Hello?

Dr. [Henry A.] Kissinger.[note 3] Henry A. Kissinger was U.S. national security adviser from January 1969 to November 1975, and U.S. secretary of state from September 1973 to January 1977.

Mr. President?

Hello, Henry. I wonder if you have any ideas about the Irish thing, as to whether we ought to say anything. You noticed they burned down the embassy in Dublin today.

I would stay out of it.

Right.

I would—

That’s what I—that’s my feeling, too.

I really think I—you will—

It’s the agony of Ireland and England. It’s gone on for 500 years, and I don’t think it would do a goddamn—

You’ll infuriate the British. I mean, you’d pay a price with the British beyond anything.

Well, you—the point is, of course, all the Irish fanatics here in this country are—

You couldn’t say enough to satisfy the Irish here and be responsible.

All you can do is just stay out of it. Internal problem, right?

That’s—as long as we possibly can.

I—that’s my feeling. OK. What’d you think on the [Edmund S.] Muskie [D–Maine] thing?[note 4] Edmund S. Muskie was a U.S. senator [D–Maine] from January 1959 to May 1980, and Hubert H. Humphrey Jr.‘s running mate in 1968. As the 1972 Democratic presidential front-runner, Muskie had criticized President Nixon’s public position on Vietnam as an attempt “to win at the conference table what we have not won and cannot win on the battlefield.” James M. Naughton, “Muskie Peace Plan Bids Saigon Settle or Lose Aid,” New York Times, 3 February 1972. [Ronald L. “Ron”] Ziegler gave him a little shot.[note 5] Ronald L. “Ron” Ziegler was White House press secretary from January 1969 to August 1974. Ziegler had said, “Now is not the time for partisanship to be put above the objective of peace.” James M. Naughton, “Muskie Peace Plan Bids Saigon Settle or Lose Aid,” New York Times, 3 February 1972. Thought that was all right.

That’s right. Just on a factual basis—

Well—

—I talked to [Melvin R. “Mel”] Laird, and he’s going to say something tomorrow.[note 6] Melvin R. “Mel” Laird was a U.S. representative [R–Wisconsin] from January 1953 to January 1969; chair of the House Republican Conference from January 1965 to January 1969; U.S. secretary of defense from January 1969 to January 1973; and White House domestic affairs adviser from May 1973 to January 1974.

Is he? Good for him.

[Unclear.]

What’s he going to say?

Oh, that he hurried to turn things off before Hanoi did. Actually, the other side, you know, made a little switch today. They didn’t make an acceptable proposition.

I know. They did something, I know.

But at least they responded.

This is a terrible, terrible thing this man has done. You know, this is a—good God, he’s a candidate for president. And he tells the enemy, in effect, “Wait for me and you’ll get a better deal.”[note 7] Like most opponents of the war (and large majorities of American voters polled in the early 1970s) Muskie advocated setting a date for bringing the last American troops home in return for the release of American prisoners of war. James M. Naughton, “Muskie Peace Plan Bids Saigon Settle or Lose Aid,” New York Times, 3 February 1972.

Exactly.

For Chr—if I’d done that, the New York Times and the Washington Post would’ve ridden me out on a goddamn rail.[note 8] During the 1968 presidential campaign, President Lyndon B. Johnson had called on all candidates to refrain from offering Hanoi a better deal than his in Paris. In the final days of the campaign, he learned that some Republicans were doing just that in Nixon’s name. Ken Hughes, Chasing Shadows: The Nixon Tapes, the Chennault Affair, and the Origins of Watergate (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014), 4–56.

It’s an outrage. It is a—and it’s a total mis—distortion of our position—[note 9] Contrary to Muskie’s charge, Nixon and Kissinger were not trying to get at the conference table what they could not win on the battlefield. Instead, they sought a “decent interval” between their final withdrawal of American troops and North Vietnam’s final conquest of the South. Privately, they assured Hanoi’s sponsors in Moscow and Beijing that if North Vietnam waited a year or two before taking over the South, President Nixon would not intervene. Jeffrey Kimball, The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy, Modern War Studies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 186–93; Jussi Hanhimäki, “Some More ‘Smoking Guns’? The Vietnam War and Kissinger’s Summitry with Moscow and Beijing, 1971–1973,” Passport (December 2001); Ken Hughes, Fatal Politics: The Nixon Tapes, the Vietnam War, and the Casualties of Reelection (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2015).

You bet.

—on top of everything else.

Yeah. I hope that some of the [Kissinger attempts to interject] the boys in the Congress said a few things—

I think the Congress—we ought to get some shot in the Congress.

Well, we—they’ve done it. But nobody carried it, you see, of course, that’s the problem.

And [H. R.] Bob [Haldeman] tells me that [Patrick J. “Pat”] Buchanan has written something for [William P. “Bill”] Rogers.[note 10] H. R. “Bob” Haldeman was White House chief of staff from January 1969 to April 1973. Patrick J. “Pat” Buchanan was special assistant to the president for media analysis and speechwriting from January 1969 to August 1974. William P. “Bill” Rogers was U.S. deputy attorney general from January 1953 to October 1957; U.S. attorney general from October 1957 to January 1961; and U.S. secretary of state from January 1969 to September 1973.

Yes, right. Which he will do tomorrow, I hope. Which I think maybe he should tomorrow [Kissinger attempts to interject] in the event this story—depends on how big this story plays.

I think Rogers should do it anyway.

Yeah.

So that he’s positioned on this thing.

Right. That’s right, so that we—

And also so that the others—

That’s right, we should be positioned. Goddamn it, we can’t have State Department going running off on this goddamn thing.

That’s right. And I think we should have Muskie worry. One of the reasons—

I know.

—we get attacked so much is because it’s too safe to attack us. [President Nixon acknowledges.] There aren’t enough people hitting back.

That’s right. Well, that’s why I, you know, got Haldeman and Ziegler over and got the Ziegler line out. And I said—and I dictated, you know, the whole thing for Buchanan.

OK.

I dictated the eight points. I said, “Now, goddamn it, take them on.”

Good, good.

So we’ll get something out.

Good. Well, that’s—

But the point is that, with all of the things that are, plus with what we’re doing—good heavens, the support that we have, and [Michael J. “Mike”] Mansfield [D–Montana] withdrawing his amendment—for Christ’s sakes, this is the time to be strong.[note 11] Michael J. “Mike” Mansfield was a U.S. senator [D–Montana] from January 1953 to January 1977, and Senate Majority Leader from January 1961 to January 1977. The President was mistaken. Senate Majority Leader Mansfield continued to urge Congress to pass an amendment that would force Nixon to withdraw the last troops from Vietnam within six months of passage, provided that Hanoi released American POWs. “Mansfield Pushes Own Pullout Plan,” Washington Post, 30 January 1972. And not to back away.

Well, and it serves no—if he had—it serves no conceivable purpose. Of course, I think he’s hurting himself with it.

Well, we never—we always [laughing] assume that, you know, but we never know.

I think the people [unclear]. I mean, what is it—I mean, first of all, his statement of opposition is just totally wrong.

Sure.

But secondly, even if it weren’t, before the other side had flatly turned it down, for him to turn it down and make arguments the other side hasn’t even made [President Nixon acknowledges] is an outrage.

That’s right.

But it shows how weak and foolish he is.

That’s right. Well, in the morning, as I told you, eight o’clock. And then we’ll put you on very soon with Mansfield, and you can tell him about [Andrei] Gromyko and your Zhou Enlai thing, you know.[note 12] Andrei Gromyko was Soviet minister for foreign affairs from February 1957 to July 1985. Zhou Enlai was premier of the People’s Republic of China from October 1949 to January 1976. President Nixon had breakfast with Senate Majority Leader Mansfield on 3 February 1972. Kissinger joined them. That’ll keep him—because he has said, not just because of our offer, but that’s one of the reasons, but for other—that and other reasons, he’s not resubmitting the amendment.[note 13] In fact, Mansfield did not withdraw his amendment calling for American withdrawal from Vietnam within six months. Well, that’s all right, we won’t mention that. [Kissinger acknowledges.] We’ll just let that go.

Right, right, right.

OK.

Right.

Let’s hope the Irish thing goes—tomorrow we’ll see [Kenneth B.] Keating and [Ellsworth F.] Bunker, right?[note 14] Kenneth B. Keating was a U.S. representative [R–New York] from January 1947 to January 1959; a U.S. senator [R–New York] from January 1959 to January 1965; U.S. ambassador to India from 1969 to 1972; and U.S. ambassador to Israel from August 1973 to May 1975. Ellsworth F. Bunker was U.S. ambassador to Argentina from March 1951 to March 1952; U.S. ambassador to Italy from May 1952 to April 1953; U.S. ambassador to India from November 1956 to March 1961; U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States from 1964 to 1965; U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam from April 1967 to May 1973; and recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1963 and 1967.

Right. Now, I talked to Keating today. [President Nixon acknowledges.] And I gave him a rather full picture of some of the moves we had made, so that he’d—

Yeah.

—stop sniping at us.[note 15] Nixon and Kissinger regarded Keating as excessively pro-Indian, reflecting the supposed bias of officials in the State Department. They thought that his official reports of atrocities by the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan (what became the independent nation of Bangladesh) over the previous year had been exaggerated and complicated U.S. diplomacy in the region. They assumed that Keating had leaked material from these reports to the media. The White House was instead focused on India’s recent alignment with the Soviet Union and its complicity in the dismemberment of an independent nation (Pakistan) during the December 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. This, in their view, had the effect of weakening the People’s Republic of China geopolitically and undermining U.S. efforts to improve relations with the PRC. Nixon’s public position toward the subcontinent was that the United States was not anti-Indian but anti-war and pro-peace.

[Chuckles.]

I also told him if I talked to [Lakshmi Kant] Jha, I’ll send him either a back channel or—[note 16] Lakshmi Kant “L. K.” Jha was governor of the Reserve Bank of India from July 1967 to May 1970; Indian ambassador to the United States from 1970 to 1973; and governor of Jammu and Kashmir state in India from July 1973 to February 1981.

Right.

—a letter. Now, you might just confirm this with him.

Right.

That we’ll be in touch directly. He’s [Keating’s] being egged on at [the] State [Department] to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee, and he will.

Yeah.

If you could give him a word that he really should protect the credibility of the White House, it would help—

Right.

—before we get these [Jack N.] Anderson papers.[note 17] Jack N. Anderson was an investigative journalist and syndicated columnist. Anderson obtained and published excerpts from highly classified government documents relating to U.S. policy toward India and Pakistan. These included material from the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), chaired by Henry Kissinger, which revealed a U.S. policy tilt toward Pakistan.

Right.

Because the—if we are attacked, we have to respond with things which will hurt our relations with India. And that he’ll understand.

[softly] Oh, yes. [Pause.] OK.

But he’s in a pretty—he’s in a friendly mood.

He’s a good man. He’s for us, you know, politically.

And I called [Charles J.] Nelson in.[note 18] Charles J. Nelson served as U.S. ambassador to the southern African countries of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland from 1971 to 1974.

Did you?

Nelson’s going to give him a little hell.

[Chuckles.] Good.

So he’ll be disposed to be . . .

Well, any event, I think today we’ve got our [clears throat] contingency plan well positioned.

I thought, Mr. President, your handling of the NSC [National Security Council] meeting was superb, because [Thomas H.] Moorer really gave you a lousy briefing.[note 19] Adm. Thomas H. Moorer was chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1970 to June 1974. Moorer briefed the National Security Council on preparations for the expected North Vietnamese military offensive.

You think so?

He—oh, yeah! And—

Well, I kept digging it out of him, though.

Well, you—sure. What he said, he acted like a smart lawyer, not like a military man. He said the right things if you dug it out of him. But [President Nixon acknowledges] if you—if, say, you had been a Muskie, and it had just gone over your head, he—

Well, I noticed that he had a red thing and a black thing. And I said, “All right. We have done this. We haven’t done this. What about this? What about that?" By the time we got through, boy, he knew what the hell he was up against, didn’t he?

Oh, yeah. Well, that’s the point. And—

And so did Laird.

Oh, Laird called up this afternoon and asked whether you were giving him hell. I said no, you weren’t giving him hell, you were just—wanted to make sure he understood what you wanted.

Right. And let me say, when I look at that contingency plan, it’s going to be tough. It’s going to be goddamn tough. There’s not going to be any complaints that, as a result of our failure, we lost this. You understand?

I think when the attack starts, Mr. President, we ought to pour everything in every place except North Vietnam.

Exactly. And, I mean, really pour it in.

That’s right. And that’s why we need more forces in there. And all these sortie raids are just average figures. They don’t help us on a [President Nixon acknowledges] one- or two-day strike.

The point is, that’s why we’ve got to get that carrier out there. We got to get the other planes.

Exactly.

I don’t want that—I hope you ordered that today.

I’ve already talked to Laird.

The plane—the carrier’s got to move today. The B-52s move today. The A-1s, the F-4s. Today. Get them all there. That’ll have a psychological effect. And then we’ll put them in South Vietnam for a couple weeks. And then, right after we return, we’ll blast the hell out of North Vietnam.

Exactly.

Don’t you agree?

Absolutely. If they’ve started their offensive. But I think we should wait now until they start the offensive. We can’t achieve enough good—

Not a thing. I agree.

Because if you hit them first, then eventually you’ll be blamed for having triggered the offensive.

I know. No, I know. We’re not going to do a thing. I understand that.

But I’d get the forces in there.

Yeah. That’s the reason. Get the forces in, it might blunt their offensive. It might take a couple times.

That’s right. I think they’re going to go through with this. But Bunker, he—well, you’ll see him tomorrow—is really quite content, quite confident that they can handle it.

You know, I think they can, too. I didn’t want to say it there, but I have a feeling the South Vietnamese are much stronger than the North Vietnamese realized. Lam Son proved it.[note 20] Lam Son 719 was a South Vietnamese ground offensive backed by American airpower, targeting the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos from February through March 1971. And, by God, they’re going to get a hell of a shock.

Well, if we get the same ratios, if we can kill 20,000 North Vietnamese with this attack, then I think we’ll have a negotiation this year. If we have—

Well, this year? We’ve got to have it this spring.

Well, we had one last year.

Yeah.

And that I still think they were thinking very seriously—

Right, till the Senate screwed it up.[note 21] In June 1971, the Senate passed a nonbinding resolution calling on the President to withdraw American troops from Vietnam, provided that Hanoi freed American prisoners of war. Although the resolution did not have the force of law, Nixon blamed it for Hanoi’s rejection of his latest negotiating proposal.

And—

Well, one thing we can be sure of, Henry, let me say that, talking to our friend . . . [W. Kenneth] Riland today.[note 22] W. Kenneth Riland was an osteopathic physician who treated Richard Nixon, and cofounded the New York College of Osteopathic Medicine. And I said, “You know,” I said, “Have you noticed how India and Pakistan and the Anderson Papers, nobody’s for—everybody’s forgotten the goddamn things. Because we’ve done something else.” We keep these bastards on the—we’ve got them on a hot fiddle, Henry. We really have.

That’s right. Well, there’ll be a little slip again tomorrow with the Senate Relations—the Foreign Relations Committee, when Keating testifies.

Well—

But we ought to tell him that he ought to protect the White House.

What is—do we see him before he testifies?

Yes.

Don’t worry, I’ll tell him. Hard. OK.

Good. That would be very helpful.