the United States, was then a Republican member of the House of Representatives from Michigan. for example, and certain other congressional leaders who will be asking this kind of a question. And there are many other individuals in the city that ought to be briefed apart from those that I will see tonight. The Scotty Restons and that.[note 4] James “Scotty” Reston was a prominent reporter and columnist for the New York Times.

You’ll see them at the press [unclear]—

Well, I will probably not see Scotty Reston. But I think someone should have seen him privately.

I had a private talk with Scotty and went over this [unclear].

What about John McCone? Any of these people that John [McCone] ought to see?

Yes. He ought to see [Senators Richard] Russell and [J. William] Fulbright as soon as he can today. I saw your speech with them last night, and I think that the attitude was much better than was indicated here. And, particularly, some of the statements that you made that you were going to prevent the use of these missiles against us, and that explains it a little better. That’s better. We didn’t quite say that in the meeting yesterday. They didn’t get everything in the meeting they got from your speech and McCone can give them a good deal more. I tried to give them a little bit myself, later, after the speech.

Well, actually—

[Congressman Carl] Vinson desired to see Mr. McCone this morning, and I told him that I thought he’d clear up . . .

Well, why don’t you see . . .

Yeah, I’ll do that. I’ll see them a little later.

Now it seems to me, you may want to set for your committee, I mean the group of people that you deal with, just to get the. . . . But that’s a natural thing, but I think—so why don’t you—people that you know. . . . I think it should be on a completely off-the-record basis when you talk to them.

Yeah, I’ll talk to them. Well, I’ll talk with Russell and [Congressman Carl] Vinson. They are the fellows that run the two committees that I deal with.

You might want to get Ford in. Doesn’t mean you’ll get him.

Yes, that’s a—that brings in [Congressman Clarence] Cannon.

I can take care of Ford very—

I had a very long, long meeting with Cannon and Ford and [Congressman John] Taber, and [Congressman George] Mahon the day they left [after Congress recessed in mid-September]. Now, this was before we had the evidence. But there were enough shreds of things coming through so this will not . . . that I predicted that this is what we were going to bump into. But I told them we had no positive evidence. I think we’ve handled Ford all right.

You ought to pick up Mahon too on that.

Yeah.

What about now, now what problem is the . . . do you have an on-the-record [press conference]?

I think I should later today, particularly assuming we get this [presidential quarantine] proclamation out today, as soon as possible.

Now John, it seems to me you ought to talk to the people the Vice President suggested, and any others in the Congress. I don’t think we ought to bring in too many. They just feed on each other. But I don’t know whether there is any members of the press who are of particular significance who John McCone ought to talk to.

I think someone ought to catch [columnist Stewart] Alsop and Reston.

I saw Reston. I saw Alsop with Reston and I had about an hour with them.

On this particular point, George?

Well, we went over this point among others. And I think they were pretty well set.

Well, why doesn’t John McCone use his judgment on how to respond and [unclear].

Why don’t you [do] Alsop and—

Arthur Krock.

Well, Arthur. [Chuckles, unclear] come down on him. Bundy, didn’t say Arthur, but maybe you’re a friend of his, maybe . . . You use your judgment on that.

Yeah.

The three I saw yesterday were—

He’s [Krock’s] suggesting this is part of the political campaign.

—were Alsop, Reston, [Washington Post editor] Al Friendly. And Walter Lippmann is coming in to see me this morning.

Yeah, I think [Hearst newspapers columnist] Bill White. Who wants to talk to Bill White?

The Vice President would like [unclear].

Him and . . .

[Publisher of the Washington Post] Phil Graham called me last night. And he was all right with that. Bill [Tyler] and I talked to him.

. . . [Reporter] Ben McKelway. What about Ben McKelway? Well, I’ll tell you what, right after this meeting I’ll have some suggestions to you and to the State [Department] about some of these special people that we think ought to get some special time today.

I think I’ll call up Eisenhower and get permission from him to use his name in talking with these congressional people. [Unclear] his view of this thing as a soldier. I wanted to bring it up last night [in the meeting with the congressional leadership], but I was afraid that it would be a violation of confidence.

I think on background too, because it’s better to have it come from him than have it. . . . I think, they’ll be in touch with him.

I think the point is, this mobile [missile] business isn’t quite clear. And everybody thinks that a military base takes a long time to construct, and I think that that’s the [follow-up story]—

The man that’s very important from that point of view is [New York Times military affairs reporter] Hanson Baldwin. His article this morning is perfectly right on this.

We can get him [unclear].

Can you can get past him? [Laughter.]

I guess, to him through the Navy.[note 5] A graduate of Annapolis, Baldwin had long been a major conduit for Navy press leaks. Get to him all right.

[Unclear.] All right. Well, anyway, we’ll get that.

What about the answer to the question of what we’re going to do about them [the missiles already in Cuba]?

I don’t think we probably ought to answer that. You’d just better wait for the extra hour.

All right, I would think that maybe they’re going to ask Bob about this at the press conference, at the State Department.

Whether we’re going to go invade rather than—

Well, no. I suppose you’d say we’re going to try to make efforts through diplomatic—

No, I would suggest not saying that. Last night they asked me that five times and I repeated every time in the words the President used: We will take such further action as is required to accomplish our objective.[note 6] President Kennedy’s exact words were: “Should these offensive military preparations continue, thus increasing the threat to the hemisphere, further action will be justified. I have directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities.”

That’s exactly what we’ve stuck to.

And they said: “Well, does this mean military action?”

It is of great importance that, unless we get a clear-cut decision around this table to change, we stay right with the President’s speech. We’re just getting, [U.S. ambassador to Moscow Foy] Kohler has reported that he was handed two documents, the Soviet statement which is just coming over the ticker—and we have only an incomplete version—and another thing, which he’s sending telegraphically and he didn’t say what it was.

Did we ever put out my letter to Khrushchev? He’ll probably—

No, sir. We told Khrushchev that we would not do so.

All right.

We told [Soviet ambassador to Washington Anatoly] Dobrynin.

What?

Now, the. . . .

The first Soviet reaction was cautious, including on Cuba. In both the TASS statement and Dobrynin’s reaction, and the fact that it was the Cubans that raised this in the Security Council.

The first two pages of this [just-released TASS statement] are a rehash of stuff we’ve heard before. I think Tommy [unclear].

What’s your second point, Bobby?

Just this. On the second, the fact that they’re doing this. We’ve taken this action after they’ve got their missiles already there, unopposed. I think probably we get by with this answer for about 24 hours. But we’re going to have difficulty after that.

[aside to Arthur Lundahl] Could I just share—Just show these two or three pictures tomorrow [unclear].

In a broader sense, I don’t think the country’s reaction is that we’ve done too little.

The people are going to start thinking today about the fact that they’re there, and what we—

Well, what I was going to say—that’s what I was going to say—I think we ought to get an analysis from CIA or from someone as to what the effects of a blockade of everything but food and medicine would be on Cuba, given their known supplies and what it would do to the country’s economy, and what the political effects would be, in Cuba as well as outside. Because we should certainly have to have that as one of our possible courses of action.

Do we want that on Berlin too?

Yeah, I think probably, what the effect would be of a blockade in Berlin by them.

The same kind [of blockade].

Yes, there’s much work that has already been done.

Missiles up there, the MRBMs. You’ll recall four of them. There’s three of them here. The coverage of yesterday.

This was photographed yesterday, or the day before?

Yesterday, sir. So the four of them were back there; there’s only one of them at the forward position, so two of them have gone.

I see.

And where they might have gone, we don’t know at the present time. They could have been right back there in the trees. They could have been [unclear] to another locale.

I think that you, Bob, ought to have this point of this, emphasizing the mobility of these and the way they could have flown them in or taken them in by submarine and nobody would have known.[note 7] President Kennedy is concerned again that his administration might be accused of dilatory discovery of the Soviet missiles. In fact, the MRBMs were much too large to have been carried in a Soviet airplane or inside a Soviet submarine. Only cargo ships with specially designed holds or deck layouts (such as those used in the lumber trade) could carry the nearly 75-foot-long missiles.

Mr. President, I used this particular picture last night with the press. I showed it to them. I pointed out the mobility. I told them of the convoys coming in here, our watch of those. And that between Sunday and Monday, in one 24-hour period, I didn’t identify the days, I stated the number of buildings that had been added, and the changes in the site situation.

And to emphasize, I showed them also a picture of an IRBM site and emphasized the difference between MRBMs and IRBMs. And the MRBMs are mobile and that we estimated that they could be set up, torn down, moved, and set up again in a six-day period. And this was why it was only this week that this information became available.

Let’s get that on the record, [unclear].

And I have a transcript of that on tape.

May I also say that those pictures were in the hands of the Tactical Air Command, as a basis for target folders, at 10:00 p.m. last night. We sent down—how many is this—25 sets of them. So that we were taking U-2 photographs one day and targeting them the next. Based on them.

OK. Do you mind if I have these?

This shows our coverage now. Everything in the island is covered except the [unclear] at this time.

Ninety-seven percent.

We have covered 97 percent. So that’s rather [unclear]. We’ll have three [low-level reconnaissance] missions out today.

Mr. President, the critical action we need to take is a determination of when the proclamation will be effective, the proclamation of the quarantine, the time it will be issued, the time it will become effective, and the time for the first intercept of a ship under the terms of that proclamation. We would propose that it be issued as soon as possible today following OAS action. We had hoped that that would be before six tonight. If it is issued before six tonight, we propose that the quarantine be effective at dawn tomorrow. This is a lesser grace period of—approximately 12-hour grace period—instead of the 24 hours that we have discussed previously.

Eleven seconds excised as classified information.

Furthermore, it’ll be to our advantage to make the quarantine effective at dawn, because this will allow a day of naval activity, tomorrow, which would not be possible were the quarantine to be effective 24 hours after this evening. We would have to wait until the following day.

We’d like the day of naval activity tomorrow because there is one particular ship we’re interested in.

The Poltava?

No, the Poltava is—[Unclear interjection by President Kennedy]. Well I’m not either. The Poltava is way out here on the 22nd and tomorrow morning it will be someplace in this area, which is still on the order of, perhaps 1,200 miles from Cuba, and we can’t get a cruiser out there with any certainty by tomorrow morning with the necessary antisubmarine escort.

So we would propose to go after this ship, which we believe has 70-foot hatches which are large enough to take the missiles, by which time that ship will be moving into this area. And we think that we can intercept it quite effectively.

Which is that? The name?

The Kimovsk.

Wouldn’t you guess anything that has a missile on it would be turned around last night?

Well, I think so. And we would like to have the first ship either turned around or stopped and found to have offensive weapons, one or the other.

We’d like to grab this anyway, but of course if they turned around last night, they’re back—

Well, I doubt that they’ve turned around yet. We have no indication they have, which will be checked today. But it would seem to me it’s likely they’ll turn around when they’re halted—or requested to halt—in which case our first intercept has been successful.

If they don’t turn around, and we search and find offensive weapons on board, it’s successful. What we wish to avoid is intercepting one of the other ships that may not have offensive weapons on it.

It was my argument, we just have to assume that any Russian ship, in view of our statement, that has offensive weapons will be turned around now.

That’s acceptance of the quarantine.

That’s right. I mean they’ll turn them around before they get within the range so that [unclear]. [Unclear exchange.]

I think our plan ought to be designed to try to catch an offensive-weapons ship. That’s the objective, and to do it as promptly as possible after the effective time of the quarantine. And for that purpose, we’d like the quarantine made effective tomorrow and go after that ship.

Do you put in a zone, Bob, where you intercept? You will declare a zone?

No, we don’t propose to declare a zone.

You intercept anyplace?

We’ll intercept any place where it appears that the ship is moving towards Cuba.

What about the other ships?

We’ll wait until we get the first one before we choose the second one.

Shouldn’t we have stopped these though?

I don’t believe so, Mr. President, until we have this first intercept. I think that it is extremely important to try to pick a ship that has offensive weapons on it. It would be—wait a minute—be an unfortunate incident if we hailed a ship that refused to stop; we then disable it and found it didn’t have offensive weapons on it. That would be a poor way to start.

Poor way to start.

So what we’re trying to do is find one that has offensive weapons. Hail it. And either have it turn around, in which case we’ve had a success; or, alternatively, disable it and find the offensive weapons.

Well, what I think we ought to do is try to keep this on track. My guess is that anything that has offensive weapons in it, particularly missiles or missile support, will be turned around by them so that we don’t grab it. And therefore, we ought to be able to announce in a day or two [unclear] which ships were turned around and which came out.

You’ve got them all under surveillance, haven’t you?

Yes.

You’ll know if they’ve turned them around. That Kimovsk is a good prospect. However, it’s the type of ship that’s used for the transportation of heavy construction equipment. This might be the purpose of that voyage.

May I just say that one of the answers to this problem that Bobby raised, which you may not want to put on the record, but off the record, is that we’re not saying that there’s any action that actually we’re taking necessarily, that this action alone because of the blockade, results in the elimination of these. Because quite obviously, they’re already there.

On the other hand there’s no action we ever could have taken, unless we’d have invaded Cuba a year ago, to prevent them being there, because they could have come in, the missiles themselves could have come in by submarines and personnel in separately; particularly the mobile kind that they could set up in the week. And there’s just no way, unless you were going to invade Cuba six months ago, really. You might say, no, we could have perhaps found them two weeks before, but you still wouldn’t have found any until they were there.

So there’s no answer to this unless you were going to invade Cuba six months ago, or a year ago, or two years ago, or three years ago. That’s the—and the fact of the matter is there wasn’t anybody suggesting an invasion of Cuba at a time when they necessarily could have stopped these things coming onto the island. It’s possible they could have come on in July on the first ship, before the other technicians came on—particularly the mobile kind. So that what we are doing is throwing down a card on the table in a game which we don’t know the ending of. But it’s not, at least, at the beginning.

We recognize that the missiles are already there. But we also recognize there’s not a damn thing anybody could do about the missiles being there unless we had invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs or a previous Cuban invasion the year before. That’s part of your problem. Some of that you can’t put on the record, but it’s a very legitimate point. There was no way we could have stopped this happening. We could have stopped this four months ago, what with the SAM sites and all the rest, by an invasion last July. But you see they’re going to put up mobile missiles, without an, unless we could have invaded some months ago you couldn’t have stopped it. [Unclear.]

In my opinion one should add all the consequences of invasion at that time. Yes, I saw these.

And even the British [press] today are saying our action is too . . . The Manchester [Guardian] and all the lousy British press. They’re not even with us today. Six months ago, when we would have had everything going . . .

The day we get the Manchester Guardian, Mr. President, we’re wrong. [Laughs.]

OK.

Mr. President, based on the assumption the proclamation would be issued this evening, we would also like to issue the notice this evening that we are extending the tours of duty of all Navy personnel now on active duty and all Marine personnel on active duty, the reason being that we are entering a period of high activity for the Navy and we are utilizing the Marines to reinforce Guantánamo.

This will require, or I think can best be done by, an executive order signed by you. I have such an executive order here. I will leave it with Ted Sorensen to bring to your attention today. We should have it signed today and we will issue that.

May I take you back one second?

Yes.

There is no question of international law with respect to the amount of notice on a blockade?

No, we believe not. Our lawyers have examined that, Mac, and tell us we can—if the proclamation is made effective tonight, we can make the quarantine effective tomorrow.

You should have this approved, Mr. President.

Yes, yes.

Then I will leave this executive order with you, Mr. President, and Mac . . . today. [Bundy agrees.]

Now, you asked me yesterday to consider the reaction to a U-2 accident and we would recommend this: That SAC [Strategic Air Command] be instructed to immediately inform the Joint Chiefs, as far as myself and yourself, upon any deviation from course of a U-2 aircraft that is unexplained.[note 8] At that time the Strategic Air Command (in cooperation with the then-secret National Reconnaissance Office of the U.S. Air Force), not the CIA, was operating the U-2s flying over Cuba. Later SAC would draw on CIA pilots in support of its effort. They maintain a minute-by-minute check on the U-2s as they proceed through their flight pattern. They will be able to tell us when the U-2 moves off course and, we believe, why, particularly if it’s shot down. That information can be in here in a matter of minutes, literally 15 minutes after the incident.

We are maintaining aircraft on alert that have the capability, if you decide to instruct it to do so, to go in and shoot the SAM site that shot down the U-2. There would be approximately eight aircraft required to destroy the SAM site. We would recommend the information on the U-2 accident to come in here and that we present recommendations to you at the time as to action required. I believe we would recommend that we send the eight aircraft out to destroy the SAM site. If that is your decision, those aircraft can move out, destroy the SAM site, and have it destroyed within two hours of the time the U-2 itself was struck, so that we could announce almost simultaneously the loss of the U-2 and the destruction of the SAM site that allegedly destroyed it.

Well, there are two questions. First, is it possible to send—so that we assure the cause of the accident, is it possible to send an accompanying plane just outside the 3-mile limit [on Cuba’s national airspace] or is that too burdensome and expensive?

Well, it’s not so much that it’s burdensome as it is uncertain. And we think that the best way to handle it is through the SAC report.

We’ve got the. . . . Now is there somebody flying along? Is there some way, that if they do get hit, they can get into the ocean and you can get them picked up?

Yes, yes. We do have air-sea rescue aircraft associated with them.

Now, there are two things. First, do we want to indicate that in advance, number one? Or, number two, if we lose one of our officers in a plane, then the next fellow we send up . . .

I suppose what we do is, when we take out that SAM site, we announce that if any U-2 is shot down, we’ll take out every SAM site.

Exactly.

Is surveillance being reaffirmed in the OAS, George?

No, it is not.

We think we have enough? We think we have enough?

We have enough.

It’s very clear [unclear].

Then I would think what we would do is, if the first one [is shot down], we have to take it out [the offending SAM site], and then announce what’s happened. And then we would announce that any further reconnaissance planes which are authorized by the OAS are done, then all these SAM sites are . . . [Bundy and Ball agree.] We would have to do a SAM site and a U-2 a day.

One point I might make, Mr. President, I think it’s highly unlikely we can really identify the guilty SAM site.

I understand.

It doesn’t really matter, I don’t think, however.

And secondly, the Secretary mentions eight planes. I would like to reserve judgment on the total . . . approval on the total, because I think if we go in we send in . . .

Good. OK. Anybody have any question about this?

A question that we do . . . Would you launch an attack on information received from the plane? Or would you wait until it has returned, so you’ve got verification on it?

We would launch it on information received from the airplane.

Wouldn’t it depend, how much information?

Well, I think we can make the . . . We’re going to have the chance to . . .

Well, Mr. President, I think the next question I was going to ask is, if you are unavailable, which with a 15-minute thing of this kind we can’t ever be certain of, in terms of the detail of the information . . .

Do you want to delegate that authority now to the Secretary of Defense or do you want to, or what’s your . . . ?

Well, what we want to do is, I will delegate to the Secretary of Defense on the understanding that the information would be very clear, that the accident that happened was not malfunction.

That it was in fact a matter of military action.

Action against us.

Only if you’re unavailable and only if it’s clear.

Now, the only other question is whether we ought to at some point, in the day after the OAS acts, I don’t know whether we can reaffirm just unilaterally the OAS implementing the decision of October 6th on surveillance so that there is some warning.

I have told the press. I read the statement before my press conference last night and it’s very clear. And I told the press on background that that was what we’re going to do. And I think tonight I can say it after the OAS meeting, whether it reaffirms or doesn’t reaffirm.

We won’t say what our action will be.

No, we will simply say that we are continuing surveillance as, in effect, directed by the OAS.

Let me say, the OAS resolution as presently drafted is very broad. It, while not specifically mentioning surveillance as such, surveillance would be accompanied, encompassed [unclear], including use of armed . . . The resolution, proposed resolution is, recommends, that member states, in accordance with Article 6 in the Rio Treaty, “take all measures, individually and collectively, including . . . use of armed force”—well, this certainly includes reconnaissance—“which they may deem necessary to ensure that the government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from a Sino-Soviet power military material.”

Does that resolution . . . [It] would not give us the authority for an invasion, would it? ’Cause it just says, “continue to receive [military material]”?

Yes, it . . . I wouldn’t . . . I’d like to have the Secretary answer that, but I should think that—

Has this been submitted to them [the OAS member countries]?

This is being submitted this morning.

Well, no. But it’s further than that . . . it says that [reading again from the draft OAS resolution] “to ensure the government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent missiles and bases in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming active threats to the peace and security of the Continent.” Which is practically everything that you could possibly ask for.

OK, all right. Can you continue, Mr. Secretary?

The next contingency is an air intercept. We don’t know, and we’re not prepared to recommend to you action relating to air intercept. We will maintain, with the help of CIA and our own resources, the careful watch on the movement of Soviet aircraft to Cuba. We’ll inform you immediately upon receiving any information indicating such aircraft is moving in there. The Navy and the Joint Chiefs are considering how we might intercept and what the rules of engagement will be, and we will be prepared to talk about that later.

You asked about the aircraft on alert against the nine missile sites. They are on alert. They will be prepared to move against those sites. We do believe we should have warning the night before, in preparation for a dawn strike, however. In an emergency, it could be done with less warning, but we would recommend against it, except in an emergency.

This is a part of the overall strike plan. We’d have to pull out that portion and execute it.

The next subject: invasion preparations and the action we’re taking to be prepared for an invasion.

The most important single action we need to take, and the one with the longest lead time, is the chartering of merchant vessels, cargo vessels in particular. We need about 134 ships. Of the 134, about 20 are military vessels, we are diverting those from their other activities and assembling them now. Of the remaining 114 we started yesterday to charter, we chartered four yesterday. There are nine others we could have chartered that we turned down because they were either unsuitable or the price was too high. We propose to continue today to charter under forced draft. We may pick up another 10 to 20 ships today. That will leave us short perhaps 90 to 100 ships. We’ll have to obtain those by requisitioning them.

The 100-odd ships we need to requisition [unclear correction from someone]. The number of ships we’ll requisition would be on the order of 60 to 70 percent of all ships in U.S. East Coast ports. So this is a tremendous dislocation of shipping. We’re not prepared to recommend such requisitioning to you this morning. We do believe we should proceed to charter today and the Chiefs are working out a very careful analysis of when these additional ships are required in relation to the early days of an invasion. We think that the action we’re proposing is satisfactory for today.

We do not propose to call up today the transport aircraft, 21 squadrons—16 aircraft apiece, some 300 transport aircraft, that would come from the Air Reserve and [Air National] Guard that are essential for the invasion forces. This can be done at the start of the preparations for the invasion, either simultaneous with the air strike or shortly before, giving a lead time of something on the order of five to seven days for those air squadrons. So we don’t believe that today we need to take that action.

I’d like to bring up the shipping again. This concerns me because you not only preempt the large percentage of the ships, but you also affect industry in a great many areas. For instance, the lumber industry in the entire Northwest is dependent upon American-flag ships coming around. And these come from Japan, Honolulu, and elsewhere, and pick up cargoes and come around.

What you do by preempting these ships is you turn off, you turn the entire East Coast lumber business over to Canada. Now practically all industry that ships by water is affected, either they ship coastwise or inter-coastal. I wonder if we shouldn’t consider using flags of the ships of friendly nations. There’s great numbers of ships laying around and your entire requirement could be served by a fraction of the cost. If this could be done, and I raise this just as a matter of policy, whether there is legal restriction or whether it would be impossible to arrange diplomatically . . . But I would think the Germans, for instance, might go along. There are a hell of a lot of German ships around, British ships.

I would think the risk involved, Mr. President, would preclude any offering of foreign bottoms if they get involved in an invasion of Cuba, which they soon will.

Well, you might man them. [Unclear.]

Underwriting [unclear].

The question of what to do on shipping is a very complicated one. All I’m prepared to recommend now is that we go ahead with chartering on a commercial basis, voluntary basis. And tomorrow we’ll be prepared to raise it again. We have Admiral [John] Sylvester of the Navy in charge of this. He’s examining all alternatives and we just don’t know what course we should follow.

I think, in addition to the problem of the ships themselves, you ought to look at the effect on the economy.

We are, exactly.

This could be very, very serious.

Yes. This is the primary reason why we’re not recommending requisitioning. It will disturb the whole export flow of goods.

Well, it won’t disturb the export because most of your export, or a great part of your export, goes in foreign bottoms.

Well, a lot of it goes in American bottoms. And it will disturb the trade in any case, we agree.

What’s got to be affected is your coastal lines and inter-coastal operations, which can’t go on foreign bottoms. It’s against the law. This is what’s going to be affected.

Well, now can we—there’s no way—I know what the law says but is there any power we’ve got that can exempt them from that law during this period? We shouldn’t be that hamstrung. Is there anything that—national emergency powers, anything?

I don’t know whether there is or not.

You can look it up.

You could ship by foreign bottoms, that would . . .

Who will do that?

The Attorney General.

Who’s working with you on the shipping over in your shop?

I’m working with Admiral Sylvester of the Navy.

OK.

Next point is to confirm again, Mr. President, we propose to exclude petroleum, oil, and lubricants from the initial list of prohibited goods.

The final point relates to low-level reconnaissance. I believe it’s John McCone’s recommendation, as it is that of the Chiefs, that we undertake a series of low-level flights today to establish details of these missiles and to obtain the evidence to prove to a layman the existence of missiles in Cuba.

May I raise the question please, sir, on the matter of exempting POL [petroleum, oil, and lubricants]. One of these things which we might think about as an action to be taken on the loss of a U-2, would be a tightening of the embargo. And the next obvious step is to POL. Now we may not want to take it to that point. But I think this is something we should at least give consideration to.

You can look at it every day, George, and see [unclear].

Well now, it seems to me, I think the films, unless we need them for tactical reasons, I think we’ve proved it to the laymen. The only question is if you need the . . . you don’t want to do the low-level flights—

Mr. President, may I comment on that? Because the question of evidence is becoming of great importance in the international debate. Now, it’s too soon to be sure what the reaction will be in the United Nations but we’ve had a number of calls, both from Mr. Stevenson and from Mr. [John] McCloy, emphasizing the importance of proof at the U.N.

Has the President seen that [unclear]?

That’s SAC with the low level [photography], Mr. President.

That’s what?

That’s SAC at low level.

Where exactly?

In from Florida. It starts here and moves across the entire area. This is [at an altitude of] approximately 200 feet, we believe.

So, in other words, then, we’d do that today?

That would be our recommendation.

There is a question about whether these things really exist?

Oh, Mr. President, we have an immediate question as to what to say about what we now know. For example, our position currently has been that we will show pictures without leaving them in people’s hands and not making them available for publication. We showed them to friends and to newspaper men, but not in the [U.N.] Security Council.

I, myself, think we are now ready to take the view that the pictures can be shown in the Security Council, if I understood the directive this morning. The second question is whether locations can be mentioned.

There is some feeling in New York that if we say we ought to go and look at the town of “Umpty-ump,” that this will carry conviction. The question that I would put is, which towns, whether to do this and, if so, which towns? We obviously must not do it in a way which indicates that we only know thus, because that will show what, if anything, we’re missing. But it may be that the best thing to do is to defer that question for 24 hours.

Well, I don’t think we ought to give them the towns until we’ve gotten some agreement [in the U.N.] that they’re really going to go there. Because they could be moving these [missiles] anyhow. We’d give away quite a lot. I don’t know whether we get a hell of a lot until we—

Fixed sites are the ones that one might suggest. [Unclear exchange in which McNamara, Bundy, and McCone chime in that the photos of fixed sites (which have no missiles yet) are the least persuasive.]

Well then, why don’t we do this filming thing then anyway, because . . . You’re going to start moving people. . . .

If could raise a question. When we were over at the laboratory the other day the indication was that the low—[note 9] Robert Kennedy’s visit, with McNamara, to the National Photographic Interpretation Center on Saturday morning, 20 October.

I think they were wrong, Bobby. This is a strip [of film] taken to show the benefits of low level.

This is new film, a new camera, and it’s very, very much better.

The reason I feel this, Mr. President, is there’s been some comment in the European press that’s been skeptical—both Britain and the French. Most particularly, [Mexican president López] Mateos made a statement in the Philippines that, if the evidence was conclusive, the attitude of Mexico toward Castro and Cuba would change.[note 10] Mexico’s president Adolfo López Mateos was visiting Manila when the crisis broke, and his plane was met by Americans bearing evidence about the missile deployment when it refueled in Honolulu en route back home.

And I think we ought to get the conclusive evidence, and I think this is the way to do it.

I think this is a way of proving [unclear].

OK. [Unclear.]

Do you want to put [unclear]?

Right now?

Yes.

Yes. They’re on alert now.

We would take [unclear].

Well now, General, they go in under the radar, do they? This does not give away . . . If we’re going to have to do that technique again [for an air strike], this doesn’t give away our abilities too much?

No, sir, we don’t think so. We don’t think there’s any real danger, but there’s always a certain amount in doing it. If we start a milk run [an easy mission] in the same place, we would [unclear].

OK. Fine.

Will that give away exactly where we know that the—

Are you going through everything? [speaking over others] Do you want to leave one out, or put some others in?

No, I think we ought to do all nine [missile sites].

Yeah, but do you think it would be worthwhile?

How about the suspected tenth [missile site] that was in the papers this morning?

Well, we don’t know where the tenth is. We looked very carefully last night for it.

We have only collateral information about it [unclear].

This is the part we have to handle very precisely. It is very dangerous, and I don’t think that we ought to stay over that territory any longer than . . .

No, I’m not thinking of those, but whether you could send another two or three [planes] so it doesn’t look like we’re just hitting the ones that we do know. I mean, whether you want to send something over some other thing that you want to see. So, it doesn’t look like we’re just hitting the . . .

I think they know we know, Bobby. They—

They know we know, but they don’t—as I understand the explanation, we . . . There is perhaps another one that we don’t know about.

Well, the one we don’t know about is—at the moment we think—not started. It looks as though the crew that will construct the tenth site is working on the ninth.

Why don’t we take one flight either over Havana harbor or Mariel and—

We can stay away from . . .

Just too much [unclear].

No, that’s a—

It’s terribly dangerous.

These are low-level flights.

We can’t all run the flights.

I think we’re on sound ground if we stay with the—

All right.

How many are there now?

Approximately 650.

Six hundred fifty.

Mr. President—

I need some suggestions for Pierre [Salinger].

[very quietly] Bobby, would you [unclear]?

Let me talk to Art [unclear]. Work it out. [Bundy interjects something.] Right, but I want to be sure we don’t issue another announcement this afternoon, doing something else. We want a consistent policy that we can live with for some time. I asked him last night to go through the Korean War basis there.

This is based on Korean experience. [Unclear exchange.]

So what about our reserves?

[Unclear.] We propose no further action on the Reserve and Guard today, Mr. President, other than to extend the tours of the Navy and Marine personnel. [Robert Kennedy is involved in a background conversation with McCone.]

We may wish to call up about 10,000 Navy men to man the 40 destroyers and about 12 antisubmarine squadrons tomorrow or the next day. There is not need for that as yet. We’d like to postpone it. It’s an action that’s difficult to reverse. The extension of tours that we will propose tonight can’t be reversed very easily.

The question is, though, if we’re leading up to an invasion, whether we are doing all the things that we would have to do?

We believe so. The Reserves would not be used in the invasion, exclusive of the transport aircraft that would be required.

What about the movement of, like, the 101st [Airborne Division], 82nd [Airborne Division], and all the rest?

They’re all moving.

All of their equipment?

And the Fifth Infantry Division[note 11] Actually not the Fifth Infantry but the Fifth Marine Expeditionary Brigade. of the Marines is moving from the West Coast and the armored division from Fort Hood is moving to the East Coast.

The other question is these airfields down in Florida. Everybody’s lived in peace so long that . . . Is everything going to be lined up on those three airports in Florida in a way in which if they come in, if they—obviously they will take a reprisal. I should think one of their planes would strafe us.

We’re aware of that, Mr. President. It’s true, these fields are congested. Unfortunately, a lot of the congestion is necessary. They are dispersing the planes as well as they can on Key West. We’ve reinforced the air defenses to the extent we’re capable of.

We have an officer—General [Curtis] LeMay has been put in charge of representing the Chiefs—of the air defense, to supervise the air defense arrangements down there. He is sending one of his most experienced officers down today on the ground to take a look at the situation.

We have talked to Admiral [Robert] Dennison about these fields. He knows the situation but he feels that he prefers to stay that way because it can help him increase readiness.

Well, what I’d like to do is, can we have somebody go take a photograph of those fields at about five this afternoon or four this afternoon, and just get an idea of what our . . . ? Because there isn’t any doubt. . . . You see these people don’t know that we’re maybe going to hit a SAM site tomorrow and their reprisal would be to strafe on our fields. And it would be nice to know what our targets are.

That’s quite true. These are very lush targets; there’s no doubt about it. Unfortunately, our fields are so limited, and our requirements are so great, we really can’t—

Well, for example, they’re using the West Palm Beach airport, I wonder? That’s a hell of a military airport. It hasn’t been used much.

No, sir. I don’t know.

It seems to me you could close that off because there’s not much travel that goes through there. They could go down to Miami and go and they take over that field. There’s a lot of barracks there, too. You might check on that.

They’re using Opa Locka.

West Palm is a pretty good field and it was a good base in the war, and it isn’t used much now.

We just haven’t got enough fields in this area to support . . .

No, but I do think we better . . . We have to figure that if we do execute this plan we just agreed on this morning [for retaliation if a U-2 were shot down], that they’re going to strafe our fields, and we don’t want them to shoot up 100 planes. We’ve just got to figure out some other device. [Unclear exchange.]

This is one of these rather humorous examples of the over-sophistication of our weapons. We have everything, except to deal with a simple aircraft coming in low.

That’s a lot of [unclear]. You’ll look into West Palm Beach, Ros?

Yes.

OK.

[explaining the need to display photographs in presentations later that day at the United Nations] And this is agreed—[John] McCloy has worked there. He says they need these things they probably can’t have, but anyway, I’ll read them [the list of requests from Adlai Stevenson and McCloy in New York].

A large map marked in color showing at least some of the sites. I mean, they don’t insist upon showing all the sites, and they would make it very clear that there are other sites which they know about which they are not disclosing.

An indication of the rough orders of magnitudes of sites—of each type and the number of missiles accommodated on those sites. The photographs showing locations and dates, and not merely anonymous photographs. They would also have thought they would like, but I told them I thought this was out of the question, photographs with similar installations in the U.S.S.R. They then came back and said, well, couldn’t they have them pre-May 1960 because it was clear we were flying U-2s before that time? I told them I thought this was quite unlikely. But they are very concerned about having this evidence, and—

Mr. President, I suggest that we proceed on a two-stage basis. Your operation you’ve just ordered [low-level reconnaissance flights] will produce much more interesting and effective evidence tomorrow.

Yes.

The [unclear, speaking over the President] today and say: “Ample evidence is available and will be presented if the question is challenged.” We doubt if the opposition dares to challenge it. It’s a perfectly manageable tactical position for 24 hours.

Excuse me, I’m sorry. It will be more than 24 hours wouldn’t it? If you fly these things?

You can fly them now.

No, no, no. That’s the tactical intelligence to be done in two or three hours after they’ve landed the plane.

Yes. If that is challenged, if these pictures we’re now getting don’t come out, then we can release at least a couple of these [U-2 photos], enough to sustain them. And I’d invite them to challenge it.

I think, from an intelligence point of view, we can meet most of these requirements. I’d like to think about that pre-1960 flight. There’s a question of the effect on you, Bob, from a military point of view.

Well I think that the way to meet that is to take a picture of a May Day [Moscow military] parade that showed the weapons.

Yes. You can take that out and show it to them.

We have that.

Actually, John, if you don’t say at what altitude these were taken or the date, then . . . If you don’t say what altitude, you’re not giving much away, are you, in these pictures?

If it indicates a number—

All right. I’ll tell you what let’s do. Let’s let Mr. McCone and Mr. Ball settle what they ought to give to them and then under what conditions.

I have nothing more, Mr. President.

Well now, the only thing, as I say, is, Mac, once again, is that if the Russians respond with some actions which make invasion desirable or inevitable, I want to be able to . . . be able to feel that we haven’t wasted any days here on that.

The real problem is the shipping problem, Mr. President. If we solve that . . .

I think we ought to . . . and now Bob’s going to look at that, and then I think we probably ought to be [ready] for the next week, every possible number and everybody else that you need to be [ready], if that’s the only way we can do it. And then it may be that other . . . There may be some emergency powers which will exempt them from the Jones Act, so they can go on foreign bottoms for this two-week period.[note 14] The Jones Act of 1928 required certain exporters to use U.S. ships except in emergencies. And let them do it and who’s going to challenge it? If necessary, we just do it as some emergency power.

Mr. President, there are two questions I’d like to raise. One is, if we don’t get OAS action today but it appears we’re going to get it the next day. Do you want, in fact, to actually stop the Soviet ships beginning tomorrow? The point is that they’re much less apt to run a legal blockade than they are an illegal one. And I think you might want to keep that in mind.

All right. Well, we’ll be in touch if we’re not going to get it. [Unclear.]

The second thing is, I’m meeting with the ambassadorial group this afternoon and they’ll—we will be discussing what we do about an action in Germany against Berlin. The most likely minimum thing, I think, is that they will insist on inspecting U.S. convoys more than they do now. And what should be our—

I think we ought to accept that. That’s my quick reaction, unless somebody else says that . . . But I don’t think we’re in very good shape to have a big fight about whether they inspect our trucks or something. I think we ought to—

I think we ought to take time out, Mr. President, and not go through until we look it over very hard.

Wouldn’t it be better to stop any convoys [into Berlin] the next day or so?

And then we’re going to get in the pattern where it’s tough to begin again. I would rather have them inspecting them.

Mr. President, my suggestion is that we ought to have a second meeting with this committee at the end of the afternoon. We will know about the OAS. We will know about the initial reaction of the ambassadorial group. We will know if the [low-level] pictures came through. We will know about what Kohler’s message is [from Moscow].

Right. Try to keep these meetings as brief as possible. [The meeting starts to break up. Some fragments of conversations are audible.]

I’ll set an hour [for the next meeting] when I know a little more, probably about five.

Six, I would say.

Six is more likely.

Six unless you get further notice. [Several conversations at once.]

Six unless we get further notice.

As I say, the press thing, everybody is going to be available today and Ted [Sorensen] will be able to talk for the next few minutes if anybody [unclear]. John [McCone] also.

Could I have your attention for one more moment? There’s something I know the Attorney General’s interested in. We need to get a working party that will be concerned not with today or tomorrow, but with processes of this through time. Would you all consider whom you might want to have from your departments and I’ll ask again for names at the end of the day.

Now, this is to do what kind of work, Mac?

To think ahead to wider problems here. [Unclear exchange with Taylor and Bundy.]

. . . contingencies and reactions thereto.

That’s it.

It’ll take a long . . . [unclear] necessary thing.

I’m really thinking in the range of things that this group isn’t going to pay much attention to.

Yeah, I think we need one from [unclear], one member from the Joint Staff plus Paul Nitze.

That would be ideal. That would be ideal.

So, you can count on that. Max is [unclear].

I also think that without regard to department, there’s a problem of temperament and style as to who should run this. I have not hit upon the right person yet. I’m not sure that Paul [Nitze] might not be the man to beat. Well, if you give me individual suggestions on that, I’ll try to have it worked out at the end of the afternoon.

All right, but not until tomorrow. Because if we can get organized in the course of the day, we will have done a good job.

[to McCone] Now, this business of getting back to what McNamara [unclear] to showing some [unclear].

Well, it really doesn’t matter if Congress won’t grant powers—[Unclear exchange].

It seem to me [unclear].

The pictures you show.

Yeah. That’s what I’m thinking of [unclear]. We select . . . and my thought is this: To select two of the best [intelligence] people [to be sent to New York to explain the photos]. [Laughter, probably occasioned by some remark not caught on the tape.] [Unclear exchange.]

The ultimate political action by the Russians: Moscow TASS in Russian is transmitting a Soviet defense ministry order stating that there would be no demobilization of forces. [Laughter.]

[Unclear] very mild response. [Mixed conversations. Some people leave. Bundy can be heard speaking.]

I asked this yesterday. It gave me real pleasure to get out a memorandum which, if you say that the ambassador at large will be appointed and everybody, following protocol, said there is only one; let’s see who it is. [Laughter.]

I will. Now, let me just get this just absolutely clear in my head. If there is not an OAS action we will review it again at six?

It [unclear] gives me authority to [unclear].

[Unclear.] we’d better get that right now. Do you want to hold the line? I’ll get it signed.

[Unclear.] If OAS action is coming today, then the [blockade] proclamation goes out tonight. [Unclear exchange involving Ball, McCone, and Alexis Johnson.]

Do you release this to the press? If you show it [the intelligence on the missiles] to the Security Council, [unclear]. This is all I’m thinking of.

This is all I’m thinking of. You’ve got two choices. You can show the individuals, friendly members in the Security Council, show this to them, or you can produce it in a Security Council meeting. If you produce it in the Security Council meeting, it seems to me there are almost insurmountable problems as far as giving them to the press.

The difficulty is of getting into the press. These pictures cannot be reproduced [unclear] in newspapers [unclear] mean anything.

Therefore, how [unclear] give on background [unclear]. I think you either have to give it to individual members of the Security Council or give it to groups of members of four or five, in the form of . . .

I think that this is what you would try, and I think this is what you would try to do, in the first instance. Now, whether the question’s going to arise of presenting it formally in the Security Council, it seems to me you’re in an impossible position in showing this in, giving them the picture, if you will, to the Soviet member of the Security Council.

Why don’t we get hold of Stevenson on the phone right now and before we talk to [unclear].

Yes, yes. I think you can get ahold of him. [Speaks to someone else.]

[to an operator] Well can you get Ambassador Stevenson on the phone for me? And I wonder if—

Are we going to have somewhere where both Mr. McCone and I can [unclear]?

Three [o’clock]. We’ll—he’s right here. And it’s all [unclear].

Yes, you just might want to. . . .

Just hold on a minute, I’ll call you right back.

There were several [delegates] without instructions. So they’re [OAS ministers] meeting again at three.

It looks like we’ll have everybody but an abstention with Mexico on one paragraph, unless we can straighten that out before three. López Mateos is on a plane from Hawaii to his home.[note 15] Because López Mateos was on a plane returning from his visit to the Philippines, he was unable to approve revised instructions for Mexico’s representative at the OAS meeting. But we’ll have the resolution, with a large majority, shortly after three.

Oh, gee, wonderful!

They’re really rallying around. Bolivia, who had withdrawn from the OAS pending their settlement with Chile, turned up this morning.

Oh, terrific! Terrific.

Now, we can put the question of the timing of the issuance of the [quarantine] proclamation. I should think that we should be ready . . . issue the proclamation [unclear].

At four. I have it right here. It’s all cleared by our lawyers. And I believe by your lawyers.

Now, what is the . . . ? Privately I’ve been telling two or three of these fellows in order to . . . that there could be contact this afternoon. Therefore it’s very important for us to have this resolution.

We would propose having it [the quarantine] at dawn tomorrow.

Daylight tomorrow.

Yeah, but don’t tell them that.

This will be very important for what we’ve been talking about [referring to the United Nations].

Oh, very important.

If the OAS were to act, it would help the—

This will relieve our problems here.

The meeting in the Security Council is set for four this afternoon, if they should act—

I understand a long TASS statement is on the wire. Have you been getting that in here?

Not yet.

Let’s don’t howl too soon here, boys.

If the OAS has acted before the Security Council, oh that’s going to be a big help. Mmmm. Our diplomacy is working.

[reading the report on the TASS statement] No demobilization of forces. Meeting of the Warsaw Pact. Well, my God.

Well, as a matter of fact, I said to somebody . . . I don’t know what John McCone thinks of this, but I think it was very significant that we were here this morning. We’ve passed the one contingency: an immediate, sudden, irrational strike.

Yeah, yeah.

Some further news from the U.N. is . . .

When I say that we’re here, that they’re [the Soviets are] here either. [Chuckles.]

When we asked for a Security Council meeting at three this afternoon, [Soviet ambassador to the U.N. Valerian] Zorin is dragging his feet.

Well, I just talked to Stevenson, and he says, and Stevenson says, he [Zorin] is dragging his feet because the Russians are getting up a request for a resolution of their own. And there’s going to be a countercomplaint filed. And this is what they’re dragging their feet for. So that they’re meeting at four.

It’s significant they let the Cubans bring the first one [proposal in the U.N.] and not themselves.

Well, we caught them [the Soviets]. We caught them without their contingency [plan].

Tell the Security Council we would be happy to evacuate them to Seattle or someplace. [Laughter.][note 16] The context of this bit of gallows humor is that most of these officials had, in recent days or hours, been obliged to review plans for the evacuation of themselves or family members in case of a Soviet nuclear attack.

Well, I think we planned that. . . .

I’ll go on back. [Unclear.]

That’s great. That’s terrific. Oh that’s great news. We really caught them with their contingencies down.

Well, they’re doing so at Honolulu [briefing López Mateos during his refueling stop]. They’re doing so. I don’t know whether his people got in touch with Honolulu or not.

Let’s see. That plane from the Philippines stops at Guam, doesn’t it?

No, he’s flying in a charter.

Oh, he is.

Yeah, he’s flying a chartered aircraft. What we did, we transmitted the text of the President’s statement to him in the air between Manila and Honolulu.

Oh, we did.

Yes, so he would have it by the time he got to Honolulu, and hopefully has, as we were arranging with . . . The Mexico Embassy was arranging for the Mexican government to contact him at Honolulu.

You don’t know whether he is at Honolulu.

Yes, it should be about now. It was—at eight it was about three hours. But the embassy down there was on it and making telephone contact with Honolulu and CINCPAC, our political adviser at CINCPAC [headquarters of the commander in chief, Pacific Theater, in Honolulu].

Your meeting with the ambassador and all that [unclear]?

All ears, splendid. Just splendid. The Secretary [Rusk] handled the neutrals and apparently did a completely superb job. I talked to a few of them afterwards.

And the first reactions from all the other ambassadors, the NATO ambassadors, was very good.

The briefing, being able to give them this briefing, this is what counts. Of course, this is the problem that Stevenson has.

I’ll tell you what won [unclear]. Much the most [effective] was actually seeing the pictures, rather than—

Seeing the pictures.

[to someone entering the room] Did Dean tell you how he made out?

Yes, fantastic.

Let me tell you one more thing. In order to get Berlin contingency planning forward, and to have it centralized under authority, it has just been agreed by the two, by Secretary Rusk and the President, that Paul Nitze will become the chairman of the special working group of this committee for Berlin. Now, if Berlin gets hot, it will come right into the whole [Executive] Committee. But we’ve got to have some group doing this while the rest of us are doing all these other things.

OK.

I haven’t notified Paul yet, but he’s the senior man in the government who really possesses [unclear].

John? Hello? Will you put John through?

Gee, that OAS thing.

[talking to Stevenson] I’ll put John McCone on. I think we can work this out some way. And I’m going to get on the other phone. Hold on a second.

[talking to Stevenson] Yes, Governor? Now, we want to do everything we can to meet your requirement and producing a . . . very forward as possible. There are two problems, of course. One is revealing too much and thus affect any future undertaking that we might be obliged to go forward with.

And, second, is revealing too much about our means. With regard to the latter, I’m not concerned about that if we keep this on the basis of military reconnaissance, which it is. But not identifying the type of equipment very much. [Pause as Stevenson replies.]

But now the question is whether this has to be made public. Your meeting of the Security Council is probably going to be televised, I understand. And again, whatever information is released cannot be given to the members, individually or collectively, beforehand? Or does it have to be presented formally? [Pause as Stevenson replies.] I see. [Pause.] Mm-hmm. [Pause.] Mm-hmm. [Pause.] Yeah. [Pause.]

Well, you’re answering the question now, and that is this: Your case must be made in the open forum, if it has to be made at all. So, therefore, this then releases it into the public domain, right? [Pause.] Pictures of what? [Pause.] Yeah. [Pause.] Yeah. [Pause.] Mm-hmm. [Pause.]

In other words, if you have the map . . . a couple of locations and then say there are more. [Pause.] Yeah. [Pause.] Mm-hmm. [Pause.]

Well, all right. Now let me go over this and I’ll tell you what I’ll do. I don’t want to—[Pause.]

You see, the problem of these pictures is this. When you release them, if you’re going to give anything to any foreign delegate, you have to give it to the press. Now these pictures, blown up as they are, are, under study, convincing. They are convincing to you and to me. You reproduce those in the newspaper and they’re totally unconvincing, you see? [Pause.] That’s right. [Pause.] Yeah. [Pause.] Mm-hmm. [Pause.] Yeah. [Pause.] Mm-hmm. [Pause.] Yeah. [Pause.]

Well, for now, I’ll tell you what I’ll do. Let me go into this and I’ll send a couple of fellows up there right away. [Pause.]

Well, I don’t like surfacing the thing. There’s a problem there. But he’s got a man. But what I might do is have him come up and work with you and prepare the scenario. [Pause.] Mm-hmm. [Pause.] Yeah.

Well, I’ll have him come up and work with you on the scenario and just how far we can go.

Now there’s one thing that is quite significant. And that is, we’re going to attempt a . . . we are releasing some low-level photography today. This will not be available until six, seven. Well, this might show very much more distinctive pictures than what we have. This would be [photos taken] at 200–300 feet, you see? [Pause.]

Yeah, but we won’t get that . . . we couldn’t get that into your hands until late this evening [Pause.] I see. [Pause.] Yeah. [Pause.] I could do that. [Pause.] Yeah.

Well, that’s why we’re taking this [low-level photography]. Now, of course, we’ll have to see what the results are. If we just release them . . . we just released the [low-level] flights a half hour ago, so they won’t be back for another couple of hours. [Pause.]

Well, they might. You don’t know. But we’ll have to see. In any event, I’ll do two things. I’ll have Lundahl come up there to work with you in the preparation of a scenario of what we’ve got. Then I’ll be prepared to get this other stuff up to you just as quick as available. [Pause.] Yeah. [Pause.] Yeah. [Pause.] Yeah.

All right, fine. Now just a minute. Tommy Thompson has something he wants to mention.

Would it be feasible for him to say that these pictures have been shown to every non-Communist delegate and ambassador in Washington? Any delegate who wants to see them, he can see them at the American delegation.

[on the other line] If any what?

If any delegate wants to see them, he can see them at the American delegation. The principal delegate. [Pause.]

Right. [Pause.] There were messages from one of the seven [Soviet] ships [nearing Cuba] this morning at one, but we couldn’t read them out. So I don’t think anybody knows what’s going on.

Now, Tommy Thompson’s question suggested one approach to this that you might consider, Governor. And that is that you tell your members of your committee that these pictures have been shown to all non-Communist ambassadors and then invite them to come to your office to see them as a means of getting around presenting them in public. Now, I don’t know whether that would constitute—[Pause.] Yeah. [Pause.] That’s fine. [Pause.] That’s correct.

Yeah, compromise our security and throw them into the public domain, which we don’t want to do. Well, you think it over and I’ll have Lundahl up there. [Pause.] Mm-hmm. [Pause.] Yeah. [Pause.] Yeah.

Well, you think it over and I’ll let you know when he calls again. Yeah. Lundahl and one man will come with him. [Pause.]

Well, he’ll probably get away from here at 12:30, take an hour on the plane, so he’d be in your office at a quarter past two. [Pause.] Will do. [Pause.] All right.

Did he like that idea?

Yes, he thought it was good. He was going to go ahead with it with a friendly ambassador. He’s going to think about the U.A.R. [United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria] and Romania.

Well, I wouldn’t think I’d put the U.A.R. . . .

[on the phone to someone else] Listen, it’s Mr. McCone. Would you get Mr. Ray Cline for me? Dr. Cline at the CIA. And call me in here? Thank you.

Maybe I should get in touch with Roger [Hilsman], too, so we don’t cross things. I think Roger worked on this also. I’ve stopped Roger. Roger was going up [to New York], and I’ve stopped him.

I’ll send Ray, Ray Cline and Lundahl up there.

Yeah, yeah. And have him get in touch with Roger so that we keep our—

Oh, yeah. OK, gentlemen.

George, the question I have on my mind is, if it’s this hard to start a blockade around Cuba, how the hell did we ever start World War II? [Laughter.]

Ray Cline.

Oh, thanks.

Hello? Say, Ray, Governor Stevenson and Jack McCloy are in some difficulty on putting together a convincing case to the Security Council. In the event they’re challenged, you see. So I told them that we could not surface Lundahl, but I have Lundahl go up there to help him with his scenario. Actually, Lundahl probably couldn’t get in the place if they wanted him to, see?

Now, what I’d like to do is to have Lundahl and you, if you could, or if you can pick the best man you can to work with Lundahl. This is a matter of helping Stevenson, McCloy, and Lovett, you see.[note 17] President Kennedy had asked Robert Lovett and McCloy to aid Stevenson in presenting and supporting the U.S. position at the United Nations. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., was also in New York helping Stevenson. That’s a pretty senior group of people. And you know them all. With what . . . and what they would like to do—

[aside to Jerome Wiesner] Jerry, just a minute.

What they would like to do would be to show them a map which showed, say, one location of the medium [-range ballistic missiles], you see, and one location of the IRBMs. And then the progressive pictures of those two, you see. And then they might want some other things.

See, they’re in a little bad spot because at the time of the Bay of Pigs, why Stevenson showed some fake pictures and they later turned out to be fake, you see. So he is kind of in trouble up there.

So, what I would like to . . . We ordered the low-level flights, and they’re laid on. And we’ll get those pictures back early this afternoon. And that will do us a lot of good. [Pause.]

No, because he’s got to be prepared at four. So you get Lundahl and get what’s-his-name on his plane and Woody, and then go on up. You’ll need some security men. And they can meet you there and all the rest, fine? [Pause.]

Yeah, just go . . . Walt knows how to do all that.[note 18] Walt Elder was McCone’s executive assistant at the CIA. [Pause.] Yeah, and if that plane is not available, get a MATS [Military Air Transportation System] plane. [Pause.] Yeah. [Pause.] Yeah. [Pause.] Yeah. [Pause.] All right. [Pause.] Yeah, do that.

Now, they’re pulling Roger [Hilsman] out of this U.N. operation, and we’re going to take that, see? [Pause.]

Yeah, I told Stevenson you’d be in his office at a quarter past two. In the U.N. [Pause.] Well, you better find out exactly. They’ll know in New York. The thing for you to do is to get going—OK. [McCone hangs up.]

Mr. Wiesner?

You started to talk about something yesterday that I didn’t pick up enough on, and then I had a second question to raise with you. We had talked about possible neutron detectors.

About what?

Neutron detectors for nuclear weapons detection.[note 19] Technology to detect the possible presence of nuclear weapons would be useful in any inspection of Soviet ships or aircraft en route to Cuba, either overtly through the official quarantine or covertly. The technology, referred to as “black boxes,” might also be useful if the crisis were settled by some international inspection of sites in Cuba to verify the withdrawal of Soviet weapons. The last time I looked at this there was nothing really sensible kicking around. You implied that there was some work going on that maybe I should take a look at.

Well, there was, and there was a black box, and our fellows thought it was working good enough [unclear].

Who in your place should I talk with?

Pete Scoville.[note 20] Herbert “Pete” Scoville was the CIA’s deputy director for research.

Well, we would have to have entrée to use their equipment. Normally they, except for the outstations of the various oil companies and mining companies, they would be located in the capital cities also, as we are.

The radios?

[Unclear] the radio site.

Let me see that. Could I?

There is a very elaborate American-owned commercial network that’s in the sort of Central American area that is associated with United Fruit.

United Fruit Company.

Tropical radio gaps. They are not necessarily in big cities, but are in plantation areas.

Have you got enough personnel?

Yes, sir. We have made a study of it, a rather quick one I might add, and it indicates that we will need 43 people to put these stations on the air 24 hours a day.

How many have you got on the frequency now?

Twenty-nine.

Twenty-nine, sir.

You need 43 more—

If you want to keep it going 24 hours a day.

Seven days a week.

So this is the most complete system, [unclear]’s system, and the government has it now. You see, State has none and the military has very little.

And I doubt whether you could augment it very rapidly. Because you couldn’t make it [unclear] rapidly.

The most rapid, the quickest thing you can do is to get technicians of one sort or another to operate it and put this on a 24-hour-a-day basis and then get additional backup on moves and back up what you’ve got, in some carefully selected, remote and secure places.

You ought to get together with State—maybe we should put it together—and see what additional arrangements they have made with the commercial operators. I thought they had some. To see whether this does give us additional facilities. And then see whether the political people plus your people can put these where we are most likely to have trouble, and therefore where we ought to put our efforts to increase the communication.

Jerry, there is one problem. If we put this on a 24-hour basis, which is desirable, we’d have to get a lot of support from the military, if they’ve got any operators. We might have to bring in, on an emergency basis, civilian operators that would be willing to come in on an emergency.

Are you convinced that a 24-hour basis is necessary? I’m not certain of it.

Well, I feel—I rather feel so particularly from the standpoint of our communication with them, you see.

But they don’t have . . . ? I thought there was an alerting system?

There is in nine [embassies].

Where if you try to call them up you get the Marine guard.

This exists only at nine.

Nine of these stations.

Might this be easier to do than . . . ?

That might be. That might be.

The problem . . . I wanted to touch base with you to make sure that I was not going in a direction contrary to yours.

No, this is . . . I think that we’ve got this on a 24 hours. But of course these boats have been [unclear] last night, but it can’t be maintained that way.

Sure. Why don’t we get together with State’s people to see what additional things there are and see whether they feel there is a need.

You go right ahead, and I’ll work closely with State.

[to others] Dr. Wiesner has been one of those commissioned to look into this. We want to support both State and Defense in every way possible and, except emergency measures that are necessary, we will find the operators [others interject: “The 43”] bleeding a few from overseas stations of our own, and we’ll take the steps necessary. Getting them from the military, and if we have to bring in, do a recruiting job of outsiders, we’ll do that.

That number is necessary if you want to bring this whole network up to 24 hours. There may be selected parts that—

Of the 43, we can find 20 within our own organization now.

That’s right, just 20.

But there’s one thing that’s worrying me, then I’ve got to [unclear]. One real concern that I have, I’ve just noticed that Defense says they’ve just [unclear] the old network. Now if we had a crisis somewhere else in the world. Hell of a crisis. You should keep that in mind here too. Let’s not get ourselves down there and then suddenly—

If you bring in those 20, will you impair [communications in] Frankfurt and the Far East and so on?

We’ll begin to impair. Yes, sir. We’re talking about replacements who are home on home leave, or scheduled to go out again. And we’re going to pull them in from home leave and send them to Latin America, which means other places won’t—

We’re pretty darn sure we need them.

At what rate can you transmit on this system?

Sixty words a minute. Radio [unclear].

Well thanks very much.

Well, look. While we’re still going . . . because the President’s directive on communications can be straightened out. By the end of the day I think we’ll have that all in hand. Why don’t we get together with you and try to get the State people over too.

Do you want to have a repeat? For all intents and purposes, something like the meeting you had last night.

Last night. But I think with just a smaller group, and probably tomorrow morning.

All right. That’s a good idea.

Let me explain something. Mr. Smith is our area manager for the American communications. Mr. Bloom [?], he was out of town yesterday, down at Norfolk working with CINCLANT on another problem, incidentally, which is going to require about 20 people.

What is that?

It’s a contingency operation of the military.

As a consequence, he didn’t come. He will be able to come today, but—

Well, I think [unclear] less panic among people down here . . . find those areas where it’s most likely to be needed.

I know Jim [?] is dying to get this out, and he has the . . . When we say 43 more people, that means three men in position instead of the one or two. This still means, for a fairly brief period of time, and brief now being in the order of a magnitude of weeks, you now have continuous coverage. But if you’re going into sustained operations, and I’m now thinking in terms of months, by [unclear]. You need to buy additional equipment.

But three of them, I don’t think will give any trouble.

It either will not be much more than you’ve got now, or you’ll need it for a probably brief time, it would seem to me.

I like to hear you say that.

Is this your assessment?

Well, I’m just guessing.

That’s correct.

How does one get back down to the . . .