—leverage on the Vietnamese military, that they will not coalesce to the point where they will do it. They have too much at stake, in terms of their day-to-day life, and too great an inability to get together, one with the other.

Those are the eight conclusions that I reached.[note 3] These conclusions appear in both Krulak’s written report and the FRUS memcon of the meeting. See “Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities,” 10 September 1963, in FRUS, 1961–1963, 4: doc. 82. They derive from just as broad a base of investigation as one can have in the brief two days that I was there. But I must say that the 87 people to whom I spoke reflect the attitudes of far more than that many Vietnamese with whom they’re in association. So I’d say that—it would be many times over that man[y]—that number of Vietnamese viewpoints which I’ve expressed here.

Mr. [Joseph A. “Joe”] Mendenhall, do you want to add any comment?[note 4] Joseph A. “Joe” Mendenhall was a U.S. State Department official during the 1960s; a policy adviser for Vietnam and Laos during the Kennedy administration; a leader of the Krulak-Mendenhall fact-finding mission in September 1963; director of the State Department’s Vietnam Working Group from January to July 1964; director of the Office of Far Eastern Regional Affairs from July 1964 to 1965; director of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission in Laos from 1965 to 1968; deputy director and later head of the USAID Vietnam Bureau in 1968; and U.S. ambassador to Madagascar from 1972 to 1975.

Yes, I would like to, Mr. Secretary. [Unclear exchange.] I would like to say that I was struck with the virtual complete breakdown of the civil government in Saigon. This has been reflected in the cable which we’ve had on Mr. [Nguyễn Đình] Thuận’s views, that he indicated that he feels himself useless today.[note 5] Nguyễn Đình Thuận was the South Vietnamese secretary of state until the overthrow of Ngô Đinh Diệm in November 1963. For the contents of the cable, see “Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State,” 9 September 1963, in FRUS, 1961–1963, 4: doc. 78. He indicated that the minister of economy is reading detective novels. I was told at USOM [United States Operations Mission] that the [South Vietnamese] Ministry of Rural Affairs is not operating at the present time. The USOM director indicated to me that contacts between the USOM and Vietnamese government officials have been pretty completely broken, except by telephone call.[note 6] The USOM director was Joseph Brent. If there is, I think, a Vietnamese minister looks all around his room for mics before he talks to a USOM official. I was also told by our DCM [deputy chief of mission] that many high officials in the Vietnamese government are not sleeping at home, for fear of being arrested.[note 7] The deputy chief of mission was William C. Trueheart. There was a pervasive atmosphere of fear in the city of Saigon, which exceeded what it was in October ‘61, when General [Maxwell D. “Max”] Taylor’s mission came out.[note 8] Gen. Maxwell D. “Max” Taylor was a military representative of the president from 1961 to 1962; chair of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff from October 1962 to July 1964; and U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam from July 1964 to July 1965. For documentation on the Taylor Mission, which lasted from 15 October through 3 November 1961, see FRUS, 1961–1963: Vietnam 1961, ed. Ronald D. Landa and Charles S. Sampson (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), 1: 380–476. At that time, it was fear against the Vietcong [VC]; now it is fear of [Ngô Đình] Nhu.[note 9] Ngô Đình Nhu was the younger brother of and chief political adviser to South Vietnamese president Ngô Đình Diệm until their assassinations in November 1963. Vietcong, or VC for short, was the term Diệm used initially to refer to all enemies of his government, and which the United States later used to refer to Vietnamese Communists, whether they were members of the National Liberation Front or the People’s Liberation Armed Forces. Jessica M. Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance: Ngô Đình Diệm, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 175.

The Vietnamese friends I talked to, their first remark to me was how greatly the situation has changed since—for the worse—since I’d left a year ago. The student arrests have had a very great impact on the attitudes of officials, both military and civilian in the government, because many of their own children have been arrested, and the results and attitudes, I think, are evident. Now, the people I talked to in the government, when I asked them about the war against the VC, they said that is secondary now; our first concern is our, in effect, our war with the regime here in Saigon.

Now, one man, whose judgment I value very highly, Dean [Vũ Quốc] Thúc, who collaborated with Mr. [Eugene] Staley in the economic report on Vietnam in 1961, told me that he thought there is an explosive danger of a religious war between Buddhists and Catholics in Vietnam if the government continues its repressive measures against the Buddhists.[note 10] Vũ Quốc Thúc was an economist; an adviser to Ngô Đinh Diệm; dean of Saigon University Law School; chair of the Vietnam Special Financial Group; coauthor with Eugene Staley of an economic report on Vietnam in 1961; and secretary of state in charge of Post-War Reconstruction under Nguyễn Văn Thiệu until 1971. Eugene A. Staley was an economist; research director at the Stanford Research Institute; and head of an economic mission to South Vietnam in 1961. Staley’s “Special Financial Group” visited Vietnam from 16 June through 14 July 1961. A letter from Staley and Thúc to President Kennedy and President Diệm summarizing the report is available at “Letter from the Vietnam and United States Special Financial Groups to Presidents Diệm and Kennedy,” 14 July 1961, in FRUS, 1961–1963, 1: 221–23, doc. 93. Both the report and letter are available in United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, V.B.4 (Book 11 of 12), 1: 182–209. He says he greatly fears that a Buddhist fanatic will assassinate a Catholic priest, or throw a grenade into a church, and then the bomb will be ignited.

Everyone holds Nhu responsible for what has happened in Saigon. He is the focal point of hate, and I mean really hate, on the part of the people there. [Ngô Đình] Diệm himself is increasingly identified with Nhu as responsible, but this is probably not the view of a majority of people, except among students.[note 11] Ngô Đinh Diệm was president of South Vietnam from October 1955 until his assassination in November 1963.

There are increasing reports in Saigon and in Hué, as well, that students are talking of moving over to the Vietcong side. Again I was struck when Dean Thục told me that he’s under surveillance at his house in Saigon; he is therefore going to move out 10 kilometers into the country where he has another house. And I said, “What about the VC danger?” He said there’s no bigger danger from the VC than there is from the government.

Now, I didn’t travel as much outside Saigon. I spent 28 of 38 hours outside of Saigon, but I didn’t get to as many place as General Krulak because I think I had a slower aircraft. I went up to Hué and central Vietnam, to Danang and had a brief visit to Nha Trang, all in central, coastal provinces. I chose those provinces primarily because they are the ones where the Buddhist issue has been an important one. I was told that south of Saigon, the Buddhist issue has not had any effect. But in that area, particularly in the four northernmost provinces, for which I got a real feel, there has been very definite impact from the Buddhist issue. The cities of Hué and Danang are very much like the city of Saigon in their reaction. Again, an atmosphere of fear and hate.

I was also told that the security situation in two of the four provinces is deteriorating. In Quang Tin province, which is the fourth from the northernmost, the—they’ve had the worst month in August since last November. In Quang Nam, the third from the top, where the VC had been pushed back from the coast, there are now signs that they are beginning to return to the coast.

Now, it’s not clear whether this is because of the Buddhist issue, but it is known that in at least two of those provinces, there has been Buddhist agitation in the villages as well as in the cities. And in the province around the city of Hué, there are reports that the people are now beginning to drift toward the VC because of the repressive measures affecting the Buddhists.

Now, my conclusion is that . . . and this conclusion is shared, I might say, by Mr. [William C.] Trueheart, our deputy chief of mission, who is the American with political experience that’s been longer on the scene, I think, than anyone else. It’s also shared by our consul [John J. Helble] in Hué, that Mr. Nhu must go or that we will not be able to win the war in Vietnam if he stays.[note 12] John J. Helble was a career Foreign Service officer, and the U.S. consul in Hué during the Buddhist Crisis and overthrow of the Diệm regime in South Vietnam in 1963. Now, Trueheart commented, at a meeting in the ambassador’s office, that he was very much afraid that the people were going to begin to move over toward the VC if the alternative was only between Nhu and the Vietcong. I’d say I found that on the part of other U.S. civilian officials in central Vietnam. That is my conclusion as well, Mr. President.

You both went to the same country?

Yes, sir. [Laughter.]

One talked to military and one to civilians.

[speaking over the group] Well, I mean, how is it that we get such different—this is not a new thing; this is what we’ve been dealing with for three weeks. On the one hand, you’ve got the military saying the war is going better; on the other hand, you’ve got political strains or deteriorations affecting the military. Now, what—you two gentlemen are both—have a lot of experience. We’ve got a lot of confidence in both of you. What is the reason for the difference? You must have an explanation what the reasons for the difference [unclear]?

I’ll tell you a reason: it’s metropolitan versus national. That’s my judgment, sir. That Mr. Mendenhall has expressed a metropolitan viewpoint and I expressed one that reflects more of the countryside. Now, this is not to say that my viewpoint should prevail at all. But the city of Saigon is like the bullseye in a target, but there’s a great big target around it, too. The attitudes in Saigon, indeed, are different. They’re far more political, far less pragmatic, than are those in the countryside.

With respect to Mr. Mendenhall’s comments regarding degradation in the war effort in one of the northern provinces, I was there, and talked to our military advisers, whose view is the reverse. And I believe that their view is correct.

It would seem difficult to make a synthesis between these two widely divergent views, until our attention is focused on our purpose in Vietnam, which is to win. And I believe, in military terms, we’re winning. And this wretched government that is there, much as we deplore it, and Mr. Nhu is certainly the figurehead of the things that we deplore, we could still stagger through and win the war if somehow we could be permitted to tolerate their conduct. I feel sure that we could.

Mr. President, may I add a word?

[Rufus C.] Phillips [III] is here, who is just back, too.[note 13] Rufus C. Phillips III was an officer for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Saigon in the 1950s; a U.S. army officer and adviser to the South Vietnam government in the 1960s; director of rural programs for U.S. Operations Mission (USOM) in 1963; and an adviser for the Strategic Hamlet Program in 1963.

Mr. Phillips is the assistant director of our AID [Agency for International Development] mission for rural matters, Mr. President. [Unclear] you may want—

[Unclear]?

I want to just add a word from previous experience. Mr. Mendenhall mentioned that there was more fear and hate now, and not just stagnation of government than there was in, I believe you said, the fall of ‘61, or the summer of ‘61, when General Taylor’s mission was undertaken, thereby implied that there was fear and hate, and I believe there was in Vietnam during that time. Since then, that situation has been raised; I think there’s no question about it. The fear and hate dissipated as the actions of the government became more successful against the Vietcong and in relationship to the people.

Sir, I think there’s a parallel to be drawn here. I don’t know the degree to which the paralysis has—is more acute than it was in the fall of ‘61. But since we were able, in the fall of ‘61, to bring it out again, and to develop strength on the basis which was admittedly weak. I’m sure you remember the assessments of whether or not this situation would bear the weight of increased U.S. assistance. I would suggest that, from what Mr. Mendenhall said, we look at the degree of difference and see whether the thing won’t still bear the weight, in some form or another, to carry through to the winning of this struggle, as General Krulak has suggested.

Well, the action we took, though—The trouble with that analogy is that the action we took in ‘61 was to strengthen our effort against the VC. The source of terror now is the government.[note 14] President Kennedy may have spoken the first phrase in this passage: “Well, the action we took, though.”

No, the analogy I—

If I understand it.

The analogy that I [unclear exchange] —Well, Joe, you will recall telling me when I first arrived, that you felt the same thing then, that the government wasn’t good enough to be developed and to bear the weight of U.S. assistance.[note 15] Mendenhall had been political counselor in the Saigon embassy from 1959 to 1961.

I think we should hear Mr. Phillips [unclear] . . .

You want to come up and—just here—well, you can move your chair up.

Mr. President, I’ve been in Vietnam off and on since 1954. I know many Vietnamese very intimately and they speak to me as a friend. I went out there with the hope that we could win with the Diệm government. I know the President quite well. In fact, of all the Americans in Vietnam present there, I probably had more time with him than anybody. I also know Mr. Nhu well. I also know many of the generals well, simply because I was associated with them in times past, and in the execution of this rural assistance program, which is mainly [in] support of the Strategic Hamlet Program. I have continued to be in very close contact with them.

My assessment of the situation is as follows: Mr. Nhu has completely lost the confidence and respect of the majority of the officer corps and of the civil servants for the government. They do not support this government and would not support it if they had a conceivable alternative. The problem now is that there is a crisis of confidence there.

First, the crisis of confidence in regard to the Americans. Without leveling any criticism at anyone, because we had a policy and we followed it, the fact is that we have been supporting the Diệm government 100 percent until recently, and there is no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, officers in the army, generals, and civil servants are reluctant to stick their neck out, because they know that Nhu will move against them, that he has the power to do so, and they are looking for American leadership. They do not have a leadership of their own now, because if one person emerged, he would be knocked off, and they know this. So they’re looking for indications from us of where we stand and where our principles are. But they do not lack the guts to move, as some people have said. Furthermore—

Well, the United States has made it clear in the last two months by numerous statements from the [State] Department and others that it does not approve of the course of events. That has not been sufficient to ignite a reaction over there.

No, sir. It hasn’t—

More [unclear] is required.

It hasn’t, because we have criticized this government in the past. And this has not been conducive to any action. What they are looking for are some concrete actions which indicate that we do not approve of what this government has done.

Now, if I may say so, I believe that we can take what you might call the middle course of action, which would be a series of steps to show where we stand. This would be a calculated, psychological warfare and political warfare campaign to isolate the Nhus, to discredit them, and to build up confidence in the loyal opposition. And there is a loyal opposition there. These people would like to see the President remain if he could, because he is a symbol to his people and to many of them. But they are unalterably opposed to the Nhus. And in my opinion, if the Nhus remain, we cannot win the war there. I have this on very direct opinion from Secretary Thuận of the government, who is a longtime, personal friend of mine. I have it from many officers in the officer corps who are longtime friends of mine. They have come reluctantly to this conclusion and they are willing to go down on record with us [unclear].[note 16] Phillips may have said “and believe it.”

Now, our problem right now, very frankly, sir, if I may speak up, is that we do not have a campaign manager there. We have an ambassador who is very forceful, but we need someone to guide and operate such a campaign. And I would—

A campaign to do what, Mr. Phillips?

A campaign to isolate and discredit the Nhus, a campaign to show that the United States will not support the government with the Nhus in it, and a campaign to embolden, to encourage the generals and the civilians in the government to begin to form—to take action. And if I may make a recommendation, sir, there is one person in this government who, in my opinion, is qualified to undertake this campaign for the ambassador. His name is General [Edward G.] Lansdale.[note 17] Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale was an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) officer until 1948; U.S. deputy assistant secretary for special operations and later U.S. assistant secretary of defense for special operations from 1957 to 1963; a U.S. Air Force officer until 1963; and a minister to the U.S. embassy in Saigon from 1965 to 1968. He is widely respected in Vietnam; he has the capacity to do this job. I have discussed this with the ambassador. He agrees with me; he believes he should come out. This is the only way that I see that we can win out there.

And I would like to add a caveat, if I may, to the opinions of General Krulak, with all due respect to him. The—our advisers out there have been instructed since they arrived that they are not to discuss politics with their counterparts and they are not to get into delicate matters involving internal affairs. Therefore, it is very difficult for them to know what the opinions of our—of their counterparts are, if they cannot and do not discuss politics with them. Therefore, I believe that this should condition any assessment of the opinions of our advisers.

I might say, Mr. President, I felt the same thing in talking with American military advisers: that they are restricted, apparently, from some directive from MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group] in their political contacts with their Vietnamese counterparts.

Very sensibly.

Well, I think it’s probably to [several speakers attempt to interject] —[unclear] talk about it—the kind of action we might take in this campaign. What are the sort of things you are [unclear] considering?

Well, sir, the first thing I would consider is cutting off aid to Colonel [Lệ Quang] Tung.[note 18] Lê Quang Tung was commander of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Special Forces from 1960 until his assassination in November 1963. The Ngôs used Tung’s Special Forces as a personal Praetorian Guard under the family’s personal control. American funding for these forces went through the CIA. This would hurt them materially, but even—

Now, couldn’t he—

—more psychologically.

Couldn’t he—has—he has a responsib[ility]—doesn’t—don’t the funds for some of the groups outside of his immediate group in Saigon go through him? Wouldn’t he be able to first withdraw some of the border guards and other groups before they would actually get at that hardcore force of his in Saigon? So it might be some months before he would be squeezed in Saigon?

Well, sir, I think that what we can do is go around him in support—supporting border groups is concerned. [President Kennedy acknowledges.] It’s true that he could borrow money from the President, and he would not have—we would not put a direct squeeze on him. But we would put a psychological squeeze on him. This would mean a great deal to the generals. Because they say, “How can you say that [President Kennedy acknowledges] you would support a change of government when you’re still supporting this guy?”

Which generals?

General [Dương Văn] Minh, General [Lệ Văn] Kim, General [Trần Thiện] Khiêm, General [Nguyễn] Khánh.[note 19] Dương Văn Minh, also known as Big Minh, was a leader of the coup against Ngô Đình Diệm in November 1963, and chair of the Military Revolutionary Council from November 1963 to October 1964. Big Minh’s own government was toppled in a coup in late January 1964. He later served as president of the Republic of Vietnam for three days in April 1975. Lt. Gen. Lê Văn Kim was an officer in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), and an organizer of the 1963 coup that overthrew Ngô Đình Diệm. Trần Thiện Khiêm was a military officer in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam; a participant in the 1963 and 1964 coups to overthrow the South Vietnamese government; and prime minister of the Republic of Vietnam from August 1969 to April 1975. Nguyễn Khánh was major general and chief of staff of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in 1960; chair of the Military Revolutionary Council in January, February, and August 1964; and prime minister of South Vietnam from February to August 1964 and September to November 1964.

[Trần Văn] Đôn.[note 20] Gen. Trần Văn Đôn was chief of staff of the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN) and commander of the I-Corps in the early 1960s; a participant in the 1963 South Vietnamese coup against Ngô Đình Diệm; and South Vietnamese minister of defense for the Military Revolutionary Council.

Đôn.

Well, when did they say that?

They said this, sir, in the middle of the exercise to try and mount a coup.[note 21] The reference is to the aborted coup of late August 1963.

[Unclear.] What else do you think of? What are some of the other things you think we might do?

Well, sir, I think we have a Motion Picture Center there—

And this Motion Picture Center is now processing films which are quite laudatory of the Nhus. I believe that we could withdraw support from this center without endangering the war effort.

OK. What else?

I believe we could also require that any new request for aid be received with a signed statement that this aid would not assist in any repression of the Buddhists or any other religion, and it would not materially assist the buildup of the Nhus.

Harder to get that last part. Then what? Any others?

Well, sir, there are several covert actions I think we could take which would certainly split General [Tôn Thất] Đính and Tung, both of whom are at each other’s throat.[note 22] Lt. Gen. Tôn Thất Đính was an officer in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN); head of II Corps from August 1958 to December 1962; head of III Corps from December 1962 to January 1964; a collaborator in the November 1963 coup that overthrew Ngô Đình Diệm; interior minister of South Vietnam from November 1963 to January 1964; head of the military branch of the Cần Lao Party; head of I Corps in 1966; and a South Vietnamese senator from 1967 to 1975. I think we could discredit them.

There are a series of actions of this type which could be taken. [Pause.]

Can I ask a question, Mr. President?

Yes.

Very interesting idea—graduated pressure. What would—what do you think would be the result of this? Would it be a . . . military action against the Nhus? Would it be a military action against the government? Or is it likely to result in a sort of a quiet decision on the part of the Nhus that they’ve had it, and their departure from the country? Because, what I’m thinking about is, what happens if you start this and you get a reaction as expected from those that you’re encouraging. Would it be then [you] get a civil war or do you get a quiet palace revolution, or what do you think you get?

Well, I think what you get is the possible—increasing possibility of splitting Nhu off from the President, which I don’t think we should throw the towel in on. I think there is still a slight chance of this. I think that we may get a reaction from Nhu himself. Not a direct military reaction, but some kind—kind of retaliation to perhaps cutting some of the aid programs himself which we support. However, if he does this, he will lose the support, what support he enjoys, from the officer corps and from the civil service. And by doing—by forcing him into this corner, we force him to take actions which, in turn, loses the government the support of the people that we want to change the government.

Of course, I would think his response would be—considering they’ve got some funds—would be to gradually be withdrawing the funds from the areas which are the furthest from Saigon and lead to a good many charges that Americans are squeezing, and that this is causing an increase in Vietcong strength. It would be a psychological struggle and a gradual retreat toward Saigon, with his charging that we’re losing the war there, and we charging—and then finally . . . he might take off, and then we wouldn’t have much left. In other words, he’d bring it all around. We [unclear]—he would be capable of that.[note 23] President Kennedy may have said, “We have enough evidence that he would be capable of that.” If he [unclear] he might go live in the south of France, and the country would be gone, and the responsibility would be charged to us.

I don’t believe, sir—

[Unclear] he might do.

I don’t believe, sir, that the army would stand still for this for one minute, because too many of them are on the blacklist of the Communists. They know that if Vietnam falls, this is the end of it. So I don’t believe they would stand for it. Separately, we have money out in the provinces now and a lot of it’s our money, and it’s very difficult for him to withdraw, sir. We have enough to run this operation for two or three months. Furthermore, we could take some of the remaining purchase piasters we have and, if necessary, take them out there ourselves in suitcases. That’s quite feasible; that’s how we started the whole operation. We could wind it up that way, too.

You stationed here or in—

No, sir.

Saigon.

In Saigon.

All right.

He’s running the Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam, sir, and he’s done a magnificent job with it. Just thought I’d get a plug in for . . . [Chuckles.]

Mr. President, there’s one point which perhaps needs focus, having to do with the usefulness to you of your military advisers there, in terms of telling you what’s going on. Their advice is useful in telling you whether you have a good investment in the war—whether the war is being won or lost, not whether the political machinations are succeeding or failing. And they tell you that the war is being won; they don’t tell you about palace intrigue. I say this to put it in proper perspective, because Mr. Phillips’s comment might have suggested that I was suggesting to you that you put credence in the political judgments. And he’s quite right: their judgments are military, and if they were to tell you that we’re losing the war, it would certainly alter greatly your reactions to whatever else you do. They say that the war is going well. And this is the key thing that they say in the face of all other activity.

How do you explain this report of the military—the war’s going well?

Well, sir, I explain it in the following fashion. It’s still progressing in the First, Second, and Third Corps. I wish to dispute the General, however, on the Fourth Corps. It is not going well in the Fourth Corps.

What’s that? The Delta?

And I have the direct evidence to prove it, because I’ve just gone through the Fourth Corps.

That’s the south. [Unclear] down there—

Right, sir. That is the Delta. [Unclear exchange.] The Strategic Hamlet Program is being chewed to pieces down there. In Long An province, which is just to the south of Saigon, where a concentrated effort was made in expanding the program, I would say that it was about 60 percent wiped out. We have districts there where 13 out of 15 hamlets were overrun and totally destroyed. We have some 50 kilometers of barbed wire which has been cut up into pieces. We have hamlet militia who have turned their weapons in for fear. And we have—

How long has that been going on?

This has been going on during July and August, sir.

[speaking over Phillips] I mean is this new or was this there? This was supposed to be bad in May and June, wasn’t it?

Well, it grew increasingly bad from June on.

[Unclear] an inaccurate New York Times story, do you remember?

Rufus, do you connect this in any way with the recent political developments or—[note 24] This speaker might be either David Bell or Michael Forrestal.

I do not connect this with the political developments.

No. Right.

This is just a—a military . . .

Exactly.

That’s correct, sir.

This is the hard part of the battle that we’re in and it’s not yet being won, and I think that’s essentially what [unclear].

[speaking to Krulak] What’s your feeling about that?

I think he’s wrong. I—his judgment is put up against [Paul D.] Harkins, and I’ll take Harkins.[note 25] Gen. Paul D. Harkins was deputy chief of staff to Gen. George Patton during World War II; deputy commandant of cadets at West Point from 1946 to 1961; a U.S. Army officer during the Korean War; and commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), from January 1962 to June 1964. The—it’s a tough war, Mr. President, in the Fourth Corps. And it’s, strategically, this is the way it was intended to be—that the spring was to be compressed north and south, and it’s being compressed. The example—they’re transferring forces, actually, from the Second Corps to the Fourth Corps to increase their density there. They’re putting the best forces they can, as they can spare them, into this area.

I would not dispute that they have a wretched problem, largely, because of the maritime nature of the area. It’s completely interspersed with waterways. It’s very hard to get any mobility, excepting by helicopter, and they’re acquiring more and more helicopter mobility. No, the battle isn’t being lost in the Fourth Corps in pure, military terms. [Unclear exchange.]

Is there agreement on the particular statistics [President Kennedy attempts to interject] that Phillips puts forward? That we have lost hamlets?

[Unclear.]

I’m not sure.

What about General [Robert G. K.] Thompson’s view that the Vietcong may be, now, turning their attention to the cities, and that some of the activities in the cities may be directly related to Vietcong [unclear]?[note 26] Sir Robert G. K. Thompson was a British former colonial officer and a counterinsurgency expert. Thompson led the British Advisory Mission (BRIAM) in Vietnam, had consulted with the Kennedy administration on its program, and had played a significant role in defeating the Communist insurgency in Malaya.

I don’t believe, sir, that they’re turning too much activity to the cities, because there’s been too much activity down in the Delta. There’s been a tremendous amount of activity in the Delta. The apparent appearance—and I say apparent—of additional units, in any case, in overwhelming force in at least two provinces, more than ARVN [Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam] or anybody else within. Consequently, the strategic hamlets are not being protected and are being overrun almost wholesale in two provinces.

I would like to add one thing, sir, if I might, and say that I believe that essentially when someone says that this is a military war, and that this is a military judgment, I don’t believe you can say this about this war. This is essentially a political war, because it’s a war for men’s minds. And if we lose the minds of these people—we lose the minds of the officer corps and of the civil servants—we will have lost the war, even though the appearances may look otherwise for some time to come.

Mr. President, since the matter of psychological warfare has been raised, it might be useful to hear from John [M.] Mecklin, briefly.[note 27] John M. Mecklin was a news reporter during World War II; a journalist for Time from 1948 to 1966; public affairs adviser for the U.S. Mission to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in Paris from 1961 to 1962; USIA public affairs officer at the United States Embassy in Saigon, South Vietnam, from 1962 to 1964; and a journalist for Fortune from 1966 to 1968. Mecklin wrote up a more detailed account of his views in “Memorandum from the Counselor for Public Affairs of the Embassy in Vietnam (Mecklin) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow),” in FRUS, 1961–1963, 4: doc. 81.

Oh, yes. Fine. Come up, Mr. Mecklin.

[Unclear], John.

Mr. President, I concur in general with what Mr. Phillips has said. I’d like first to underline his point about the American image. I think that we are in deep trouble with the politically conscious portion of the Vietnamese people. The Voice of America, in the last few weeks, has achieved very nearly unbelievable prestige and influence in Vietnam to the point where [unclear] in hamlets, who are virtually living off—even—and these are rural hamlets—who are listening regularly to the Voice of America to find out what’s going on. There was—there is a widespread feeling of appeal to the United States, that we should do something. I realize that this is unsophisticated and perhaps unreasonable, but that’s how people feel. I think that the United States’ prestige is very much at stake in Vietnam and among a good many third countries who are observing this—these developments, especially the Buddhist countries in the neighborhood. But I think that—but I have no argument, certainly, with General Krulak’s judgments on the state of the war, but I think it’s very nearly a certainty that the military effort will gradually be infected. The officer corps belong to the literate, informed, politically conscious segment of the population. And in the virtual vacuum of leadership that is now set in in Saigon, I can’t see how damage to the officer corps can be avoided over the coming months.

On what to do, I think that what Mr. Phillips has suggested is inadequate. I think that if we’re going to do anything, we have to go whole hog in this situation. I also have been acquainted with Vietnam for a decade, and the [Ngô] family, and I don’t think they will react to [unclear] cuts in aid, especially not limited ones of this sort.[note 28] Mecklin had been a journalist and, in 1962, became counselor for public affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. I don’t even think it would work to suspend all aid. We’d—there would be a period of months of near chaos, in my opinion. And eventually, of course, the government would fall, but we have no idea of what we’d get. We’d be drawing to a three-card flush.

I agree with that.

I think that if it is our—the judgment of our government that we must take action against the GVN [Government of (South) Vietnam], we have to decide first on whether or not we’re prepared to use American combat forces. And I don’t think anything short of this readiness will be successful. But I think that we should start out by requiring or working toward the removal of the whole government, including President Diệm, and not only the Nhus, because I think if this government has been a failure, the greater blame rests on President Diệm. The Nhus, in many ways, are a symptom of the malaise rather than the cause of. Perhaps if we did something like that, we could then compromise, give Diệm a way out, allow him to stay, and have the Nhus gone. But in any case, I don’t see how we could hope or take the kind of action that a power like the United States should undertake without facing this first decision of what we’re going to do when everything else fails. Because in my opinion, the chances are pretty good that everything else will fail.

When you talk about American combat troops, what do you—what are you thinking about?

Well, I think by the time we suspend aid, for example, there will be reprisals and actions against American nationals, the advisory effort will collapse, troops will be needed simply to protect American lives. I think that the GVN is not likely to surrender unless they are under such direct pressure as we applied in Lebanon in 1958—that is, the immediate presence of American power. And then I think the chances of things coming apart thereafter are so great, we might get a dog as a military leader afterward, who would be even less effective than what we have now. We have no idea of what we would get. And then we should—I think the area is so important to the United States that we should be prepared to use our troops to maintain the effort against the VC.

Mr. President, it seems to me that we need to digest these reports. I don’t think we have to make the—ask you for a decision this morning. But it [Unclear] matter, and that is that back at the end of May, or the 1st of June, it was not anyone’s judgment that I’m aware of that this war could not be won with the present government. Well, now, what has happened? I think we need to examine what has happened during July and August, precipitating this problem. What are the actions that have been taken and what are the repressive measures which have changed—which turned the situation around, because there’s been many. And see whether or not those actions can be reversed in situations—any way brought back to normal. I think it’s the general view that Nhu has been very heavily responsible for the deterioration of the situation—the support in the cities [unclear]. It is discouraging to find that our ambassador finds it very difficult to come—has little contact with Diệm on these central issues. Diệm is a worldly man who can evade and avoid, and he’s been doing that thus far pretty well. But I think we ought to digest these more recent reports and come to you with a recommendation. It seems to me that at the end of June, that we all were encouraged to think that this war was going well and that the thing was under—was moving positively. Now, we’ve examined what has happened since, because the . . . we were winning with the present government.

I’d like to—

Mr. Secretary, I think I should say that [William J.] Bill Jorden, who was sent out there.[note 29] William J. “Bill” Jorden was a New York Times reporter from 1952 to 1961; a State Department staffer during the 1960s; and U.S. ambassador to Panama from 1974 to 1978. He came back with [unclear], believing that sooner or later there would be an outburst. There’s been an undercurrent of warnings that we’ve had of a fall [unclear] that just wouldn’t get through. Now, of course, no one foresaw such heavy-handed [unclear] as the Nhus handed to the Buddhists, or the type of action which he’s taken, but I think the Secretary [President Kennedy attempts to interject] probably wasn’t familiar with a good many of the statements which came out of Vietnam, of which I was familiar. [Unclear] [an unidentified speaker attempts to interject] sent out there on several occasions to not only—he came back in March and thought that—he believed that there would be a [unclear] before the end of the year.

I’d like to point out—[note 30] The memorandum of this conversation indicates that at this point in the meeting, McCone began to read from a Special National Intelligence Estimate [SNIE]. See SNIE 53-2-63, “The Situation in South Vietnam,” 10 July 1963, in FRUS, 1961–1963, 3: doc. 217 .

That said, that the relations between the Diệm-Nhu regime and the [unclear]—and the public, and also the relations between the regime and the United States, are so disturbed that victory over the Vietcong is doubtful, if not impossible. It did not indicate that this—these difficulties between the regime and the United States could not be repaired, but it did at that time forecast that we were heading for, [unclear] severe difficulties. I’d also like to add that—

—does not take as ominous a view of the situation as expressed here. Now, we feel that there will be a growing understanding between the military and the Diệm regime. We think the military are critical of Nhu, but the feeling isn’t so great as to prevent working—satisfactory working arrangements between the regime and the military. And finally, it is the statement’s opinion that the cutting off of aid would be—have very, very serious consequences from the standpoint of the basic objective that we’re facing, and that is defeating Communism.

Now, may I, further, may I just express appreciation to General Krulak and Mr. Mendenhall, Mr. Phillips, excuse me— [Unclear exchange.] ’Cause you’re a very good reporter. I think it’s very helpful to us. I appreciate the fact that you made the recommendations in your report in very specific language and therefore give us an advantage. We want to—we’ve got to have another meeting about this matter over the next 24 hours [unclear] tomorrow. But two or three things—I think I’d like to see what we—in this aid . . . I think we ought to have a program. I talked to you last week about it, Roger [Hilsman], what—so we’d know what we could do and what the steps would be [unclear]—

Preliminary steps.

—if we decided to go up the aid route. Several recommendations . . .

We ought to have the program in hand so that we know what we’re talking about, so would you have that—

Yes, sir, I’ve had several days of work on it. This is still—

[Unclear] with the AID people and with the CIA people?

These people just arrived back, sir.

All right. Well, how about talking to them and the CIA?

We certainly will, sir.

I suggest maybe everybody take a look at that in the next 24 hours so that when we discuss this we’ll all know what we’re talking about.

The other thing is, I think that we ought to try to discourage this government here—this is really the first time this has happened in . . . from . . . State putting out one line about the Nhus must go, the Pentagon putting out this is the way to chaos. There is this very strong difference of opinion. It’s out in the Saigon area. It’s reflected in a lot of the newspaper stories out of there—this story here . . . yesterday’s [New York] Journal-American: “Gloom shrouds the Pentagon planners as they try to fight the shambles against the rugged war that was being won. And the military has every right to be angry with the Diệm government [unclear] the unbelievably inept American diplomacy and [unclear],” et cetera, et cetera. “The administration’s clumsy intervention in the Vietnam hothouse.”

I know that there is some view of that in the Pentagon. There’s also a view in the State Department that the military are wrong about the fate of the war, which, to me, it ought to be fought out here and not try to be fought out in the press, at least till we know a little more about it. Everybody can write about it afterwards, and who was right and wrong, but I think we ought to try to keep it concentrated here. So I think, in regard to getting rid of the Diệms and Nhus, it was unsuccessful for the last two weeks, now we’ve got another stage. If there’s anybody who has any ideas, we want to hear them. There’s no sense in just complaining about it [unclear] be passed to the—out to Saigon.

Yesterday evening, a paper, a United States security officer was describing, at a time when some trucks with our symbol was being used to arrest some students, the United States security officer pointing to some foreign newspaperman says, “Take a picture of that. I—we want them to see that back in the States.”[note 31] In a story on the South Vietnamese government’s arrest of high school students, the Washington Post reported that “as police loaded them into the trucks, a U.S. aid mission official pointed to the U.S. hands-across-the-sea emblem and called to photographers: ‘Get pictures of that emblem. I want the people back in the States to see that.’” See Peter Arnett, “Viet Police Subdue Schoolboys,” Washington Post, 10 September 1963. I don’t know whether a United States security officer—what term that covers, whether it’s military or diplomatic, Voice of America, or AID, but I mean, that isn’t a very good way to have the government carry out its policies. So if we could try to get that very clear on both sides and not . . . then I think that . . .

I’d like to have us think about congressional action. We don’t want the Congress to cut off the funds if they let Cabot—Ambassador Lodge has said that congressional action really is what seems to concern them most, [Nolting attempts to interject] so that we would want to have a resolution put in by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which would express the alarm, concern, revulsion of the United States government about religious and political repression.

I made a report on that, sir. I think the problem is going to be to stop it rather than start it. Senator [Frank F.] Church [D–Idaho] has circulated a letter to all members of the Senate with a proposed resolution.[note 32] Frank F. Church was a U.S. senator [D–Idaho] from January 1957 to January 1981. Senator Church had been discussing the idea of a Senate resolution that proposed the curtailment of U.S. aid in the absence of GVN reforms. Church introduced his resolution on 12 September 1963. AP, “22 Senators Call for Viet Reforms or End of Aid,” Washington Post, 13 September 1963.

It was a Sense-of-the-Senate resolution.

A Sense-of-the-Senate that . . . . Now, he’s willing to do anything we want to, in terms of wording. And it could be worded so that, you know, it might be helpful to Lodge rather than hurtful. And then the Sense-of-the-Senate that this government should do some things that may possibly [unclear]—

I’d like to get a copy—I think we all ought to get a—we ought to get a copy of his resolution today. We’d better talk to [Frederick G.] Fred Dutton and [Lawrence F. “Larry”] O’Brien [Jr.] so we—we don’t want him to offer it, then have it beaten.[note 33] Frederick G. “Fred” Dutton was executive secretary to Governor Edmund G. “Pat” Brown from 1959 to 1960; deputy national chair of Citizens for Kennedy-Johnson in 1960; special assistant to the president in 1961; U.S. assistant secretary of state for congressional relations from 1961 to 1964; and a campaign adviser to Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy in 1968. Lawrence F. “Larry” O’Brien Jr. was special assistant to the president for congressional affairs from 1961 to 1965; U.S. postmaster general from November 1965 to April 1968; and chair of the Democratic National Committee from 1968 to 1969 and 1970 to 1972. He and Carl [B. Albert] [D–Oklahoma], which some of the . . . in order to . . . some senator would attack on the grounds that it’s going to weaken the war militarily.[note 34] Carl B. Albert was a U.S. representative [D–Oklahoma] from January 1947 to January 1977; House Democratic Whip from January 1955 to January 1962; House Majority Leader from January 1962 to January 1971; and Speaker of the House from January 1971 to January 1977. Seems to me we ought to make a judgment ourselves. We can always beat it, if we have to, probably, and we’d get Frank Church, maybe, to come off it, make it into a speech. But we ought to decide here whether it’s advantageous to us. In that case, it ought to have the support of Senator [Michael J. “Mike”] Mansfield [D–Montana], and, if possible, Senator [Everett M.] Dirksen [R–Illinois], and pass nearly unanimously, and we ought to tell them we think it’s to our advantage.[note 35] Michael J. “Mike” Mansfield was a U.S. senator [D–Montana] from January 1953 to January 1977, and Senate Majority Leader from January 1961 to January 1977. Everett M. Dirksen was a U.S. senator [R–Illinois] from January 1951 until his death in September 1969, and Senate Minority Leader from January 1959 to September 1969. So I’d like to have it—us be prepared to—I think everybody ought to have that. If we meet tomorrow, we ought to have a judgment as to whether this is in our interest. Because we don’t want it to be offered and beaten. That just would—that would really cut our credit with Saigon. [Unclear.] All right, we’ll meet tomorrow.

Mr. President, do you want to plan some early action on the question of keeping Madame Nhu out of the U.S.?[note 36] Trần Lệ Xuân, also known as Madame Nhu, was the wife of South Vietnamese political adviser Ngô Đình Nhu, and the first lady of South Vietnam from October 1955 to November 1963.

Well, I think we ought to write the letter. I don’t think we can keep her out by passport.

No. She’s already got a visa issued in ‘62. It’s good till ‘64.

No. That’s right. I don’t think you play with the passport. We ought to write to them direct, as part of the—I [unclear] we’re going to draft a letter to Diệm.

We are working on it.

In which we will discuss our whole concern. I think this congressional resolution is worth . . . ought to give some thought to—but I think we ought to take—we want make sure it’s successful rather than beaten.

Mr. President, [President Kennedy acknowledges] may I be permitted one last comment here?

Sure.

This is very much a tactical situation out there, sir. And I do not believe that all the shots can be called from back here. I believe that if you could lay down the broad outlines of the policy and give the discretion to the ambassador, he will do the job.

All right. Thank you. I appreciate the suggestion.