—five miles or so. And I may be in error on the mileage, but in any event, it bottomed, and the allegation is that the chart was in error and that, according to the chart, it was substantially above the bottom. The—certain damage occurred to its steering apparatus and some of its diving planes, but it was on the surface about a half an hour ago, and no one was injured. There was no leakage, so far as we know, to its nuclear plant. A salvage ship was standing by and—to assist it moving into port, and we anticipate no problems.[note 1] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary. But for a time it looked like we might have another nuclear incident on our hands. [President Johnson acknowledges.] The result is, Mr. President, I’m really not up to date on Southeast Asia. I can’t tell you anything.

What is the story behind the . . . well, what was your evaluation yesterday? I wanted to ask you to go in the office, and I looked at you, and you thought—I thought you were so damn tired you better go home to your wife.

No, no. No, I was—

And we’d had—well, we’d start at that breakfast, but I just didn’t—

No, I’m sorry. I would love to have come in. Well . . . I . . . I think it shows two things, Mr. President. First, that they have more power than some credit them with. I don’t think it’s a last-gasp action. I do think that it represents a maximum effort in the sense of, they’ve poured on all of their assets, and my guess is that we will inflict very heavy losses on them, both in terms of personnel and materièl, and this will set them back some, but that after they absorb the losses, they will remain a substantial force. I don’t anticipate that we’ll hit them so hard that they’ll be knocked out for an extended period or forced to drop way back in level of effort against us. I do think that it is such a well-coordinated, such an obviously advance-planned operation, that it probably relates to negotiations in some way. I would expect that were they successful here, they’d then move forward more forcefully on the negotiation front, and that—thinking that they have a stronger position from which to bargain. I don’t believe they’re going to be successful. I think that in Khe Sanh, where we’re going to have the real military engagement, I believe we’ll deal them a heavy defeat. I think in the other areas it’s largely a propaganda effort and a publicity effort, and I think they’ll gain that way. I imagine our people across the country this morning will feel that they’re much stronger than they had previously anticipated they were. And in that sense I think they gain.

The question in my mind is how to respond to this. Is there anything we should be doing we’re not doing? I’ve talked to the [Joint] Chiefs [of Staff] about some kind of a reciprocal action, retaliation for their attack on our embassy, or in retaliation for their attack across the country. There just isn’t anything they have come up with that is worth a damn. They talk about an area bombing attack over Hanoi. The weather is terrible. You can’t get in there with pinpoint targeting. The only way you could bomb it at all at the present time is area bombing; I wouldn’t recommend that to you under any circumstances. They just haven’t been able to think of retaliation that means anything. My own feeling is that we ought to depend upon our ability to inflict very heavy casualties on them, as our proper response and as the message we give to our people.[note 2] End of 2021 revisions.

[softly] Mm-hmm. I think that one thing we ought to do is try to keep [William C.] Westmoreland in the news out there—[note 3] Gen. William C. Westmoreland, often referred to as “Westy,” was commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from 1964 to 1968, and chief of staff of the U.S. Army from 1968 to 1972.

Yes, I—

—every—twice a day—

I quite agree.

—as much as you do and I think you ought to [unclear]—

I asked Bill to talk yesterday to our people there and have Westy make—I said once a day, but I’ll make it twice a day.[note 4] McNamara may be referring to William P. “Bill” Bundy, who was an intelligence analyst; U.S. deputy assistant secretary for international security affairs from 1961 to 1963; U.S. assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs from 1963 to 1964; U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs from 1964 to 1969; and editor of Foreign Affairs from 1972 to 1984. You’re quite right.

I think you ought to, too. I don’t think they get enough information. I think you’ve become sensitive, and we’ve all pulled in, and I meet with them once every two or three months. [McNamara acknowledges.] You meet with them once a month if there’s something big. But if you’ll remember, you used to see them every—almost daily—

Oh, yes, [unclear]—

—and I think it shows the difference and I think in this campaign year, the other crowd has got two or three committees grinding out things. Their only interest is to find something wrong. [McNamara acknowledges throughout.] People look for something wrong unless you’ve got so much choking them that is happening. Just factual stuff—

We see that in [Gerald R.] Jerry Ford [Jr.] [R–Michigan] last night.[note 5] Gerald R. “Jerry” Ford Jr. was a U.S. representative [R–Michigan] from January 1949 to December 1973; House Minority Leader from January 1965 to December 1973; vice president of the United States from December 1973 to August 1974; and president of the United States from August 1974 to January 1977. According to the Presidential Daily Diary, President Johnson had briefed Republican congressional leaders, including Ford, in the Cabinet Room at 6:04 p.m. on 30 January 1968.

I want your evaluation of that.

I thought it was a disgrace. I really thought it was a goddamn disgrace. That’s why I stepped in at one point. I didn’t know whether to open up earlier or not. I didn’t want to reduce your reaction to him, because I thought it was very effective, but damn I was annoyed at that. I thought it was discourteous and . . . absolutely irresponsible.

It seemed to me that he was so determined to find something wrong, [McNamara acknowledges throughout] and he had nothing that he could find wrong, although there might be much that was wrong. We all said that [the] first thing we’d do is save the 52 minutes that he didn’t respond. We’d respond in the light of what we knew now. But at that time we didn’t. And he’s just so determined to find something that was wrong that he wouldn’t even listen to the other things, it looked like to me. Now, I thought maybe I was just prejudiced, but when he started pounding the table I thought he was just—

They became in—he became intemperate. It was just a disgraceful performance. Now, I do think that when he left, he’d cooled down some, and I think the unanimous front that he faced, and particularly [Earle G.] Bus Wheeler’s strong support of it, cooled him off, and I doubt very much he’s going to make many speeches about this subject.[note 6] Gen. Earle G. “Bus” Wheeler was chief of staff of the U.S. Army from October 1962 to July 1964, and chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1964 to July 1970.

They’re going to find something, anything they can find, though, that’s wrong. What do you think our reaction ought to be? Should it be different from what it was last night? We’re going into other meetings. I thought that I was rather willing to admit the possibility of error all along.

Well—

I kept saying that, sure, if you ask me now, today, I’d change a lot of things. [McNamara acknowledges.] I would respond immediately instead of waiting 52 minutes.

I think that I’d take exactly that tack with other meetings, except that I wouldn’t initiate it. And I don’t think you’re going to get that kind of partisan criticism in some of these other meetings. I’d be surprised if [Leslie C.] Arends [R–Illinois], for example, did that.[note 7] Leslie C. Arends was a U.S. representative [R–Illinois] from January 1935 to December 1974, and House Republican Whip from January 1943 to December 1974. He’s not strong enough to do that. [Pause.] But if he does, I’d respond exactly the same way.

Did you think we were too strong with Jerry or too weak?

Oh, no. Oh, no, no, no, no. I thought it was—frankly, I thought it was just right, Mr. President. I thought when he left, he’d cooled down some and he’d—he found that there wasn’t a chink in our armor that he’d been able to break through.

Now, if we’d have had [Melvin R. “Mel”] Laird [R–Wisconsin] it’d just been more of that, wouldn’t it?[note 8] Melvin R. “Mel” Laird was a U.S. representative [R–Wisconsin] from January 1953 to January 1969; chair of the House Republican Conference from January 1965 to January 1969; U.S. secretary of defense from January 1969 to January 1973; and White House domestic affairs adviser from May 1973 to January 1974.

Oh, that’s right, and that’s why I didn’t want him there, Mr. President. He’s impossible to do. You can’t argue with him. He’s a bright guy, and he’s brighter than Jerry, for one thing.

How did you evaluate [Everett M.] Dirksen [R–Illinois]?[note 9] Everett M. Dirksen was a U.S. senator [R–Illinois] from January 1951 to September 1969, and Senate Minority Leader from January 1959 to September 1969.

I don’t know. I concluded that he was just keeping his powder dry and preserving his options.

He was very anxious to go in with all flags flying, all guns blazing, until I talked to him a long time the other day at the [National] Security Council luncheon or something. He called me. I don’t know whether you all noticed it, but I had a long talk with him and—on the phone. And he wound up, he said, “All right, what do you want me to do?” And I said, “I just want you to say that the President is reviewing this matter and will give the leaders a report, and whatever the nation needs will be supplied and will be supported.” And he said, “All right.” So he said something along that line, didn’t say much. Yesterday, he said a little more. But—

What’d he say?

—I thought maybe last night what he was doing—I was hoping that you’d have this reaction, but I guess it’s not justified. I was hoping he was just utterly disgusted with Ford’s performance and didn’t want to go against him, and [at] the same time didn’t want to endorse him.

Well, Mr. President, I thought that for a time, but then he remained silent so long. Initially, I—when Ford was getting angry and his face was contorted with anger, I thought Dirksen really was feeling contempt. But then it went on, and on, and on, and he didn’t say a damn word, and he could have very easily at one or two points—

Well, I know it, but—yes, but what—he would be charged with undercutting him, and I just thought he couldn’t say anything with that display. It’s like your wife tears up and throws over the—

Well, yeah. Maybe so, but I thought there were several openings when he could’ve said, “Well, Bus, what do you think about this now? Surely there’s something we could’ve done differently, or is—but would it have made any difference?” This is what—this is the line Everett should’ve taken. Sure, there’s certain things here we must’ve been able to—52 minutes, but suppose you hadn’t done it in 52 minutes, would the end be any different? And the answer, of course, is no. There were several openings he had, and he didn’t seize them. And that’s why I felt he was preserving his options. And also, I haven’t read the record. It’s on my desk right now, but—of yesterday—but the newspaper reports weren’t particularly good on what he said yesterday, it seemed to me.

Mm-hmm. About Dirksen?

Yeah.

Ah. Now, one thing about [David L. “Dave”] McDonald, Bob, I thought if we got in deep trouble, he is a little better witness, I believe, than most of them.[note 10] Adm. David L. “Dave” McDonald was chief of naval operations from August 1963 to August 1967. Isn’t he better than [Thomas H.] Moorer?[note 11] Adm. Thomas H. Moorer was chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1970 to June 1974.

Yes, he is better than Moorer.

He looks sharper to me, and more [McNamara acknowledges throughout] modern, clearer, and cleaner.

Actually, Moorer—

And I think you got to scare the hell out of McDonald and get him into this thing [McNamara acknowledges] and his Navy, and his skipper, and—

Well, hell, it’s his operation in a very real sense.

Yeah. Well, that’s—

He hasn’t been gone long enough to have—

Well, that’s what I mean.

Oh, you’re absolutely right, and I—

And I’d get him up to it, up in his ears, [McNamara acknowledges throughout] and then I’d picture him as Mr. Objective and Mr. Fair and Mr. So-and-So.

Mr. President, I knew you were disappointed with the briefer yesterday, but I did it purposefully. If you saw all his medals, and you must have, Christ, he has 14 campaign ribbons and medals there, and he has three stars on his shoulders, and quite frankly I did it purposefully to put him forward instead of me. Not that I’m trying to get out of the line of fire, but I just thought that in this situation, those people would be more impressed by a man with a suit on his [unclear]—

I think it’s all right to try him, but—

This morning we’ll do it differently.

The closer you get to leaving, [McNamara acknowledges] the more I miss you, and I just—there’s not anybody in this government that can say as much in as little time as you can.

Well, Mr. President, as I said, I quite frankly, I’ve tried to cut back and—

I thought he was just—I thought he was just . . . I just didn’t think he was up to it.

Yeah. This morning, I thought we’d have Bus do what he did last night, and then I’ll take the questions.

That’s good. OK.

Very good. Mr. President?

Yeah?

One thing. You might like Bus first, this morning, to start with South Vietnam. He’ll very quickly cover it, in two or three minutes, the events of the night.

Good, good. Tell him, Bob, and you, too, although you don’t ever have any trouble. But tell him to talk louder from [McNamara acknowledges throughout] that end of the room. It’s—the echo—

The acoustics are awful in there.

That’s right. I can’t hear half of what’s going on.

Yeah. All right, I’ll tell him. Thanks.