Dr. [Henry A.] Kissinger?[note 1] Henry A. Kissinger was U.S. national security adviser from January 1969 to November 1975, and U.S. secretary of state from September 1973 to January 1977.

Yes.

Secretary [William P. “Bill”] Rogers.[note 2] William P. “Bill” Rogers was U.S. deputy attorney general from January 1953 to October 1957; U.S. attorney general from October 1957 to January 1961; and U.S. secretary of state from January 1969 to September 1973.

Right.

There you are.

Hello?

Hello, Bill?

Yeah, Henry.

Hi, I’m sitting here with the President. I wanted to tell you, first of all, that I thought that, really, you were terrif—gave a terrific boost to us when you talked to the leaders.[note 3] According to the Presidential Daily Diary, before delivering his speech President Nixon and his aides briefed congressional leaders of both parties in the White House Cabinet Room.

Is he there?

Yeah, he’s there.

Let me [unclear].

Yeah, he wants to talk to you [Rogers acknowledges] to find out what you thought of the [unclear]. OK, I just wanted to say that.

Good. Well, thank you.

OK.

Bill?

Hi, Mr. President. I [unclear]—

Well, I just thought you should know that Henry and [John A.] Scali and the guys that were—and [Ronald L. “Ron”] Ziegler—the guys who were there thought you [laughing] did a hell of a job—[note 4] John A. Scali was an ABC News diplomatic correspondent from 1961 to April 1971; special consultant to the president from April 1971 to February 1973; and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from February 1973 to June 1975. Ronald L. “Ron” Ziegler was White House press secretary from January 1969 to August 1974.

Well, I—

—in putting those sons of bitches, you know . . . well, you know.

You were great. I’m here at the—with the Prime Minister of the Netherlands [Barend Willem Biesheuvel], you know, having—[note 5] Barend Willem Biesheuvel was deputy prime minister of the Netherlands from July 1963 to April 1967, and prime minister of the Netherlands from July 1971 to May 1973.

Yeah, we’re having—you and I—aren’t you coming tomorrow? Or are you not coming?

I’m at—well, I don’t know, I’m having a [unclear]. But [Michael J.] Mike Mansfield [D–Montana] is here.[note 6] Michael J. “Mike” Mansfield was a U.S. senator [D–Montana] from January 1953 to January 1977, and Senate Majority Leader from January 1961 to January 1977. I thought you’d be interested to know what Mike said.

Well, Mike is a wonderful guy, you know.

We watched it—

He’s a decent man.

Yeah, we all watched it together. And Mike said to me—I said, “What’d you think of it, Mike?" He said, “Well, it was a great step forward,” and then he said, “I don’t think you can go any farther than you’ve gone.”

Did he?

Yeah. Now, it seems to me that’s really what we were trying to prove.

Well, that’s great, Bill. Now, if you can, [clears throat] frankly, you can do it better than—you know, they consider me to be a warmonger, and probably Henry and a few other people, but, by golly, they think that you really are, you know, trying to, you know, [Rogers acknowledges] and, I mean, they know you’re tough, but they think that you’re trying to do it. But is—and Mike really said that?

Yeah, he said, “I don’t think you can go any farther than you’ve gone.” Now, I said—to me, that was a very significant thing.

Yeah.

Because, you know, he’s very dovish. And . . .

I know.

And to have him say that we couldn’t go any farther than we’ve gone I thought was great. [President Nixon acknowledges.] I hope he says it publicly.

Well, whether he does or doesn’t, that’s a political problem.

The people here, we all watched it before dinner, and everyone was very complimentary. And the Prime Minister of the Netherlands thought your delivery was great. He has a television show every week, and he said, “The President was terrific.”

[Chuckles.] Oh, well. Yeah.

So you gave it very well indeed. Well, I don’t know, I think that you proved a point. I don’t know what else we could do.

What the hell else can we offer, Bill? We’ve offered—the poor guy’s [Nguyễn Văn Thiệu’s] going to resign.[note 7] Nguyễn Văn Thiệu was president of South Vietnam from June 1965 to April 1975.

Yeah.

Jesus Christ. I mean, you know, we haven’t said whether he’ll run again, but that’s another thing. [Rogers acknowledges throughout.] But the point is, he’s going to resign a month before, caretaker government, and all the rest. It’s really—we’ve gone pretty far.

Well, I think it’ll have a great effect, and I think—I don’t know what the American people could expect us to do. I mean, we’ve done every goddamn thing you can think of.

Well, we’ve really offered everything we really can.

Yeah. I also think, Mr. President, that if we have to take some stronger action to meet this [unclear]—

The offensive.

—we can go ahead and do it.

Yeah.

I—

Well, we—incidentally, one thing I wanted to check with you, and we will have a meeting—I just talked to Henry about this point, and I thought that [unclear] I want your judgment on it: It seems to me that you, [Melvin R. “Mel”] Laird, [Thomas H.] Moorer, [Richard M. “Dick”] Helms, Kissinger, and I should sit down and have a little chat about what we do.[note 8] Melvin R. “Mel” Laird was a U.S. representative [R–Wisconsin] from January 1953 to January 1969; chair of the House Republican Conference from January 1965 to January 1969; U.S. secretary of defense from January 1969 to January 1973; and White House domestic affairs adviser from May 1973 to January 1974. Adm. Thomas H. Moorer was chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1970 to June 1974. Richard M. “Dick” Helms was deputy director for plans at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from February 1962 to April 1965; deputy director of the CIA from April 1965 to June 1966; and director of the CIA from July 1966 to February 1973.

Now, on the offensive thing, my feeling at the moment is that we should not do anything until they strike. Or do you think we should do something to stop the strike? I don’t know, I—

Well, I think we ought to listen to the military. If we could take some action that would be effective—the trouble that I have with the military is that they [unclear]—

[speaking over Rogers] The bastards always come up with a five-day strike and, shit, that don’t do anything.

Then nothing happens. [President Nixon acknowledges.] Then they say the weather is no good or some goddamn thing. But I think that—I think we ought to have a meeting.

All right.

I think that we ought—

When do you think we should have it? Should we have it tomorrow? Or maybe wait till Thursday after—well, maybe to see what the other side’s reaction is.

Yeah. Well, I think we ought to have it pretty soon, because I—reading that telegram from [Creighton W.] Abrams [Jr.], it seems to me that we ought to be sure that what you decide is just the right thing.[note 9] Gen. Creighton W. Abrams Jr. was assistant deputy chief of staff and director of operations at the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations from 1962 to 1963; commander of V Corps in Europe from 1963 to 1964; vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army from 1964 to 1967; deputy commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from May 1967 to June 1968; and commander of MACV from June 1968 to June 1972. And if we have to take action ahead of time to stop it—

Then we go—

—then we should take it.

We should take it and go on and be very positive about it.

That’s right.

We’re doing this to protect Americans and—

We ought to say why we’re doing it, and, I mean, I’m all for taking action. The only thing that gets me unhappy is that when the military tells us all these things [unclear] so successful—

And then they—

—and they don’t, you know—

Mmm, couldn’t agree more.

[speaking over President Nixon] We’ll take a hell of a lot of flak if they don’t succeed.

I don’t want to drop one stinking bomb unless it’s going to do some good.

That’s right. But on the other hand if we just—if we could take some action that would prevent this from happening, then I’d be all for it.

Well, listen—

But I think it’s a good idea.

Well, listen, tomorrow is Wednesday, so I do the leaders tomorrow and then . . . you know, it might be a good idea, I think, if you dropped in to this meeting tomorrow for the first 15 minutes or so, just to get everybody steamed up. [Rogers acknowledges.] I mean, I want them to be for us, so drop by. But in the meantime, let’s withhold the [unclear]—and then for this meeting, let’s have the meeting, maybe after [William J.] Porter has presented it in Paris, right?[note 10] William J. Porter was a career Foreign Service officer; U.S. ambassador to Algeria from November 1962 to July 1965; U.S. ambassador to South Korea from August 1967 to August 1971; head of the U.S. delegation at the Paris Peace Talks from 1971 to 1973; U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs from February 1973 to February 1974; and U.S. ambassador to Canada from March 1974 to December 1975.

Yeah, that’s a good idea.

And then we all sit down and get a contingency plan. But believe me, we’re not going to bomb anybody unless it’s going to do some good.

That’s right. Well, I think what we ought to do is be sure that if something goes wrong that the military can’t blame us.

Oh yes, like that damn story in the [Washington] Post this morning.

[Unclear.] Well, you should be very pleased with this broadcast tonight.

You feel all right, do you?

I thought it was great.

[laughing] OK, Bill.

Bye, Mr. President.

Thank you.

Bye.