Hello?

Dr. [Henry A.] Kissinger calling you, Mr. President.[note 2] Henry A. Kissinger was U.S. national security adviser from January 1969 to November 1975, and U.S. secretary of state from September 1973 to January 1977.

Yeah.

The President.

Hello?

Mr. President?

Yeah, Henry.

I just wanted to mention a number of relatively minor things to you.

Yeah.

One is that the South Vietnamese are launching another one of these raid-type operations tonight.

Good.

This time, it’s a more sizeable one. There’s a big sweep inside South Vietnam.

Good.

And then they’re going to land some battalions in Base Area 611.[note 3] The offensive was directed against the North Vietnamese forces that held the A Shau Valley along South Vietnam’s border with Laos. Craig R. Whitney, “Sweep By Saigon Reported Opened,” New York Times, 17 April 1971.

Mm-hmm.

And I think it’s very useful to tie down the North Vietnamese.

Good.

And—

Is it well programmed, and well supported, and well planned?

Well programmed and well supported, Mr. President. And I’ve called [Thomas H.] Moorer to say that we don’t want any significant American losses in helicopters, and so forth.[note 4] Admiral Thomas H. Moorer was chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1970 to June 1974.

Right. Right.

Secondly, I talked today to this fellow [Yuli M.] Vorontsov from the Soviet embassy.[note 5] Yuli M. Vorontsov was chargé d’affaires at the Soviety embassy in Washington, D.C., during the 1970s.

Right.

The reason was that there’s a meeting between [David Kenneth] Rush and [Pyotr] Abrasimov—[note 6] David Kenneth Rush was U.S. ambassador to West Germany from July 1969 to February 1972; U.S. deputy secretary of defense from February 1972 to January 1973; and counselor to the president from May to September 1974. Pyotr Abrasimov was Soviet ambassador to Poland from 1957 to 1961; Soviety ambassador to East Germany from 1962 to 1971; and ambassador to France from 1971 to 1973.

Yes.

—on Berlin. And I just wanted to make sure that they didn’t blow—that they understood which way the channels were going.[note 7] Kissinger was anxious to ensure that the Soviets, in this case Abrasimov, understood the need to keep the back-channel negotiations secret and separate from the formal Four Power Talks. Abrasimov, whom Kissinger regarded as a mindless Communist Party functionary, either did not understand this or was determined to undermine the back channel. For this reason Kissinger and Dobrynin would later use instead the Soviet ambassador to West Germany, Valentin Falin. And—

He understood that?

Oh, yeah. He understood it and he said that [Anatoly] Dobrynin was coming back Sunday with new instructions and that we should take the [Leonid] Brezhnev speech very seriously.[note 8] Anatoly Dobrynin was Soviet ambassador to the United States from January 1962 to May 1986. Leonid Brezhnev was general secretary of the Communist Party in the USSR from October 1964 to November 1982. Dobrynin was scheduled to return to the United States following the crucial 24th Soviet Communist Party Congress. The Congress had been expected to set the future direction of the Kremlin’s foreign policy. Vorontsov indicated to Kissinger that the major address to the Congress by Communist Party general secretary Leonid Brezhnev, which was widely interpreted as being conciliatory towards the West, should be taken as authoritative. That suggested to Kissinger that Dobrynin would bring back new instructions to move forward on major diplomatic issues, particularly Berlin and SALT. And he was slobbering all over me.

Good.

And—

We’ll see Sunday what he saw—tells you.

And then I did something which was a little unorthodox. I told him that Dobrynin had given me his phone number in Moscow. [President Nixon acknowledges.] So he called me up—and I’d lost it. So he called me an hour later and said it might be a nice thing if I called Dobrynin and congratulated him on his Central Committee membership.[note 9] The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party was nominally the highest organ of the party between party congresses, although, in fact, the committee’s political bureau (Politburo) held effective power. Dobrynin’s election to the Central Committee indicated that he was in good standing with the highest levels of the Soviet leadership.

Good. Do it.

So I—in fact, I did it. And Dobrynin said, “We’ll have something on that exchange of letters when I come back.”[note 10] In the back-channel negotiations over SALT, the United States sought to codify, through an exchange of letters between the heads of government, a new framework that would set the stage for a formal arms control agreement (or agreements).

He said that?

Yeah.

Yeah?

But he didn’t say what it was.

Yeah.

And he also said he was coming with new instructions.

But not indicating anything on the summit thing?[note 11] President Nixon hoped for Soviet agreement to a summit meeting in the fall of 1971, at which time SALT and other agreements could be signed officially.

Well, he couldn’t, Mr. President, on an open telephone.

Oh, it was open telephone. OK.

Yeah. We don’t have a secure line. We have the hot line, but I didn’t want to use that.[note 12] An open, or commercial, telephone line could be monitored by eavesdroppers, including foreign governments. Kissinger did not have available a secure, or encrypted telephone, which would maintain privacy. The U.S.–Soviet Hot Line was designed specifically for secure high-level communications during a crisis.

Right.

This was a commercial phone.

Good.

And—

But he probably—how’d he sound?

Oh, he sounded . . . they’re going to do something, Mr. President. And then, finally, one other thing, I called Mike Mansfield [D–Montana] on your behalf.[note 13] Michael J. “Mike” Mansfield was a U.S. senator [D–Montana] from January 1953 to January 1977, and Senate Majority Leader from January 1961 to January 1977. [Unclear]—

Just a second. Hold it.

Go ahead.

I called Mike Mansfield.

Yeah?

And told him that you had asked me to tell him about what you are announcing tomorrow in strictest confidence.[note 14] On 14 April, Nixon announced that he was easing some long-standing travel and trade restrictions with China.

Right.

And I thought that he would have appreciated it. And he was all—he was beside himself. Very statesmanlike and—

Was he?

The President has his warm support and congratulations and . . . and he said now he sees what you were talking about in your—when you were hinting at China policy and . . . [President Nixon acknowledges.] Of course, he raised again his going there.[note 15] Mansfield, who later become U.S. ambassador to Japan, had a long-standing interest in Asian affairs. He had raised publicly the idea of visiting China as a private citizen, as a way of encouraging improved Sino-American relations. Nixon and Kissinger did all they could to discourage such a trip, as it would take some luster off of what they hoped would be a historic presidential visit before the 1972 elections.

Oh, yeah, we have it in mind.

And I thought, Mr. President, that tomorrow morning, if you agree, that perhaps [Clark] MacGregor might call [Gerald R.] Ford [R–Michigan] and [Carl B.] Albert [D–Oklahoma].[note 16] In other words, by informing House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford [R–Michigan], and House Speaker Carl Albert [D–Oklahoma], of the President’s plans to remove restrictions on travel and trade with China, White House congressional liaison Clark MacGregor could elevate his status in their eyes. Clark MacGregor was White House congressional liaison from January 1971 to July 1972, and chair of the Committee to Re-Elect the President from July 1972 to November 1972. Gerald R. “Jerry” Ford was a U.S. representative [R–Michigan] from January 1949 to December 1973; House Minority Leader from January 1965 to December 1973; and vice president of the United States from December 1973 to August 1974. Carl B. Albert was a U.S. representative [D–Oklahoma] from January 1947 to January 1977, and served as Speaker of the House from January 1971 to January 1977. That gives MacGregor a little status and gives him something dovish to do.

Yeah.

And let State notify the Foreign Relations Committee.

Well, let MacGregor also call [George H.] Mahon [D–Texas].[note 17] George Mahon was a U.S. representative [D–Texas] from January 1935 to January 1979, and chair of the House Appropriations Committee from April 1964 to January 1979. [Kissinger acknowledges.] Mahon is a good man.

That’s a good thing.

And let him hit—because he’s the best man on that side.

Right.

And let’s see, on our side, [Hugh D.] Scott [R–Pennsylvania].[note 18] Hugh D. Scott was a U.S. senator [R–Pennsylvania] from January 1959 to January 1977, and Senate Minority Leader from September 1969 to January 1977.

Scott he should call.

Yeah. He might as well.

Maybe [Robert P.] Griffin [R–Michigan].[note 19] Robert P. Griffin was a U.S. senator [R–Michigan] from May 1966 to January 1979, and Senate Republican Whip from 1969 to 1977.

Yeah. Scott and Griffin. Yeah. And, let’s see, anybody else that . . . I think that’s enough. Let State inform the others. Well, MacGregor might call [George D.] Aiken [R–Vermont].[note 20] George D. Aiken was a U.S. senator [R–Vermont] from January 1941 to January 1975.

That—he’s on the Foreign Relations Committee.

Oh, that’s all right.

He’ll probably [unclear].

That’s all right. Let him call Aiken and let State handle the others.

OK.

See?

Right.

Give Aiken a little . . . [Kissinger acknowledges] a little brush. That’s a good idea.

Good, Mr. President. I’ll get that done [unclear].

Fine. [chuckling] OK, Henry.

Right.

Thank you.