Did you read [Clifford P.] Case’s [R–New Jersey] speech today about this congressman’s letter?[note 2] Clifford P. Case was a U.S. senator [R–New Jersey] from January 1955 to January 1979.

I saw a headline, but I haven’t read it, or—I really haven’t read it, no, Mr. President. It’s something about blackmail is what I remember.

Yeah, he says we’re blackmailing federal employees by sending them a letter asking them to—enclosing some tickets and asking them to come to something, and saying if you can’t come, why, we hope that you’ll help us, or something like that. I can’t tell who signed the letter or where it came from. But the part that concerns me is twofold: One, [John J.] Williams [R–Delaware] says he asked you to make a comment on something, and that we ignored him, and we wouldn’t advise him what could be done to control situations where employees were blackmailed.[note 3] John J. Williams was a U.S. senator [R–Delaware] from January 1947 to December 1970, and the ranking Republican on the Senate Finance Committee. And second, that I—

Which Williams is this?

Delaware.

Delaware?

That we hadn’t answered his letter. And second, that—I’m not sure he said he hadn’t answered his letter; that’s the implication, connotation to what he said. And I got a quick impression, right after that Cabinet meeting while I was meeting with [Robert C. “Bob”] Bob Weaver’s group; I just glanced at it.[note 4] Robert C. “Bob” Weaver was a member of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Black Cabinet in 1934; director of the Housing and Home Finance Agency from 1961 to 1965; and the first U.S. secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development from January 1966 to December 1968. The second thing was, and I got this a little clearer because it’s [Benjamin Franklin] Frank Smathers [Sr.]; it affected me.[note 5] Benjamin Franklin “Frank” Smathers Sr. was a district judge in New Jersey, and the father of Senator George A. Smathers. [President Johnson laughs, while Katzenbach acknowledges.] The other one was you, but he said that I condoned it and I enjoyed it, and I urged it and encouraged it, and so forth. Now, it looks to me like it’s rather unfair, but they don’t mind being unfair. But I want to be sure that what they say is unjustified, as far as we’re concerned.

If you don’t mind it, you read the tickers, and then let’s see what shape we’re in. I think you might also try to find out from Carl [B.] Albert [D–Oklahoma], or if you can’t, from even Case himself if it’s any letter that the President had anything to do with.[note 6] Carl B. Albert was a U.S. representative [D–Oklahoma] from January 1947 to January 1977, and served as Speaker of the House from January 1971 to January 1977. I don’t imagine it is. I have tried to avoid them. [Katzenbach acknowledges.] But I see they got another story today about somebody buying three tickets to the President’s dinner or club, that had an OEO [Office of Economic Opportunity] contract, and that’s along the line they were talking.

Yeah.

And I think it pointed out that the man had the contract before he bought the tickets or bought the tickets before he had the contract. Something like that. [Chuckles.]

You can play it either way. [Chuckles.]

Yeah, you can play it either way you want to. And, of course, I guess everybody that ever bought a ticket had one some way or other and I imagine everybody that ever went to their . . . Pure Oil company [slight chuckle] , I imagine had—

Sure.

—a lot with [Dwight D.] Eisenhower.[note 7] Dwight D. Eisenhower was a five-star general of the U.S. Army; governor of the American Zone of Occupied Germany from May 1945 to November 1945; chief of staff of the U.S. Army from November 1945 to February 1948; Supreme Allied Commander in Europe from April 1951 to May 1952; president of Columbia University from 1948 to 1953; and president of the United States from January 1953 to January 1961. I just guess that everybody that’s got enough to get off the poverty [Katzenbach acknowledges] has made it some way where the government has—but we never heard of the fellow, don’t know him, and we have never rendered any favor to any of them in return for anything.

Mm-hmm. No.

So, I have been just as good to the Republican contributors as I have to the Democratic contributors. [Katzenbach acknowledges.] Without any question in my mind, and if not more so.

Mm-hmm.

And so I want you to look at this, though, because they’re going to do that from here to the election. [Katzenbach acknowledges.] It’s going to be communism and Korea and corruption. [Katzenbach acknowledges.] That’s about all they know. And I think we’ve got to answer them some way. You going to get [Everett M.] Dirksen [R–Illinois] on this bill?[note 8] Everett M. Dirksen was a U.S. senator [R–Illinois] from January 1951 until his death in September 1969, and Senate Minority Leader from January 1959 to September 1969.

Well, I think so. I must say he hadn’t said so, but I think so. I got to have another meeting with him. I’ve laid off him for about ten days because I didn’t think I could make any progress while it was still in the House. Now, I’ve got to meet with him.

They had me signing letters this morning to [Emanuel “Manny”] Celler [D–New York], and Albert, and [John W.] McCormack [D–Massachusetts] [a bell rings] , and everybody up there.[note 9] Emanuel “Manny” Celler was a U.S. representative [D–New York] from March 1923 to January 1973, and chair of the House Judiciary Committee. John W. McCormack was a U.S. representative [D–Massachusetts] from January 1928 to January 1971, and Speaker of the House from January 1961 to January 1971. I guess you all wanted it done. I put out that statement. I asked them if it was your statement; they said yes. I guess that’s what you wanted done.

Yes, sir, I think it was a good statement. We were getting kicked by some of the civil rights groups a little bit. And also, I thought the strong stand on that would let, you know, Dirksen could stay where he was and make it look like a compromise. [laughing]

Another thing—

We’re not going to get anything any stronger out of the Senate, obviously.

No, or the House either. You got that by one vote, and that’s about as thin as you can cut them.

Yes, sir. [Both laugh.]

I won once in Texas [unclear]—

Well, I didn’t promise that one to you, Mr. President. I was cautious on that one. [Chuckles.]

Yeah . . .

But . . . We just didn’t have anybody else to go to in the House on that one.

On your demonstration cities, I’m concerned because they’ve got a lot of the Negro groups going around “10 billion [dollars] a year for 10 years” and we’re putting in 6 or 7 billion [dollars] now.[note 10] At the November 1965 White House Conference on Civil Rights, A. Philip Randolph had proposed a $100 billion Freedom Budget to eliminate ghettos throughout U.S. cities. See Conversation WH6608-02-10520 on this theme. “Randolph Says: ‘Freedom Budget’ May End Poverty,” Chicago Defender, 5 November 1966; John D’Emilio, Lost Prophet: The Life and Times of Bayard Rustin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 370–79, 423–24; Thomas J. Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North (New York: Random House, 2008), 375–77. [Katzenbach acknowledges.] And we got all we think that we can get in [Edmund S.] Muskie [D–Maine].[note 11] Edmund S. Muskie was a U.S. senator [D–Maine] from January 1959 to May 1980, and Hubert H. Humphrey Jr.‘s U.S. vice presidential running mate in 1968. Muskie served on the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, which had jurisdiction over the Demonstration Cities bill. He would also serve as floor manager for the bill. We don’t have the votes, and we had to get his and Joe Califano went up and worked out with him and finally got the—he agreed that he would try to get one, if we cut it in half from six years to three, and the amount of money from 2.3 [billion dollars] to 900 million [dollars], cut it in about half.[note 12] The Senate Banking and Currency Committee reduced funding for the Demonstration Cities Program from the $2.3 billion over six years that the administration had requested to $1.2 billion over three years. Along with the $900 million for demonstration projects in fiscal 1968 and 1969 referred to here, the $1.2 billion figure also included $24 million for project planning in fiscal 1967 and $250 million for urban renewal projects in the demonstration areas (cut from $600 million in the House bill). The Senate would pass the bill in largely this form on 19 August. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 1966, vol. 22 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1967), 210, 217–18, 225–26. So we did, thinking we could do like [Franklin D.] Roosevelt did, get REA established by executive order, and get our nose under the tent, and then do like we’re doing on poverty, move it up each year.[note 13] Franklin D. Roosevelt was assistant secretary of the U.S. Navy from March 1913 to August 1920; the Democratic governor of New York from January 1929 to December 1932; and president of the United States from March 1933 until his death on 12 April 1945. But it developed we had a very close vote in the committee. And the best count we could get yesterday is 41 to 39. There are 18 that haven’t made up their minds, 17 or 18. They won’t give us a commitment and they won’t tell us how they stand. That worries us. If they were for the President, they’d be grabbing. But we got to get at least 10 more out of that 17.

Now, [Abraham A. “Abe”] Ribicoff [D–Connecticut] came down and I had a pleasant hour or so with him.[note 14] Abraham A. “Abe” Ribicoff was a U.S. senator [D–Connecticut] from January 1963 to January 1981, and a member of the Finance Committee. He’s a little bit bitter since his Cabinet experiences, and he’s very anxious to get some publicity, he told me, on car safety.[note 15] Senator Ribicoff had served as secretary of health, education, and welfare under President Kennedy before running for the Senate in 1962. He had also been a long-standing advocate of improved automobile safety and had played a key role in the recent passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which established the first federal car safety standards. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, vol. 22, 1966, pp. 266–78. That he had put that bill over, and we’ve—so on and so forth. And hearings, what did it, and so forth. And that he had put this over the same way, and I told him our people would testify what we were doing, and the great need that we thought existed, and so forth. We didn’t think it’d be wise to frighten people and go too much at one thing. Maybe we ought to crawl before we walk, and walk before we run. And then he seemed to be fairly adjustable to it. He wanted the right to bring on a bunch of sociologists and others from various places. But then, he has changed it now. And he’s going to have [Robert F.] Bobby [Kennedy] [D–New York], and he’s told our people to be second [behind] Bobby and [Joseph S.] Joe Clark [Jr.] [D–Pennsylvania] and William Fitts Ryan [D–New York].[note 16] Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy was U.S. attorney general from January 1961 to September 1964, and a U.S. senator [D–New York] from January 1965 until his assassination in June 1968. Joseph S. Clark Jr. was the Democratic mayor of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, from January 1952 to January 1956, and a U.S. senator [D–Pennsylvania] from January 1957 to January 1969. William Fitts Ryan was a U.S. representative [D–New York] from January 1961 to September 1972. Senators Clark and Kennedy would both testify on 15 August, the first day of the hearings. Representative Ryan, who like Senator Clark was an urban liberal critic of the Johnson administration, did not testify. Senate Subcommittee on Executive Reorganization of the Committee on Government Operations, Federal Role in Urban Affairs, Part 1, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 15-16 August 1966, pp. III, errata sheet.

I have two concerns: One, I’m afraid that by the time they get through testifying everybody’ll be scared to death and they’ll beat our little modest bill because they won’t get—it’s too nip and tuck now and we may get beat anyway. It’s kind of like your housing situation over in the civil rights bill in the House. Second, I’m afraid that it’s going to stir up these things out here in the countryside—the Stokely Carmichaels and so forth—to such an extent that we really get them antagonized.[note 17] Stokely Carmichael was a civil rights activist; chair of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee from May 1966 to June 1967; and a member of the Black Panther Party. In June, he had coined the term “Black Power” during a speech in Greenwood, Mississippi. Now, what I’ve got is I’ve got the people just calling me every day on this civil rights thing and I think if we don’t get it through pretty quick, we’re not going to get many of them because they’re sure getting mad.

Yes, I know they are.

[Daniel D. “Dan”] Rostenkowski [D–Illinois] called last night and was rather abusive because I hadn’t denounced the rioters or nullified, and they quoted him what I said in Indianapolis.[note 18] Daniel D. “Dan” Rostenkowski was a U.S. representative [D–Illinois] from January 1959 to January 1995, and chair of the House Democratic Caucus from January 1967 to January 1971. [Roman C.] Pucinski’s [D–Illinois] written a big a letter to us.[note 19] Roman C. Pucinski was a U.S. representative [D–Illinois] from January 1959 to January 1973, and a Chicago alderman from the 41st Ward from 1973 to 1991. And I was talking to some of the boys from the northern areas, upstate New York and others, and they’re bitter. The Buffaloes and others.

No, they are. There’s no question.

And I think we better—our whole future may not be with just Stokely Carmichael.

No, I agree with that.

Well, could you—you’re going to take charge of that hearing and present it [unclear]—

No, I don’t trust—I honest to Pete just don’t trust Abe Ribicoff. That’s my difficulty. I think he’s less than candid with you. I think with you or with me, or with anybody else.

Yes, that’s right. Well, I don’t. I distrust him, so that’s why I’m saying to you, you better be prepared. [Katzenbach attempts to interject.] And I don’t know whether it’s to our advantage to let them go on. I’m a little—I don’t guess we got any choice. But I’m a little [sighs] —

I tried to talk him out of it when he first asked me about it. I told him I thought it was a bad idea. I went through some of the things you’ve just said. He’s giving all these people a forum. And I don’t—that just egged him on. [Slight chuckle.] This was, oh—and I think he already had Bob Weaver as a witness. This is when he asked me to be a witness, and I said I don’t want to be. [Pause.] But . . .

Well, do you think maybe we ought to wait till about time for these hearings, or I guess just let them testify? And I guess we have no choice, do we?

I don’t see a choice. I think what we do is just do the best thing we can and just try to get the testimony as good as we can. I’m working on that. We’ve had one meeting on it, and I’m going to have two more for the testimony at least. And just . . . you know, just . . .

I rather think, though, that with their—they want the Ford Foundation to get them lots of staff, and he wants me to call [McGeorge “Mac”] Bundy and get him a staff, and so forth.[note 20] McGeorge “Mac” Bundy was dean of the faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University from 1953 to 1961, and special assistant to the president for National Security Affairs from January 1961 to February 1966. And I think that they’ll just get up there and whip a fellow like Weaver to death, don’t you think so?

Well, not—They won’t be able to do it by next week, when they call him as a witness. [President Johnson acknowledges throughout.] I mean they won’t be that prepared. And Ribicoff doesn’t know as much as he thinks he knows about this. His staff doesn’t either. [Jerome N.] Jerry Sonosky’s the guy that’s been doing it.[note 21] Jerome N. “Jerry” Sonosky served as a legislative assistant to Senator Abraham A. “Abe” Ribicoff in the 1960s. And he doesn’t—he’s, you know, a pretty able young fellow, but he doesn’t know all that much about it. I think Weaver will be all right.

That’s good. OK, you take charge of it. [Katzenbach acknowledges.] Let me know on this corruption stuff.

Yes—

Bye.

—as I soon as I get the facts.

What’s your—why you didn’t answer him, and what I have done that justifies their saying I like it and I condone it and I urge it. [Katzenbach acknowledges.] I don’t think there’s any record of it and I don’t believe it affects us and my guess is it’s probably some local congressman.

Yeah.

OK.

I’ll find out about it. All right.