Mr. President?

Yes, Bob.

Bob. I just wanted to bring you up to date on the Belgian operation—on the Congo. It came off, as I think you’re aware, at eleven o’clock last night, Eastern Standard Time, when 545 Belgians were dropped. No casualties from fire during the drop. Two or three soldiers were injured—broken ankles and things of that kind. Twelve U.S. C-130s participated; four were hit by ground fire. One sustained major damage in a fuel tank. All, however, landed safely at Leopoldville. No U.S. casualties in the aircraft at all.

The aircraft was secured—the airfield was secured in about half an hour, which was excellent under the circumstances. The city was entered in about 45 minutes after the start of the drop. The European hostages had been rounded up by the rebels into two groups: one group was out near the airport; the other was, in effect, in a square of the city. There were 60 to 75 U.S. personnel in a hotel, and we think that, of these, as many as 15 . . . Let me start again. There were 60 to 75 personnel, including some U.S.—mostly Belgians, however—in a hotel. And of the fif—of the 60 to 75, 15 were killed by the rebels, shooting indiscriminately into the mob. Thirty were wounded. There were about 250 European civilians herded into a square. Rebels fired into those; about 15 were killed and 40 wounded. So, it looks as though something on the order of 30 hostages were killed and maybe 70 wounded.

Our consul, the man named [Michael P. E.] Hoyt, H-O-Y-T, is reported well and has been evacuated, we believe.[note 1] Michael P. E. Hoyt was a U.S. Foreign Service officer from 1956 until his retirement in 1980; U.S. consul in the Congo, Stanleyville, in 1964 during the Simba Rebellion, when he was taken hostage by rebels for 111 days; the recipient of the U.S. State Department Secretary’s Award in 1965; deputy chief of mission in Burundi and charge d’affaires during the Hutu genocide in 1972; and a counselor for human rights at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. Dr. [Paul E.] Carlson, the missionary, we believe is dead.[note 2] Dr. Paul E. Carlson was a physician and an Evangelical Covenant missionary to the Democratic Republic of the Congo beginning in 1961. He was killed on 24 November 1964 by Congolese rebels during the Simba Rebellion. The [Frédéric] Vandewalle column, which was the column led by mercenaries, entered the city about five hours after the drop started and linked up with the Belgian paratroopers.[note 3] Col. Frédéric Vandewalle was a Belgian colonial military leader in the Congo from 1937 to 1957, and head of state security forces from 1957 to 1960; an organizer of the Katangese secession from the Congo; and leader of Operation Ommegang against the Simba Rebellion during the Congo Crisis from 1963 to 1965. And the Vandewalle column captured the Camp Ketele, which was on the eastern side of the city and was the center of the rebel power area where the other hostages had been reported. Our C-130s have been running missions between Stanleyville and Leopoldville, evacuating the refugees. About 200 to 300 have already been taken out and about 500 more remain to be taken out. We think we’ll take out about half with C-130s and the other half with commercial aircraft. So far, it’s been, I should say, militarily, a highly successful operation, but the casualties to the hostages have been heavy.

How many Americans do you anticip[ate]—

We don’t really know. As you know, we thought there were about 25 American hostages there, with some 600-odd Belgian hostages. And we don’t know that any Americans were either killed or wounded, but my guess is that there must have been some.

What about—

Other than Carlson, as I mentioned, who we believe is dead.

What’d they do, just make him pay the price when their—

Well, we don’t have the exact details of his death here. We don’t know whether he was killed ahead of time or during the episode. I believe it was ahead of time, but I’m not absolutely positive of that.

Any rebels killed?

I’m sure there were, but we don’t have reports of that, either.

Who would kill them? Paratroopers?

The Belgian paratroopers, yes. And the Vandewalle column, coming in from the other side.

What’s the reaction in our country, in your judge[ment]—

It’s too early to say, Mr. President. It missed most of the morning papers. But the late morning Washington Post has an article on the front page, and the headline is, “U.S. Drops Rescuers in Congo.” The article is straightforward but appears . . . entirely sensible.

What are the potential dangers as you see that—this action?

Well, the danger is that—The dangers are severalfold: One, we can be accused of colonialism—linking up with a reactionary government in the Congo and indiscriminately killing the rebel people, who we believe will be supported by the eight-nation African conference. It looks almost certain as though [Jomo] Kenyatta and the governments of seven other African states will be supporting the rebels and, therefore, attacking us for supporting the government.[note 4] Jomo Kenyatta was president of Kenya from December 1964 to August 1978. I doubt, however, that in view of the rebel action in indiscriminately killing the hostages, there will be any strong public support in this country for that charge. I think we would have been in a worse position if we’d gone ahead and withheld the drop and then had the Vandewalle column approach the city, and the rebels would have acted, I suspect, in almost exactly the same fashion, except they would have had more time and killed more hostages. And then you would have been charged with withholding military assistance, which was close at hand, and as a result, accepting a large number of civilian deaths.

Who really planned this operation? [Paul-Henri C.] Spaak?[note 5] Paul-Henri C. Spaak was prime minister of Belgium from May 1938 to February 1939, in March 1946, and from March 1947 to August 1949; Belgian foreign minister from 1939 to 1966; president of the U.N. General Assembly from March 1946 to March 1947; president of the Common Assembly from September 1952 to May 1954; and secretary-general of NATO from May 1957 to April 1961.

It was planned by—Pardon me? It was planned by the Belgians, and it was initiated by the Belgians, and we did not put any pressure on Spaak to undertake it. And he initiated yesterday the recommendation to go ahead, after he had met with his Cabinet in Belgium, and the whole Cabinet approved the proposal before we recommended it to you at noontime.

Hmm. All right, what else?

I talked to Dean [Rusk] yesterday after your call about [Maxwell D.] Max [Taylor]‘s statement, and we did send the—I had State send out the queries last night.[note 6] Dean Rusk was U.S. deputy under secretary of state from 1949 to 1950; U.S. assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs from March 1950 to December 1951; a trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation from 1950 to 1961, and president from 1952 to 1961; U.S. secretary of state from January 1961 to January 1969; recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom, with distinction, in 1969; and professor of international law at the University of Georgia School of Law from 1970 to 1984. Gen. Maxwell D. “Max” Taylor was a military representative of the president from 1961 to 1962; chair of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff from October 1962 to July 1964; and U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam from July 1964 to July 1965. Taylor had given an interview to Life magazine in which he suggested a limited expansion of the war that would include the bombing of targets in Laos and North Vietnam. See David Halberstam, “U.S. Says Taylor Speaks Own View,” New York Times, 24 November 1964. But it turned out that State had seen the Life article and had concurred in it.

Hmm.

So Max was entirely justified in assuming that his statements were in accordance with government policy. As a matter of fact, the State Department—[Robert J.] McCloskey issued a statement yesterday to the press, which was printed in last night’s papers and also this morning’s, indicating that State had seen the article, and there is one statement in here, that the State Department concurs in it.[note 7] Robert J. McCloskey was spokesperson for the State Department from 1964 to 1973, and U.S. ambassador to Cyprus from May 1973 to January 1974. I’ll see if I can find it for you in just a second. [Pause.] Which we’re going to—It’s going to cause a little trouble, as a matter of fact. But the main point I wanted to leave with you is that I don’t believe Max got out of line here.

You don’t think the story about the Johnson administration—he’s determined whether he’d stay, but what they did is—

Mr. President, I am absolutely certain that isn’t true. I can just guarantee that. He’s not that kind of a person.

Mm-hmm. Why would State be app—Why would he be giving out such an interview, and why would they be approving it? Do they think there’s some good will flow from it?

I assume so. I think on—the interview itself wasn’t bad. I haven’t read it yet. It came out—or, it’s coming out in today’s Life. Here’s what it says, [reading aloud from the text] “‘U.S. Supports General Taylor on Value of Air Strikes against Viet Reds.’ The State Department yesterday in effect endorsed General Maxwell Taylor’s assertion that air strikes at Communist training areas in North Vietnam would help the military effort against Red guerrillas battling to overthrow the American-supported government of South Vietnam. Press Officer McCloskey said the department saw a text of an interview given by Taylor, ambassador to Saigon, in advance and did not object to any part of it. The spokesman said the State Department did not formally clear Taylor’s interview with Life, but he said this was not necessary, because the ambassador is his own man and is free to grant interviews without clearing them. If there’s anything a bit extraordinary in what an ambassador intends to say, the Department is usually informed. We were in this case. The Department’s endorsement also appeared to cover Taylor’s acknowledgment that the outcome of the struggle in South Vietnam, in which 20,000 American servicemen are engaged, is very much in doubt.”

Hmm. I think it’d be better not said, don’t you?

Well, I think it probably would have been, except I should read the article before I come to that conclusion. And I have it on my desk, but I just haven’t read it yet.

Well, interpretation that I have seen is that we’re sending up trial balloons. We don’t know what to do. That we’re just trying to see how the public [McNamara acknowledges and attempts to interject] feels, and we want to shift with the sands. I don’t like that impression.

I completely agree with it. It’s an untimely release. It couldn’t have come at a worse time, in view of that fact he’s coming back here and a discussion will take place next week. But I’m sure that he was not acting in any way that he thought was contrary to government policy. And he—under no circumstances would he make such a statement as that, that was attributed to him, about resigning in the event his recommendations were not accepted.

Bob, I wonder if you couldn’t get with [H.] Gardner Ackley and [C. Douglas] Doug Dillon and a little group there that you might think—put together and see what steps, if any, we should take in connection with the proposed steel increases.[note 8] H. Gardner Ackley was a member of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) from August 1962 to February 1968, and chair of the CEA from November 1964 to February 1968. C. Douglas “Doug” Dillon was U.S. ambassador to France from March 1953 to January 1957; U.S. under secretary of state for economic affairs from July 1958 to June 1959; U.S. under secretary of state from June 1959 to January 1961; and U.S. secretary of the treasury from January 1961 to April 1965.

Yes, Doug called. I guess you talked to Doug about that, and he called a meeting at—for 11:15 yesterday, which I was to attend. Unfortunately, the Congo crisis took precedence over it, but I believe that he met with Gardner Ackley and perhaps Kermit Gordon at the time.[note 9] Kermit Gordon was a member of the Council of Economic Advisers from 1961 to 1962, and director of the Bureau of the Budget from December 1962 to June 1965. And I talked to Doug ahead of time about my views. Now, I haven’t talked to him since, so I don’t know what they did, but we will get something together for you on that.

I talked to Clark [M.] Clifford last night.[note 10] Clark M. Clifford was a Washington lawyer; an adviser to presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson; a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1961 to 1968; chair of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from April 1963 to February 1968; and U.S. secretary of defense from March 1968 to January 1969. He’s kind of working the other side of the street with the labor people through [Arthur J.] Goldberg and trying to see if they can’t make them aware of the extreme dangers that—[note 11] Arthur J. Goldberg was part of the general counsel of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and United Steelworkers of America from 1948 to 1961; U.S. secretary of labor from January 1961 to September 1962; an associate justice on the U.S. Supreme Court from September 1962 to July 1965; and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from July 1965 to June 1968.

Yeah.

—this thing holds.

Well, I will get back to Doug this morning. I’ll make sure we have something for you.

Another thing I would like for you to do, if you could, [is] to talk to Rusk. This honorary fraternity—sorority—whatever you call it. The journalism outfit— [speaking aside to Lady Bird Johnson] [Lady] Bird [Johnson], what is that?[note 12] Lady Bird Johnson (née Claudia Alta Taylor) was the wife of Lyndon B. Johnson since 1934; second lady of the United States from January 1961 to November 1963; and first lady of the United States from November 1963 to January 1969. She graduated from the University of Texas with a degree in journalism and history.

Oh, Sigma [Delta] Chi.[note 13] McNamara means Sigma Delta Chi, the journalism honor society now known as the Society of Professional Journalists.

Yes, Sigma Chi.

Yeah, yeah.

Did you see their article yester—

I did. I did.

I think we ought to consider carefully what they have said and see if there’s any real justification for the position that they have taken. I’d like to have it objectively evaluated, and also see what we might put into effect that would improve our acceptance in these quarters.

I have a letter from [Eugene S.] Gene Robb and a group of the editorial association, in which they’re somewhat critical.[note 14] Eugene S. “Gene” Robb was publisher of the Albany (NY) Times-Union and the Knickerbocker News from 1953 until his death in August 1969, and president of the American Newspaper Publishers Association. They want to meet with me and try to clear up the secretiveness in government, and what we’re holding back and what we’re hiding, and more or less have a[n] open policy and—

Yeah.

—I have the letter yesterday from a friend of mine, kind of advising me how to be a good president. It had a page and a half all on this subject, which shows that there’s a pretty . . . influential group in this organization that’s seriously considering the practices at the White House, the Defense Department, and the State Department. [McNamara acknowledges.] And I would think that we ought to try to see what we have done during these four years and improved upon the availability and accessibility of information and Cabinet officers and presidents. And the legitimate gripe that I could see that would lie against us, at the White House, would be lack of sufficient advance notices.

Mm-hmm. I think that is a basis for criticism, Mr. President. That was one of the major charges that Sigma Chi article made.

Well, I think that’s the only real . . . and it seems to me that that would come from people who [are] kind of scattered out and don’t have people at the White House and don’t want to rely on the wire services, and so forth. We usually give them a few hours’ notice, and we sometimes give them a day’s notice, but I don’t see that we really—I don’t see they’re very consistent. If they want the information we have, when we have it, when we believe it’s news, we haven’t got much time to give them two or three days.

Well, I don’t—Mr. President, I think this is one of those image problems rather than a matter of substance. I think they interpret the lack of notice as a desire to avoid having specialists at the press conference and therefore avoid penetrating questions. And I’m sure they don’t think they need more than 12 hours’ notice.

Mm-hmm. Well, they have had that in some instances, but we don’t—unless you manufacture it, we don’t—and I don’t know how good a policy it is to just urge departments to get stuff so you’re really prepared for them. I’ve tried it, but to me it’s pretty superficial to—for the President to be going around begging people to give him something to give to the press and assuming the responsibility for getting them occupied twice a day, [McNamara acknowledges] because you may not have anything for two weeks.

Yeah, I agree.

And—

I do think this is a problem. How we solve it, I’m not entirely sure.

I think that’s right. I think that’s right. And I would like to have a little—like for you to talk to Dean, and get—I think it might be good to get McCloskey and—I mean, his man, whatever his name is—

Yeah, [James L. “Jim”] Greenfield.[note 15] James L. “Jim” Greenfield was a foreign correspondent for Time magazine; U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for public affairs during the Kennedy administration; U.S. assistant secretary of state for public affairs from September 1964 to March 1966; foreign news editor for the New York Times from 1969 to 1977; and project editor for the Times‘s publication of the Pentagon Papers.

—Greenfield, and your man, and y’all give some thoughts to it, and particularly what they say about us, and then let us evaluate that, too, and I’ll have George [E. Reedy] talk to Greenfield [McNamara acknowledges] and your man.[note 16] George E. Reedy was an aide to Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson from 1960 to 1964; White House press secretary from March 1964 to July 1965; and a special consultant to the president from 1968 to 1969.

Now, one thing worried me a little—I don’t want to say anything about it at all, but I think you ought to be prepared—this hunt down here has been pretty well advertised; I haven’t been able to participate much. [Richard B. “Dick”] Russell [Jr.] [D–Georgia] hasn’t gone out at all.[note 17] Richard B. “Dick” Russell Jr. was a U.S. senator [D–Georgia] from January 1933 to January 1971; chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee from January 1951 to January 1953 and January 1955 to January 1969; and chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee from January 1969 to January 1971. President Johnson was hosting several additional Georgia politicians on a hunting trip that had generated considerable angst for him. (Russell did not participate in the actual hunt.) See Conversation WH6411-19-6346-6347. I’ve talked to him at some length about this training for these rejects.[note 18] President Johnson is referring to Project 100,000 for draft rejectees.

Yeah.

And he says, well, if we want it, that he’ll go ahead and help us. He doesn’t say when. I thought I would close up on that in the morning.

I talked to him about this Congo operation; he would normally be expected to really raise hell about it. I think that he thinks that we’re doing the only thing we could do under the circumstances. That the alternative is worse than what we really did.

I think pretty generally the meeting’s going all right. There’s some tensions and strains there between the governor [Carl E. Sanders Sr.] and the senator.[note 19] Carl E. Sanders Sr. was the Democratic governor of Georgia from January 1963 to January 1967. But I think we’re going to come out of it as well as we could.

Now, he told me he was going home this morning, and that you were going—he had asked you to send for him.

Yes.

They—the Republicans have raised a good deal of questions, in the press, about whether this was—trip was being made at government expense or not, and they didn’t want any hunting parties conducted by jet airplanes, and so forth. They were informed by our people here that they were coming in their own plane, that we had agreed to send our own personal plane for them, not a government plane, but one we own. But they said no, they wanted to come in their own.[note 20] In a conversation on 10 November 1964, Senator Russell had said, “Well, I can get—I think I can get Lockheed to fly us out there in one of their planes.” See Conversation WH6411-14-6315. Now, I assume that—I didn’t know about this until this morning when they told me that they were contemplating—the military aide said that instead of—they wanted to leave here about 8:15. Now, I assume that you’re going to—there’s—that you got a good reason why you need to have him up there to talk to him—

Oh, absolutely. He’s going to breakfast tomorrow morning at eight o’clock with [Cyrus R.] Cy [Vance] and me, [President Johnson attempts to interject] and it’s very important.[note 21] Cyrus R. “Cy” Vance was secretary of the U.S. Army from 1962 to 1963; U.S. deputy secretary of defense from 1964 to 1967; special representative of the president to Cyprus in 1967 and to Korea in 1968; and U.S. negotiator at the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam from 1968 to 1969. We’re going over a whole series of projects that we’re considering for the fiscal ‘66 program and on which we want his advice.

So, you’ll just—your position would be, if you’re asked, that you—

That I asked for him.

—he was here, and you asked for him, and asked him if he’d come, and told him you’d send for him.

That’s right.

You think that’s all right?

That’s right, and that he had not planned to come here. He planned to go back to Georgia, and he’s coming at my request.

All right. Any other news?

No, sir. [Slight chuckle.]

Well, I’ll—thank you a whole lot.

Very good. Bye.