Yeah.

Mac?

Yeah.

This statement’s all right.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Now, let me ask you this: Is [Moïse] Tshombe not aboard on this thing?[note 1] Moïse Kapenda Tshombe was president of the secessionist Katanga Province of the Congo from 1960 to 1963, and prime minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from July 1964 to October 1965.

No, Tshombe’s aboard, but what he’s given is authorization rather than a request, which was the best that could be done in the haggling with him in the last two or three days.

Well, now, what’s he going to denounce us and say this is ag—

[speaking under President Johnson] No, he’s not [unclear]—

Is he going to say this is aggression? I—

No, he’s not, Mr. President. He’s actually very strong for the operation [unclear]—

That was my impression, but the papers indicate that he’s . . . he says any unilateral decision made without his agreement will be regarded as aggression.

No, that is not correct. We checked that out, and that was a statement by an informa[tion]—that was a New York Times story, at least the one I saw, and we checked it out, and it was an information officer going off half-cocked at a time before we’d been able to get in to Tshombe.[note 2] For the Times story mentioned by Bundy, see “Rebels in Congo Near Showdown, Shift Prisoners,” New York Times, 22 November 1964. As Bundy indicates, the story refers to a statement by the “Congolese government,” rather than by Tshombe himself. He does have a political problem in that he doesn’t want to be the fellow who couldn’t do it himself. But he has given a written authorization, and we have documents to prove it, and those documents are available both to us and to the United Nations, and there isn’t any problem in terms of the legal authorization of the Belgians and ourselves to operate under the Geneva Conventions and our own obligations toward our own nationals.

But there is a doubt as to whether he really . . . urges us to do this?

He hasn’t asked us to do it; he’s authorized us to do it. That’s right.

Mm-hmm. Now, why do we think that—I’m just getting prepared. I want to get as good a background on why do we think this is essential. [speaking over Bundy] We see no hope of being able to negotiate it out.

There’s no hope of negotiating it out. And—

What about the United Nations?

Well, we’ve been in and out of every forum but the United Nations. These people have no standing at the United Nations. They refuse to have international visiting parties, even African ones, the OAU, the Organization of the African Union, come in there. We have, as the statement says, tried every which way to get the Red Cross and the OAU and other international bodies to handle this matter, and we’ve got no answer except threats to the hostages if we don’t abandon Tshombe, is what it amounts to.

Now, what do you think the press reaction’s going to be to this?

I think the press will hold their breath till they see whether it works, Mr. President, [President Johnson acknowledges] is my guess, and I think we’re going to—I think the advantage we have at the moment is that we will have the first stories. With any luck, our paratroopers will have—the Belgian paratroopers will take the radio, and we will be the people who know what is, in fact, happening in Stanleyville. So that we will have a chance to deal—that’s why we’re all on the job all night tonight, because the first news is the news that decides in a matter of this case—a matter of this kind, it seems to me a very large part of the battle. And that’s why we want this statement cleared to go, because it will be the first public statement that this thing is actually happening, although rumors have been around all afternoon and evening coming mainly out of Brazzaville. [President Johnson acknowledges.]

I would guess that the public reaction will be that [President Johnson snorts] unless the thing is a complete shambles, which I do not expect myself, that this was a resolute action, that the principal responsibility rested, first, with the Congo government which authorized it, second, with the Belgian government, and, third, with the United States government, which was firmly in position and which has not allowed itself to hesitate in the face of—and which has made every reasonable effort. I think the record is clear on that point.

The real trouble with this damn thing is, of course, that we don’t know what’s going to happen in that city. And the real choice has been whether we would feel sorrier if we tried it, and it didn’t work well, or if we didn’t try it, and it didn’t work well. And it’s that negative reason that has made me feel that the advice to you was right, and that [Paul-Henri C.] Spaak’s decision was right, and that we were right to go along with it.[note 3] Paul-Henri C. Spaak was prime minister of Belgium from May 1938 to February 1939, in March 1946, and from March 1947 to August 1949; Belgian foreign minister from 1939 to 1966; president of the U.N. General Assembly from March 1946 to March 1947; president of the Common Assembly from September 1952 to May 1954; and secretary-general of NATO from May 1957 to April 1961. [President Johnson acknowledges.] Because if there’s a shambles in Stanleyville and 500 paratroopers are down at Kamina, we look damn silly.

Now, how many [Chester B.] Bowleses have we got around town that are not aboard on this?[note 4] Chester B. Bowles was a U.S. representative [D–Connecticut] from January 1959 to January 1961; U.S. under secretary of state from January to December 1961; and U.S. ambassador to India from October 1951 to March 1953 and July 1963 to April 1969. Bowles had expressed concern about the failed Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961 and had been vocal in his opposition both prior to its commencement and after its conclusion. Any?

Not a one, Mr. President. The people who have the most reservations about it probably are people—if I had to guess, the fellow who was most wary this morning was [Robert S.] Bob McNamara, and you know him, he’s a grave.[note 5] Robert S. “Bob” McNamara was president of Ford Motor Company from November 1960 to January 1961; U.S. secretary of defense from January 1961 to February 1968; and president of the World Bank from April 1968 to July 1981. Nobody will ever know that. [President Johnson acknowledges.] John [A.] McCone is a little wary, and you might get some backlash from his people.[note 6] John A. McCone was a California businessman; chair of the Atomic Energy Commission from July 1958 to January 1961; and director of the Central Intelligence Agency from November 1961 to April 1965.

Well, did he agree to this?

He agreed to it on the ground that Spaak recommended it, but if Spaak had not recommended it, he would have been against it.

Mm-hmm. What about [W. Averell] Harriman?[note 7] W. Averell Harriman was U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union from October 1943 to January 1946; U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom from April 1946 to October 1946; U.S. secretary of commerce from October 1946 to April 1948; director of the Mutual Security Agency from October 1951 to January 1953; a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1952 and 1956; the Democratic governor of New York from January 1955 to December 1958; U.S. ambassador-at-large from January 1961 to November 1961; U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs from December 1961 to April 1963; U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs from April 1963 to March 1965; and ambassador-at-large and chief U.S. delegate to the Paris Peace Talks from May 1968 to January 1969.

Harriman is hot for it. [President Johnson acknowledges.] [George W.] Ball is—Ball is hot for it.[note 8] George W. Ball was a Washington lawyer with an international practice; an adviser to Adlai E. Stevenson II in 1952, 1956, and 1960; U.S. under secretary of state for economic affairs in 1961; U.S. under secretary of state from 1961 to 1966; and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in 1968.

Now, Carl [T.] Rowan’s very much against it.[note 9] Carl T. Rowan was U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state in 1961; a delegate to the United Nations in 1962; U.S. ambassador to Finland in 1963; and director of the U.S. Information Agency from 1964 to 1965.

Is he?

Yeah. He thinks that—

[Donald M.] Don Wilson has been in every meeting and hasn’t said a word, so there’s been no representation that I’ve heard of a USIA [United States Information Agency] opinion against it.[note 10] Donald M. “Don” Wilson was deputy director of the U.S. Information Agency from 1961 to 1965.

He says it’ll hurt us with the other African countries. It’ll hurt us—

[speaking over President Johnson] Well, it will. It will. I mean, if he’s just—if he’s reciting simply as to whether, from the point of view of U.S. propaganda, it’s easier or harder in Africa the morning after, he’s absolutely right. It is harder.

He thinks it’ll hurt us with the Negroes in this country.

I’m no expert on that, but I would guess that in a straight humanitarian venture and when it becomes clear, as it will be clear within a week, that these people go in and they come out, and that they are there on this mission and no other, I think it’ll be a very short-lived feeling among American Negroes and even among African Negroes. [President Johnson acknowledges.] Not half the patch of what we’d have to deal with if a lot of people got massacred, because we couldn’t quite say yes to a Belgian request.

When is this supposed to occur?

They are in the air. They’re on schedule. We—they should be dropping in anytime within—between now and midnight. Eleven [o’clock p.m.] Washington time, which is right now, has been the target hour, but you know how these things are. [President Johnson acknowledges.] First light is the theory. The first light in Stanleyville, and it should be at this hour here in Washington.

How long before we should know something?

It might take a couple hours, and we might know something in an hour. We just don’t know, and it might take longer, because it depends on how busy they are, and whether they have time to report out, and whether they get the radio, or whether they have to use their own single-side band, which is a slightly longer system.

OK, you let me know soon as you know anything.

I’ll call you as soon as I know anything, and I’ll call you if I don’t know anything.

All right. Good-bye.

Right.