Hello?

Dr. [Henry A.] Kissinger, Mr. President.[note 1] Henry A. Kissinger was U.S. national security adviser from January 1969 to November 1975, and U.S. secretary of state from September 1973 to January 1977.

Hello?

Well, how’s it going today?

Mr. President.

You got any more of your work done?

Yes, I think we are going to make February 8th now.[note 2] Kissinger was working on President Nixon’s annual State of the World report, the administration’s assessment of the global environment and a public statement of foreign policy objectives. It was released on 8 February 1972. [President Nixon acknowledges.] We are making good progress. We’re doing about a chapter a day now.

Boy. [Laughs.] I know it’s a terrific job. Well, we—

Yeah, but I think this time we’ll get a much better reception. Last year, we put it out in the middle of the Laotian period.[note 3] Beginning on 8 February 1971, the armed forces of South Vietnam, aided by U.S. air power and logistical support, had conducted offensive operations in southeastern Laos, designed to disrupt future offensives by the North Vietnamese army.

Oh, God, that’s right! It was rough, wasn’t it?

And—well, they didn’t attack it, but they sort of buried it, because they weren’t [President Nixon acknowledges] about to give you credit for it.

Well, I suppose this time there’ll be a—that we may expect that they’ll be banging around there in II Corps and a few other places, from what [Alexander M.] Al [Haig Jr.] tells me, but—[note 4] Alexander M. “Al” Haig Jr. was military assistant to the president from January 1969 to June 1970; deputy national security adviser from June 1970 to January 1973; Army vice chief of staff from January to May 1973; and White House chief of staff from May 1973 to August 1974. II Corps was one of four military regions in South Vietnam.

Yeah, I think—

—but we aren’t—we can’t do anything about it, Henry. I mean, as Al was saying, you know, if the South Vietnamese can’t handle it now, they never will be able to.

Well, that’s right, and—but that’s where our move next week is going to help a lot, because if their answer to our peace offer is an offensive—[note 5] President Nixon planned to reveal in a televised speech that Kissinger and the North Vietnamese had been engaged in secret negotiations to settle the Vietnam War.

Right.

—that should certainly help us in public opinion here.

Yeah. That is why, I think, making it perhaps on that date—

It’s, on the whole, the best day.

—the 18th is better than waiting, ‘cause we just don’t know when they’re going to start cr—start hitting.[note 6] The President ended up making the speech on 25 January 1972.

[speaking under President Nixon] Exactly. I think one—

Otherwise, it might look like a reaction to an offensive.

Exactly.

And—

I think, basically, the Russians are putting them up to it, to overshadow the—we have an intelligence report today [President Nixon acknowledges] in which one of their people in Paris says they’re going to do it so that they—in February so that they can overshadow your trip to Peking.[note 7] North Vietnam launched a full-scale invasion of South Vietnam at the end of March, more than a month after Nixon’s summit in Beijing.

Uh-huh. Well, it won’t do that.

I don’t think they’ve got that much power.

Yeah. It won’t—

On the other hand, it tends—it’s a double-edged sword for them, because if they do it at that time, you’re overshadowing their offensive.

[chuckling] Yeah. Yeah. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Right.

And from what I hear from Haig—and you, of course, have had a chance to talk to him personally [President Nixon acknowledges] and to the others—I don’t think there’s any question anymore that this—that they’re going all-out to make the—

Oh, that’s right. Right. I haven’t talked to the others except briefly, but I—Haig gave me a rundown.

But they’ve paid the price now, and they have no interest. [President Nixon acknowledges throughout.] I mean, if they were to make the trip a failure, they’d pay—they’ve already paid the price for the trip, so—they’ve got as heavy an invest—a heavier investment than we have in it.

Sure. Anything further on your—with . . . [Anatoly] Dobrynin?[note 8] Anatoly Dobrynin was Soviet ambassador to the United States from January 1962 to May 1986. Dobrynin was Kissinger’s principal interlocutor in a secret diplomatic back channel with the Soviet leadership. Dobrynin was frequently away from Washington for consultations in Moscow, which often led to intermittent contacts that frustrated Kissinger. Have you checked with him yet?

Yes, I’ve checked. He’s coming in around the 15th.

I see.

And I’ve left word that I want to see him as soon as he comes in.

Mm-hmm. Well, that’s the way to leave it. In the meantime, you have pending the thing from [Maurice H. “Maury”] Stans, which—[note 9] Maurice H. “Maury” Stans was U.S. secretary of commerce from January 1969 to February 1972, and chair of the Finance Committee of the Committee to Re-Elect the President in 1972. Secretary Stans was the administration’s point person in dealing with the Soviets over the possible expansion of Western trade, including agricultural products and technology transfer. President Nixon and Kissinger thought that the prospect of increased commerce offered the Soviets an important incentive to cooperate with Washington on a broader range of issues. At the same time, they were concerned that Stans, influenced by the business community, was excessively eager to promote East-West trade, which would undercut their ability to link expanded commerce to good behavior by Moscow on geopolitical matters.

Right. I’ll talk to Stans again tomorrow and . . .

Yeah.

But that thing is going—I have no doubt, Mr. President, they are going to try to embarrass us at the Peking summit.

Mm-hmm.

They are really not so much attacking us as Peking.

Mm-hmm. I see. Yep, mm-hmm. [Pause.] Well, fine, fine. Then you can see them—see him on the 15th, and that’s that.

I’ll see him, I think—

If he wants—yeah, that’s—well, he’d want to.

—on the 15th and 20th.

But he’s already in—

[Unclear] that he’d be in—

But he’s already—he has already—they’ve already indicated he wants to see you, hasn’t he?

Oh, yes. Oh, yes. They’ve already said he wants to see me as soon as he comes in.

Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.

So—

Did you talk to anybody there or just have them call [Yuli M.] Vorontsov, or what?[note 10] Yuli M. Vorontsov was chargé d’affaires at the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C., during the 1970s. Vorontsov was the Soviet official with whom Kissinger dealt in Dobrynin’s absence. In his memoirs, Kissinger characterized Vorontsov as “clever, amiable and discreet, but quite powerless.” Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), 632.

No, I talked to Vorontsov.

Oh, you did?

Yes.

And—

There’s no—I have every . . .

How was his temperature?

Oh, he’s very friendly.

Yeah.

They, in their turn, Mr. President, they’re taking a cheap shot at the Chinese right now.

Right.

But as soon as that one is over, they’re going to go all out on their . . .

Well, they’ll want to overshadow the Peking one, won’t they?

Of course.

That’s what I would think.

I think they have too heavy an investment in there.

Right. Right. Well, OK, Henry. We’ll—

So—

I’ll be out of touch now. I’m going to Camp David in a couple of minutes, and I’ll be out of touch till Thursday afternoon. I’ve got to go into some writing, so I won’t—

Well, I’ll be back—

But if there’s something—something you have to call me about, you call me, but I won’t be calling you. OK?

Well, I’ll be coming back Thursday—

And the same with—

—as well, Mr. President. I’ll bring a draft of that other thing.

Same with Haig. I’m going to—I’m not going to talk to him, either. So if you’ll let him know that [Kissinger acknowledges] —get in touch with me if there’s anything I need to know, but otherwise I haven’t—I’m not going to talk to anybody.

Well, we won’t bother you unless it’s overwhelming.

‘Cause I’ll have to concentrate on the domestic stuff in this—the meantime. Haig was telling me [laughs] the—that the Laotians want three ARVN [Army of the Republic of Vietnam] divisions in there. Of course, that’s out of the question.

Yeah. [Laughs.]

First, the ARVN wouldn’t go without our helicopters, et cetera, and we’re just not going to go into that right now.

No.

It’s too bad, but—

It’s a tragedy, because we’re on the verge of victory.

That’s right, that’s right. What do you project in Laos? Just—

Well, I—

—continued deterioration?

I think they’re going to lose—they’re going to . . . I think they’re going to make a major gain in the north, and they may have enough people in Vientiane. But on the other hand, it’s a sign of weakness on their part that they are—that they have to operate on the fringes.[note 11] Laos would be the last country in Indochina to be taken over by Communists in 1975.

Mm-hmm. [Slight pause.] Well, there’ll be some discussion of Laos here, but let’s face it, most Americans are going to say, “Stay the hell out.”

Well, I think we’ll be dominating the news now.

Because when we went into Laos last year, we didn’t go in for the purpose of Laos, you know, we pointed that out. [Kissinger acknowledges.] We went in for our own purposes. [Slight pause.] Right, how’s the weather? Pretty good, I hope?

It’s warmed up. It’s perfect.

Isn’t that good? Well, I hope you—

It’s a shame it wasn’t like that last—

Sit out on your little patio there and—

That’s right.

—get a little sun.

[chuckling] Right, Mr. President.

OK, Henry. Good-bye.

I’ll see you on Thursday.

You bet.

Bye.