Transcript
Edited by Ken Hughes, with Patrick J. Garrity, Erin R. Mahan, and Kieran K. Matthews
For President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger, the critical breakthrough that led to the 20 May 1971 U.S.–Soviet announcement of major progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) was the linkage between strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces. According to the 20 May framework agreement, limits on these two elements of the nuclear balance—long-range bombers and missiles, on the one hand, and antiballistic missile systems (ABMs), on the other—were to be negotiated and agreed to simultaneously. Nixon and Kissinger were anxious to halt a major Soviet buildup in strategic offensive forces; the United States’s main negotiating leverage to encourage Soviet restraint was its SAFEGUARD ABM program. Thus, the importance in their minds of an agreement that would establish a firm negotiating relationship between offensive and defensive systems.
In the early rounds of SALT, the Soviets had favored proceeding sequentially, with limits on ABM first, followed by restrictions on offensive forces. Unfortunately, as Nixon and Kissinger saw things, liberals in Congress and the media—and some U.S. government officials—also favored an ABM-only or ABM-first approach. In this conversation, Nixon and Kissinger express concern that their critics (led by the New York Times) would deliberately misinterpret and even try to sabotage the 20 May framework agreement by refusing to acknowledge the offense-defense linkage, and thereby encourage the Soviets to revisit the matter as the SALT negotiations went forward. Kissinger is urged to take the fight to the critics and to establish full political credit to the White House for its diplomatic successes.[note 1] For a more detailed account of the SALT negotiations and the 20 May announcement, see http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/content/nixon_SALT. Liberal and moderate critics of the Nixon–Kissinger approach to SALT had a different take on matters. They agreed that there was an integral linkage between offensive and defensive forces but contended that it only made sense to explore the possibility of ABM agreement first, given Soviet interest in that approach. Such an agreement might have been much simpler and quicker to reach than a comprehensive one involving offensive forces. The Soviets had only one incomplete deployed ABM system, and the United States had none, only plans for a future SAFEGUARD program. On the other hand, the two sides had thousands of nuclear-capable missiles and bombers, and there was no simple agreement about what constituted a “strategic” offensive weapon. An agreement that strictly limited, and ideally banned, ABMs would get to the heart of the nuclear competition between the two sides by making it unequivocally clear that neither could execute a successful first strike against the other. Both sides would then lose their incentive to build up strategic offensive forces, making limits on bombers and missiles much easier to achieve. Critics of the Nixon–Kissinger approach did not object to the 20 May framework per se, but they argued that it left too many loose ends, especially as it was conducted through a secret back channel that excluded diplomatic and technical professionals.
Hello?
Dr. [Henry A.] Kissinger, sir.[note 2] Henry A. Kissinger was U.S. national security adviser from January 1969 to November 1975, and U.S. secretary of state from September 1973 to January 1977. He’s on the line.
Hello. Henry?
Mr. President?
Yeah, how are you getting along on your briefings? [Kissinger attempts to interject.] You see any more people?[note 3] After the 20 May SALT announcement, Kissinger had engaged in a series of background briefings for the media and other key figures in the national security community. He sought to shape their understanding of the new arms control framework and to gain credit for the administration in holding out for diplomatic progress on American terms.
I have, but I’ve seen people all afternoon.
Right, mm-hmm.
But I don’t know whether you’ve seen the Los Angeles Times, for example.
No, no.
John [A.] Scali was in, and he expressed—my own feelings—he said he’s—John said there is some thought, maybe on your part, that we haven’t had a good press.[note 4] John A. Scali was an ABC News diplomatic correspondent from 1961 to April 1971; special consultant to the president from April 1971 to February 1973; and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from February 1973 to June 1975. He thinks this is the most spectacular thing he’s seen.
Well, I think, what I really think in terms of the press is basically the [Washington] Post and the [New York] Times. Like the Times headline, if you read it, is—says, “U.S. and Soviet to Stress ABMs” [Antiballistic Missiles]. Well, you know, now that’s a deliberate shaft, you see.
That is a shaft.
It’s a shaft, and it’s just com—it’s totally incorrect, and somebody ought to take them on, on that. Don’t you think?
I’m having Max Frankel come in.[note 5] Max Frankel was chief Washington correspondent and Washington Bureau chief for the New York Times from 1968 to 1972.
Yeah. All right. Is he coming in?
Yeah.
Well, I would lay it in. I’d say that’s—I’d just say that’s totally incorrect, deliberately so, and it really is.
Oh, totally.
And, of course, they didn’t give it the play that they should have, either. I mean, this kind of a thing would have been an eight-column banner if the other—you know what I mean? [Chuckles.] [Kissinger acknowledges.] They’re dying, Henry, that’s their problem.
Well, that is their problem.
Their problem. And Scali has got to realize that whatever we got is not really what it’s worth. I’m not disappointed; that’s what I expected. But I would say that I expected—I mean, I think we’ve done an excellent job considering what the opposition is. But, you know, really, you figure—stop to think—Jesus, these senators are out on a limb, the newspapers are out on a limb. They all, you know, the Post and the rest have been saying all those things. So what the hell do you expect them to do? They’re going to try to—as best to protect their position, and they’re petrified at the thought that maybe we’re going to get an agreement.
But it has a certain advantage in that it, in the long term, that it isn’t overplayed.
Sure. Oh, that’s true.
Makes the negotiations easier.
True, true. Oh, I’m not—
And still, it’s a big, you know, Los Angeles Times has a big headline.
Mm-hmm, sure.
It’s front-page everywhere.
Sure. Oh, it would be. Well, good God, it ought to be front-page, but what I meant is that the—as I said, the New York Times is playing its usual game, just straight-out—
I think it will continue to build.
To stress ABMs, [scoffs] they just—they missed their—they missed the point. That isn’t what it says. I mean, the significance is not that it stresses it, it’s to stress both.[note 6] That is, both strategic offensive and defensive forces.
Exactly.
It’s . . . and I think most of the others got that, that it’s defensive and offensive. But—
But with them, the Los Angeles Times had on the front page “Nixon Initiative” or “Nixon Letter to Kosygin Starts the Process” or something like that as the headline.[note 7] The front-page headline in the 21 May edition of the Los Angeles Times read, “U.S., Russ Closer on Weapons Limit: Nixon Explains ‘Joint Intent’ for Strategic Curbs.”
That’s good. That’s good. Now, that’s the way to get it across.
The Baltimore Sun, I understand, has a good headline.
Right. Sure, sure.
So we’ve got these special problem children here from the New York Times and the Washington Post.
[speaking over Kissinger] Sure, sure, sure. And as a matter of fact, the others will nitpick, but they better not nitpick too much, Henry, because there’s going to be a deal made here. You and I both know it.
And Scali is going over to the [National] Press Club and I gave him a few details [unclear]. [President Nixon acknowledges.] So I think this—
No, I think we’re—no, I think, listen, I don’t think you could have handled it better. It’s all out there. And, of course, we got to—we want to realize we got a hell of a television wallop on it. We hit that—
That was the lead eight minutes of these networks—
Yeah, the lead. And apparently the—[Eric] Sevareid and the others—[note 8] Eric Sevareid was a journalist and commentator for CBS News from 1939 to 1977.
He was very good. And [John W.] Chancellor was very good.[note 9] John W. Chancellor was a television news journalist who anchored the NBC Nightly News from 1970 to 1982. Well, Scali may not know the politics, but he feels it was a tremendous play. Maybe not as much as . . .
No, no, it was fine.
It’s certainly not as much as [John F.] Kennedy would’ve gotten, but—[note 10] John F. Kennedy was president of the United States from January 1961 to November 1963.
It’s fine. It’s got them on their heels for a little while. And again, it gets Vietnam off of the [front] page. Did they—incidentally, did they run the low casualties in their stories?[note 11] As Nixon gradually withdrew American soldiers from Vietnam and shifted those remaining from offensive to defensive operations, the weekly casualty rate had fallen.
I haven’t seen it anywhere.
Mm-hmm. Check that. Well, my guess is they probably didn’t. You might needle and ask them to see if they did, you know.
I’ll look into it.
[Charles W. “Chuck”] Colson’s people—don’t you bother.[note 12] Charles W. “Chuck” Colson was White House special counsel from November 1969 to March 1973. But I think it’s fine. We’re just—just the right thing, just play it right on out.
Well, I’ll be seeing Time and Newsweek this afternoon.
Good. And play it very—I think the idea of playing everything just very positively, we’re going to work for [an] agreement that’s . . . sure it’s hard, but we expect to get one. It’s offensive and defensive. It’s simultaneous. Period. That’s all.
That’s right.
And you’ll have a little fun with them. [chuckling] OK, Henry.
Right.
Thank you.
Cite as
“Richard Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger on 21 May 1971,” Conversation 003-110, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [Nixon Telephone Tapes: 1971, ed. Ken Hughes] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL: http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4002023