Hello, Bill?

Yes, sir.

All right. Now tell me about our problems. I couldn’t hear you very well.

All right.

Have you run into anybody leaving?

No, sir. The only one that has said definitely now that he’s going to leave is [Democratic Representative Joseph] Addabbo of New York, but I think we can get him back.[note 1] Representative Joseph P. Addabbo was a New York Democrat; he would vote in favor of the economic opportunity bill. I talked to [Louisiana Democratic Representative] Hale Boggs about 15 minutes ago, and he is going to … he and these other fellows are going to get on it first thing in the morning. He doesn’t think we’re going to lose anybody.

He’s a big talker, though.

That’s right. [Unclear]—

He don’t do much work, and we better—

He’s lazy.

We better get three or four boys, and Larry [O’Brien] better get his three or four boys, and we better furnish him three or four boys.

That’s right.

It’ll be too late, though, in the morning to do anything about it.

Well, we’ve been calling right up until just recently. In fact, [Sargent] Shriver is still in his office calling, and Larry was there when I left about 15 minutes ago to come get something to eat.

Now, what are they … what are they doing? Taking the 228 and calling them and say[ing], “Are you going to be there tomorrow?”

Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

And how many have they got down that list?

I do not know, Mr. President. I know that between Shriver and Walter [Jenkins] and me, we’ve talked to about 40 tonight.

And all of them said they’d be there?

Yes, sir. Oh, the Texas delegation is griping. They’re saying, oh, “He’s kept us over here. We’ve got to stay over tomorrow now, and … [unclear]—"

Well, did they—were the Texas delegation coming home?

No, sir, but they were planning—two of them were: Jim Wright and Jake Pickle.[note 2] Representatives Jim Wright and J. J. “Jake” Pickle were Texas Democrats, with Pickle representing President Johnson’s district; both would vote in favor of the economic opportunity bill. And some of the others were planning to go somewhere else. Joe Kilgore said he wasn’t going to vote for it tomorrow.[note 3] Representative Joe M. Kilgore was a Texas Democrat; he would vote against the bill. In February 1964, Kilgore became upset with Johnson when the President helped keep Kilgore from challenging liberal Texas Senator Ralph Yarborough in the Democratic primary. See Conversation WH6402-01-1805, 1806 and WH6402-02-1828. He was very mad and said that he thought they’d get through tonight. He’d put his blood on the floor tonight—today—and he just wasn’t going to vote for it tomorrow, but Walter and I both think he will.

Well, now, does he know we didn’t do it? He ought to be mad at them.

Yes, sir. Yes, sir. We said we were ready to go … that [Charles] Halleck did this, not us.[note 4] Halleck was House minority leader. We didn’t—and Walter told him—I was sitting there—Walter told him very clearly that we didn’t have anything to do with it. We were ready to go tonight, but that this was the other side’s decision.

Well, what did he say? Didn’t he admit that?

No, sir. He was kind of in a sour mood.

But the strategy tomorrow of the Republicans is going to be to—on Halleck’s part—is to introduce the [Peter] Frelinghuysen bill, which they did not do today, and try to get that bill recommitted.[note 5] Representative Peter Frelinghuysen of New Jersey had led the Republican opposition to the economic opportunity bill. In April, he had introduced a Republican alternative to the economic opportunity bill that placed authority over program administration with the states rather than with a federal agency. It also required the states to provide matching funds equal to one-third to one-half of total project costs. On 8 August, Frelinghuysen would make a last-ditch attempt to block the economic opportunity bill through a recommittal motion that would have replaced it with his own bill. Richard L. Lyons, “Poverty Bill Tentatively Approved,” Washington Post, 8 August 1964; Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 1964, vol. 20 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965), pp. 221, 226. And … and unless we work awfully hard, they’ll pick up maybe most of these 20 Republican votes on that particular issue. That’s 20 out of 238 right there. So if the other Repub—[note 6] On 8 August, Frelinghuysen’s recommittal motion would fail on a 177–295 roll call vote with 49 Republicans (and all House Democrats) voting against it. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1964, vol. 20, p. 646.

We didn’t get 20 Republicans, did we?[note 7] Johnson was referring to a vote that day on a motion by poverty bill floor manager Phil Landrum’s motion to substitute an amended version of the Senate-passed bill for the existing House version. The motion had passed on a 228–190 vote, with the support of 20 Republicans. The House had also defeated a motion by Representative Howard Smith of Virginia to strike the enacting clause, which would have killed the bill. Nineteen Republicans voted against Smith’s motion. The next day, 22 Republicans would vote in favor of the final bill. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1964, vol. 20, p. 646. See Conversation WH6408-11-4807, 4808.

Yes, sir, we got 20.

I thought you said 14.

I did, but when I called you back on the plane I had the list in front of me, and it was 20.[note 8] While the President was en route to Texas on the Air Force One JetStar, he had received unrecorded calls from Moyers at 7:12 P.M. and 8:50 P.M. eastern time. He had also made an unrecorded call to Moyers at 8:32 P.M. And that’s damn good. And that’s one reason, I guess, Halleck was so mad: He didn’t think he’d lose that many. [Brief pause.]

Now, that’s going to be their strategy, and our only strategy is just to get the people there. This is what we’re working on.

[Pause.] Well, now somebody ought to call each one of the 20 and ask the Republicans if they’re going to make any change. Walter can call some of them.

Well, I know about eight of them, and Shriver is calling every one of them. He is … I asked him to call every Republican who voted for us and first to thank him and then tell him that we really need him tomorrow.[note 9] Moyers was referring to House votes earlier in the day on Representative Howard Smith’s recommittal motion and on Representative Phil Landrum’s substitute bill.

This is where we learned, for example, about their strategy. It was [John] Saylor of Pennsylvania who told Shriver that this is what they were going to do tomorrow.[note 10] Representative John P. Saylor was a Pennsylvania Republican; he would vote in favor of the economic opportunity bill. And he said, “Mr. Shriver, we stand a chance of losing a lot of our boys on that particular motion, and I hope you can keep yours, so that you can beat us, and then … turn them back.”

Hmm … Well, that’s crucial, because …

That, that, that …

I thought these folks were just willing to stand out against … why would they want to vote for Frelinghuysen?

Well, it’s a matter of party … party issue, Mr. President.

Well, but they faced up to that today and went against him.

That’s right, but they might save a little face.

I think we can hold them. [Pause.] We can hold them. But the only way that we can do it is just to call them.

Well, couldn’t Walter call the five Texans and tell them that … “think you want to vote against the Frelinghuysen substitute for us”?[note 11] On 8 August, the Texas Democratic delegation would vote together against the Frelinghuysen substitute (Representative Lindley Beckworth paired against it).

That’s a good line—yes, sir. I don’t know how many he finally got to, but he was talking to them left and right.

But the five—he ought to tell them the strategy, so that we can get fellows like [Omar] Burleson and [Moyers acknowledges] them to please stay with us on that.[note 12] Representative Omar Burleson was a Texas Democrat; he would vote against the economic opportunity bill.

Right.

Vote against a bill.

All right. We’ll do that. We’ll try to give you a report before noon tomorrow.

Now, what is the problem that we’re supposed to furnish transportation for Jake [Pickle] and [Jim] Wright?

Well, there are [chuckles slightly] two things—

Did they call up and ask for it?

A number of them have, and Larry said—

No, no, now, ask them. Now, did Jake and Wright call us up and ask us to fly them home? I want to know if they’ve got that kind of gall.

Jim Wright did. Jim Wright asked Carl Albert to find him transportation if he stayed. Walter, calling Jake Pickle to thank him and ask him if he’s going to be there tomorrow, was told, “No, I’m not; I’m going to catch a midnight plane out of here to go to Texas. I have to lead up the Aqua parade tomorrow in Austin—100,000 people.”[note 13] The Aqua parade (probably a water parade on Town Lake) was part of the Austin Aqua Festival, a multiday event that promoted the Austin area as a tourism destination.

And Walter talked to him pretty straightforwardly, and Jake said … that, well, he would stay, but he sure did need a ride home tomorrow. And he said, “Is the President going down this weekend?” And Walter said, “He’s already gone,” and Jake said, “Oh, hell,” he said, “I wish he’d waited; I’d have gone with him tomorrow. Do you have any other means of getting me down?” Walter said, “I don’t think so, Jake. I just don’t know of anything at all.”

And it was after that conversation Walter asked me when I talked to you that—

Well, he’s got to—how was he going today?

Well, he was going … he was going on a commercial flight.

Well, there’s one that leaves there at 5 [P.M.] tomorrow.

Well, that’s probably what he’ll have to do.

But, for example, Joe Montoya: I talked to Montoya, asked him if he was going to stay, and he said, no, he’s got to be in New Mexico by tomorrow night, and he can’t do it unless he leaves at 9 in the morning.[note 14] Joseph M. Montoya was a New Mexico Democrat; he would vote in favor of the economic opportunity bill. And I said, “Well, we sure do need you on this vote and got to have you, because we’re going to lose some Republicans,” and he said, “Well, I’ll stay.” He said, “Do you have a plane going to California somewhere like that that could drop me off?” And I said, “No, sir. We don’t.” I said, “If I can find something, Mr. President, we’ll get it—Joe—but I don’t think we do,” and he said, “Well, if you can, let me know,” he said, “but, anyway, I’ll stay.” And I said, “That’s fine. We appreciate that.”

Then Jake Pickle came back and said, “Well, if the President is already down there, he could help me by leading that parade in the morning if I’m up here.”

[under his breath] Oh, that’s …

Walter asked me to ask you about that.

Of course not.

Right, I wouldn’t. … I wouldn’t—but I …

My feeling is—and this is unverified—is that all the Texans who were here today will be here tomorrow. Our job is to get those six to stay with us or not to be here to vote against us.

Now, that was [Bob] Casey and [John] Dowdy: We lost both of those even after John Jones called them.[note 15] Representatives Bob Casey and John Dowdy were Texas Democrats; both had voted against the Landrum substitute and would vote against the economic opportunity bill.

Yes, sir.

We lost Casey and Dowdy and [Walter] Rogers.[note 16] Representative Walter Rogers was a Texas Democrat; he had voted in favor of the Landrum substitute but would pair against the final bill.

Burleson, Casey, Dowdy, [Ovie] Fisher, and [Joe] Pool—five.[note 17] Representatives Ovie Fisher and Joe R. Pool were Texas Democrats; both had voted against the Landrum substitute and would vote against the final bill. I said six, but it’s five.

Well, now, wait a minute. Burleson and Casey and Dowdy and Pool.

And—

And Rogers and Fisher—

Rogers voted with us.

Rogers voted with us?

Yes, sir.

Well, that’s a hell of a lot better; they told me he voted against us.

No, sir. I’ve got it right here in front of me.

So Dowdy voted against us.

Yes, sir.

Fisher voted against us. Pool voted against us. He oughtn’t to have done that; he was sick, and he oughtn’t to have done that.

[Lindley] Beckworth was gone.[note 18] Representative Lindley Beckworth was a Texas Democrat; he had paired in favor of the Landrum substitute and would pair in favor of the final bill.

Who?

His father did die.

Did he get a pair?

I don’t think so.

[Pause.] Well, Dowdy told him he’d give him a pair.

He may have. I just don’t—I don’t think there were many pairs, and I don’t remember that one, but he may have been.

Now, the vote was 228 to 190?

Yes, sir.

So you’ve got—

[Robert] Jones voted for us in Alabama, by the way.[note 19] Representative Robert Jones was an Alabama Democrat; he had voted in favor of the Landrum substitute and would vote in favor of the final bill. See Conversation WH6408-10-4802.

Yeah, he told me he was going to, that’s … so, that’s 38 votes.

Yes, sir.

Now, if we lose 8 of them, we’d still have 30.

Right.

And if 10 Republicans changed … that would still leave us 20.

Right.

[If] 15 Republicans changed, that would still leave us 15. So, it’s just a question of not losing any more than 8, then.

That’s right.

Now, you don’t know of a human, then, up to now that’s leaving?

No, sir, as of right now, Mr. President, we do not. Neither does Boggs and neither does Albert. We had [unclear]—

Well, when are they finally going to go where they can’t offer any more substitutes and when they’re going to vote? I thought when you got down to engrossed copy, that was all there was to it.

Well, so did I. This is what Saylor told Shriver.

Well, you better check with the parliamentarian [Lewis Deschler].[note 20] The parliamentarian of the House of Representatives served as the official interpreter of the House parliamentary rules. I think after … I would assume that they’ve got it right up to where they cut off all amendments and move to previous question, and it just had no more [debate], but I don’t know.

Yeah. We’ll check on that.

How’d they get along on [Secretary of Defense Robert S.] McNamara and [Texas Democratic Representative George] Mahon?[note 21] Johnson was referring to a plan to use surplus military facilities as sites for Job Corps and other War on Poverty programs.

They worked out all right, Mr. President. McNamara talked to Mahon and told him that … exactly what he told you he would say. And Mahon said, “Well, damn it, that’s hard on us. That puts us in a hard shape to defend you up here, but if that’s the way it is, that’s the way it is.” He said, “You’re not going to hear the last of this.” He said "[Michigan Republican representative Gerald] Ford will be ranting and raving for a good while to come.”

Why?

Oh, Mr. President, just an effort to embarrass the Defense Department and McNamara—

I don’t know how it embarrasses them: to be getting rid of surplus camps.

Well …

Looks like that’s good business. Why does he want to maintain—the government to maintain them?

It—

And why would they want the government to go out and build new ones when you’ve got surplus ones you can use? I don’t see any vulnerability there.

That’s a damn good argument.

Why do you want to have some of this 900 million [dollars] spent to build new camps when McNamara’s trying to peddle them old, useless ones he’s got?

[Pause.] That’s a good argument, and I’ll see that it gets to Mahon. But that did not come up. I guess that’s why—

Well, he’s going to be in six minutes, they told me.

Right, but we got back to Mahon, who talked to Ford. [Pause.] That seemed to squash it. They had no real problems after that—

Were there any mean speeches?

Yes, sir. [Charles] Goodell made a mean speech, and [James] Utt made a mean speech, and [Charles S.] Gubser of California made a pretty mean speech, and [Glenard] Lipscomb made a … pretty wild speech.[note 22] Representative Charles E. Goodell was a New York Republican; Representatives James B. Utt, Charles S. Gubser, and Glenard P. Lipscomb were California Republicans; all would vote against the economic opportunity bill. It got—I’m told by Boggs and [Eugene] McCarthy and others that it got really mean and vicious on the floor. The Republicans got mad at Halleck for holding them over. Some of these New Jersey boys who stayed with us wanted to go home, and got mad at Halleck.

Some of the Pennsylvania people—we did well in Pennsylvania, five votes. And [J. Irving] Whalley, Republican from the 12th District, told me tonight that he did not vote for us today but he was going to vote for us on final passage tomorrow.[note 23] Representative J. Irving Whalley was a Pennsylvania Republican; he would vote in favor of the bill. We’re not—getting six more from there.

Tony Boyle delivered on Arch Moore of West Virginia, and Boyle told me tonight he would see that he [Moore] stayed with us tomorrow.[note 24] Representative Arch A. Moore Jr. was a Republican from West Virginia; he would vote in favor of the economic opportunity bill. W. A. “Tony” Boyle served as president of the United Mine Workers Union. [Pause.]

[Let’s] see … [Olin] Teague told Walter he would stay tomorrow. [W. R.] Poage and [Wright] Patman say they’ll stay. [Henry] González will be here. [Jack] Brooks will be here. [Graham] Purcell will be here. [Ray] Roberts will be here.[note 25] All of the congressmen mentioned in this passage were Texas Democrats; with the exception of Olin Teague, all would vote in favor of the bill. In fact, as of right now, all of them [the Texas delegation] except Beckworth will be here. The only one who really said he wouldn’t vote for us is [Joe M.] Kilgore, and I suspect he’s being a little bit petulant.

No, he’s not. But I don’t know why he would want to do us that way, you know. If we’d have had any responsibility for it, I can understand it. But—

Yes, sir.

He’s bound to be there, and so if Halleck and them—Goodell—did it. We didn’t; we wanted it very much tonight—more than he did. [Pause.]

[Walter] Baring was absent.[note 26] Representative Walter S. Baring was a Nevada Democrat; he would not vote on the economic opportunity bill. [Paul] Jones was absent from Missouri.[note 27] Representative Paul C. Jones was a Missouri Democrat; despite having announced against the bill, he would not vote. [John] Lesinski stayed with us, as you said he would.[note 28] Representative John Lesinski was a Democrat from Michigan; he had voted in favor of the Landrum substitute and would vote in favor of the final bill.

Did we have any disappointments that we didn’t know about?

No, sir. We did not get [Jack] Flynt, [Elijah] Forrester, or [Elliott] Hagan.[note 29] Representatives John J. “Jack” Flynt Jr., E. L. “Tic” Forrester, and G. Elliot Hagan were Georgia Democrats; all three had voted against the Landrum substitute and would vote against the final bill. We didn’t think we’d get Forrester; we had hopes about getting Flynt.

We counted Flynt and Hagan, too.

Yes, sir. We lost Hagan.

What does [Phil] Landrum say about it—anything?

Just that no … that they’re just voting conservative. They’re running scared. I talked to Landrum, by the way, and he’s not running scared tonight, although I tried to make him run scared and had Shriver call him too.

We lost [Bob] Sikes, and I thought he would be with us.[note 30] Representative Robert L. F. Sikes was a Florida Democrat; he would pair against the economic opportunity bill.

He said he’d be with us if we needed him, had to have him.

We got [Don] Fuqua, as you said.[note 31] Representative Don Fuqua was a Florida Democrat; he would vote in favor of the economic opportunity bill. See Conversation WH6408-08-4753, 4754. [President Johnson acknowledges.] We got [Robert] Stafford of Vermont.[note 32] Representative Robert T. Stafford was a Vermont Republican; he had voted in favor of the Landrum substitute and would vote in favor of the economic opportunity bill. We got [Oren] Harris, [Wilbur] Mills, and [James] Trimble.[note 33] Representatives Oren Harris, Wilbur Mills, and James Trimble were Arkansas Democrats; Harris had voted against the Landrum substitute and would vote against the final bill; Mills and Trimble voted in favor of both.

Harris?

Yes, sir.

Oren Harris voted with us?

Yes, sir.

Well, that’s wonderful.

Lost [Charles] Bennett of Florida.[note 34] Representative Charles E. Bennett was a Florida Democrat; he had voted against the Landrum substitute and would vote against the final bill.

Yeah.

Got [Russell] Tuten of Georgia.[note 35] J. Russell Tuten was a Georgia Democrat; despite a significant lobbying effort by President Johnson and Georgia Governor Carl Sanders, he had voted against the Landrum substitute and would vote against the final bill. On 4 August, he had met with Johnson and told him that if his vote was needed, he would support the bill despite the political costs in his home district. For the effort to win Tuten’s vote, see Conversation WH6408-02-4617, 4618 andWH6408-05-4674. You got him. [T. A.] Thompson of Louisiana was with us; he got here.[note 36] Representative T. A. Thompson was a Louisiana Democrat; he had voted in favor of the Landrum substitute and would vote in favor of the final bill. Later this month, Louisiana Governor John McKeithen expressed concern to President Johnson about Thompson’s reelection. See Conversation WH6408-23-4965.

[F. Edward] Hébert?[note 37] Representative F. Edward Hébert was a Louisiana Democrat and had led the Dixiecrats in the Louisiana party; he had voted in favor of the Landrum substitute and would vote in favor of the final bill.

Yes, sir. Lost [Otto] Passman, [Joe] Waggonner, got [Edwin] Willis.[note 38] Representatives Otto E. Passman, Joe D. Waggonner Jr., and Edwin E. Willis were Louisiana Democrats; Passman paired against both the Landrum substitute and the final bill; Waggonner voted against both, and Willis voted in favor of both. Passman and Waggonner represented districts in north Louisiana that were two of the most conservative in the United States. Willis chaired the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). [Richard] Lankford was gone; we got [Charles] Mathias.[note 39] Representative Richard E. Lankford was a Maryland Democrat; he would pair in favor of the final bill. Representative Charles Mathias Jr. was a Maryland Republican; he had voted in favor of the Landrum substitute and would vote in favor of the final bill.

Was Passman there? I thought Passman was going to be away.[note 40] Passman was Johnson’s nemesis on foreign aid legislation, and the President referred to him as the “caveman.” Lyndon Johnson to Speaker of the House John McCormack, 20 December 1963, The Presidential Recordings, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Kennedy Assassination and the Transfer of Power, vol. 2, December 1963, ed. Robert David Johnson and David Shreve (New York: Norton, 2005), p. 567.

He was. I said he was gone. Passman and Thompson were … I mean, Passman was absent.

Was Waggonner absent?

Yes, sir—No, sir. He was here. He voted wrong.

Mm-hmm.

We got Mathias.

What about [Rogers ] Morton?[note 41] Representative Rogers C. B. Morton was a Maryland Republican; he had voted against the Landrum substitute and would vote against the final bill.

No, sir, we did not get him.

Mmm.

All of Michigan, all of Minnesota, all of Mississippi wrong. We got [William] Hull and [Richard] Ichord both from Missouri.[note 42] William R. Hull and Richard H. Ichord were Democrats from Missouri; both had voted in favor of the Landrum substitute and would vote in favor of the final bill. We got everybody from Missouri but Jones, who was absent.[note 43] Representative Paul C. Jones was a Missouri Democrat; he would be absent from the final vote as well. But …

Everybody from California too, didn’t we?

Yes, sir. Everybody.

Did you get that Republican out there in California—Melcord, or whatever his name?

[William] Maillard? No, sir. But we got [John] Baldwin of California.[note 44] Representatives William S. Maillard and John F. Baldwin Jr. were California Republicans; they had voted as Moyers indicated on the Landrum substitute, and would vote the same way on the final bill.

Who got him?

I don’t know, Mr. President. I know Bill Doherty was working on him awfully hard and John Hennings [ sic ] from the Labor Department, under secretary of labor.[note 45] William C. Doherty was the former president of the National Association of Letter Carriers. We got [William] Cahill and [Florence] Dwyer of New Jersey.[note 46] Representatives William T. Cahill and Florence P. Dwyer were New Jersey Republicans; both had voted in favor of the Landrum substitute and would vote in favor of the final bill.

Any more Republicans from New Jersey?

No, sir.

I thought they got three, [they] told me they had three.

Well, wait a minute. We got [Milton] Glenn; yes, we got Glenn of New Jersey; that’s three.[note 47] Representative Milton W. Glenn was a New Jersey Republican; he had voted in favor of the Landrum substitute and would vote in favor of the final bill. That was a surprise to me. You got [Otis] Pike.[note 48] Representative Otis G. Pike was a New York Democrat; he had voted in favor of the Landrum substitute and would vote in favor of the final bill.

Good! I begged him, and he told me he didn’t think he could do it.

Got [Paul] Fino, [Seymour] Halpern, and [John] Lindsay—all three of them.[note 49] The three congressmen mentioned were Republicans from New York City and had voted as Moyers indicated; all would vote in favor of the final bill. Got [Frank] Horton of New York, and [Ogden] Reid of New York—that’s five Republicans from New York.[note 50] The congressmen mentioned were Republicans from New York State and had voted as Moyers indicated; both would vote in favor of the final bill. All the Democrats from New York.

Walter ought to sure get … Did we ever get that guy from Syracuse?[note 51] Representative R. Walter Riehlman represented New York’s 34th District, which included Syracuse. He had voted against the Landrum substitute and would vote against the final bill.

No, sir, we did not.

Wonder if he ever called Walter back.

I do not know. [Pause.]

Had all of Pennsylvania, all of Philadelphia, Rhode Island. Got [John] McMillan and [Mendel] Rivers.[note 52] Representatives John McMillan and Mendel Rivers were South Carolina Democrats; McMillan had voted in favor of the Landrum substitute but would vote against the final bill; Rivers voted in favor of both.

Got McMillan?

Yes, sir.

Bless his heart.

You got that one.[note 53] See Conversation WH6408-07-4736. Got [Ross] Bass, [Clifford] Davis, [Robert] Everett, [Joseph] Evins, and [Richard] Fulton from Tennessee.[note 54] All of the congressmen listed were Tennessee Democrats; all had voted as Moyers indicated on the Landrum substitute, and all would vote in favor of the final bill.

We’ve got to do something for Davis, now, and he gets drunk all the time.[note 55] Tennessee Representative Clifford Davis had been defeated in the state’s 6 August primary. See Conversation WH6408-11-4807, 4808. That’s going to be a hell of an appointment.

You know he hasn’t had a drink in eight months. I don’t know how long it’ll last, but he has not had a drink for eight months.

Was he pretty low about his defeat?

Mr. President, he was not. He called me this morning, and he was in the best of spirits and said they’d faced up to it and they were going to make a new life for themselves. They were going to both work hard for you in November. Carrie wanted to come back up here and take on that old job she had in the campaign.[note 56] Moyers was referring to Davis’s wife Carolyn. And he was in very good spirits. I [unclear]—

Did you send him that wire?

Sir?

Did we send him that wire?

Yes, sir.

Good.

Well, now, does [Hubert] Humphrey—he doesn’t know—but somebody, but Larry [O’Brien] better ask [Senate Majority Leader Mike] Mansfield to schedule—tell Larry.

All right.

Please get Mansfield to schedule that Appalachia [bill] quick as he can.[note 57] Earlier in the day, the Senate Public Works Committee had reported the administration’s Appalachian development bill to the full house on a 12–2 vote. “Senate Panel Approves Appalachian Program,” Washington Post, 8 August 1964.

All right, sir.

Because they’ll go to working on it. Then the Chamber of Commerce and all of them. We just take these things—see, when I was [majority] leader, I’d report a bill out and take it up the same afternoon, before they’d get it. And NAM [the National Association of Manufacturers] would read about it. [Moyers chuckles.] We’ve gone through NAM, Chamber of Commerce—everything on this son of a bitch for five months because of a bunch of no … well, fumblers.

But if Larry—Humphrey can’t do anything; he just talks big. But if Larry will talk to Mansfield and say please, and somebody will call the men that are interested in it, really interested in it, now. Jennings Randolph hasn’t got much influence, but who is it that’s interested in it that’s got some influence?[note 58] Senator Jennings Randolph was a West Virginia Democrat, serving his first full term after winning a special election in 1958 and reelection in 1960.

Hugh Scott is interested in it on the Republican side and will help us there, he said.[note 59] Senator Hugh Scott was a Pennsylvania Republican. Democrats, there’s not much power. Let’s see, both … Albert Gore is interested in it.[note 60] Senator Albert Gore Sr. was a Tennessee Democrat. [Moyers clears his throat.] Excuse me. [Joe] Clark of Pennsylvania is interested in it.[note 61] Senator Joseph S. Clark was a Pennsylvania Democrat.

Well, now, Clark can get Mansfield to schedule it.

All right.

If you just get ahold of Clark and tell him—tell Walter that I’ll see him next week, early.

All right, sir.

But get Clark to get Mansfield to try to schedule it Monday so we can have time to get it through. If he waits, he’ll want to schedule foreign aid. We don’t give a damn if they ever get foreign aid.

[Pause.] All right, sir.

Now, Judge Davis said that old man [Howard] Smith would give him a rule, didn’t he?[note 62] Johnson was probably referring to Representative John W. Davis, a Georgia Democrat who had served as a judge on the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit Court prior to his election to the House. The comment may have been in reference to the status of the Appalachia bill in the House. Representative Howard Smith of Virginia chaired the House Rules Committee.

Yes, sir, he did. He said he’s going up Monday to ask for it.

Will Colmer vote for his rule?[note 63] Representative William M. Colmer, a Mississippi Democrat, served on the House Rules Committee.

I don’t know, Mr. President. I’ll ask him.

[Pause.] Now, Bill, we don’t really have to have anything else.

No.

I never did get that foreign policy stuff that I’ve been begging and pleading for … and Defense—on the [party] platform. I got the other stuff, and I thought it looked pretty good.

Yes, sir.

What happened to it?

I do not know; I’ve got it.

Well, somebody told me it would be over in my night reading that night. That’s two or three nights ago. I asked you, and I thought you said that you had the Defense—

That’s right. I do not understand that, Mr. President. I have xeroxed copies of it, let me … I would . . .

Well, now, who was going to put it all together where we’ve got a finished document of whatever it is, 2[000] or 3,000 words?

Dick and I. Dick and I.[note 64] Richard Goodwin was one of Johnson’s chief speechwriters and was responsible for developing the term Great Society.

Well, now, you-all have had it, though, for a week, haven’t you?

Yes, sir, but there’s been a great deal of it in the talking stage and of talking about certain points. And we’ve taken it and tried to analyze what’s in it that’s not in the Republican platform, what’s in the Republican platform that’s not in ours, compared it to [the] 1960 platform.

Well, I thought what I read the other night read awfully good. Didn’t you have that impression?

Yes, sir. I thought—

The [Willard] Wirtz stuff?

I thought it … first, it read well, and second, the boundaries of it were pretty definitive and [unclear]—

The only thing [that] worried me is the cost. Somebody—when you go to educating every child, it’s going to cost you several billion.

And I’ve got Kermit Gordon costing it out.

Well, if you do send anything down for me and—

And it’s in a column that I’m furnishing jet planes to Texans to come home.

That’s right.

And it’s just so damn dangerous. If they could not let anybody know it and they could keep it, and you could say, “Now, there’s a courier plane going, and a courier plane will stop at Fort Worth, and it’ll stop at Austin. And it’ll leave … 30 minutes after the vote. But if you tell another damn human—unless it’s somebody who wants to go to Texas—and just tell them it’s going to take material that I’ve got to sign. Why, that’s all right. But don’t let them go to talking it; they just get us in trouble, all of them, and they don’t know. I mean, when I tell somebody that I’d really like to have a short platform, that’s always in the paper. They’ve got it all. I don’t know how they get it, but they do.

I know one thing—that somebody ought to get to me on the … if we have a wire outfit down here, we ought to get that McNamara statement today that he put out—I’m sure George [Reedy] has got it. But the … And I would like to have the conversation—tell Juanita [Roberts] that there’s a conversation I had today with the governor of Louisiana [John McKeithen] that’s recorded.

All right, sir.

And for them to never use “yeah” on the phone. I say “yes” and they put “yeah.”

All right.

Don’t ever do that in transcribing it; just put “yes.”

All right, sir.

Or “no.” And try to punctuate it: cut out, edit. All those conversations ought to be edited.

But to take that and show it to Lee White, the conversation.

All right, sir.

Transcribe it the first thing in the morning.

All right.

And let him call the Justice Department and notify them … what—[unclear] that we talked to the governor and what he said. But not to send them—repeat, repeat, double repeat, capitalize—not to send them a transcript. Just let him look at the transcript and then bring it right down to Juanita after he reads it.

All right.

Don’t let it stay up there over 20 minutes; I don’t want him to have a chance to copy it.

All right, sir.

Now, I don’t know what I’m going to have for the press conference tomorrow, do you?

Well, if you could wait until right after the poverty [bill] passage—I sent you a statement tonight on the wire that you already have now. I suggested to George [Reedy] that the news would probably be a statement you might make about the murders in Mississippi.[note 65] While considering his response to the Gulf of Tonkin incident on 4 August, Johnson had received the news that the FBI had unearthed the bodies of civil rights activists James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, and Andrew Goodman. You’ll get that question.

The third thing would—

Well, now, what about the murders? What do I say?[note 66] Johnson said that FBI’s investigation was “going exceedingly well,” and he expected “substantive results … in a very short time.” He then committed himself to prosecuting these crimes and to maintaining law and order, emphasizing the responsibilities of local officials for “civil peace.” He ended his statement on this matter by explaining, “a Federal police force is inconsistent with the tradition of this country, and I do not believe we must create such a force to keep the peace and enforce the laws. But inaction on the part of the Government when Federal laws are violated and assistance is needed is equally repugnant to our traditions. We intend to do our part when it is necessary and right to do so.” “504. The President’s News Conference at the LBJ Ranch,” 8 August 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1965), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26426&st=&st1=.

Mr. President, I think you have to state pretty strongly again opposition to violence and the [Ku Klux] Klan …

Well, why don’t you just take that speech that he had written and work out a statement that as near as you can, and see if we can’t get Senator [Richard] Russell to check it in the morning early [Moyers acknowledges] , so he can get it to me by—see, I’m going to have the press conference at about 9:15 …

9:15 …

… so they can file stuff, and I guess I can issue a poverty statement for release when it’s passed.

Yes, you can.

And, of course, if it got defeated, I’d be in a hell of a shape, wouldn’t I?

Well, I wouldn’t … I … Well, let me think about that and talk to George. 9:15, that’s 11:15 up here; they would file it; they won’t vote until 12 [noon], they probably will not vote until 1 [P.M.] tomorrow. That’s too late, really. Yes, you would get in trouble if it were defeated.

[Pause.] Well, I could do it [at] 10 [A.M.]; that’d be 12 [noon] up there.

And if you have it—are you going to have it out in Austin?

No, I’m going to have it here … at the ranch.

I mean out at the ranch. Well, they have to go back into Austin, so that might work out pretty well. Be 1:00 before they got back to Austin, or a little later, and maybe George could have this statement. I’ll get it to him in the morning. Well, he’s already got it; I sent him a copy of it. He could mimeograph it in the morning and hold it.

Tell him to do that until they get back in the bus, and if it’s … You let him know when it passed, and he can tell them that I said it.

Have we got anything on the economy? Anything on steel prices?

[Unclear.] I would like—

What am I going to say—wait just a second.

I believe Senator Russell is the best one. If Walter would just call him and say, “Now, they’ve—we’ve been notified we’re going to get a couple of mean questions on Mississippi and on the Georgia thing, and here’s what we want to say. And the President wants you to look at it before we send it to him and see if there’s anything he’s saying there that’s out of line.”

All right, sir. I’ll get that done first thing in the morning.

Well, so I’ll have it [before] 9:15, so—see, at 9 [A.M.] there [will] be 7 [A.M.] here, so that’ll be all right. [Moyers acknowledges.] So get you-all all—you just notify Walter and them to get in there tomorrow at 8:30. I want all of them there, because I’ll be calling. He and Jack [Valenti]. You-all are going to be leaving now—[unclear] that damn fool film, aren’t you? You and Jack are not going to be there?

No, we canceled that trip tomorrow to Atlantic City.

All right. [Brief pause.]

Now, is my film going to be as good as [John F.] Kennedy’s?

Yes, sir.

All right.

Your film is going to be good because it’s got so much good unused and unused—I mean, unknown material. Got stuff out of Mrs. [Lady Bird] Johnson’s files and had it touched up—that is [President Johnson acknowledges] , improved. It is good. You’ve got good shots of you as a young congressman, good shots of you in the war; it’s a good script…

OK, now … we really want to call in the folks for this poverty signing. It wants to be the biggest damn thing and the biggest speech we ever had—if we get it.

Right.

And I think it ought to be in the East Room.

All right. And you’ve got a signing on the pay bill next week, too.

We’ve got a signing nearly every day, and we want to get Buzz [Horace Busby] to get some real good quotations. We ought to get our research people busy on that schedule. Have you got any research people over at the [Democratic National] Committee?

Yes, sir.

We ought to get them to get the Jeffersons and the poets and the Frenchmen, the English, and everything we can get on man being worthy of his hire. Good quotations that we can put in this statement. They ought to be about 4[00] or 500 words.

Now, these U Thant statements and these toasts and the stuff this week, I think, has been remarkably better than it’s ever been.[note 67] U Thant was secretary general of the United Nations.

I agree.

And I think it’s getting a whole lot better play.

The two statements that Buzz did for you last week on education—one at the first of the week on Monday was very good too.

[softly] Yeah.

Good play.

Now, I think that Jack ought to ask [John] Steinbeck … to—Jack, if he needs to, ought to take Mary Margaret [Valenti]—he ought to fly up to see Steinbeck if he could and take this platform, all of it, and let him see it, so he can use it for my acceptance speech, some of it, and … get us some stuff. And I think that he could rewrite the platform if he wants to do an editing job.

… rewriting one and a real colorful one.

All right, sir.

If we can keep that out of the papers … it’ll ruin us if it gets in the paper.

I agree.

So I wouldn’t tell even Dick Goodwin about it.

No, I wouldn’t.

Just you and Jack know it.

All right.

But tell him he can take a JetStar [airplane] and go up and see Steinbeck and take the platform. Ask him if he just won’t rewrite it and edit it, and then write me an acceptance speech from it.

All right, sir.

Now, Dick’s writing me an acceptance speech, isn’t he?

Yes, sir.

And I guess it’ll be based on the platform, won’t it?

Not, not, not … not particularly.

Well, that’s what we’re going to carry out; that’s what we’re going to do.

Well, but it will have some of the general principles in it.

I sure think we ought to talk about … They talk about the backlash; we want to talk about the Republican backlash. I’d really hit them. The man’s [Goldwater’s] only got—every poll shows—he’s only got one out of every three. Our people really ought to drill that home now.

All right.

Every one that makes speeches.

Did you all have any good speakers on poverty?

Yes, we—

I guess Landrum was the best one.

Good speeches and good speakers.

Who wrote the speeches?

Oh, Harold Walsh, and Hal Pachios, and Adam Yarmolinsky, and …[note 68] Harold Walsh remains unidentified. Harold Pachios had worked in the Peace Corps under Sargent Shriver and Bill Moyers; in the summer of 1964 he moved to the Democratic National Committee to work on the advance team for the 1964 presidential campaign. Harold Pachios, Interview by Michael L. Gillette, 15 October 1990, transcript, Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TX, pp. 1–2.

How did you get by with Yarmolinsky today with the [unclear]?[note 69] For background on the Yarmolinsky issue, see Conversation WH6408-08-4756 andWH6408-08-4766, 4767. Especially see Conversation WH6408-09-4779.

It did not come up on the floor.[note 70] This statement was not accurate. During the morning debate, congressional critics of Yarmolinsky had raised the issue; Phil Landrum responded by promising that Yarmolinsky would not receive an appointment in the new Office of Economic Opportunity. Landrum had stated that he made the pledge on the “highest authority,” and it is thus significant that one of the President’s chief aides either did not know of the incident or chose not to inform him. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “The Yarmolinsky Affair,” Esquire, 63 (February 1965): 122; Michael Gillette, Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996), pp. 135–38; Marjorie Hunter, “Johnson Antipoverty Bill Approved in House, 228–190, But Foes Balk Final Vote,” New York Times, 8 August 1964.

[Unclear.]

And Jimmy Roosevelt inserted the letter that Yarmolinsky wrote to Defense to McNamara two years ago clarifying his record and denying these charges.[note 71] Representative James Roosevelt was a California Democrat. Major General Edward A. Walker had accused Yarmolinsky of holding Communist affiliations in a 1962 Senate hearing. Hunter, “Johnson Antipoverty Bill Approved in House, 228–190, But Foes Balk Final Vote,” New York Times, 8 August 1964. He put that in the record. Roosevelt and some of these liberal congressmen are very upset. They feel that Yarmolinsky’s got the shaft, and it’s just been—it’s been tough holding some of them down today from saying anything on the floor. But it would have been unwise for Yarmolinsky for them to say anything.

Yes, unwise for Roosevelt, too. He’s a plain, damn fool. Yarmolinsky better stay in the Defense Department; McNamara’s the best defender he’s got and the safest one he’s got. And he ought to tell him that’s where he wants to stay, until we can get him confirmed as assistant secretary of defense.

Well, that’s great. I’m glad to hear you say that. I won’t tell him that, but I’m glad to hear you say it.

Yeah, I’d tell him that I think that he ought to stay there. McNamara’s told me he wants to try to get him assistant secretary of defense, and I wouldn’t mind going to bat if his record’s clean.[note 72] Following his preemptive dismissal from any role with OEO, Yarmolinsky would return to the Pentagon in a reduced role as McNamara’s assistant. In October 1965, he would be promoted to the post of deputy assistant secretary of defense for international affairs, a position that did not require Senate confirmation. “Yarmolinsky Given New Pentagon Post As McNamara Aide,” New York Times, 26 October 1965.

All right.

Has he belonged to any liberal organization?

Liberals, yes.

Well …

Yes, but no Communist organization. And in those liberal organizations, he has opposed the Communists and has driven them out. And that—

Well, now, what liberal organizations that are questionable has he belonged to?

The American Veterans Committee. Are you familiar with that?

No.

That’s a small group of veterans who organized to fight for liberal causes 20, 25 years ago. Wirtz is a member, et cetera. In the beginning, there was a big fight over whether the Communists would dominate it or not. Yarmolinsky helped expose and drive them out, and that’s a matter of record.

Well, is it—

He was attacked by the Daily Worker.[note 73] The Daily Worker was the paper of record for the Communist Party of the United States of America.

Has it been cited?

No, sir. No, sir. It has not been cited by the Attorney General’s list. There were … his mother and father at one time joined to an organization that was cited, but they got out of it before it was cited, when they learned that it was Communist-oriented.

Well, we’ll just put up a fight if we win this election. McNamara told me he wanted to make him assistant secretary of defense, and I told him that’s fine if he could do it. And that was three months ago …

All right, sir.

Four months ago.

That’s good …[note 74] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary.

But now, we’ve got to get—and I don’t want to commit—I—see, I’m going to rewrite your poverty program. Y’all, you boys got together and wrote this stuff, and I thought we were just going to have [another] NYA [National Youth Administration].[note 75] The National Youth Administration was a New Deal agency that provided work-study jobs for high school and college students, allowing them to stay in school. Lyndon Johnson had served as the program’s Texas director prior to running for Congress. As I understood it—do you know what I think about the poverty program, what I thought we were going to do?

What?

I thought we were going to have CCC [Civilian Conservation Corps] camps.[note 76] The Civilian Conservation Corps was a New Deal program that provided public works jobs for young men and women.

We’ve got that.[note 77] The closest War on Poverty parallel to the CCC was the Job Corps program, although it focused more on training than on construction.

And I thought we were going to have community action [programs] where a city or a county or a school district or some governmental agency could sponsor a project—state highway department—sponsor it, and we’d pay the labor and a very limited amount of materials on it but make them put up most of the materials and a good deal of supervision, and so forth, just like we used to have.[note 78] Johnson’s Texas NYA had worked closely with the state highway department, particularly on a series of widely lauded roadside parks. Randall B. Woods, LBJ: Architect of American Ambition (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 110–11.

We’ve got that.[note 79] Although the economic opportunity bill did contain a community action program, it did not have the focus on construction, or the clear control by local or state authorities, that Johnson envisioned here. Instead, it sought to engage poor communities in planning their own antipoverty initiatives, and its most ambitious forms gave the poor themselves control over the resulting programs.

I thought that we’d say to a high school boy that was about to drop out, “We’ll let you work for the library or sweep the floors or work in the shrubs or pick the rocks, and we’ll pay you enough so you can stay in school.”

We’ve got that.[note 80] Title I of the economic opportunity bill contained a work-study program for college students; it did not cover high school students, although individuals 16 years and older could enter the Job Corps.

I thought you’d let a college boy do the same thing.

We’ve got that.

And college girl.

Now, I never heard of any liberal outfits that’s where you could subsidize anybody. I think I’m against that. I just—if y’all want to do it in the Peace Corps, then that’s your private thing and that’s [John F. “Jack”] Kennedy. But my Johnson program: I’m against subsidizing any private organization. Now, if we had a hundred billion, we might need to, but with all the governmental agencies in this country, I’d a whole lot rather [Richard J.] Dick Daley do it than the Urban League. And he’s got heads of departments, and he’s got experienced people that are handling hundreds of millions of dollars.[note 81] In this passage, the President rejected the key premise of the Community Action Program as well as many War on Poverty programs in areas such as job training that involved private organizations.

In every one of these places, I’d make them come in [and] sponsor these projects. And I just think it makes us wide open, and I don’t want anybody to get any grants.[note 82] End of 2021 revisions. Now you got the grants out for farmers, didn’t you?[note 83] The original bill had included a program of direct grants to low-income farmers. A Senate amendment had replaced them with loans. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1964, vol. 20, p. 225; Conversation WH6407-12-4309.

Altogether.

All right. And …

And I got that thing out on handicapped that I mentioned to you last night. Everybody has to work.

Well, can anybody explain to me why in the hell it costs $4,600 a year for a boy?[note 84] During the House Education and Labor Committee’s hearings on the economic opportunity bill, it had emerged that the program would have a projected per capita trainee cost of $4,750. Critics charged that this figure was excessive and noted that it would cost less to send the trainees to Harvard. Administration officials counter that such claims ignored capital and other start-up costs for the new program, as well as the educational, skills, and behavioral problems of typical Job Corps enrollees. Initial costs for the Job Corps were actually far higher, at $9,945 per trainee, although they fell to $6,500 by 1968. See Conversation WH6407-22-4461, 4462, 4463 and WH6408-07-4748; Office of Economic Opportunity, Administrative History of the Office of Economic Opportunity, January 1969, “Administrative History of OEO, Volume I, Part II,” Box 1, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, pp. 481–82, 521–22; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Education and Labor, “Hearings on Poverty,” 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1964), pp. 1513–14 ; Marjorie Hunter, “Antipoverty Measure Is Facing Opposition on the Racial Issue,” New York Times, 17 June 1964; Marjorie Hunter, “Youth Job Corps Is Ready To Roll,” New York Times, 16 August 1964; Michael Gillette, Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996), pp. 185–86, 306-7, 383n1.

[Sighs.] Well, Shriver can better than I can, but it boils down to the basic fact that travel, of the number of—you’ve got to have more instructors for this because these boys are more undisciplined; and so per capita, per 10 boys, you’ve got to have at least one, they’re figuring, one instructor, until they test it and see whether or not it goes; that adds up your cost. The other things are food and so forth. And it’s on a 12-month basis rather than on a 9-month basis, which a college education is figured at.

Well, I know that anybody can board for $100 a month; that’s 1,200 [dollars]. And I know you’re going to pay them 50 [dollars a month], isn’t that right?

That’s right, that’s 650 [ sic ].

So that’s 1,800 [dollars]. And they say “exclusive of your camp and your equipment.” So you would have to, according to this, have about $2,800 for teachers; that don’t make sense.

I don’t know enough about—

Well, you find out enough about it, because you’re not that dumb, and you’re a head of this program and you’ve been running it. And that’s the big question I’ve been asking about it every time I talk to somebody. You tell them that I want to see why we can’t cut that down because that’s going to have to stand scrutiny. I’m going to put an auditor on that.

[chuckling slightly] All right.

Now, on these five people, let’s just be awfully careful that we don’t get committed to anybody, and any of these—Mrs. Whatcha—, Negro woman—that are coming down that you’re putting in charge, giving out interviews in the New York Post—let’s be awful careful that I’m not committed to appoint a damn one of them.

Exactly.

And I want to get some real able, tough people that are good administrators in these places.

All right, sir.

And I’m willing for him to go to the best businessmen he’s got—Sears and Roebuck and everyplace he can get a businessman—and draft him. And Tom Watson will give him a man, some of them, but bring them in.[note 85] Thomas Watson Jr. was the president of IBM. But I sure do want people that will stand up on this Hill because this is a Johnson program, and it’s going to be disgraceful for the election if we’re not careful.

That’s right.

So you see that he understands that tomorrow.

I talked to him about that today, and right after that he sent me over a memo to you about one possibility and wanted you to look at it: a very able, young businessman who is the executive vice president of Encyclopedia Britannica, which is a very—he’s going for great guns out there.[note 86] Moyers was referring to Maurice B. Mitchell, the president of Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. See Conversation WH6408-13-4821, 4822, 4823, 4824. And I’ll send that down to you.

Well, what I want is, I want somebody that—I don’t … Bill Bennett’s outfit don’t appeal to me much—but I want somebody that’s really come up competitively and born on a farm and knows something about poverty himself.[note 87] Although the War on Poverty would soon be associated primarily with urban poverty, much of the early conceptualization and planning had actually focused on rural poverty. This comment suggests that the President shared this rural orientation. And, you know, that’s got … that’s had a little hockey between his toes.[note 88] “Hockey” is an informal term for horse manure.

Right. Right. Well, we’ll find them. I agree with you 100 percent on that. And I have a couple of guys in mind to suggest.

All right, that’s good. That’s good.

Now, what is [Frederick] Dutton doing?[note 89] Frederick G. Dutton served as assistant secretary of state from 1962 to 1964 and would be the deputy national chairman of the 1964 Johnson presidential campaign. In the latter capacity, he headed the campaign’s research operation. Drew Pearson, “Democrats Have Money in Bank,” Washington Post, 22 August 1964.

Well, he’s put together this … a number of big research books for us. He’s organized people to answer charges and make speeches and get on the attack—he’s doing that. He’s putting together a lot of pamphlets, which I have been reading this weekend, OKing, for the convention and the campaign. He’s brought some advance … some advance speechwriters in. He’s trying to fire some people over at the committee who are real hacks on that research committee …

That’s the best news I’ve heard… .

He says they’re all just hacks.

Did you ever get any reaction to him on Bobby [Kennedy]?[note 90] Dutton had worked on the 1960 Kennedy-Johnson campaign and had been a special assistant to President Kennedy before moving to the State Department. He would work for Robert F. Kennedy in the 1968 Democratic primary campaign.

Yes, sir.

What does he say?

He told me, he said, “I was for him,” he said, “if the President wanted him; I was not if he wasn’t. Now that it’s behind, I haven’t thought about it anymore.”

Fine.

And let me see, who was it? Bill Haddad told me that Bobby was in New York today and saw [Robert] Wagner.[note 91] After working on the 1960 Kennedy presidential campaign, William F. Haddad had served in the Peace Corps as associate director for planning and evaluation. He would serve as assistant director for inspection in the Office of Economic Opportunity in 1965 and would work as an adviser to Robert F. Kennedy during the 1968 presidential campaign. That the story up there is that Bobby told Wagner he was going to run for the Senate and that he had told you that.

Well, he hadn’t at all.

I told him I didn’t know anything about it. But … and Goodwin told me that Bobby is going to take a cruise next week and decide whether or not he runs for the Senate. And his feeling was that he would. [Pause.] But Dutton did tell me, he came the next morning and said, “I guess you know that I was for Bobby if the President was.”

Well, now we oughtn’t to have brought him in if he was, Bill. We’ve got to watch that, now. Can’t we learn from that?

Well, but he had told—I had asked him that before we ever brought him in, and he said, “I’m for whoever the President wants,” which is not inconsistent with what he said.

[Pause.] Now tell George, if you sent this to him by wire—this statement—to have it all mimeographed up tonight—on poverty.

I will do it.

Well, I’ll just read it and I’ll tell him—that’s what I’ll do.

OK.

And then you get me the one—the best, the good ones—on race.

All right.

Get them cleared out by Russell.

All right.

[Pause.] And you better get me … that edited transcript of my meeting with the governor. It doesn’t cost you anything to put this on the wire and get it down here, does it?

No, sir.

Well, get that thing so I’ll have it here tomorrow—the governor of …

Louisiana [John McKeithen].

Louisiana.[note 92] At 4:50 P.M. on this day, Johnson had recorded a conversation with Governor John McKeithen about possible violence in the upcoming desegregation of St. Helena Parish schools. Johnson used the transcript of that call in several conversations. See Conversation WH6408-11-4814,WH6408-22-4954, andWH6408-23-4965.

All right, sir.

[Pause.] Now, we ought to have some real breakthrough on this employment. I don’t know what’s new, what we can do, but if we’ve got poverty passed, I can really brag on it. See if Wirtz can’t give me a real blowing-up statement bragging on it: something I can say that’s new, predicting what’s going to happen, or something.

Now, how are you-all going to get rid of these kids right quick that are on employment rolls? When do you get your bill?

I don’t know, Mr. President, on that. I do know I talked to Secretary Wirtz about what he’s going to do to get 150,000 kids under the work-training program, and he’s moving ahead in that regard. He wants to try to … you know, by mid-October have it … at least 75,000 of them on work training—

Well, let’s just sure—we ought have a conference on it. If they pass [it] tomorrow, we ought to have one set up Monday.

That’s right; that’s exactly right.

Better set one up for me Monday with Shriver and have him bring them all in.

All right, sir.

We want the biggest signing we ever had on it, too. So, I’ll have this poverty statement …

And you better get the questions and answers in the morning, like what I’m going to say about Mississippi. What are they going to say? What question do you think they would ask me? “What do you think about this Mississippi situation?” or something?

Ah … yes, sir.

Are we going to indict them by federal grand jury, or … We haven’t found out actually who did it yet. I mean, we’re not ready, are we?

No, sir. … [Cartha “Deke”] DeLoach told me tonight they were getting pretty close, but we probably won’t be close enough tomorrow to say anything about it.[note 93] FBI Assistant Director Cartha “Deke” DeLoach was the Bureau’s chief liaison to the White House.

Have they violated any federal law?

I don’t know.

They violated—they indicted them under state law in Georgia, didn’t they?[note 94] Johnson had shifted from the Mississippi Burning case to the investigation into the murder of Lieutenant Colonel Lemuel Penn in Georgia. The day before, on 6 August, the FBI had arrested four men for that crime.

Yes, sir; that’s right—the fellows who shot that Negro.

Now, Joe Rauh was on television, and … just raising hell today on the [Mississippi] Freedom [Democratic] Party—making a speech to them at their convention, said, “They’ve got to be seated.” Now, that’s going to ruin us if we do that.[note 95] Joseph Rauh was the nation’s leading labor attorney who was representing the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party in their attempts to replace the all-white regular delegation to the DNC from Mississippi. Johnson would hold numerous conversations in the coming weeks that reiterated the sentiment here and below.

That’s right.

And you better tell Humphrey. You better call him and say, “Now, I’m taking no part … in [selecting a] vice president, but you know I like you and how much I admire you. But the President’s gone and Rauh was on television today, and there’s one thing that will make everybody—you’ve already got 15 states in the South that are not very much for you—but there’s one thing that I want to caution you against: is having anybody else sponsoring you like the Attorney General [Robert Kennedy]. Because a lot of people are coming in and saying that you’re sucking up to him in that picture. That’s number one—I want to caution you against that.

“And number two, if you’ve got any labor friends or any other friends, get ahold of Rauh and find that Rauh doesn’t get [the Credentials] Committee to seat Freedom, because you run all the border states out. And it can’t do us a bit of good to seat them; nothing good can come from it. We’ve already got the Negro vote. We’ve already got the liberal vote. But we’ve got a fighting chance in Texas … to win, and, if you can’t do this, why, you haven’t met your first test as vice president.

“And this is up to you to corral the [George] Meanys and the liberals and everybody and get Rauh to quit pledging these folks and not be coming. He’s saying, ‘I’m going to the floor fight.’[note 96] George Meany was president of the AFL-CIO. Now, if you can’t do that—and the President tells me he assigned that to you and he knows you’re taking care of it. But he’s gone now, and I just want to tell you that some people came in here today and they’re using this on you.

“So you keep putting your arm around somebody going down the corridor with them—number one—and I’ll give you suggestions from time to time. But I know of the people that are in this race [for vice president], the one he likes the most is you. But he’s getting lots of heat.”

Just say, “Now, [California] Governor [Pat] Brown’s supposed to be for you, but he was in here in the White House this week,” and so forth.

All right, sir.

OK.

Bye.

Now, I’ve got to watch this press [conference]. I’ve got to get something from [Kermit] Gordon on economy.

All right.

I’ve got to get something from [Walter] Heller on … on how much better we’re doing. I’ve got to get something from Wirtz on employment that’s good. I ought to have something from State and something from Defense.

The big news will be Vietnam, of course. Questions about that. They’ll ask you about this disparagement in the . . . your statement and the actual time of the—

I ought to have my statement down here, but I just said that “that action is being … We have replied, and that is being executed now.” I didn’t say that we’re sending planes to a certain harbor. We cut that out. [note 97] During Johnson’s late-night address to the nation on 4 August, the President announced that U.S. forces were currently launching strikes on North Vietnamese positions in reprisal for reported attacks on the U.S. destroyers Maddox and C. Turner Joy in the Tonkin Gulf. The timing of the announcment concerned Johnson, since he recognized that any statement about a retaliatory raid prior to the raid itself might later be construed as telegraphing U.S. actions to the enemy, particularly if it resulted in American casualties. See Conversation WH6408-06-4706, WH6408-06-4714, and WH6408-10-4799.

That’s right. I’ll get that down to you in the morning.

OK.

All right.

But be sure, now, to get me some paragraph that McNamara can work on and State can work on. And I imagine they’ll ask me about beef, too. I can’t think of what else they’ll work out.

We ought to tell them I’m really going to want somebody to call down here to this colonel in the morning, first thing, and tell us what happened during the night—it’s daytime over there—what happened on Vietnam so I’ll know.

All right, sir. All right, sir.

And tell them anything at all happens—

—call me here.

All right, sir.

Tell that [to the] Situation Room.

I’ll do that [unclear].

All time of night, I don’t give a damn; I want to keep just as close to it as if I was in the Situation Room.

All right, sir.

OK.

Good-bye.