Hello?

Mr. President, Mr. [Henry A.] Kissinger calling.[note 1] Henry A. Kissinger was U.S. national security adviser from January 1969 to November 1975, and U.S. secretary of state from September 1973 to January 1977.

Yeah.

The President’s on the line.

Hello.

Mr. President?

Hi, Henry.

[Clears throat.] I’ve talked to [John B.] Connally, and we’ll send him a copy [of President Nixon’s speech on Vietnam] first thing in the morning.[note 2] John B. Connally was secretary of the U.S. Navy from January 1961 to December 1961; Democratic governor of Texas from January 1963 to January 1969, during which time he was wounded in the assassination of President Kennedy; and U.S. secretary of the treasury from February 1971 to May 1972. Connally was one of Lyndon Johnson’s closest advisers, joining Johnson’s congressional staff in 1938 and managing Johnson’s campaign for the 1960 Democratic presidential nomination.

[Unclear] fine.

There’s been—and I’ve also shown a copy to [U. Alexis] Alex Johnson [President Nixon acknowledges throughout] so we can say we’ve run it past [the Department of] State.[note 3] U. Alexis “Alex” Johnson was a senior career foreign service officer; U.S. ambassador to Thailand from 1958 to 1961; U.S. deputy under secretary of state for political affairs from 1961 to 1964 and 1965 to 1966; U.S. deputy ambassador to Vietnam from 1964 to 1965; U.S. ambassador to Japan from 1966 to 1969; U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs from 1969 to 1973; and chief U.S. delegate to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks from 1973 to 1977. He was here drafting the cables to be sent out tomorrow.

Right.

And [President Nixon acknowledges] the only problem we have is that [Nguyễn Văn] Thiệu has come in.[note 4] Nguyễn Văn Thiệu was president of South Vietnam from June 1965 to April 1975. He’s seen the text, and he agrees with everything, except where we talk about the election, we say, “After consultation with President Thiệu, I now make the following proposals.” He feels since it’s his election [President Nixon acknowledges] it should be phrased in a way which says something like, “President Thiệu has informed me that he will be making the following proposals.”[note 5] The proposal that Kissinger refers to would have President Thiệu step down one month before South Vietnamese elections, which would be open to peaceful participation by the Communists.

Good. That’s the way it should be.

And I don’t see—

Absolutely. Oh, sure, that’s the way it should be.

So with your approval, we will rephrase it that way.

[speaking over Kissinger] Oh, of course, it should be that way. That’s the way it should have been in the first instance. After all, it is his proposal. We can’t tell him what to do.

That’s right. That’s right. That’s what I think.

“He’s informed me that he will make the following proposals.” Exactly.

And that makes it sound really, [President Nixon acknowledges] for our peacemaking, even better.

[laughing] Sure!

In fact, he has sent us a copy of his speech, and it’s all ours. The only trouble is—there’s one ambiguity in there. It almost sounds as if he’s going to resign altogether. [President Nixon acknowledges.] And I’ve got a cable out to [Ellsworth F.] Bunker to make sure that we know what his intentions are, because—so that we know it for our backgrounder.[note 6] Ellsworth F. Bunker was U.S. ambassador to Argentina from March 1951 to March 1952; U.S. ambassador to Italy from May 1952 to April 1953; U.S. ambassador to India from November 1956 to March 1961; U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States from 1964 to 1965; U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam from April 1967 to May 1973; and recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1963 and 1967.

Well . . . Yeah, he mustn’t—he shouldn’t do that.

But I don’t really think—I better put in the cable, “Our frank opinion is that he should not foreclose running in the election.”

No. Oh, no.

Don’t you think?

Of course!

Yes.

Why should he foreclose running? For crying out loud.

That’s it. That looks like—

Looks like he’s—may be abandoning the ship.

Right.

No, sir. I think he’s indicated he will, and we’ll say, “Is he going to run? Well, that’s a decision he’ll have to make at that time.”

Yes, exactly.

That’s right, for him to decide.

Right.

Well, that’s a very salutary change.

I think that’s right.

Good. Good.

I’ll move ahead on this.

Fine, fine. I think it’s in good shape. Did Alex like it? Was he all right?

Oh, yes. Well, he was a little stunned, but—

Was he? [Laughs.] Yeah.

Although—

Well—

[William P.] Bill [Rogers] had told him that he had been informed, which is in this case absolutely true.[note 7] William P. “Bill” Rogers was U.S. deputy attorney general from January 1953 to October 1957; U.S. attorney general from October 1957 to January 1961; and U.S. secretary of state from January 1969 to September 1973.

Of course. Well, fine, fine.

Right, Mr. President.

Well, it’s [clears throat] —it’ll stun a lot of people when—

Our October 11th plan is so complicated that—No, we have to put in one other sentence in the speech, namely that there is a two-stage aspect to our October 11th proposal. We’ve simplified it. We took it out this afternoon. [President Nixon acknowledges.] But we don’t want people to say it’s a misleading propo—it’s a misleading speech.

Yeah.

So if it can stand that one sentence—

Sure it can.

—then we can put it back in. Because then we can say we’ve been perfectly honest.

It’s a two-stage—

That in order to speed nego—progress, we’ve proposed that it can be completed in two stages.

Right.

That’s all we have to say.

Fine.

Then I can explain what the two stages are.

[speaking under Kissinger] Good, good, good. No problem.[note 8] The final speech made no mention of a two-stage process. Richard M. Nixon, "Address to the Nation Making Public a Plan for Peace in Vietnam,” 25 January 1972, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, American Presidency Project, University of California–Santa Barbara.

Right, Mr. President.

All right, Henry. Thank you.

[Unclear.]