Yes, Mr. President.

I’ve got a bunch of cowmen that are marching in on the West and the South. They say that they’ve got the biggest crop of cows in history. That the drought’s on, and they’re going to be forced to market. That when they do, the price is going to come tumbling down again, and hogs are going to follow them, and we’re going to get beat.

Now, I don’t think any of that’s true, but I’ve got a memo here from the Secretary of Agriculture [Freeman] this morning, and he says: [reading] “The Defense Subsistence Supply Agency has accelerated its buying of boneless beef. This agency’s normal purchase of 30 million pounds per quarter is being increased about 18 million pounds during March to May.” I guess that’s six million pounds a month during that period. And then it goes on into other things about the imports and so forth.

I wish that you’d get somebody in your department to give me a memo on what kind of storage you have and what kind of purchases you are making and what effect it will have. I mean, what . . . how it compares to what you have been doing for this quarter—

Yeah, what our [unclear]. Right.

And let’s be sure that we’re doing everything we can.

Yeah.

And I’d like it not for the papers, but I’d like it so in talking to one or two of these cattle leaders, that I can get their pulse down a little bit—

Sure.

—by showing to them that we’re buying this while it’s real cheap because it’s dropped so damn much and . . .

Our problem is twofold: a) the boneless, or the deboning operations are bottlenecked. We’ve got them loaded up to the hilt, I understand, and, secondly, we’ve bought to the point where deterioration is going to set in on the lower grades, the hamburger-type supplies. But I’ll get back into it, Mr. President. We’ll get you a memo on it.

Now, number two, I sure was impressed with this fellow [Andrew] O’Meara.[note 1] Andrew Pick O’Meara was the commanding general of the U.S. Army, Southern Command. Responsible for Army activities in the Caribbean and Central and South America, O’Meara had spoken to the President on the previous afternoon regarding the events in Brazil and U.S. military preparations to provide assistance to the anti-Goulart forces (mostly petroleum, oil, and lubricants supplies).

Yes. I’m glad you were. He’s doing a fine job. We’ve really gone all out to set him up down there. We got him his fourth star, and he’s excellent for that command.

Now, we ought to . . . we ought to be giving a good deal of thought too, Bob, if [Henry Cabot] Lodge comes out of there, what we’re going to do.

I thought you might like to talk about that at lunch.[note 2] After that day’s National Security Council meeting, set for noon, McNamara and Rusk joined the President for lunch at the Mansion. I have given some thought to it. Dean [Rusk] will be present, and we both—

You got any prospects?

Yes.

Who?

I think the man on the job out there is the best prospect: [William] Westmoreland.[note 3] In January 1964, Westmoreland had been appointed as the deputy to General Paul Harkins, who had served as the commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, since his appointment in February 1962 by President Kennedy.

To be ambassador?

Yes.

[Pauses.] What would you do with [Paul] Harkins?

Retire.[note 4] Neil Sheehan noted that, among reporters, Harkins had become an “object ofridicule” and that the hallmarks of his leadership were “fatuous optimism,” an expansive capacity for self-delusion, a lack of curiosity about the war, and a habit of seeing Vietnam only from the air and never from the rice paddies or muck of the countryside. Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 282–85.

Well then, who would be the military assistance man?

Well, we have a man under Westmoreland, whom we think would be very capable to take command of the military operations.[note 5] Lieutenant General John L. Throckmorton was Westmoreland’s assistant. He was elevated to deputy commander in August.

Mm-hmm.

We’ve been looking to this possibility for 90 days now, and I’ve made a series of moves that put us in a position to carry it out if it seems desirable to do so.

[Pauses.] What would you think of someone of the [Lucius] Clay stripe, ten years younger, if you could find him?[note 6] General Lucius Clay, commander in chief of the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe, military governor of the U.S. zone of occupation in Germany, and director of the 1948 Berlin airlift, had most recently served as President Kennedy’s personal emissary in West Germany (in 1961 and 1962).

Well, that’s just what we’ve got: Westmoreland.

Is he that good?

He’s the best in the Army for it without question. Now, he may not be good enough, but he’s the best we have without any doubt. And he was sent there specifically for that purpose.

You mean, anticipating he might be ambassador someday?

Yes, yes.

What would he do? Retire?

No, he’d remain on active duty, but he would fill the joint role of—

Well, can you do that?

Yes. Yes. Dean and I have talked about it and—

Do you have some military men that are serving as ambassadors still in uniform?

No, but in this particular case, they . . . he would take on the ambassador’s role as an extra duty. [Pauses.] Dean and I have discussed it and think—

Well, wouldn’t he have to go to the Senate and be confirmed?

I can’t answer the question. I’ll try to get an answer before noontime on it.

[Pauses.] Westmoreland was the guy up that was superintendent of the Academy.[note 7] Westmoreland was the superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy from 1960 to 1964.

That’s right.

Is he that strong ofa guy?

Well, he’s the best we have, without question, and I think he is that strong.

What did you think about Nixon’s criticism of Vietnam this morning?[note 8] On the previous day, Nixon held a two-hour conference in South Vietnam with his 1960 running mate, Henry Cabot Lodge. In a statement issued upon his arrival at the Saigon airport, Nixon criticized past Vietnam policy for its “compromises and improvisations.” Peter Grose, “Nixon Calls on Lodge for a Parley on Politics in U.S.,” New York Times, 2 April 1964.

Well, it didn’t look to me to be much of a criticism. I read the New York Times report of it. Seemed to me he was agreeing with our program.[note 9] Though the criticism was somewhat muted, it was also mixed with praise for Secretary McNamara’s “recent statements ofsupport for the war.” Ibid.

The [New York] Herald Tribunes got a headline, “He Criticizes Johnson’s policies,” and—[note 10] “Nixon, in Saigon, Hits Johnson Policy,” New York Herald Tribune, 2 April 1964. “Everything should be done to win the war in South Vietnam,” Nixon declared, as quoted in the Herald Tribune story, “even ifit means carrying the war to the North or bringing in American combat troops.”

Well, the Times said quite the opposite. It said that he fully supported what we’d said. He said, of course, we said it too late, and we’ve been vacillating in the past, but if we did what we said we’re going to do, he thought it was fine.

Now, I haven’t actually seen what he said. The Times article is pretty good on it. It’s buried in the back of the paper.[note 11] The story was placed on p. 23.

Mm-hmm. All right. What do you think about Panama now?

Well, I think it’s coming along reasonably well. I checked up again on Colombia this morning, and our charge [d’affaires per interim] went in to talk to the foreign minister this morning and reported back that the president of Colombia [Guillermo Leon Valencia] presumably will approve the admission of a survey team within 48 hours.[note 12] Guillermo Leon Valencia was the conservative candidate inaugurated as president of Colombia in 1964. Unofficially given the same duties and powers as ambassadors, charges d’affaires are officially ranked below ambassadors in the fourth class of diplomatic agents and are considered heads of diplomatic missions to which it is not desirable or possible to send a minister of a higher rank. After Fulton Freeman’s departure from the post on 14 March 1964 and before Covey Oliver’s appointment as ambassador to Colombia in August 1964, the United States was represented there by a charge d’affaires per interim. So we’ll follow again tomorrow.

All right.

Other than that, I think Panama is getting along fine.

[Pauses] Do you think we’re going to conclude that agreement? The State [Department] tells me that they’re about ready to buy the agreement now.

I think so, although, frankly, Mr. President, I haven’t followed it as closely as State has.

Do you think that the timing is bad after Fulbright’s speech for us to come in and affect an agreement?[note 13] Because Fulbright had urged in his recent Senate speech an immediate and magnanimous settling of the crisis with Panama, the President’s concern was that any imminent resumption of diplomatic relations there might be viewed as little more than a capitulation to Fulbright.

No . . . no, I don’t think so.

Do you think it helps us any to have an agreement?

I do.

Do you think we’ve been too tough on not agreeing?

No, no, I don’t at all. But I think if it drags on too long, there will be criticism mounting in our own press. So, I would conclude it, if we—

How many more people have you fired in Cuba?[note 14] In the wake of the water supply showdown with Castro at the Guantánamo Naval Base, President Johnson had recommended the firing of many, if not all, of the Cubans who had traditionally worked menial jobs for the U.S. military there.

We haven’t fired any more. We’re holding at the 1,000. We can fire some more if you think necessary.

I would.

I don’t really think it’s necessary.

I would. I would let a few more go. I want to be as tough on Cuba as I can.

All right . . . all right. We can do it.

I just sure would, and I’d just tighten it down and operate it as frugally as possible and as tight as Dick’s hatband.[note 15] “As tight as Dick’s hatband” is generally thought to have originated as a pejorative reference to the crown worn briefly and in a particularly ill-fitting manner by Richard Cromwell, who succeeded his father, Oliver Cromwell, as Lord Protector of England for a few months in 1658 and 1659. In much of the rural United States, the expression had somehow come to imply miserliness or frugality instead of incongruity. And let them know that they’ve got some things to lose too, if they get too rough with us.

All right. I’ll go ahead and do it.

I wouldn’t be precipitant and impulsive—we haven’t been—we’ve taken time, but at the time we thought we were going to get rid of3,000 in due time. But what did we do? Get rid of1,000 and quit?

A thousand, that’s right. A thousand.

And then stop?

Then stop. That’s right.

All right. Get rid of some more.

All right, sir. We’ll go ahead.

Now of those 1,000, 300-and-some-odd were security cases . . .

Yeah, between 200 and 300, which was a distinct plus, and—

5[00] or 600 you didn’t need.

That’s right, and we didn’t replace—so that those were two plusses.

Well, I’d try to get rid of another 500.

All right, sir. We’ll work on it.

OK. I’ll see you at noon.

Yes. Fine.