But, I think—I don’t think that any of the leaders except possibly John Lewis on the SNCC [Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee] people really feel that way at all.[note 2] John Lewis, a seminary student, was chair of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) from 1963 to 1966. Lewis was a veteran of civil rights struggles in Nashville and the Freedom Rides, and although SNCC did not agree to participate in the Bloody Sunday march, Lewis did so on his own. Along with SCLC leader Hosea Williams, he led the procession.

I think one of the thing—

[Unclear] kids are hard to handle. I mean, we’ve been having them all over the country, and—

Yeah, I know, but what are all these ministers coming in all over the country for if they don’t feel like they’ve been mistreated here?

[Pause.] Well—

This minister [James Reeb] is going to die, isn’t he?[note 3] James Reeb was a Unitarian Universalist minister and civil rights activist who was murdered by white segregationists in March 1965 during the Selma to Montgomery marches. The 38-year old Reeb died late the next day after this conversation. President Johnson then telephoned Reeb’s wife and father (at 9:25 p.m. and 9:35 p.m., respectively), according to the Presidential Daily Diary.

Yes, sir.

Is he already dead?

No, sir, but he is for all intents and purposes. I think they’re just trying to keep him alive, you know, in a technical kind of way, as long as they can, at least, so that he dies . . . doesn’t die at a time when, you know, flare things up. I think—I expect he’ll be dead by early morning.

What time do you think he’ll die?

They tell me that he could stay alive for another 24 or 36 hours on these mechanical things, but I think he’ll probably die early tomorrow morning.

Ah. Do you think you’ll have your court order in the morning?

Yeah, I think we’ll do . . . I think we’ll get it worked out tomorrow sometime. I think the judge [Frank M. Johnson Jr.] is going to be pretty good.[note 4] Frank M. Johnson Jr. was a judge of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama from 1955 to 1979, and served as chief judge from 1966 to 1979. He’s not going to embarrass [Martin Luther] King [Jr.] on this.[note 5] Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was a leader in the civil rights movement; pastor of the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama, from 1954 to 1960; organizer of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in 1957; co-pastor (with his father) of the Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta, Georgia, from 1960 until his assassination on 4 April 1968; and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964. He’s not going to find that King was in violation of any laws. And then we’re working out the terms of that march in, I think, will be pretty satisfactory terms. Then, as I told Bill Moyers, King has accepted the idea that if this minister dies that the Montgomery . . . the Selma–Montgomery March, or what they’re going to call a march, is going to be in his honor.[note 6] Bill Moyers was deputy director of the Peace Corps from 1961 to 1964; special assistant to the president from 1963 to 1967; White House press secretary from 1965 to 1967; and publisher of Newsday from 1967 to 1970. Now, that’ll do a lot to relieve the other demonstrations people would feel they had to make about this and, in addition, will give a funereal quality to it. You know, be like going to church, and that’ll keep the rowdies down. I think that’s a good idea.

All right. Now, I think that—

We ought to do something with the ministers to . . . [unclear]—

I think Bill ought to talk to some of them tonight and get the feel, and then maybe you and Bill, or you and Lee [C.] White and Bill ought to invite some of them in in the morning to take . . . to take this heat off and to explain to them what’s behind our reasoning and our thinking, and I think particularly yours and the Vice President’s [Hubert H. Humphrey Jr.] and Bill’s anyway that you can to get me out of the line of fire as much as we can.[note 7] Lee C. White was assistant special counsel to the president from 1961 to 1963; associate counsel to the president from 1963 to 1965; special counsel to the president from 1965 to 1966; and chair of the Federal Power Commission from 1966 to 1969. Hubert H. Humphrey Jr. was the Democratic mayor of Minneapolis, Minnesota, from July 1945 to November 1948; a U.S. senator [D–Minnesota] from January 1949 to December 1964 and January 1971 to January 1978; Senate Majority Whip from January 1961 to December 1964; vice president of the United States from January 1965 to January 1969; and the Democratic U.S. presidential candidate in 1968.

Right. Well, that’s what—

He has—the Vice President has a memorandum. He doesn’t have any recommendations.

Yeah.

But he’s just transmitting. That’s about all he’s doing. And we need to have somebody say to them, now, federal marshals were not dispatched to their area to arrest persons attacking federal officials because there weren’t any federal officials being attacked, were there?

No. We had one FBI fellow bummed up.[note 8] See President Johnson and Nicholas Katzenbach, 8 March 1965, Conversation WH6503-03-7029.

Now, the second thing they say is leaders of white segregationist forces, including [Albert J.] Al Lingo, will be arrested for encouraging their officers and troops to violate the civil rights of others.[note 9] Albert J. “Al” Lingo was director of the Alabama Department of Public Safety from 1963 to 1965, and an Alabama highway patrol officer. Colonel Lingo redubbed the highway patrol officers “State Troopers.” His troopers had charged into peaceful marchers with clubs and tear gas on Bloody Sunday.

We may have a case against Lingo, and we may arrest him.[note 10] The next day, on 11 March, federal judge Frank M. Johnson Jr. began a hearing to investigate the possible use of unreasonable force by Alabama authorities. In attendance with their attorneys were Colonel Lingo and Dallas County sheriff James G. “Jim” Clark Jr., whose posse of mounted officers used clubs and cattle prods to attack marchers. William Chapman, “Selma Clashes Are ‘Refought’ in Federal Court,” Washington Post, 12 March 1965. [President Johnson acknowledges.] I’ve been—and that may be possible to do if . . . It’s a delicate decision.

Sheriff [James G. “Jim”] Clark?[note 11] James G. “Jim” Clark Jr. was sheriff of Dallas County, Alabama, from 1955 to 1966.

The sheriff, well, hell, we got three cases against Sheriff Clark now. I don’t mind arresting him much.

Has it already been brought?

Yes, sir. But these are—I mean, these are cases over the past eight months against Clark, and we’re awaiting a decision which we ought to get momentarily from the Court of Appeals in one of those. I don’t really mind . . . I’m a little more reluctant on Lingo, because it touches the Governor [George C. Wallace Jr.] more.[note 12] George C. Wallace Jr. was the Democratic, and later American Independent, governor of Alabama from January 1963 to January 1967, January 1971 to January 1979, and January 1983 to January 1987. But . . . I’ve got—I just sent seven more lawyers down there to go over all this evidence and pictures and whatnot to see what we could do on that.

Well, I think you ought to say in response to this, “Now, we’ve got three cases against Clark already in the courts. I don’t suppose you all know that, but I’ve got seven lawyers going over this evidence, and it’s not something that the President does. He doesn’t [slight chuckle] go after white segregationists or white integrationists. It’s a matter that we follow law and order here.”

All right.

And, third, consideration be given to withdrawing federal financial assistance from certain principle areas of Alabama.

Mm-hmm.

We have no right to do that because somebody says you can or can’t march, do we?

I don’t see why. I would think that was something that’s governed by Title VI on the civil rights bill.[note 13] As one of the key provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI gave the executive branch extensive authority to address discrimination. The key line read: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” See U.S. Department of Justice, “Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, (Pub. L. 88-352, title VI, Sec. 601, July 2, 1964, 78 Stat. 252.), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/coord/titlevistat.php.

That’s what I think. [reading] “A total of 36 persons attended the meeting. Congressman John [J.] Conyers [Jr.] [D–Michigan] of Detroit lead a delegation from Michigan including Mildred [M. “Millie”] Jeffrey, Joseph Ross [of] the Federal Department Stores, Roy Reuther, Monsignor [Edward] Miles.[note 14] John J. Conyers Jr. was a U.S. representative [D–Michigan] since January 1965, serving his first term at the time of this conversation. Mildred M. “Millie” Jeffrey was a labor and civil rights activist; member of the NAACP since 1941; director of the Women’s Division and later the Consumer Affairs Department of the United Auto Workers (UAW); and a founding member of the National Women’s Political Caucus. Joseph Ross was president of Davidson Brothers, part of the Detroit-based Federal Department Stores chain, founded in 1929. He had come from Nieman-Marcus, and the KKK had targeted him for desegregating lunch counters in Atlanta. “Three State Store Vice-President,” Ebony, February 1964. Roy Reuther cofounded the United Auto Workers (UAW) along with his brothers Walter P. and Victor G. Reuther. Reverend William J. Miles was a Milwaukee-based Episcopal priest and civil rights activist. Edward Miles met with President Johnson on 12 May. The Reverend [Walter E.] Fauntroy of Southern Christian Leadership [Conference] led a group include[d] Bishop Paul Moore [Jr.], Episcopal bishop; Isaac Frank, Jewish community; and representatives of NAACP, CORE, Southern Christian Leadership.[note 15] Reverend Walter E. Fauntroy was a civil rights activist; pastor of New Bethel Baptist Church; director of the Washington Bureau of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); vice chair of the White House Council on Civil Rights in 1966; vice chair of the Washington, D.C., City Council in 1967; and delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives from March 1971 to January 1991. Reverend Paul Moore Jr. was a civil rights activist; an Episcopal priest since 1949; suffragan bishop of Washington, D.C., from 1964 to 1970; and bishop of New York from 1972 to 1989. Isaac Frank headed up the Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington, D.C. In summary, these people are deeply distressed, the situation in Selma. Extremely hopefully some positive steps demonstrating the federal government’s concern for the situation be taken as soon as possible. I assured them these views would be transmitted as soon as possible. I assured them of your deep concern of the situation. I expressed to them a sense of agreement on the objectives we are mutually seeking in this difficult situation. If differences exist, they are differences in judgment, rather than basic commitment and concern.”

Well, now, it seems to me that maybe we ought to suggest to him that he call his group back in tomorrow [Katzenbach acknowledges] and take up these items and say the federal marshals . . . area. We have seven lawyers, and we have FBI getting evidence, and we have arrests being made.

All right.

There’s . . . The leaders of the white segregation—of course, we already have the cases against Clark. We’re just trying to win them.

Yeah.

I don’t know whether we got a case against Lingo, and I would say I doubt that we have, if we don’t have. Consideration be given to withdrawing federal financial assistance. We’ll certainly withdraw it if there’s any violation of Federal Six . . . Title VI, and we say so.

All right.

The . . . [unclear comment by Katzenbach] the fact that they want to meet with the President, they can meet with everybody they want to, and he’s got a good many problems, but if it gives them any satisfaction, be glad to do it. What he’s going to do is follow the recommendations of the . . . the counsel in the matter, the lawyers, the Attorney General and the rest of them, and we’re doing that.

Now, Bill [Moyers], what else do you have to suggest? Let Humphrey call this group together, and you all meet with them, and then, also call the preachers together and meet with them?

Yes, sir, because they are two separate groups—

Then, out of that, if either group wants to and needs to and has to to satisfy them, I don’t mind meeting with them. Now, I’ve got to have a press conference tomorrow—

Which are the two groups? One is the ministers, the other is—

One—

The civil rights group that came in yesterday and the other group is the ministers coming in Friday.[note 16] Johnson met with black newspaper publishers at noon on 11 March, a civil rights group led by Walter Fauntroy at 10:10 a.m. on 12 March, and a committee of the National Council of Churches at 12:15 p.m. that same day. Participants in each session are listed in the Presidential Daily Diary.

But I think before they get here Friday we ought to . . . take the cork out of the bottle on them in the morning.

Yeah, I do, too. Particularly with the ministers. They’ll be much easier to deal with.

Before they start for—

Conyers—Conyers is a tough fellow to deal with.

I can’t hear you.

John Conyers is a tough fellow to deal with, I’ll tell you that. [Pause.] He’s pretty far out.

Who is he? Now, John Conyers? Oh, yeah, Conyers of Detroit. Yeah.

Yeah. He’s a new congressman there, Negro.

Yeah?

And I’ve had a lot of talks with him. I can get a couple of people to . . . down there to go talk with him some more. I mean, a couple people in Congress that are like [James C.] Jim Corman [D–California] of California and a couple of people well identified with civil rights.[note 17] James C. “Jim” Corman was a U.S. representative [D–California] from January 1961 to January 1981. I think even [William D.] Don Edwards [D–California].[note 18] William D. “Don” Edwards was a U.S. representative [D–California] from January 1963 to January 1995.

What I’m anxious to do is not to have the image that we’re southerners and that you’re following a southern president over here who is afraid of Lingo.

Right. Right, well, I—

All I want to do is do what the law and the right dictates. And I have to depend on y’all to tell me as near as you can see it. Now, I’ve got the Vice President tell me what they’re saying in these two memos, so I’m going to say to him to get with you in the morning early, and, Bill, I’m going to ask Bill to talk to preachers tonight and see if he can’t get a group of them as big as you can get in the place where it’s the least . . . I would think in Humphrey’s office would be the best place for the two of you to meet, Bill, to go over and you to go. And I think that you ought to point out to them that we’re doing everything that we can in their interest including drafting the message. Now, what’s the status of that?

I got a draft over there tonight to the White House, which I don’t like much, Mr. President. I’m going to work some more tonight on it.

Mm-hmm. All right, now, what’s the—

[Unclear.] It just doesn’t sing yet, [slight chuckle] I’ll tell you.

What is the development of . . . with [Michael J. “Mike”] Mansfield [D–Montana] and what the hell’s he getting mad at you about?[note 19] Michael J. “Mike” Mansfield was a U.S. senator [D–Montana] from January 1953 to January 1977, and Senate Majority Leader from January 1961 to January 1977.

What? Mansfield?

Yeah.

[Unclear] [Everett M.] Dirksen’s [R–Illinois] story, that’s all.[note 20] Everett M. Dirksen was a U.S. senator [R–Illinois] from January 1951 until his death in September 1969, and Senate Minority Leader from January 1959 to September 1969.

What did Dirksen do, put out an interview that you’d talked to him?

Yeah. Yeah.

And you had—didn’t he call you?

Dirksen?

Yeah.

Yeah, but that was all right. I hadn’t talked with Mansfield, and that was when he—but I’ve calmed that down, I’m sure.

What did you—why did you tell him? What did you tell him?

I told him the exact truth, exactly what I’d done. I said I went down and talked to Dirksen for ten minutes, asked him what his views on this were because we were trying to draft something, and I wanted to know whether he had any particular views on it.

What did he say, “Why didn’t you talk to me?”

No. He didn’t say that. He was very nice. He’s too polite to say that, but that’s what he felt. Of course, the answer is awfully easy in a way.

Dirksen’s on [Senate] Judiciary [Committee] and a lawyer and a Republican. This man is our leader and not a lawyer and not on the Committee.

That’s right. But I think he feels better about it. I don’t think he’s going to do anything. I told him [unclear] we had a draft of the message—told Mike—maybe tonight, but I’ve called him since, called him personally, down there. And said try to get him a draft of the message tomorrow so he could look that over and, you know, give his [unclear]—

Well, now, the ticker says that he said that he’s going to probably put in his own bill tomorrow.

Well, that’s—he’s not going to do that, Mr. President. And I’m confident because in the first place, he’s got [Charles D.] Charlie Ferris drafting a bill for him, and I’ve got a man down there trying to help Charlie.[note 21] Charles D. “Charlie” Ferris was Senator Mike Mansfield’s top lawyer, and general counsel and staff director for the Senate Democratic Policy Committee from 1963 to 1977. They can’t possibly get a bill done.

Who is Charlie Ferris?

He’s the counsel to the [Senate] Democratic Policy Committee. And he’s a fellow that Mike asked to draft a bill. But I talked—when I talked to Senator Mansfield today, I was in his office for about 45 minutes talking with him, and he’s not going to put that [unclear].

Is Dirksen planning to pull out on us?

No, sir.

This is just politics on the television tonight where they say that they might have to go it alone and go the 15th Amendment route, and our message is too—our bill’s too long and no good and too many whereas’s and so forth.

Well, Mike feels that way about it and so does Dirksen, and he’s probably right, could be simplified. But they’re just trying to get in the act, Mr. President, that’s all. [President Johnson acknowledges.] And Dirksen’s told me that he wants to—he told me what he wanted was, if it was possible to work out, he wanted you to recommend a bill, and he wanted to jointly sponsor it with Mike. That’s the best possible situation.[note 22] Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen met with Katzenbach on 12 March and worked out a bipartisan bill to be proposed by the two Senate leaders. E. W. Kenworthy, “Leaders Agree on Bill for Negro Voting Rights,” New York Times, 13 March 1965.

Now, what’s [William M. “Bill”] McCulloch [R–Ohio]?[note 23] William M. “Bill” McCulloch was a U.S. representative [R–Ohio] from November 1947 to January 1973, and the ranking Republican on the House Judiciary Committee.

McCulloch was pretty good today, and I talked to him, and I said I thought that what was important was not to agree necessarily on the language of the bill—because it will take me a year to work that out [laughing] with McCulloch—but to agree on certain principles that the bill had to cover, and he agreed with that. And the only point of difficulty at all there was that he wants me to work through him rather than talk separately or independently with [Gerald R.] Jerry Ford [Jr.] [R–Michigan].[note 24] Gerald R. “Jerry” Ford Jr. was a U.S. representative [R–Michigan] from January 1949 to December 1973; House Minority Leader from January 1965 to December 1973; vice president of the United States from December 1973 to August 1974; and president of the United States from August 1974 to January 1977.

Hmm.

And I think probably that’s the way to do it.[note 25] Gerald Ford began his run as House Minority Leader during this session, replacing Charles Halleck of Indiana.

Yes, I think so since he’s been appointed to the task force and since he wants you to do it.[note 26] President Johnson was referring to a Republican voting rights task force, of which Congressman McCulloch was the chair.

Yeah.

And I don’t think he’d do what Jerry wanted him to anyway and if he feels that way about it . . . Well—

Yeah. This fellow—the fellow he relies on, his staff guy—

Yes.

—is very, very . . . good.

That all right?

Very loyal to us. In fact, he told me—and this is really very confidential—that he drafted the [John V.] Lindsay [R–New York] bill, and he told me all of the traps that they were trying to lay for us down there.[note 27] John V. Lindsay was a U.S. representative [R–New York] from January 1959 to December 1965, and mayor of New York from January 1966 to December 1973. Lindsay was a liberal Republican who was elected mayor of New York City later this year. He served two terms. In 1971, during his second term, he left the Republican Party to become a Democrat. [Chuckles.] [President Johnson acknowledges.] So—

For Lindsay?

Yeah. So, I think that . . . I think we’re in good shape in knowing what to avoid in this bill.

All right. Now, see, I need to know why we didn’t send [Burke] Marshall.[note 28] Burke Marshall was U.S. assistant attorney general for civil rights from 1961 to December 1964. Why we didn’t send troops. Why we didn’t arrest anybody. And I guess we ought to say we’ve arrested everybody we know. How many have we arrested? Four or Five? For this murder?

For the murder, they got the five arrested by the local authorities, but they . . . they expressed their appreciation to the FBI for the contributions we had made. [President Johnson acknowledges.] That in addition to that, I have arranged with them down there, that, if—when the minister dies, they’ll file first-degree murder charges within an hour.

Mm-hmm. [Pause.] Well, now, should we be having somebody in your department communicate all this to the Negro leaders so that the [Roy O.] Wilkinses and the rest of them are not . . . ?[note 29] Roy O. Wilkins was executive secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) from 1955 to 1964; executive director of the NAACP from 1965 to 1977; and recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1967.

I’ve communicated most of it to them today, and Burke Marshall’s been helping me.

Do you find any agitation against Johnson, the southerner, not acting?

Not a bit. Not a bit, Mr. President.

Well, King’s article—this preacher tonight was inflammatory on television. What’s his name, Bill?

I can’t remember his name, Mr. President. He was from St. [unclear] Church here in Washington.

Negro?

No, white.

White?

Just back from Selma.

And they said that—what did he say, Bill?

He said that everyone felt down there that there was no leadership in Washington, that the President had abdicated his responsibilities and that they had to appeal to somebody other than the President to get anything done; that he was not interested . . . or compassionate.

That sounds like they didn’t know I’d made a statement at all.

[Pause.] The feeling runs high, I know, but I don’t know why it should be directed that way. I think the only thing to do is really what you suggested, is to talk to them. I’ve tried to get as much out in front on that as I could, you know, in the sending of troops and all that, to indicate my own doubts about it.

Well—

Un-wisdom of it, not to put it in any way on you. Of course, it’s a stupid thing to do, Mr. President, at this point, but it’s what a lot of these people want, and it’s all they want. And the difficulty with satisfying them is that unless you send troops, they’re not happy. And I think that a lot of it is—it’s a kind of professional agitation, Mr. President, a lot of these people. I think we have to get the good people, and I think it’s very important to meet with the ministers. I agree with that. [Pause.] And to be positive with them, and I think that the Vice President and I could be positive with them.

Well, I think that you ought to, first, take care of their problems: federal marshals, federal troops, arresting Clark [and] Lingo, withdrawing financial assistance—

Mm-hmm.

—seeing the President, and . . . the message going up. And I think you just have to tell them that, very frankly, that your time’s been divided between trying to draft the toughest law you ever saw and the toughest message and, also, handle these matters. And that we’d have been further along if we hadn’t had these problems there.

Mm-hmm.

But you’ve done the best you could and under both circumstances. Then say, now, here is our positive program: Here’s what we’re going to do. Here’s our message. Here’s what it’s going to contain. Here’s our law. Here’s what we’re going to do about it. Here’s when I’m talking to both sides, and here’s the conferences I’ve had yesterday. Here’s where we’re going to prosecute these people down here, and here’s how many people we’ve had. We’ve kept it out of the newspapers. Well, we’ve had eight or ten lawyers and 20, 30 FBI men, and we think that they’re really [in] better shape than if we’d had a bunch of marshals.

Yeah, and I can go—the marshals, I’ve got an awfully good explanation on . . . [unclear]—

Well, what am I going to say at the press conference about them?

Well, we sent some material over on that, Mr. President, and what the authority was on that. I think the . . in a way, the—on marshals, going to send marshals somewhere, it’s exactly the same authority, legally, that you have to send troops.

Yes.

And the job of sending marshals, really—because we don’t have marshals in any great numbers that are available for this—the argument that I make to people is that to produce a meaningful force of marshals, 3[00] to 500 marshals at any place, takes about 72 hours to put together, and they can stay there for about four days. And that this involves leaving the Mexican border totally unpatrolled with border patrol. It involves putting all prison guards on time and a half throughout the country. It involves not transporting prisoners from one institution to another, or prisoners that are sentenced from the local jail to a federal penitentiary.

[Pause.] I’m afraid they’d interpret that as just a bunch of government gobbledy-gook that’s talking about a few dollars when there are lives at stake. I think our better answer, to me, is that we do not think that marshals or troops would get any more done than the FBI and the lawyers are getting done. And that is, namely, to get these people arrested, indicted, and prosecuted, and sent to jail if it’s possible.

Yeah.

And we don’t know what else troops could do. Well, I guess they say that troops could have stopped these deputies from knocking these people in the head.

Yeah.

But I don’t believe that troops would have caught these folks coming out of the café, would they?

No, sir. That’s something that could have happened anywhere, just like the murder of those kids down in Mississippi . . . you know, except there were no law enforcement officials involved in this.[note 30] In the Mississippi Burning case in which three civil rights workers—James Chaney, Michael Schwerner, and Andrew Goodman—were murdered, the Ku Klux Klan mob that killed them had conspired with the sheriff and deputy sheriff of Neshoba County, Mississippi. These were five people . . . I guess they were garage mechanics, worked in a garage down there.

Had they had some words with them or anything?

No, they just went around—it’s like one of those senseless killings, you know. They’re cruising around in the car and saw these people and went out and—they were going into a Negro café—went out and jumped them and beat them.[note 31] The ministers were leaving Walker’s Café in Selma.

All right, then I’ll call Humphrey. Bill, you call the churchmen—

All right.

—and coordinate with . . . with Lee White and Nick, and y’all call and set up some meetings in the morning, soon as you can get them with a) the preachers, b) the civil rights groups, and have Nick available and you available or Lee White—I guess you and Lee White available—for the editors. What time are they, twelve [o’clock], one o’clock?[note 32] President Johnson met with black newspaper publishers at noon on 11 March, a civil rights group led by Walter Fauntroy at 10:10 a.m. on 12 March, and a committee of the National Council of Churches at 12:15 p.m. that same day. Participants in each session are listed in the Presidential Daily Diary.

Twelve.

Twelve, one o’clock.

I’m seeing Mansfield and Dirksen at 9:30, and I’d like to keep that if I possibly can.

Fine, yeah.

Yeah, I would.

OK.

Then if you need any help calling any ministers, Bill, let me know.

OK.

Bye.

[Unclear.]

And, listen, you might ask . . . you got a lot of people more experienced than we are over here. Maybe Burke Marshall could give us ideas of who the leading preacher would be. Bill’s going to just explore it with somebody he knows.

All right.

But you might ask him, Bill. You might check Bill Marshall—Burke Marshall.

You want to check with him, Bill, or should I have him call you, or . . . ?

I’d be glad to call him.

All right.

Let—now, let Nick have him—

All right—

—call you because he—

All right. Fine.

All right. I’ll get him to think about it and give you a ring.

OK.

All right.