[E.] Buford [Ellington]?[note 3] E. Buford Ellington was the Democratic governor of Tennessee from January 1959 to January 1963 and January 1967 to January 1971, and became director of the Office of Emergency Planning in 1965.

Yes, sir. I’m sorry I left. I thought you were through.

I thought so, too, but you’re dealing with a very treacherous guy, and you all just must not even come in quoting him anymore.

All right.

Because he’s a no-good son of a bitch. [Pause.] And I think you know it. But he announced tonight he would ask Johnson to provide sufficient officers to protect the Negroes. He appeared before the joint session, and he says that the . . . federal government— [reading aloud] “‘They say our courts are too slow,’ [George C.] Wallace [Jr.] said.[note 4] George C. Wallace Jr. was the Democratic, and later American Independent, governor of Alabama from January 1963 to January 1967, January 1971 to January 1979, and January 1983 to January 1987. ‘Therefore, we must now submit to mob rule. It’s a tragedy and a sorrow beyond words, but the federal judge compounds anarchy by ordering the state to protect the Army.’” [Ellington acknowledges.] He said tonight that he would ask Johnson to provide protection for Negroes marching from Selma to Montgomery. “‘I intend to call on the President of the United States to provide sufficient officers to guarantee the safety and the welfare of citizens in and around the route. The federal government has created this matter. They can help protect it,’ Wallace told televised”—

No. No. Can you get that open?

[speaking to Roberts, who mistakenly comes on the line] Juanita, please get off the phone, honey. [to Ellington, continuing to read aloud] He said, “It would take 6,171 law enforcement personnel working eight-hour shifts to possibly guard the marchers.”

Well, I’m not going to talk to him anymore now. I’m through with him.

Well, you better tell him you’re not. Tell him you’re not. Tell him you read it on the ticker. And I’ve been [unclear] since 3:30, messing with that son of a bitch, and he is absolutely treacherous.

[speaking over President Johnson] I know it, I know it. Well, you know, I told you when you first—[note 5] On 8 March, the day after Bloody Sunday, Ellington had told Johnson that “you can’t trust him” and that “it is an element of danger there in talking with George.” See President Johnson and Buford Ellington, 8 March 1965, Conversation WH6503-03-7031.

[reading] “‘Tonight, I should ask the people of Alabama for restraint. I ask you to stay away from tension. I ask you not to play in [to] their hands. I ask you to stay home. I hope that when this march takes place you will stay there.’ He did not immediately specify whether he had asked Johnson for troops or marshals. Wallace began his speech after a fistfight, the arrest of 90 civil rights advocates, and a countermarch by segregationists, deepening racial tensions in Montgomery.”

Well, I told Burke [Marshall] and Lee [C. White] all the way through that I didn’t trust him and everything.[note 6] Burke Marshall was U.S. assistant attorney general for civil rights from 1961 to December 1964. Lee C. White was assistant special counsel to the president from 1961 to 1963; associate counsel to the president from 1963 to 1965; special counsel to the president from 1965 to 1966; and chair of the Federal Power Commission from 1966 to 1969. White was the chief aide on civil rights matters. So I’m just not going to answer any calls to him or talk to him. Not till after—

I’d answer one and just tell him, “Now, listen, George, I offered you—I went over to the President today and told the President that I had talked to you and you wanted help.”

Yeah.

“He called you and offered to give it to you.”

Right.

“You ran like a goddamn rabbit! Then you ran down to the television and told them that we had created it, therefore, you’re going to ask it. Now, why in the hell didn’t you stand up like a man and say what you were going to do to begin with?”

Well, I’ll tell you, if it’s all right with you, I’m not going to answer his call. If he keeps calling me, I’ll wait till in the morning where I can record it, see, because I told him all the time, I [unclear]—

Come over here. You can record it anytime.

Well, I can record it from here. That’s where I been doing it, from my apartment.

That’s [unclear].

Just went through the, you know . . .

White House.

Yeah.

I would do it. I would do it. And I’d talk to him—

What I mean, now, he’ll start calling me in a few minutes, and I’m just not going to answer him until the morning—

No. I don’t think—I don’t think—I think you ought to. I think you ought to answer him tonight and just say, “Now, let me tell you, George, I just want this for the record.”

Good.

“You called me up, asked for help. I offered to give it to you. You ran like a rabbit.”

That’s right. That’s right.

“Now, then, you went publicly and you said this. Now, I want to know whether you mean it or whether you don’t, and if you do you, why, you come out there and put it on the record because I’ve got the record, and I won’t—I’m not going to be double-crossed this way.”

I will do.

I’m going to issue a statement here that kind of burns his tail, and I’ll ask them to call you and give it to you.

OK.

[softly] Fine.

Good.

Waiting. Waiting.