Transcript
Edited by Kent B. Germany, Ken Hughes, Guian A. McKee, and Marc J. Selverstone, with Kieran K. Matthews
On the evening of Election Day, National Security Adviser McGeorge “Mac” Bundy called President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch near Austin, Texas. After campaigning late the previous night and availing himself of an early morning photo opportunity to vote, Johnson had spent much of the day resting in bed. He had woken up just before Bundy’s call and was still groggy. Nevertheless, he would soon be making major decisions about the direction of U.S. policy in Vietnam.
On this day, President Johnson would establish an interagency working group on Vietnam to review various options for prosecuting the war. Chaired by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William P. “Bill” Bundy, this new body—labeled alternately as the NSC Working Group, the NSC Working Group on SVN/SEA, or the Executive Committee (ExComm)—brought together officials at the assistant secretary level. Over the next two weeks, it pored over a series of proposals that Bundy molded into a single paper that the National Security Council would review on 24 November. That paper would be redrafted during the next week and presented to President Johnson on 1 December 1964.[note 1] William C. Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, 1961–1964 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 2:365–75; “Editorial Note,” U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968: Vietnam 1964 (hereafter FRUS), ed. Edward C. Keefer and Charles S. Sampson (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992), 1:886–88.
Hello?
[Pause.] Mr. Bundy, I have the secretary on the line.
Happy Election Day, Mr. Bundy.
How are you?
Fine. Just a moment for the President.
Hello?
Yes.
How’s [every]thing going?
Everything’s fine up here. We don’t know any more than you do, yet, but we feel good.
What happened outside, out yonder?
What happened, sir?
Vietnam.
Nothing out there. We have recommendations and comment going back and forth, but there’s no further event on the scene as far as I know. [President Johnson sighs.] [Maxwell D. “Max”] Taylor is of the opinion that you’ve seen, but he’s also of the opinion that we have time to get organized.[note 2] Gen. Maxwell D. “Max” Taylor was a military representative of the president from 1961 to 1962; chair of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff from October 1962 to July 1964; and U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam from July 1964 to July 1965. The [Joint] Chiefs [of Staff] and my brother [William P. “Bill” Bundy] are working on the staff work.[note 3] William P. “Bill” Bundy was an intelligence analyst; U.S. deputy assistant secretary for international security affairs from 1961 to 1963; U.S. assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs from 1963 to 1964; U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs from 1964 to 1969; and editor of Foreign Affairs from 1972 to 1984. We expect it to take several days to get the kinds of plans and counterplans and checks and balances that we were talking about yesterday worked out.[note 4] The Presidential Daily Diary indicates that on Monday, 2 November, President Johnson met with National Security Adviser McGeorge “Mac” Bundy, Secretary of Defense Robert S. “Bob” McNamara, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk in the Cabinet Room from 12:40 to 1:25 p.m. The Foreign Relations series states that William P. “Bill” Bundy and George W. Ball also attended the meeting. See “Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp),” 1 November 1964, FRUS, 865–76, fn 2.
How should—
The military have accepted that, as I understand it.
With . . . approval?
Well, I don’t—I haven’t actually heard from [Robert S.] Bob [McNamara] back, but the messages back and forth show good humor.[note 5] Robert S. “Bob” McNamara was president of Ford Motor Company from November 1960 to January 1961; U.S. secretary of defense from January 1961 to February 1968; and president of the World Bank from April 1968 to July 1981. I don’t think there’s any immediate trouble, but I think they’re operating under the assumption that we’re really getting ready, and at the same time, we’re not sending anything to the field that implies a decision. So Max doesn’t yet know how sharply and clearly you indicated your intention to General [Earle G. “Bus”] Wheeler yesterday.[note 6] Gen. Earle G. “Bus” Wheeler was chief of staff of the U.S. Army from October 1962 to July 1964, and chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1964 to July 1970. We just don’t want that in the cables until we’re ready to go.[note 7] The administration was moving to a more sustained approach for dealing with Vietcong attacks and away from the tit-for-tat response that Taylor had been suggesting. See “Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp),” 1 November 1964, FRUS, 865–76, note 3.
Do you—are you less sharp on it?
Mr. President, I feel, in a way, that we—that nobody should ask you to make any decision until you’re acting with today behind you.
Yeah.
If I were deciding it, yes, I would feel about as you did yesterday. But I don’t think anyone should decide anything until your— [President Johnson snorts] until your— [President Johnson snorts] until you have this day under your belt.
Have you heard from any of the politicians today? Any of the writers, the [Walter] Lippmanns or the [James “Scotty”] Restons, or anybody?[note 8] Walter Lippmann was the editor of the New York Herald Tribune from 1931 to 1963; a columnist at the Washington Post from 1963 to 1967; a columnist at Newsweek magazine from 1963 to 1971; and a recipient of Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1964. James B. “Scotty” Reston was a columnist and Washington, D.C., bureau chief of the New York Times from 1953 to 1964; associate editor of the New York Times from 1964 to 1968; executive editor of the New York Times from 1968 to 1969; vice president of the New York Times from 1969 to 1974; and recipient of the Pulitzer Prize for National Reporting in 1945 and 1957.
[Joseph W. “Joe”] Alsop’s been around.[note 9] Joseph W. “Joe” Alsop was a prominent Washington journalist and syndicated columnist, and the brother of Stewart J. O. Alsop. He’s of the mood to work on this problem right away. Lippmann talked to Bill [D.] Moyers.[note 10] Bill D. Moyers was deputy director of the Peace Corps from 1961 to 1964; special assistant to the president from 1963 to 1967; White House press secretary from 1965 to 1967; and publisher of Newsday from 1967 to 1970. I haven’t gotten back to Bill, and I don’t know what he said. Alsop, of course, as usual, wants us to make up our minds to put the necessary amount of heat on in Southeast Asia. Walter doesn’t really think that’s problem number one. I think he thinks the most important problem is to get you to take time to . . . think about the problem in the new perspective that today will give. That’s what he did think when I had lunch with him about two days ago. He wouldn’t put Southeast Asia first on the agenda, although I think that’s because he’s not really as close to it as some of the rest of us.
The press, generally, are all of the view that you’re going to get a very—[Philip L.] Geyelin, for example, came in this afternoon—are of the view that you’re going to get such a mandate that you will be able to set any course you want in any part of the world.[note 11] Philip L. Geyelin was a foreign correspondent for the Wall Street Journal from 1946 to 1967; deputy editorial page editor and later senior editor for the Washington Post from 1967 to 1979; and a recipient of the Pulitzer Prize in 1970. “‘LBJ’s Agenda: A Backlog of Problems Confronts the President in Foreign Policy Field,’ Wall Street Journal, 5 November 1964. I’m a little less of the view that our election decides all the events everywhere else. But I think it will put [unclear]—
I am, too, and I’m less of the view it’s going to be that big.[note 12] President Johnson is referring to his margin of victory over Senator Barry M. Goldwater Sr. [R–Arizona]. [Snorts.]
Well, that we just don’t know yet.
Did they run three or four full-page ads up there today and saturate the television?
No, they haven’t. The tele—not here. The papers in New York were full of ads, but mostly about Kennedy-Keating.[note 13] Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy was U.S. attorney general from January 1961 to September 1964, and a U.S. senator [D–New York] from January 1965 until his assassination in June 1968. Kenneth B. Keating was a U.S. representative [R–New York] from January 1947 to January 1959; a U.S. senator [R–New York] from January 1959 to January 1965; U.S. ambassador to India from 1969 to 1972; and U.S. ambassador to Israel from August 1973 to May 1975. Robert Kennedy was running to unseat the incumbent Republican Kenneth Keating from New York. I—Bill [Moyers] would have more direct political news than I have, but when I talked to him this morning, he sounded very unworried and of the view that the thing really was—had come down to the last two or three days in very good—the way he put it to me was, he did not have the worries he’d been having two or three days ago.
We’re in a situation now where we’ll know a lot more in an hour and a half, when we’ll really know something from Connecticut and something from the model precincts. [President Johnson coughs.] My understanding is that CBS [Columbia Broadcasting System], at least this is what they—I had lunch with the Washington Post people, who think it’s all absolutely in the bag. And they say to watch [Louis P.] Lou Harris, because they’ve been up and down it in every primary, and in every—and in the ‘62 elections—and he really does know how to get it very close.[note 14] Louis P. “Lou” Harris was head of the polling firm Louis P. Harris and Associates, and became the first presidential pollster in 1960.
You want—Mary [L. Bundy] there?[note 15] Mary L. Bundy was the wife of McGeorge Bundy since 1950. [Is] Mary in Washington with you?
Yes, sir, she is.
Give her my love and tell her I haven’t seen her in so long that I—
I will, Mr. President, and how have you been? It must have been a long day for you.
I just fell apart, Mac, I just fell apart. I just so damn—my back is killing me. My head is hurting. I haven’t been up all day, and—
Well, you shouldn’t. I gather you had time to show the boys how to draw water from a well. That hit the tickers nice [unclear] sharp. [Chuckles.]
Well, I did [that] early this morning. And I got to bed late, and then I went and got up early. But we had a—oh, we had a . . . people are so good. They’re so good.
I’m sure you’ve had the most wonderful welcome down there.
We had a—they never had anything in a hundred years like it. It’s probably 125,000.
Yeah. [Unclear]—
And just as far as you could see. Had as many almost as the town’s got.
[Unclear.]
And not an ugly sign, and not an ugly word. And we didn’t have any bitterness in our—we just said that “here we are, and we’ve prepared for this. And if it’s your will, we continue, OK?" And we’ve got a great country, and we’ve got . . . [Bundy attempts to interject] we’re blessed. And it was just a wonderful evening. [speaking over Bundy] It was a very touching evening. But I got so sore today, I didn’t realize how much I’d been doing and how high up on the mountain I’d been. I’ve been—got—I’ve been keyed too high.
Well, you’ve just been living on air and on nerve for a month now. And I—we—I can promise you, Mr. President, that we are—we’re all right here, and we’re none of us going anywhere, any further than our desks, for the next few days till we get sorted out. And there isn’t anything that needs a hurried decision. And my own judgment is that, (a) I think it is going to be a big victory, and I think it’s going to be a strong one, stronger than I’d been guessing until the last two or three days. And there is some gossip that the pollsters have all shaded their—hedged their bets—and that their private betting is that it’s going to be even bigger than they’ve published. But I don’t know how much truth there is [to that].
Trans[fer]—Tell Mary hello for me, and we’ll get together when I get back. And transfer me to Bill if you can, if the operator would come back on.
I can get you back, yeah.
Yes?
Can you get—is this—which deck White House is this?[note 16] Bundy seems to say “deck,” though given the operator’s reply, he might have meant to say “desk.”
I’m in front.
Mr. Moyers—the President wants to reach.
I’ll take him. Thank you.
Thank you.
Cite as
“Lyndon B. Johnson and McGeorge Bundy on 3 November 1964,” Conversation WH6411-01-6108, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [Election of 1964, vol. 2, ed. Kent B. Germany, Ken Hughes, Guian A. McKee, and Marc J. Selverstone] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL: http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4002626