Transcript
Edited by Max Holland, with David Shreve, Ashley Havard High, and Patricia Dunn
See the daily introduction for 1963-11-29 [from the Norton edition]
Johnson called to consult with the Georgia senator on the plan for a presidential commission. At their lunch together on Tuesday, Russell had apparently expressed some concern over competing investigations on Capitol Hill, one or more of which were likely to be televised. Thus, Johnson’s Senate mentor was in agreement with the idea of a special commission if it meant an end to all congressional hearings.
Until this conversation, however, Russell did not know that Johnson wanted him to serve on the panel. Simultaneously, Johnson was disingenuous to the point of being misleading about whom he wanted to chair the commission. While telling Russell that he “maybe wants somebody from the Supreme Court,” President Johnson neglected to mention that someone was Earl Warren. Indeed, his first and only choice was the Chief Justice, and although Warren had turned down the post already, Johnson was not prepared to accept no for an answer. The Chief Justice was scheduled to arrive in the Oval Office at 4:30 p.m., and Johnson was confident a one-on-one meeting would lead to Warren changing his mind. At one point in the conversation, Johnson even asked Russell to help him craft an argument for overcoming Warren’s resistance, unbeknownst to the Georgian. The President undoubtedly realized that if he were candid with Russell, the senator was likely to refuse appointment to the commission. Russell detested the Chief Justice because of several decisions handed down by the Warren Court.
Even so, Russell pleaded with Johnson to find someone else to serve on the panel, on the grounds that he didn’t have the time and enough energy for the task. Johnson ended the conversation believing, not unreasonably, that Russell had agreed to serve because the President thought it was so important.
. . . it concerns [J. Edgar] Hoover, and [the] Secretary of State, and some others.
We’re trying to avoid having all the House committee—Hale Boggs and a bunch have got some things started over there, and Jim Eastland and [Everett] Dirksen and a bunch got them started in the Senate. [Attorney General] Bobby Kennedy’s got his ideas, and Hoover’s got his report, and they want to have [Thomas] Dewey in for a while. So, I’ve about concluded upon—that I can get people pretty well together—and I’ve talked to the leadership—on trying to have the three branches—have two congressmen and two senators, and maybe two or three outsiders, and maybe somebody from the [Supreme] Court, or at least some person of a judicial background, that are absolutely topflight folks, on about a seven-man board to evaluate Hoover’s report. And it’d be largely done by staff, but they can work on it.
[aside] Bill [Moyers], give me that list of the people.
[to Russell ] And . . . I wanted to get your reaction to it. I think that’d be better than [the Senate] Judiciary [Committee] running one investigation, the House [Judiciary Committee] running another investigation, and having four [or] five going [in] opposite directions, because—
Well, I agree with that. But I don’t think that Hoover ought to make his report too soon.[note 1] After Oswald’s murder on 24 November, Johnson had ordered the FBI to make a complete report on the events in Dallas, even though its legal authority to do so was tenuous.
He’s ready with it now, and he wants to get it off just as quick as he can.
[disapprovingly] Uh-oh.
And he’d probably have it out today, at most on Monday.
Well, he ain’t going to publish the damned thing, is he?
He’s going to turn it over to this group.[note 2] Johnson was referring to the presidential commission. And . . . there’s some things about it I can’t talk about, but—[note 3] Johnson was probably referring to the allegation leveled by Nicaraguan informant Gilberto Alvarado that Oswald received money in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.
Yeah, I understand that. But . . . I think it’d be mighty well if that thing was kept quiet another week or ten days . . . I just do.
Well I think it would be turned over—they’re taking this Court of Inquiry in Texas, and I think the results of that Court of Inquiry and Hoover’s report, and all of them, would go to this group. And they would evaluate it, and then maybe . . . evaluate it for the general public.
Uh-huh.[note 4] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary.
Now, here’s who I’m going to try to get on it. I don’t know—I don’t think I can get any member of the [Supreme] Court . . . I’m going to try to.[note 5] Chief Justice Warren was due at the White House in 25 minutes. I’m going to try to get Allen [W.] Dulles. I’m going to try to get Senator Russell and Senator [John Sherman] Cooper from the Senate.
Oh, no no. Get somebody else, now—
Yeah, I know, wait a minute now. I want to try—
I haven’t got time.
—[to] get [Gerald R.] Jerry Ford [Jr.]. It’s not going to take much time. But we got to have [a] states’ rights man or somebody that the country has confidence in. And I’m going to have—[T. Hale] Boggs [Sr.] has entered a resolution over there, and I haven’t talked to anybody about the membership but you.[note 6] Johnson had discussed the membership most candidly with Abe Fortas, of course, and to a lesser extent with J. Edgar Hoover. This conversation marked the first time Johnson was revealing the commission’s approximate makeup to a member of Congress. But I would think that Ford and Boggs would be pretty good; they’re both pretty young men, and—
They’re both solid citizens.
—and I think that Cooper’s a Republican, and you’re a good states’ rights man. I think it might get John [J.] McCloy and Allen Dulles, and maybe somebody from the [Supreme] Court.[note 7] End of 2021 revisions.
[If] you don’t get somebody from [the] Supreme Court—I don’t know him personally, but this Judge [Harold] Medina, up there that tried all those Communists, is known all over [the] United States.[note 8] Judge Harold Medina, United State Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, became well known nationally and something of a hero to conservatives after presiding over the 1948—1949 trial of 11 American Communist leaders charged with violating the Smith Act. I don’t know what kind of man he is; he might not do.
Uh-huh.
But Judge Medina—
Uh-huh. Uh-huh.
—I think he’s on the Circuit Court of Appeals up in New York now.[note 9] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary.
Who would be the best one if I didn’t get the Chief [Justice]?[note 10] This was the closest Johnson came to saying he wanted Earl Warren. Yet Johnson couched the question in such a way that Russell probably thought the President was not considering the Chief Justice. I understand none of the Court—
Well . . . No, no, you wouldn’t want [Tom C.] Clark hardly.[note 11] Tom Clark was a U.S. Supreme Court associate justice.
—I understand none of the Court—No, we can’t have a Texan.
No, that’s what I said; that’d disqualify him.
[J. Edgar] Hoover tells me all three of these shots were aimed for the President [John F. "Jack" Kennedy]. And that this telescopic sight would bring this thing up where you could shoot a man with it as easy as you’d get a man sitting talking to you.
I thought it was just a seven-dollar-and-a-half thing.
Well, it was a 21-dollar gun. But he said he looked through the telescopic sight himself, and he said, “Mr. President, I could hit a man on that street going 20 miles an hour as easy as I could hit you sitting talking to you.” That’s his language. [Pause.] OK. Now I—
Well, I—really, Mr. President, unless you—
Well, I’m—
—unless you really think it’d be of some benefit—
Yeah, I know it would be—
—[unclear] see it'd save my life, I declare, I don’t want to serve on that [unclear].
I know you don’t want to do anything, but I want you to. And I think that this is important enough, and you’ll see why.[note 12] See footnote 114.[note 13] End of 2021 revisions.
Now, the next thing: I know how you feel about this CIA. But they’re worried about having to go into a lot of this stuff with [the] Foreign Relations Committee. How much of a problem would it give you to just quietly let [J. William] Fulbright and [Bourke] Hickenlooper come into your CIA committee?[note 14] Russell chaired the Senate Armed Services subcommittee with responsibility for oversight of the CIA. For background on this issue, see introduction to Johnson’s conversation with Senator Fulbright at 7:11 p.m. on 29 November.
[As] long it’s confined to those two, it wouldn’t present any problem at all—
Well, that’s all we’d make it now.
But, ah, there [will] be changes made up there. And I don’t want some of those fellas—some of those fellas got no business there. I—
Well—
—got a lot of bad talkers on that committee.
Why don’t you do it by invitation then?
And we’ve had a splendid record up to now. There [has] never been one thing leaked.
You got a perfect one; you got a perfect one. And they—that’s what—that’s—they know that. But they’re worried about—they can’t do it with—
See, I’ve been very careful. I’ve even kept Margaret Chase Smith off that—[note 15] Senator Margaret Chase Smith (R-Maine) was a member of the full Armed Services Committee.
Yeah.
—committee though I’ve got a lot of faith in her. But I’ve kept her off—
Yeah.
—[be]cause I just wanted to be sure that I knew what I was doing.
That’s right. Couldn’t you do it quietly by invitation? Just on—
Yes, I could.
—a personal basis? And then that invitation to end anytime you wanted it to, and I’d say that to them?
Yes, I’ll be glad to do that—
Hmm.
—invite them over there.
OK. When [are] you coming back?
Well, I just got down here.[note 16] Russell was in Winder, Georgia, for the Thanksgiving holiday. I’m coming in there Sunday afternoon.
Uh-hmm. I had a nice visit with your governor, and told him that we had talked—[note 17] Governor Carl Sanders represented a younger generation of Democrats who were more moderate on racial issues. As such, Russell considered him as a potential and strong rival for his Senate seat. Russell’s term expired in 1966.
Yeah—you didn’t tell me you [were] inviting him up here.
I didn’t invite him up here!
Well, how [did] you happen to get ahold of him? You had to make him a phone call.
You told me that he was coming up here!
Oh.
So I came back in my office. I told you [to] tell him that I wanted to see him!
I know it. That’s—
So—
—the reason I couldn’t understand it.
—well, I—when I came back in my office, I told him that you said he’s going to have lunch with you, and to get ahold of him and tell him I wanted to see him before he went back.
Oh.
Hell, I hadn’t invited him up here; I never heard of it. But after he’s up here—
Well, I know it. I saw where he was in the box there with Lady Bird.[note 18] Russell was referring to the House gallery where Lady Bird listened to the Joint Session address. in a calculated bit of political symbolism, Governor Sanders (representing the “New South”), New York mayor Robert Wagner (representing ethnically diverse cities), and White House aide Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (a spokesman for Democratic liberals), had been conspicuously seated next to the First Lady.
Ohhh. Well, they—they heard that he was coming, you see, when I—when you told me, that afternoon, that he’s coming. And so they wanted some southerner, some outstanding southerner—
Well it was a good thing! I don’t think you could’ve done better. But I just was surprised you didn’t say—
No.
—something about it.
No, no. I didn’t know at the time I’d seen you that he was invited. I don’t know—
Oh, I see.
See [Lady] Bird got up the list of folks, and I guess we got him that after—
Well, you couldn’t have done better than got him; he’s an awful nice young fella.
Well, you—
And you just willing the very soul out of him.
Well, I just told him how much I loved Georgia, and he told the press that his grandpappy came from there. [Laughs, and Russell joins in.]
Yeah, well he’s a good boy.
Well, Georgia’s a good state. That’s what I like about it.
Well, it is a good state.
And . . .
Mr. President, can’t you get someone else for that job?[note 19] Russell meant the presidential commission.
Well, if I can, I will. But I’m not going to . . . this country’s got a lot of confidence in you. And if I had my way, you’d be in my place and I’d trade with you!
[chuckling] Oh no, that would never do.
Well, it would too.
I’d go crazy in six weeks in that job, and you—
The country [would] be in a helluva lot better shape.
—and you’d be—you’ll go run it [the] next nine years.[note 20] Having taken office so late in President Kennedy’s first term, Johnson was eligible to govern for nine years if he managed to win election in 1964 and 1968. I’ll be—
No, no—
—dead in another—
—no.
—two[or]three years, anyhow.[note 21] Russell suffered from emphysema. He died in 1971.
You get your rest. I don’t want to bother you anymore, but I’m going to have to be calling you every once in a while, so—
Well I—you know I’m always available, but I—
OK. All right. Good-bye.
Well—well, I—
You think about anybody else now, besides [Judge Harold] Medina.
Well, I don’t know him.
What about that—that old man [who] died, that was on that circuit court down there that I liked?
Oh, he would have been ideal, but he’s dead.
Uh-huh. That other fella—
Ned Sibley.[note 22] Russell was referring to Judge Samuel H. Sibley, who sat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit until his death in 1958. He’s a magnificent man; he’d [have] been perfect.
That fella you got on there now though, is not too good, is he?
[Elbert] Tuttle?[note 23] Elbert P. Tuttle was chief judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. No.
Yeah, Tuttle. He’s an Eisenhower appointee?
Yeah—
Yeah.
—he’s a pretty good man, but . . .
They tell me, he gives them some problems, but that’s—
He’s going to give them more problems. He’s the kind of fella that thinks he’s the last word.
Uh-huh.
Thinks he’s the last word. He’s . . .
Hmm.
Is there someone there [in Washington]?
You know [E. Barrett] Prettyman?[note 24] E. Barrett Prettyman was chief judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Washington.
Yeah.
What do you think about him?
Pretty good man. He’s getting a little old, isn’t he?
Yeah, yeah.
Prettyman’s—
But I don’t think he’s—
—a good man.
—I don’t think he’s known.
Well, he’s not but . . . he don’t have to be. He doesn’t have to be. Now, you [are] going to let the Attorney General [Robert Kennedy] nominate someone, aren’t you?
No, uh-uh.[note 25] In his memoir, however, Johnson wrote, “I appointed the two men Bobby Kennedy asked me to put on it—Allen Dulles and John McCloy—immediately.” Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 27.
Well, [are] you going to have Hoover on there?
No. It’s his report.
Oh, that’s right; that’s right. It wouldn’t do . . . it wouldn’t do.
But he’s agreeable to folks like Dulles, and . . .
Well, Dulles is a good man. That was a happy thought.
McCloy.
McCloy I guess is a good man. I don’t think—I don’t hold him in near as high regard as I do Dulles, but he’s all right. He’s got a big reputation.
Let me see . . . if I think of a judge in the next 30–40 minutes I’ll—[note 26] Russell thought Johnson was seeking a judge other than the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and Johnson was doing nothing to correct Russell’s misperception.
Thank you.
—call you, but you can get plenty of them. Ah . . .
Thank you.
Some of these circuit court judges—some right there in the District [of Columbia] one or two, are pretty good—
What do you think about a [U.S. Supreme Court] justice sitting on it?
I don’t—I think it’d be all right.
Why—why shouldn’t you? How many assassinations]—you don’t have a President assassinated but every 50 years.
Well, they put . . . they put them on the Pearl Harbor inquiry, you know.[note 27] Via an executive order, Roosevelt appointed a presidential commission in 1941 to report on the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The five-man panel was chaired by Supreme Court Associate Justice Owen Roberts.
I know it. But he’s [Earl Warren]—that’s why he’s against it now.[note 28] The Roberts Commission’s 1942 report on the surprise Japanese attack did not put the controversy to rest and sullied the Court’s image according to some observers. Also, Chief Justice Warren generally opposed extracurricular activities by sitting justices. See Warren, Memoirs, pp. 356—57.
They’re afraid it might get into the [Supreme] Court?[note 29] Russell was referring to the possibility that aspects of the assassination, such as the pending trial of Jack Ruby, might eventually reach the highest court.
I guess so. I don’t know.
That’s probably the theory . . . That’s probably the theory of it. . . . I’m not very good on thinking about things like that.
Well, give me the arguments . . . why they ought to.[note 30] Johnson was asking Russell to help him develop the line of argument Johnson could use in the upcoming meeting with Warren—unbeknownst to Russell!
Well, {the only argument about it is that, of course, in a} matter of this magnitude, the American people would feel reassured to have a member of the highest Court—that’s the only [argument] you’ve got. You have many more circuit court judges [who] are far abler than some of your Supreme Court justices, but that is the argument. [That’s the] only argument you can make for it.
If you had some topflight Supreme Court—ah, state supreme court chief justice . . . if you knew [one]—but they’re not known all over the country, I don’t care how able they are. This thing of television [and] radio has narrowed the group of celebrities to just those in the very highest positions. I don’t know. . . . You’ve got some smart boys around you there that can give you the name of some outstanding circuit court judge.
{OK. You be thinking.}
All right.
Bye.
Bye.
Cite as
“Lyndon Johnson and Richard Russell on 29 November 1963,” Tape K6311.05, PNO 7, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [The Kennedy Assassination and the Transfer of Power, vol. 1, ed. Max Holland] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL: http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/9010161
Originally published in
Lyndon B. Johnson: The Kennedy Assassination and the Transfer of Power, November 1963–January 1964, ed. Max Holland, vol. 1 of The Presidential Recordings (New York and London: W. W. Norton and Company, 2005).