Yes, Mayor.

Hello, Mr. President?

How are you?

From the Daley home, to the President, Mrs. [Lady Bird] Johnson, and your family, a merry, merry Christmas and a happy and healthy New Year.[note 2] Lady Bird Johnson (née Claudia Alta Taylor) was the wife of Lyndon B. Johnson since 1934, and first lady of the United States from November 1963 to January 1969.

Thank you, Mayor.

You’re a great President and a great man, and you’re doing a wonderful thing for our country. We’re still saying a prayer for you at Christmas Mass tonight.

Thank you, Mayor, I need it, I need it.

Well, we all do, but, by God, you’re doing a wonderful job. We’re all praying for you, that the Lord will continue to guide you and keep you in good health.

I wanted to call you, I was thinking about you yesterday, and I thought I’d wait till maybe Christmas day. I wanted to visit with you [Daley acknowledges] and wanted to ask your judgment on two or three things, get you to think about it. We’re in a . . . we’re in a very difficult way with our budget. I don’t know what to do. If we . . . if we assume that we can get the war over this year, which nobody—

I hope to God you can.

—which nobody knows, we could go in on one set of circumstances; if we don’t, we’d have to go into another one. But most of my economists tell me if we can keep the budget down under 112 [billion dollars] that we can get by without a tax increase.[note 3] For a discussion of the budget and tax increase considerations, see Robert S. McNamara to President Johnson, 22 December 1965, Conversation WH6512-04-9327.

Well, I think—

On the other hand, there’s a good many of them think that I’m going to have us a much bigger deficit than anybody has ever had. We’ll take in 98 billion [dollars] or something this year. And that if . . . if I don’t ask for a tax increase, it’d be pretty inflationary.

I see.

What do you think about a tax increase election year?

I think if you can avoid it, I would. I think a tax increase will always . . . you know, the opposition will jump on it and make all kinds of noise and sounds.

How much you think I got to shave these domestic programs?

Well, I wouldn’t shave them too much, but I wouldn’t increase them. And I think if you can keep your economy going the way you are, and you can keep . . . if we can only put more people onto the employment rolls, which you’re trying with your poverty program, in my opinion that’s the great number one, more jobs, more jobs. Then you’ll increase your income, you’ll increase your taxes, you’ll also increase the income of the people and take them off the relief and welfare rolls. And in my opinion, this is what we should strive to do. If we could get our employment, which you’ve been doing so successfully, down and down percentage-wise, the more we get it down, the better it is for the entire fiscal operations of the country.

Mayor, I’ve got . . . I’ve got it down to 4.3 [percent], and they estimate that this time next year I’ll have it around 3.3, maybe 3.[note 4] President Johnson referred to the national unemployment rate, which stood at 4.2 percent in mid-November 1965. “Unemployment Rate Drops,” Wall Street Journal, 3 December 1965.

If you get it down there, look what it means: the earning power, then the taxing for the government and every [one] of those people that will go to work in that 1 or one-half percent. And if we can get it down to that figure, I think we’ll be in very good shape, and I think the whole country will be in shape, because what we’re doing here is putting the emphasis on jobs. You know, the other things are fine—education, training, but . . . health—the main emphasis is get people jobs, get them working.[note 5] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary.

I got your poverty group [People’s War Council against Poverty] from Syracuse [New York] down here giving me hell—

Oh, yeah?

—because the mayor [William F. Walsh] turned them down, and they came over and invaded my house yesterday and got arrested.

My God.

We got FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] says one of them is a strong Communist sympathizer.

Yeah. Well, they’re trying to pressure you, Mr. President. And [unclear] pressure you. They’re trying to snatch control of this country, control of everything just under this program. And the fact is, and the truth of the matter is, that they’ve never had such a fine program in the history of our country. [President Johnson coughs.] And what I keep saying is, “Lord God, let’s get together. Let’s cooperate. We’re fine to be fighting, but what difference does it make who will get the credit as long as we get jobs, and get the people out of slums and blight, and get education?” But many of these people throughout the country are not concerned with the solutions. They’re concerned with the agitation of the problem. And this is all over the country. And they’ve seen an opportunity to snatch a popular issue, but one that you and I know doesn’t bear the right of logic, and that is: only the poor can control these programs. Well, that’s ridiculous.

That’s a good—

Because you have to have [President Johnson snorts]—it’d be the same thing as saying in your operation that only the soldier could control the army, that you are not entitled to generals, to scientists, to the great experts, to the fine educated and dedicated [unclear]—

What shape would we be in now if [R. Sargent] Shriver got out of the program with a blast?[note 6] R. Sargent Shriver was director of the Peace Corps from March 1961 to February 1966; director of the Office of Economic Opportunity from October 1964 to March 1968; and U.S. ambassador to France from April 1968 to March 1970.

How do you mean a blast?

Well, he’s unhappy because we’re not giving him everything he wants—

Well, I—

And he’s got to give up one or the other of his programs: poverty or peace.

Yes.

And I guess [Bernard L.] Bernie Boutin wouldn’t be very imaginative, but he’s a good administrator, and he’d be able.[note 7] Bernard L. “Bernie” Boutin was deputy administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA) from January 1961 to November 1961; administrator of the GSA from November 1962 to November 1964; deputy director of the Office of Economic Opportunity from 1965 to 1966; and administrator of the Small Business Administration from May 1966 to July 1967. At the time of this conversation, Boutin was in charge of the Community Action Program. He had held the position since October 1965, and had previously served as administrator for the General Services Administration under both Kennedy and Johnson. “Boutin Gets No. 2 Job in Poverty War,” Washington Post, 6 October 1965; Michael L. Gillette, Launching the War on Poverty: An Oral History (New York: Twayne, 1996), 351. If Shriver got out of poverty and went to the Peace Corps, I think that we’d have a lot of agitation from the Adam Clayton Powell [Jr.]s [D–New York] and Roy [O.] Wilkinses and the damned professionals.[note 8] Adam Clayton Powell Jr. was a U.S. representative [D–New York] from January 1945 to January 1967 and January 1969 to January 1971, and chair of the House Committee on Education and Labor from 1961 to 1966. Roy O. Wilkins was executive secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) from 1955 to 1964; executive director of the NAACP from 1965 to 1977; and recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1967.

How long will the agitation be?

I don’t know.

For one day, for one week, for one month? Our concern, and I know yours is, I’m more concerned about the answer to the solution of the problem than I am whether this fellow’s up on the platform or that fellow. Because if we can show in another—we’ve done a fairly good job out here, Mr. President. Shriver said that himself, but he won’t say it publicly, that we have the best poverty program in the country.[note 9] Mayor Daley had maintained a tight control over the War on Poverty in Chicago. Despite protests from Chicago community groups seeking more input into the program, Sargent Shriver had praised Daley’s operation of the program during a 6 December 1965 visit to Chicago. James Sullivan, “Daley, Shriver Hit Poverty War ‘Rumors’; 200 Picket Hotel While They Speak,” Chicago Tribune, 7 December 1965; Eve Edstrom, “Civil War Develops in Anti-Poverty Leadership,” Washington Post, 16 December 1965; Gillette, Launching the War on Poverty, 80, 208. And this is the poverty program—the number one in jobs, number two in education, number three in training, and number four in health. And that’s the emphasis we’re putting. No fanfare on all these other things; that’s fine. But I wouldn’t think that if we have the . . .

First, we have to have some guidelines, as you know. There’s been no guidelines set out. There’s been no direction, so that everyone has been floundering around. But I don’t think they’re weak. The people still have great confidence in you. I know the people out here in the Middle West and in Chicago [Illinois] still feel very strongly that Johnson is a great president, a good president. He’s a dedicated man. He’s a devoted man. I don’t know, maybe some of those guys in Washington [D.C.] don’t think the same way, but we do. And anything you would do along this line wouldn’t make any difference at all. What the hell? You’re always going to have the Powells in your hair anyhow.[note 10] End of 2021 revisions. You’re always going to have these other people. But if we’re . . . if we’re doing the job, if we’re getting jobs, if you’re reducing that unemployment figure, if we’re getting education—and we are—if we’re getting Head Start, if we’re getting the health program . . . We’re going to start—we made application for a health program, which is probably the first of its kind to give health advice and health assistance to 650,000 people in poverty.[note 11] In July 1966, Chicago would receive almost $2 million in OEO grants to establish neighborhood health centers in low-income neighborhoods. “U.S. OK’s 2 Million for 2 W. Side Health Centers,” Chicago Tribune, 3 July 1966. We know that we’re going ahead, because we send people in to follow them up, see, and ask the reactions, Mr. President—

Well, now, here’s the problem I’ve got with him, though. I gave him 700 million dollars the first year. He came in the second year, and I told him he could go to a billion [dollars]. And he started a damn revolution, and we just had hell, and we fought around and finally compromised it out. He wanted 2 billion, and we got it . . . I agreed to a billion and a half. Now, we gave him a billion and a half this year. He went up on the Hill, and the Congress recomm—authorized—we don’t ever have to appropriate what they authorize; we usually appropriate less than they authorize—but they authorized a billion, 780 [million]. This year I gave him a billion and a half [dollars]. [Daley acknowledges.]

Now, next year he comes in with his budget hearing the other day, and I told them all I want them to stay about what they had this year, because I had to go up 10, 12 billion on Vietnam, and that increase had to go to Vietnam, because I’m losing—I lost ten planes last week, 3 million [dollars] a plane. [Daley acknowledges.] And I just can’t be short out there.

That’s right.

And even with that I’m going to have a budget of 112, [1]15 billion dollars [Daley acknowledges] from 99 [billion dollars]. And that’s going to look like hell if I don’t increase anything. Well, they say that they’re going to increase, and so forth. Now, he’s going to resign from both jobs, and let me pick the one he resigns from. I—

I don’t think that—well, what the hell is he doing that for? He’s got to sit down with you. You’ve got to—it’s got to, you know, be worked out, I would think. I don’t, I don’t . . . I don’t think he should put that on you. I think that, after all, if he’s on the team—

Well, he says, “Are you ready to—" [speaking over Daley] He says he’ll—

[Unclear.] And after a meeting with the President, as you usually do, then he comes out and announce that he asked the President to be assigned to the Peace Corps. That he realized that whatever it was, that he just—the two operations, and he tried to do it during an emergency, but now that he’s doing a great job, blah blah blah, that he has asked you for one of the assignments. I don’t think it would be fair to you to do it this way.

It’s not, but [Robert F.] Bobby [Kennedy] [D–New York] and that group are not very fair to us, Mayor.[note 12] Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy was U.S. attorney general from January 1961 to September 1964, and a U.S. senator [D–New York] from January 1965 until his assassination in June 1968. Kennedy and Shriver were brothers-in-law.

Well—

I see [Edward M.] Ted [Kennedy] [D–Massachusetts]—I see Bobby and Teddy both gave out interviews—Teddy did yesterday—that we got to consult more with the Congress on Vietnam.[note 13] Edward M. “Teddy” Kennedy was a U.S. senator [D–Massachusetts] from November 1962 until his death on 25 August 2009, and Senate Democratic Whip from January 1969 to January 1971. Well, goddamn, I’ve had every member of Congress in three times this year.

Well, you see—

[speaking over Daley] Now, his brother—his brother was President three years—

Those fellows don’t know how to play on a team, you know, Mr. President. They never had any teamwork. It’s all right to, you know, be standing off a little by yourself, but we know that this is a team operation and at no time do we need more teamwork and cooperation than now, standing behind our President. They might go over and talk to you individually, but this stuff with the issuing statements, I just think they’re killing themselves. I don’t think they’re bothering you. But this other fellow, at any time that you would want me to talk to him, along any line after the holidays, I’ll be glad to, because I don’t think it’s fair to you as the President to do this to—

What do you think our budget ought to be next year on poverty? [Daley attempts to interject.] Would you increase it over this year?

I think I’d hold it.

That’s what I’m trying to do.

Gosh, or increase it very little so you’d show some increase, so that they couldn’t say—because I really think we can do a much better operation than we have been and do it more effectively and more efficiently.

What we’ve done is this now: [Robert S. “Bob”] McNamara’s taken 500,000 of these boys for training in the service; that’s a half a million of them.[note 14] Robert S. “Bob” McNamara was president of Ford Motor Company from November 1960 to January 1961; U.S. secretary of defense from January 1961 to February 1968; and president of the World Bank from April 1968 to July 1981. In this passage, President Johnson referred to people who would be eligible for War on Poverty programs, but who would be enrolled instead in other new Great Society initiatives. In August 1966, Secretary of Defense Robert S. “Bob” McNamara would announce a plan to enroll draft rejects in a remedial training program that would enable them to reach the military’s enlistment standards. The program would initially enroll 40,000 rejected draftees, and expand to 100,000 in its second year. Sargent Shriver viewed the new program as a direct threat to the Job Corps. Johnson may refer here to an early version of this plan. A role for the Defense Department in the War on Poverty had been under consideration since the initial planning of the program. Fred M. Hechinger, “Education: What Mark for Army as Educator,” New York Times, 28 August 1966; “McNamara Sees Corps Unaffected,” Washington Post, 28 August 1966; Jean M. White, “McNamara Plan Sends Job Corps to Barricades,” Washington Post, 25 August 1966. [W. Willard “Bill”] Wirtz has taken a hundred thousand and training them under manpower training.[note 15] W. Willard “Bill” Wirtz was U.S. secretary of labor from September 1962 to January 1969. Here, President Johnson referred to the 1965 amendments to the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA), originially passed in 1962. While the original program had focused on retraining unemployed skilled workers with families, the 1965 legislation continued an expansion of MDTA begun in the 1963 amendments, which increased the availability of training programs for the unskilled, the poor, single people, and dropouts. In particular, the 1965 amendments increased the eligibility period for training allowances, authorized training allowances for single people in training programs, removed a cap on the percentage of trainees who could be under 22, and created “a program of experimental, demonstration and pilot projects” for “the long-term unemployed, disadvantaged youth, displaced older workers, the handicapped and members of minority and similar groups.” Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, vol. 21 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1966), 810–11. [Daley acknowledges.] I put through a college program, taking care of another hundred thousand. So—[note 16] Johnson referred to the Higher Education Act of 1965, which provided scholarship funds for 140,000 college students. The bill also expanded college work-study programs and added insured loans. The Work-Study Program was transferred from the Office of Economic Opportunity to the Office of Education in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1965, vol. 21, pp. 294–96.

Right.

—it narrows it down to less than a million that he’s got from over 2 million we started with.

That’s right.

Now, then, if I’m giving him after—the private industry is taking a hell of a group of them. [Daley attempts to interject.] I put 400 million [dollars] in war contracts in the Appalachia area and its employment. I’ve reduced it [the U.S. unemployment rate] from 4.3 to 3.2 and that’s taken care of 6[00,000], 700,000.

And every local government that’s worth its salt has got a cooperative program in which they’re taking some more of them on . . . in the way of jobs. And we’ll have more of them in ’66. [President Johnson acknowledges.] But I’m sure that you can work it out, and I don’t think there should be any conflict in this thing over poverty. I don’t think that the director—and you’ve been very nice to him, in both positions—should take any arbitrary action. I think it should be done and resolved sitting down and working it out and having him say what he would like, and then after the meeting come out and say, “I asked the President to be relieved of one or the other.” Not to just resign both of them. I think this is an unfair thing to do to any man, including the President of the United States. And regardless of what they’re planning or what they’re thinking, it isn’t fair for him and anyone to put—you have to talk to him and then explain it to him. He’s interested in the future. He’s very anxious—ambitious, as you know, politically. Well, for a fellow to do a thing like this, he wouldn’t get very far, in my opinion.

My own thought is what he ought to do is we ought to try to keep him as close to this year as we can. We ought to make him go up and get these appropriations through in January, February, or March sometime.

That’s right.

And we ought to put a man in the Peace Corps that can handle it. Hold on, just name him for a while, and then when Shriver wants to change over after he gets this appropriation through and gets the election behind him, we put him back in the Peace Corps [Daley attempts to interject] and have a man trained for the poverty thing.[note 17] Shriver would actually stay on as OEO director until the spring of 1968, when President Johnson appointed him U.S. ambassador to France.

That’s the way to do it. That’s a wonderful solution, Mr. President. Well, again, I would like to say very sincerely that everything that’s good to you, Mrs. Johnson, and to your fine family—

Now, Mayor, you’re responsible for most of it. You’re one of the best men I’ve got [Daley acknowledges], one of the ones I love the most, and one of the ones who stayed with me when the going was tough in ’60 and spring of ’64, and I never forget it.

Well, I’ll be there—

Say, I’ve got a problem, and you’ve got to worry about—you’ve got your own problems more than this—but, you know, they wound up this election, and [Richard C. “Dick”] Maguire who’d been running the thing for Kennedy, he’s left now [Daley acknowledges], and he’s leaving that committee owing over 3 billion dollars.[note 18] Richard C. “Dick” Maguire was treasurer of the Democratic National Committee in the 1960s, and a scheduler and aide in the Kennedy White House.

Is that right?

Yeah, and . . . [Daley attempts to interject throughout.] We’ve got to do something about it next year, and I’ve got to have you and about five others like Arthur [B.] Krim and some of these practical, hard-headed, able fellows and they got to figure out what to do and what I got to do at a minimum, maybe five or ten places, and then we got to divide them, and we got to put every Cabinet officer, every top man, the President, the Vice President, and then we got to go in and give y’all a share and we got to figure out some way to get rid of this, ‘cause I don’t want to lay awake at night thinking about [Daley acknowledges] Maguire leaving a 3-million[-dollar] deficit.[note 19] Arthur B. Krim was a lawyer; chair of United Artists from 1951 to 1978; finance chair for the Democratic National Committee; and an adviser to Lyndon Johnson.

We can do that, Mr. President, and we’ll be glad to cooperate, you know that.

OK, give Mrs. [Eleanor “Sis”] Daley my love.[note 20] Eleanor “Sis” Daley was the wife of Mayor Richard J. Daley since 1936, and the first lady of Chicago from 1955 to 1976.

Fine. Good-bye, Mr. President.

Bye.