Transcript
Edited by Guian A. McKee, with David G. Coleman and Kieran K. Matthews
House Appropriations Committee Chairman George Mahon of Texas called the President to lobby for a proposed cotton research station that would be located in his home state. Mahon argued that because funds for research into improving cotton production had been included in the cotton-wheat subsidy bill that Congress had passed in early April, Johnson could simply request an appropriation of part of those funds in the current fiscal year. This, he maintained, would provide immediate political benefits in the South. Both men clearly understood the context of the conversation, which Johnson soon made explicit: Mahon’s vote on the economic opportunity bill. As the chair of a powerful committee, Mahon’s vote would influence other members of the Texas delegation and potentially other southern Democrats as well. The President agreed to reconsider the research expenditure and then tried to win Mahon over by explaining how the bill would promote the work ethic and personal responsibility. The exchange included what would soon become Johnson’s standard line in arguing for the War on Poverty as a means to promote traditional conceptions of opportunity and self-reliance, as well as budgetary frugality: “I’m going to take tax-eaters and make taxpayers out of them.” It also illustrated Johnson’s emphasis on the Job Corps and work-training components of the bill, rather than on the more innovative—and controversial—community action programs. Such rhetorical tactics would be typical of the strategy he would use to court conservative Democratic support for the economic opportunity bill.
Yes, sir.
George, George Mahon talking.
Yeah, George … yeah, George.
The cotton-wheat bill, the Cooley Bill, was not too popular.[note 1] Representative Harold D. Cooley, a Democrat from North Carolina, served as the chairman of the House Agriculture Committee, which had oversight responsibility for the cotton-wheat subsidy bill in the House. Cooley was a prominent supporter of the cotton subsidy elements of the bill.
Yeah.
But there was one provision in it that everybody embraced, and that was a $10 million research fund to reduce the cost of production of cotton so it could become more competitive.[note 2] Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 1964, vol. 20 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965), p. 100.
Yeah.
Now, the Farm Bureau is very strong in the South and particularly in Texas, and they were against the bill, but they were for the $10 million authorization for—to bring down the cost of production through research.[note 3] For the Farm Bureau’s support of the research components of the cotton-wheat bill, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1964, vol. 20, p. 103. Now, we don’t have a budget estimate on it. We have some money that might be used for it in the bill that passed the House, but it seems to me that in the South where we’re going to need some help, that if the Republicans and the Farm Bureau people can say, “Well, they passed the bill to do something about cotton and wheat, cotton in particular, yet they—the President was so indifferent that he didn’t even request any funds to carry out this research to bring down the cost of cotton and make it more competitive.” Now … so I think this has rather important political overtones. Now, I don’t … I doubt that they could spend any $10 million wisely and prudently, but I think we ought to have a … some sum for the remainder of this fiscal year, which would get us on the road to success in research in bringing down the cost of production of cotton.
Now, I was … I talked to Jamie Whitten about this, and Jamie thinks that they might squeeze the money out some way or other, out of research in general and so forth, but there’s no note made by the [Bureau of the] Budget.
I’ll talk to—Budget’s against it. They gave me a full report on it. Whitten raised the question with them, and they thought they might get a million dollars this year, but Budget came in and said that they didn’t think that they had the plans clear enough for us to go in and go beyond our budget and go outside of it unless they could do it within the regular research funds, that they were pretty high on those anyway in that field. Now, I’ll check with them again tomorrow and see.[note 4] Representative Jamie Whitten, a Mississippi Democrat, served on the House Appropriations Committee and chaired its agriculture subcommittee.
Well, now, here’s the thing …
I want to … I told Larry O’Brien I want to do anything and everything that I can for you. I do have a problem, though, of sending supplemental estimates up, because I’m running out of my contingents, and I don’t want my budget to go over and be bad and [have people] say that “it’s a phony,” and “he is—he told us that he was going to spend so much, and he’s spending a lot more.”[note 5] Johnson had fought to keep his fiscal 1965 budget under $100 billion and in January had submitted a budget estimate that actually came in at $97.9 billion. This strategy allowed the President to claim that his overall policies were frugal, built support for his tax-cut proposal, and limited Congress’s ability to impose further cuts on his proposals. Submitting supplemental appropriations such as the one Mahon requested for the cotton research station would allow opponents to attack the legitimacy of Johnson’s claims. For an earlier expression of Johnson’s concerns about making supplemental requests, see George Reedy to Johnson, 12:36 P.M., 28 April 1964, The Presidential Recordings, Lyndon B. Johnson: Toward the Great Society, February 1, 1964–May 31, 1964, vol. 6, April 14, 1964–May 31, 1964, ed. Guian A. McKee (New York: Norton, 2007), pp. 265–71. For the fiscal 1965 budget process, see Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1964, vol. 20, pp. 146–47, 865–70; The Presidential Recordings, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Kennedy Assassination and the Transfer of Power, November 1963–January 1964, vol. 2, December 1963, ed. Robert David Johnson and David Shreve; and vol. 3, January 1964, ed. Kent B. Germany and Robert David Johnson (New York: Norton, 2005). And you don’t have the normal cuts this year, thank God, that we’ve had before because we’ve kept our budget tight.
That’s right.
The House cuts have been about 3 percent compared to 7½ [ percent] last year.
Yeah.
And the Senate will restore some of that.[note 6] Congress eventually imposed cuts of 3.4 percent on the President’s proposed budget for fiscal 1965. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1964, vol. 20, p. 146. But I will talk to them tomorrow and see what they think and see if we can’t get [Orville] Freeman to see if he can’t squeeze it out of his research and peg some of it specifically. Or, if not, see if I can’t get him with the budget director and see if they can’t get 500,000 [dollars] or a million to start something so we won’t be charged with a thing, but I don’t know. They wrote me two weeks ago and said absolutely no …
Well, now I think—
… but I’ll reopen it if you … if, if …
I think you should.
All right, OK.
Now, I’ll tell you. I talked to Elmer Staats in detail about it today and he said that Freeman sent up a budget request for the 10 million [dollars] and that after surveying the thing, they figured that they couldn’t possibly spend more—wisely—more than 5 [million dollars]. It’s not so much a matter—
They recommended to me [to] spend nothing, George.
Well, yes … I’m sure that that was their position, but my point is that we need to take note of it. It’s all right to say that they’re not ready to pursue it at this time for the full authorized request, but we think so much could be wisely spent. We’re very much interested in this program of research to bring down the cost of—
If you’re vitally interested in it, I’m vitally interested in it because of that. Ordinarily, I would say as a political or any other proposition that “yes, we passed the farm bill after the budget had gone up. I’m studying it. I’m having hearings. I’m going to be prudent about it. I’ll send my budget up in January. And I’ll try to see what ought to be included [unclear]. We didn’t pass the bill until four months after the budget went up, and if I’d had the bill and I could’ve considered it beforehand, I’d have done it, but I haven’t sent anything except real emergency things that could come in as supplementals [Mahon acknowledges] , but—for instance, my poverty.[note 7] The House had passed final appropriations for Johnson’s fiscal 1965 budget on 1 July; the Senate would complete its appropriations by 19 August, with the exception of foreign aid, which it deferred until 2 October. The process actually moved far faster in 1964 than it had in preceding sessions. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1964, vol. 20, p. 146. I’ve got a budget estimate for that. I’ve got 900 million [dollars]—it’s in there, and I don’t squeeze a dime over the budget unless it’s really an Alaskan earthquake or something.”[note 8] A massive earthquake had struck Alaska on 27 March. Johnson had request $50 million in aid from the President’s Emergency Disaster Relief Fund. Congress later added another $41.4 million in fiscal 1964 deficiency appropriations. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1964, vol. 20, pp. 205–06, 436–38.
Yeah. Well, my only interest really in this is the overall political aspects of the whole [unclear]—
Well, I’ll take a look at it from that angle, and …
[with Johnson acknowledging] You don’t have to go all way, just a … just a gesture, I think, might be adequate.
I talked to Spessard Holland yesterday, and he said he wished that we could get some sort of an indication from the White House. They’d like to put in a little something or do something about it. And just—in other words, to recognize this thing.
[Unclear.] I’ll take a good look at it.[note 9] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary. I want you to take a good look now and help me on my poverty [bill]. That’s what the Republicans want to beat, that one bill, and I’m going to take tax-eaters and make taxpayers out of them, and I’m going to stop these damn riots.[note 10] Johnson was referring to recent outbreaks of violence that had occurred in Harlem and Rochester, New York. I’ve gotten every one of these cities—all these young people have nothing to do, sitting around, and I got them all to agree today no more demonstrations. [Mahon attempts to interject.] And they’re asking, “Please, put these people to work.” And I’m going to put 150,000 of them to work in 90 days’ time on useful, hardworking projects. Teach them some discipline, and when to get up, and how to work all day, and in two years, I’ll have them trained where they can at least drive a truck instead of sit around a pool room. [Mahon acknowledges.] And I’ve got . . . [Charles N. “Charlie”] Halleck [R–Indiana] said he’s going to have every Republican vote against it. And this is the only Johnson proposal that’s strictly mine, is the poverty bill. And I’ve got it out of existing funds that they’ve been using in [Departments of] Labor and HEW [Health, Education, and Welfare], and I’ve got it in my budget estimate, and I’ve got it all centralized under the best administrator I got. So, please, for God’s sakes, try to—the [Omar T.] Burlesons [D–Texas] and the rest of them that run off, tell them they can vote against me the rest of the year, but don’t vote on that one thing where the Republicans are going to brand my nose.
Well, I’m going to help you get all the money.[note 11] Mahon was indicating that as chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, he would help Johnson secure a full appropriation for the Economic Opportunity Act—even if he did not vote for it himself. The President, however, wanted Mahon’s vote as well—as his response demonstrated. Now, I’m a little in the problem here, but I’ll pray over it, and I’ll be in touch.
Oh, please. Don’t you—you help me, because this is one I just can’t lose. This is the only Johnson proposal I’ve got. The only bill, and it’s as sound as a dollar. I’m making them work for it. I want to take taxpayers . . . and make taxpayers out of them. And all they’re doing is sitting around on the porch now. Every home I’ve gone into has had an old 18-, 19-year-old boy that’s been turned back from the [U.S.] Army, and all he’s doing is sitting there with a relief check. I want to take him and work [the] hell out of him, and I’ll work a good many of them right in your Lubbock [Texas] and show them how to do it, and they’ll be bragging on it more than they are the Peace Corps. And the conservatives will be leading the hay way, because my NYA [National Youth Administration] produced the governor of Texas [John B. Connally].[note 12] Johnson was referring to his tenure as the Texas administrator of the New Deal’s National Youth Administration and to current Texas Governor John Connally, a Johnson protégé and sometime loyalist. As a student at the University of Texas School of Law, Connally had an NYA-sponsored job at the Texas Supreme Court. He first came to Johnson’s attention in 1939 when the president of the University of Texas Board of Regents recommended Connally for a position on Johnson’s congressional staff. James Reston Jr., The Lone Star: The Life of John Connally (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), pp. 10, 30–31. That’s where I got him.
Yes, that’s right.
He came right off of Floresville for 15 dollars a month. [Mahon acknowledges.] But you pray at it and look at it.
OK, I'll do it.
Bye, bye.[note 13] End of 2021 revisions.
Cite as
“Lyndon Johnson and George Mahon on 29 July 1964,” Conversation WH6407-18-4407, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [Lyndon B. Johnson: Civil Rights, Vietnam, and the War on Poverty, ed. David G. Coleman, Kent B. Germany, Guian A. McKee, and Marc J. Selverstone] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL: http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4000684