OK.

It’s Dr. [Henry A.] Kissinger returning your call.[note 1] Henry A. Kissinger was U.S. national security adviser from January 1969 to November 1975, and U.S. secretary of state from September 1973 to January 1977.

Yeah, OK.

OK. On the line, sir.

Hello?

Mr. President?

Hi, Henry.

Sorry, I thought it was better if I finished with [Ronald W. “Ron”] Reagan—[note 2] Ronald W. “Ron” Reagan was a Hollywood film and television actor from the 1930s to 1960s; president of the Screen Actors Guild from 1947 to 1952 and 1959 to 1960; the Republican governor of California from January 1967 to January 1975; founder of the Citizens for the Republic (CFTR) political action committee in 1977; and president of the United States from January 1981 to January 1989.

Oh, no, no, no. I was just calling to get a report. I thought you had called. I’d been eating dinner.

No, I talked to Reagan, and he’s in great shape.

Did you get the Taiwan thing out? [Kissinger attempts to interject.] I tell you what I think has happened on Taiwan: It’s the goddamn Washington Post! Their headline, if you see it, is “Nixon Agrees to Withdraw from Taiwan.”[note 3] See Stanley Karnow, “Nixon Pledges Pullout of Forces on Taiwan,” Washington Post, 28 February 1972. The People’s Republic of China insisted that the island of Taiwan was an integral part of Chinese territory and demanded that the United States must abandon its commitments to the current government there, which still claimed to be the legitimate ruler of China.

Well, Reagan says there is a little trouble out on the West Coast in some of their evening papers’ headlines. But he said he never doubted for a minute. He read the communiqué.[note 4] A joint statement issued by Chinese and American leaders on 27 February 1972, known as the Shanghai Communiqué, expressed the American position on Taiwan in the following language: “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.” For its part, “[t]he Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan.” Kissinger described the outcome as one of “constructive ambiguity.” He said, “Hell, that’s what the President told me he’d do.” He said, “This is conditional. This is our policy. That’s the Nixon Doctrine.”[note 5] The Nixon Doctrine, or Guam Doctrine, announced by the President during a trip to the Pacific in July 1969, held that while the United States would maintain its treaty commitments to allies in Asia, those allies would henceforth be primarily responsible for their own local defense. The United States would provide appropriate economic and military aid, and a shield if the ally was threatened by a nuclear power.

Yeah.

And he said, “You have to remember, Henry”—he was giving me courage!

Yeah, what’d he say?

He said, “You have to remember the press has been dying all week long.”

Oh?

And—

He did, huh?

Yeah. And he said he had heard what you said tonight. He said, “That’s terrific.” He said—

Oh, he heard the speech?

Yeah.

Good.[note 6] On his return to Andrews Air Force Base that day, the President had addressed members of Congress and other officials who greeted the U.S. delegation. His remarks included the following: “With respect to Taiwan, we stated our established policy that our forces overseas will be reduced gradually as tensions ease, and that our ultimate objective is to withdraw our forces as a peaceful settlement is achieved. We have agreed that we will not negotiate the fate of other nations behind their backs, and we did not do so at Peking. There were no secret deals of any kind. We have done all this without giving up any United States commitment to any other country.”

He said he was proud of you. He said the only other thing that he would suggest is that we plant a question for [Ronald L. “Ron”] Ziegler tomorrow, saying, “Well, what about the defense commitment?"[note 7] Ronald L. “Ron” Ziegler was White House press secretary from January 1969 to August 1974. And he should say, “As Dr. Kissinger said in Shanghai, as the President said yesterday, ‘No, the defense commitment still stands.’” And that’s an honest thing to say.

Is that all right?

Yes.

OK. We’ll do it.

But I think you should take it just a tiny bit easy with your statement to these guys—

To the leaders? Oh, don’t worry. I’ve covered it. I’m going to let you and [William P. “Bill”] Rogers say what you want.[note 8] William P. “Bill” Rogers was U.S. deputy attorney general from January 1953 to October 1957; U.S. attorney general from October 1957 to January 1961; and U.S. secretary of state from January 1969 to September 1973. Nixon and other senior administration officials planned to brief congressional leaders the following day, 1 March 1972, on the outcome of the visit to China.

Now, Barry [M.] Goldwater [Sr.] [R–Arizona], I talked to, was a little more difficult.[note 9] Barry M. Goldwater Sr. was a U.S. senator [R–Arizona] from January 1953 to January 1965 and January 1969 to January 1987, and the Republican presidential candidate in 1964. In a speech at the 1964 Republican National Convention, Nixon had referred to Goldwater as “Mr. Conservative.” RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Touchstone, 1990), 260. He said, “Just make sure you explain it properly tomorrow morning to the leaders.” And I’m having breakfast with him on Wednesday.

All right.

And I think they’re going to get him—

Well, he’s, of course—Buckley’s working on him.[note 10] Here, “Buckley” could refer to either William F. Buckley Jr., a syndicated columnist, public television host, and editor of National Review; or to his brother, James L. “Jim” Buckley, a U.S. senator [C–New York] from January 1971 to January 1977.

And—

Buckley’s working on him.

Actually, I have to say, in his—in Reagan’s defense, [James L.] Jim Buckley [C–New York] called him this morning, trying to get him agitated.[note 11] James L. “Jim” Buckley was a U.S. senator [C–New York] from January 1971 to January 1977, and the brother of William F. Buckley Jr. [President Nixon acknowledges.] But he said, “No, I believe in the President.” And . . .

Do you think maybe Jim Buckley’s lost, then?

I don’t think so. No, he’s just—no, to put it more fairly, Jim Buckley asked if—what he, Reagan, thought he could say. And he said, “Just say that the President . . . that,” he said, “you are sure the President didn’t undermine the defense commitment with that [unclear].” [President Nixon acknowledges.] Buckley then said he [unclear].

We said it tonight. What the hell does he want?

That’s right.

All said.

But Reagan—

OK.

Reagan congratulated you. He said it was one of the greatest speeches of the American president. He just—he was [unclear]. And Nancy [D. Reagan], who’s got a hell of a lot more brains than he has—[note 12] Nancy D. Reagan (née Anne Frances Robbins) was the wife of Ronald W. Reagan since March 1952, and the first lady of California from January 1967 to January 1975.

Mm-hmm.

—was equally enthusiastic.

She was? OK.

Yeah.

Well, of course, Reagan can see it in terms of the political impact, can’t he?

Yeah.

The television impact, huh?

That’s right.

Hmm.

He said you had a great pilot last week. And I think he thinks you can run it—you can sell it as a series.

[Laughs.] OK. Well, good, Henry. Fine.

So I really think [President Nixon acknowledges] we all reacted a little bit too strongly to the Washington Post.

Well, the Washington Post, then there was some radio, and the early wires, and you know. Also, let’s face it, Buckley has quite an influence, Henry.

Well, we made a damn mistake [unclear].[note 13] William F. Buckley was one of the many journalists Nixon brought with him to China, but the conservative columnist was publicly critical of the event. After returning from China, Buckley endorsed Rep. John M. Ashbrook [R–Ohio] in his primary challenge against Nixon. “In a scathing commentary based on his observations as a member of the press party on the trip, the columnist, publisher of the influential conservative magazine National Review, accused President Nixon of making consort with the devil and ‘doing it with the excessive moral enthusiasm that marks Mr. Nixon’s approach to all problems.’” Bill Kovach, “William Buckley Critical,” New York Times, 1 March 1972.

We really did, because he’s been supercilious, and nasty, and hard to deal with.

There are a lot of columns he couldn’t have written if he hadn’t been on that.

That’s right. [Pauses.] I don’t know how to handle him except to have nothing to do with him from now on. What do you think?

Well, I may try to talk to him. [Unclear.] But I think one lesson we’ve learned is, no sense taking an opponent.

Never take your enemies. I’ve told [H. R. “Bob”] Haldeman that a dozen times.[note 14] H. R. “Bob” Haldeman was White House chief of staff from January 1969 to April 1973.

Give him— [President Nixon acknowledges] because you only give them empirical information.

Yeah, yeah. [Patrick J. “Pat”] Buchanan was the one that pushed him—pushed for him.[note 15] Patrick J. “Pat” Buchanan was special assistant to the president for media analysis and speechwriting from January 1969 to August 1974.

And, you know, [Alexander M. “Al”] Haig [Jr.] [President Nixon acknowledges] is about as hard-line as you can get.[note 16] Alexander M. “Al” Haig Jr. was military assistant to the president from January 1969 to June 1970; deputy national security adviser from June 1970 to January 1973; Army vice chief of staff from January to May 1973; and White House chief of staff from May 1973 to August 1974.

That’s right.

He thinks this is one of the great diplomatic revolutions.

He does.

Now, one other interesting thing, last week—I didn’t want to bother you there with things [President Nixon acknowledges] —the Russians sent us a message sort of saying, “What’s going on? You keep criticizing us.”

We aren’t criticizing them.

Well, we were before [unclear]. I sent back a message this evening saying, “When you quiet down, we are serious about [unclear].”

Yeah.

And from that day on there haven’t been any hostile items, and [Russian News Agency] TASS so far has [unclear] very factual way.

Well . . . [Coughs.] I think on this meeting with [Anatoly] Dobrynin, it’s probably worth it if you would bring him in for a minute just to say hello to me.[note 17] Anatoly Dobrynin was Soviet ambassador to the United States from January 1962 to May 1986. Dobrynin was also Kissinger’s chief interlocutor in secret back-channel negotiations with the Soviet leadership. [Kissinger acknowledges.] I just think it’s just a good little touch [unclear].

Well, my frank opinion is to do it after, not right this minute.

Why?

Because I’m worried that these—

The Chinese.

—[unclear] getting back to the Chinese that you saw Dobrynin, right?

Fine, fine, fine. But you can see him.

Oh, I’ll see him Wednesday. I’m having lunch with him.

And then you tell him, though, ‘cause he may say, “Well, the President [Kissinger attempts to interject] said he’d like to see me.” Say, “Yes, the President does want to see you, because prior to the trip, Mr. Ambassador, the President wants to have a good, off-the-record talk with you to get your advice.” How about that? Something like that?

Oh, that’s good.

And then say we’ll—say that you’ll—and maybe we’ll set it up for a little dinner or something. A little private dinner. Let’s do it that way.

Well, my experience, Mr. President, with the Russians has been that you never lose by being [unclear]—

Well, my point is, hang that out there, then he can report to his government that he’s going to be seeing the President to have a talk. OK.

Right.

OK, boy.

[chuckling] Right.

Get some rest. You ought to feel pretty good.

Right, I—well, you did it all.

Hell, we [unclear]. You know, poor Rogers, he—he’ll—I think you’re right, he’ll be for this now that it’s public.[note 18] Secretary of State William P. Rogers had been a marginal figure in the preparations for the visit to China and during meetings with Chinese leaders. Kissinger had received most of the public visibility and credit for the opening to China. Rogers, on behalf of the State Department, had been particularly skeptical about the preparations for and wording of the Shanghai Communiqué. That public reaction out there, I mean, that—we didn’t stack that goddamn audience.[note 19] Nixon is referring to the tenor of the reception at Andrews Air Force Base that he received upon his return from China. The President insisted that the White House had made no specific effort to prompt a favorable response. That was—

No. Hell, there were some demonstrators there.

Yeah. Oh, sure. A few. Very few interruptions [unclear].

No, no, I mean, I’m just saying that this is the best proof that it wasn’t a stacked audience.

On the other hand, they were with us. Those people were cheering. They started to clap when the plane drove up. You know that? Before we even landed.

That Cabinet, which had—which if things were at all tough—they would certainly—they have never yet been out in front when things were tough. They were in ecstasy. [Pauses.] And Elliot [L.] Richardson, who is a sophisticated guy, says that this was a diplomatic masterstroke.[note 20] Elliot L. Richardson was U.S. under secretary of state from January 1969 to June 1970; U.S. secretary of health, education, and welfare from June 1970 to January 1973; U.S. secretary of defense from January to May 1973; and U.S. attorney general from May to October 1973. In October 1973, Richardson resigned his office rather than carry out an order from President Nixon to remove the Special Watergate Prosecutor, Archibald Cox. That the communiqué was superb.

He sees it? He sees it.

Mr. President—

Why the hell didn’t Bill [Rogers] see it? Goddamn it, I don’t understand it.

Well, he doesn’t have that sort of [unclear].

You think that’s it?

Yes, he doesn’t have [unclear].

And that poor damn [Marshall] Green was egging him on, I’m sure.[note 21] Marshall Green was U.S. ambassador to Indonesia from June 1965 to March 1969; assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from May 1969 to May 1973; and U.S. ambassador to Australia from 1973 to 1975. Green had been critical of much of Kissinger’s approach to the opening to the People’s Republic of China.

Well, he’s done it on everything. [Unclear.] You remember, on Berlin, he told us this was going to lose our leverage [unclear].[note 22] This refers to the Four Power Talks over Berlin, which successfully resolved the status of the divided city with an agreement in 1971 between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. The negotiations were directed closely by the White House, with little State Department input. Some State Department officials had argued that a policy of improved relations with China would cause the Kremlin to react by refusing to move ahead with negotiations similar to the Four Power Talks. Reagan saw it. These guys are now—

Reagan is really—but he was all right.

Reagan didn’t make [unclear]—

Would you ask him to make a statement?

I asked him for it before, but tomorrow morning I [unclear].

Yeah. I want him to make a statement.[note 23] It is unclear whether Nixon is referring to Reagan or the Secretary of State. Rogers met with the media on 7 March 1972, at which time he defended the administration’s China policy and said that he had not “felt excluded at all.”

Yeah.

OK.

Good.