—you and your brother [Edward M.] Teddy [Kennedy] [D–Massachusetts] with the [unclear].[note 1] Edward M. “Teddy” Kennedy was a U.S. senator [D–Massachusetts] from November 1962 until his death on 25 August 2009, and Senate Democratic Whip from January 1969 to January 1971. Does that sound sensible to you?

Yeah, I would be very glad to, Dick, with anyone who wanted to talk to. I don’t know what—whether I could do any—

Well, he was talking about, you know, the same thing about the Secretary of State [Dean Rusk].[note 2] Dean Rusk was U.S. secretary of state from January 1961 to January 1969. He said he understands it couldn’t be done tomorrow, but maybe if there is a review, an analysis. I said, “Well, what about this committee and this—maybe the committee would recommend it. They’re always—like a ball game, you always change pitchers or do something when you’re not doing it the way it’s coming off.” And I said, “Maybe the President, like everyone else, is anxious to work this thing out. No one wants to work it out more than he does. And surely he’s susceptible to any suggestion that’s reasonable and that’s fair and that’s just. But I think the thing for you men to do is to sit down and discuss it at great length with the President yourself. And—instead of going ahead off on a tangent with this California thing and then really getting into it and then there wouldn’t be any drawing back.” I said, “You—the best thing to do is to try to sit down and see if you can’t come to some—you can’t—the President has his problems, you have yours, but surely a discussion of the thing might be helpful.”

Tell you—I’ll tell you one thing, Dick, that would be good. They are very friendly with [Clark M.] Clifford.[note 3] Clark M. Clifford was a Washington lawyer; an adviser to presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson; a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1961 to 1968; chair of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from April 1963 to February 1968; and U.S. secretary of defense from March 1968 to January 1969.

Yeah.

Clifford is new and has no obligations to anyone. He gave up a million-dollar practice just to come in and help out. He turned down three Cabinet posts before he took this one, and he has done legal work for Teddy and tried to help him in connection with his—some of the things up at Harvard, and he’s also been friendly with the other one, and he was very close to President [John F. “Jack”] Kennedy.[note 4] John F. “Jack” Kennedy was a U.S. representative [D–Massachusetts] from January 1947 to January 1953; a U.S. senator [D–Massachusetts] from January 1953 to December 1960; and president of the United States from January 1961 until his assassination on 22 November 1963. He handled the transition from [Dwight D.] Eisenhower over to Kennedy.[note 5] Dwight D. Eisenhower was a five-star general of the U.S. Army; governor of the American Zone of Occupied Germany from May 1945 to November 1945; chief of staff of the U.S. Army from November 1945 to February 1948; Supreme Allied Commander in Europe from April 1951 to May 1952; president of Columbia University from 1948 to 1953; and president of the United States from January 1953 to January 1961. I think it would take less spotlight, attract less attention, make it less embarrassing to them, and to me, too, and I think both of us would completely trust him. He is the chairman of a group that is now looking into this whole thing, and who’s going out to make a—take a new look just as soon as we can get the emergency needs met. We’re going to—we’re going to try to decide on that over the weekend how many men we can give [William C.] Westmoreland now to try to hold what they say is going to be a victory between now and July.[note 6] Gen. William C. Westmoreland, often referred to as “Westy,” was commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from 1964 to 1968, and chief of staff of the U.S. Army from 1968 to 1972. They say this is—they’ve changed their strategy from a guerrilla force to an all-out mass push on the cities. He’s got to resist it. If he resists it successfully, why, then they’ve had it. If he doesn’t, then we’ve had it. So we have got to decide what we do and we’re going to make a tentative decision, then consult with the Congress, and then, perhaps get Clifford to go out or have him send the best person out.

These people have a very—they don’t like Rusk. They didn’t like him in the other administration, and they wanted me to get rid of him. They proposed that I appoint Bill Moyers in his place, Bobby did.[note 7] Bill Moyers was deputy director of the Peace Corps from 1961 to 1964; special assistant to the president from 1963 to 1967; White House press secretary from 1965 to 1967; and publisher of Newsday from 1967 to 1970. And I don’t think it does any good talking to him.

I couldn’t appoint a committee to over—to review him without going into it with him, and I’m very fearful—we tried to reach [Theodore C. “Ted”] Sorensen tonight.[note 8] Theodore C. “Ted” Sorensen was a speechwriter and special assistant to the president from 1961 to 1964; author of a best-selling biography of John F. Kennedy in 1965; an adviser for Robert F. Kennedy’s presidential campaign in 1968; and an attorney and senior counsel at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison in New York City from 1966 until his death in 2010. He had gone to the University of Rochester to speak and will be in at midnight. We left a call in for him; our man contacts him here. But I’m very fearful that Hanoi will interpret anything I do publicly as a need to give to my domestic critics. They are playing it very hard all day today that the Rusk appearance yesterday and the New Hampshire appearance shows that they are very much in the eclipse in this country. [Daley acknowledges.] And we are very much going down. And I don’t want to do anything that undermines my men and gives them any reason to believe that I’m not in charge, or that I’m going to appoint a committee to investigate my Secretary [of State], or to make a judgment that the commander in chief ought to make.

Now, I would be very glad to select a group of independent folks. I’d want to sit down with Clifford and with Rusk and with my better people, like CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], and figure out who we could get that would be of value.[note 9] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary. Every time you appoint one of these committees, you get more than you can do anything about.

For instance, I—Kennedy—[John F.] Jack Kennedy spent 9 billion [dollars] on the cities in his last federal budget in ‘64. This year I’ve got 22 [billion] in there. [Daley acknowledges.] Yet [Robert F.] Bobby [Kennedy] [D–New York] says I’m not doing enough.[note 10] Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy was U.S. attorney general from January 1961 to September 1964, and a U.S. senator [D–New York] from January 1965 until his assassination in June 1968. Yet the Congress is going to cut about 5 [billion] out of what I’ve got, and I’m fighting to hold it.

The Kerner Commission made a very exhaustive study and spent a couple of million dollars, but they recommended that I spend 80 million, and I got no place to get the 80. [Daley acknowledges.] I can’t borrow it. I can’t tax it. I can’t get a tax bill of any kind, and they didn’t discuss that. That’s the detail they didn’t get into. And Bobby just gave them hell today for not carrying out the Kerner Commission study.[note 11] In 1967, President Johnson founded the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders to investigate that year’s riots. The commission became known as the Kerner Commission, named after its chair, Gov. Otto J. Kerner Jr. [D–Illinois]. Well, I didn’t realize when I appointed [Otto J.] Kerner [Jr.] that this son of a bitch from New York, [John V.] Lindsay, would take charge.[note 12] Otto J. Kerner Jr. was the Democratic governor of Illinois from January 1961 to May 1968; chair of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (later referred to as the Kerner Commission); and a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit from April 1968 to July 1974. John V. Lindsay was a U.S. representative [R–New York] from January 1959 to December 1965, and mayor of New York from January 1966 to December 1973. In 1971, Lindsay became a Democrat.

Yeah.

He did take charge—

Yes, he did.

—and he recommended I hire 2 and a half million people on federal payroll, and I just—I’ve not wanted to reflect on Kerner and criticize the commission.[note 13] The Kerner Commission Report recommended that the federal government create 1 million public sector jobs and 1 million private sector jobs over the next three years. At the same time, I couldn’t embrace it, because I’ve got a budget. When I came in, Kennedy had a budget of 97 billion [dollars]. My budget tonight’s 187 [billion dollars].

Yeah.

Now, that’s what’s happened in four years. And I got to have some fiscal solvency, and I can’t have it unless I have a tax bill. But Bobby said today that I’m not doing enough for the cities. Well, I want to do everything a human can if they’ll give me any money. But, now, the trouble with a commission—you appoint one and, my gosh, they’re liable to recommend to you something that you’ll have to turn over and knock down. It’ll hurt you worse unless you’re careful.[note 14] End of 2021 revisions.

Now, I think I could get a fellow like [McGeorge “Mac”] Bundy, that they wanted yesterday, and maybe a fellow even like Sorensen, who’s strong for Bobby.[note 15] McGeorge “Mac” Bundy was dean of the faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University from 1953 to 1961, and a special assistant to the president for National Security Affairs from 1961 to 1966. I’m—I have terrible fears that if I appointed candidates, they: (a) the Republicans wouldn’t serve; (b) the candidates, [Eugene J. “Gene”] McCarthy [D–Minnesota] and the rest of them, I think, would think I was trying to trap them political.[note 16] Eugene J. “Gene” McCarthy was a U.S. representative [DFL–Minnesota] from January 1949 to January 1959, and a U.S. senator [DFL–Minnesota] from January 1959 to January 1971. McCarthy was also a Democratic presidential candidate. And I’m afraid the country would think it was political, but it’s something I want to consider, and I want to talk to him about. But it seems to me, knowing Bobby—he came down to see me once before, and before he comes, his press men tell all the press.

I see.

They get here before he does. There are at least a hundred out waiting at the door.

Oh, yeah.

He comes in. When he goes out, he’s got to make his case. [Daley acknowledges throughout.] It’s usually a reflection on me. Then they all come in to me. I have to make my case, and it gets back at him. He can very quietly get in his car and ride over to the Pentagon and see Clifford, who was one of his brother’s greatest advisers, been a good adviser to him, and say, “Now, you’re here, and you’re new, and you’re friendly to [J. William “Bill”] Fulbright [D–Arkansas], and you were my brother’s friend.[note 17] J. William “Bill” Fulbright was a U.S. senator [D–Arkansas] from January 1945 to December 1974, and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from January 1959 to December 1974. Now, you’re reviewing this thing. I understand the President appointed you as chairman of the committee. He didn’t appoint Rusk—he appointed Clifford. And he put the CIA man on the committee, and he put Rusk on the committee, and he put [Walt W.] Rostow on the committee, but he made Clifford chairman of it.[note 18] Walt W. Rostow was an MIT economist; deputy national security adviser from January 1961 to November 1961; counselor of the State Department and chair of the Policy Planning Council from 1961 to 1966; and national security adviser from February 1966 to January 1969. Now, you’re reviewing this, I want to give you my views.” And then I think Clifford would take them and would consider them, and he could talk to the committee about it, and we could consider setting up a group. And the group would be glad to hear him, or I would be glad to hear him, quietly.

Now, the California demand is not as much from California as it is from him, Dick. He is—

Yeah.

He is calling everybody. [Daley acknowledges.] He called Nebraska today. They all called—

He’s getting panicky after this thing in New Hampshire.

Well, he did it before, Dick. Here’s what he did. He told [Philip A.] Phil Hart [D–Michigan] last Thursday—Thursday a week—last Thursday.[note 19] Philip A. “Phil” Hart was a U.S. senator [D–Michigan] from January 1959 to December 1976; a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee; and a floor leader of the Johnson administration’s voting rights bill in 1965. A friend of mine heard him tell Phil Hart. Now, we didn’t get it secondhand [Daley acknowledges throughout] that he was going to announce as soon as New Hampshire was over with. That he had to announce, and he was going to do it. [R. Sargent] Shriver, who is wanting to go to Paris, called up and asked that his appointment be announced not later than Tuesday—this was about Sunday—because he had a bet with his wife and—that he knew Bobby was going to announce.[note 20] R. Sargent Shriver was director of the Peace Corps from March 1961 to February 1966; director of the Office of Economic Opportunity from October 1964 to March 1968; and U.S. ambassador to France from April 1968 to March 1970. Shriver was also the brother-in-law of President John F. Kennedy and Senators Robert F. Kennedy [D–New York] and Edward M. “Teddy” Kennedy [D–Massachusetts]. LBJ appointed Shriver as U.S. ambassador to France on 22 April 1968. Now, we had those two direct pieces of evidence. In addition, he went out to California, presumably to see this Mexican who was fasting, this striker, this Cesar Chavez.[note 21] Cesar Chavez was a civil rights and labor activist, and cofounder of the National Farm Workers Assocation (renamed United Farm Workers) in 1962. When Chavez broke a 25-day fast at a Mass on 10 March 1968, Sen. Robert F. Kennedy [D–New York] attended, and called Chavez “one of the heroic figures of our times.” David Larsen, “Chavez Breaks Fast at Mass Attended by Kennedy, 6,000,” Los Angeles Times, 11 March 1968.

Oh, yeah.

And he went out to see [Jesse M.] Unruh, and Unruh was in here to see me about three weeks ago and he wouldn’t go on our slate because he wanted to hold Bobby’s slate.[note 22] Jesse M. Unruh was speaker of the California State Assembly from September 1961 to January 1969. And he went out to see him this last week.

Now, he thinks that he can win California and he thinks that McCarthy, I guess, can win Wisconsin. I don’t think there’s any question but what they can win these 400 convention votes, because I don’t see how I can get out and campaign for them. I don’t see how I can do that, and I think that we have to take the 2,600 votes and try to be as inactive [as] we can. Let them have the 400, get 1,300 wrapped up, and then go on and try not to offend them and get in and not—try not to destroy the party.[note 23] In other words, President Johnson would not have to win the California and Wisconsin primaries in order to win the nomination at the Democratic National Convention.

But I believe that the best man I know of outside of you, out there, in this town, who is amenable to listening to him and reasoning with Bobby, if he’s subject to any reason—I believe he wants something out of it or he’s going to do it anyway, and I don’t know what we can give him. I can’t throw [Hubert H.] Humphrey [Jr.] overboard.[note 24] In other words, President Johnson ruled out replacing Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey with Sen. Robert F. Kennedy [D–New York] as his running mate. Hubert H. Humphrey Jr. was the Democratic mayor of Minneapolis, Minnesota, from July 1945 to November 1948; a U.S. senator [DFL–Minnesota] from January 1949 to December 1964 and January 1971 to January 1978; Senate Majority Whip from January 1961 to December 1964; vice president of the United States from January 1965 to January 1969; and the Democratic U.S. presidential candidate in 1968. I’m not going to throw Rusk overboard, because I don’t believe it’s in the national interest. I am willing to be prudent and reasonable. I have never agreed to send any 200,000 to Vietnam.[note 25] Administration discussions about the prospect of sending an additional 206,000 U.S. troops to Vietnam surfaced publicly on 10 March 1968. Neil Sheehan and Hedrick Smith, “Westmoreland Requests 206,000 More Men, Stirring Debate in Administration,” New York Times, 10 March 1968. I’m not going to turn Westmoreland down. I’m either going to fire him, get him out of there, or support him. And, as of tonight, I’m going to support him. I’m not going to panic with him. If I find he’s done something wrong, or he’s misjudged things, or he’s—the Communists have outsmarted him, or—I may have to be like [Abraham] Lincoln.[note 26] Abraham Lincoln was a U.S. representative [W–Illinois] from March 1847 to March 1849, and president of the United States from March 1861 until his assassination in April 1865. I may have to change him. But I see no evidence of it at all.

I think that after this big push on the cities, that we lost a lot of sentiment in this country because of the papers and the television, and it’s just almost a panic thing. And in New Hampshire, I think they used a lot of their money. These kids were, practically every one, two-dollar-an-hour kids from the colleges. I talked to the governor, and I talked to the senator, and I talked to the mayor, and I talked to [Bernard L.] Barney Boutin, and he said everything up there is bought and paid for and brought in, and they never saw as much money come in from Boston.[note 27] Bernard L. “Barney” Boutin was deputy administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA) from January 1961 to November 1961; administrator of the GSA from November 1962 to November 1964; deputy director of the Office of Economic Opportunity from 1965 to 1966; and administrator of the Small Business Administration from May 1966 to July 1967. According to the Presidential Daily Diary, President Johnson spoke with Sen. Thomas J. McIntyre, Gov. John W. King—both New Hampshire Democrats—and Bernard Boutin, campaign manager for a slate of LBJ delegates, on 13 March 1968. Marquis Childs, “Bernard L. Boutin: A Political Chore,” Washington Post, 23 February 1968.

So, I think it’s all a part of one strategy, these two. They met today. McCarthy had a long meeting with Kennedy today. And I—but if it’s just a question of my being reasonable, you can count on my doing that. If it’s a question of my cutting and running, why, then I’m not going to do that. But I believe that his coming to the White House would bring a retinue with him that would inflame things instead of help them. Although I would be very happy to see him or anybody else.

[The conversation echoes in the background.] Now, Teddy [Kennedy] came back from Vietnam about a month ago. I called him on my own initiative. I asked him to come down. He did. I listened to all he said and considered it and sent it to every member of the Joint Chiefs [of Staff] and to both secretaries, and tried to carry out his views to the extent we could consistently. I sent the cities message up about two weeks ago, and I called Bobby myself, notwithstanding all these calls he’s making around against me. I called him and told him I wanted to talk to him about the cities message. That I had a billion dollars in there for Model Cities, up from 300 million last year. That I had all these jobs in there, and I had the rent supplements in there. And could I have a discussion with him? And he said yes, he’d be glad to have me send my man up to see him. I sent him up there. The man got primarily a lecture, and the fellow was very friendly with him. He was [Robert S. “Bob”] McNamara’s assistant, a boy named [Joseph A. “Joe”] Califano [Jr.], Italian from Brooklyn.[note 28] Robert S. “Bob” McNamara was president of Ford Motor Company from November 1960 to January 1961; U.S. secretary of defense from January 1961 to February 1968; and president of the World Bank from April 1968 to July 1981. Joseph A. “Joe” Califano Jr. was special assistant to the president from July 1965 to January 1969. Califano had worked in the Pentagon during the Kennedy administration. And—but he said he—Bobby lectured him most of the time. Said—but I—this was two weeks ago.

Now, he’s called out to California, and to Oregon, and to Nebraska in the last 24 hours about getting his name on the ticket. And he’s got [John Kenneth] Galbraith up in Harvard suggesting that he run.[note 29] John Kenneth Galbraith was a noted liberal economist and Harvard University professor; U.S. ambassador to India from 1961 to 1963; and president of the American Economic Association (AEA) in 1972. Galbraith served in every Democratic administration from FDR to LBJ. And that’s about the way it is.

Now, summarizing, I think a[n] independent committee ought to be explored with Clifford and with Rusk, and maybe pick about five good men that are not wedded to any viewpoint, and see if they can find a better solution or any new ideas. That’s number one. Number two, I think it would be a good thing if you could ever use any influence you have with him to get him to go sit down and talk to Clifford who’s—in time of war, we ought to be united. And tell him that you understand, that he can speak for me, and that if they—he can be their secretary of state if they want him to be. The . . . and see if anything would come out of that meeting. Number three, as soon as Sorensen gets back from Rochester, I’ll be glad to get the names from him. I had hoped that he—is any indication from your conversation that Sorensen talked to him after he saw me?

Yes, he did.

Uh-huh.

Yes, he said he did.

Uh-huh. What was his—

He said the President hasn’t heard back from him.

What was his reaction?

He just—he left it right there.

Uh-huh. [Inhales heavily.] I think we have two or three things that we have to be very careful of. I think that we . . . the men—that we have 3 and a half million that we are directing and I do not believe that they are the—the leaders here believe that we ought to cut and run, and I’m not about to, of course. I’m not doing anything rash. I’m not doing near as much as the military people and the chairman of the committees think we ought to be doing. When Bobby [Kennedy] gets a roll call in the Senate, he gets 11 or 12 votes.

Mm-hmm.

He doesn’t prevail. And he does have a great name, and he does—his brother is gone. And he does have a lot of media support. And I think it would be very devastating—

Well, the media support is just one to defeat the Democratic ticket, that’s all.

That’s all. That’s all it can be. And I lost 180 million worth of gold today because of the divisions, and they won’t act on my tax bill. We’re having an international depression in the offering. [William McChesney] Bill Martin [Jr.]‘s been to all the central banks of Europe, and it’s just as dangerous as it can be.[note 30] William McChesney “Bill” Martin Jr. was chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from April 1951 to January 1970. In the meantime, the situation in Vietnam is just as dangerous as it can be, and I . . . I guess I got 14 inches of stuff I have on my table right now that I’m working at. I had dinner at eleven o’clock. So—

You would suggest then I tell him to see [unclear]—

I would ask him if he wouldn’t mind going in the morning. Tell him I think it’d be a good idea—and you do—and sit down with Clifford and give him his ideas. Talk to him about anything that troubles him. Make any suggestion he wants to make. It’ll come direct to me. If he doesn’t want to do that, if he wants to talk to me, I’ll be glad to see him. I would think, though, that the press would be embarrassing to him and to me, too. And I’ve got to be careful in anything I do that it’s not done publicly, so Hanoi won’t think I’m running out [Daley acknowledges] or caving or that they are having pressure on me.

Yeah.

The Soviets, Bobby sees them pretty regularly. He goes in and out, and they come in and out of his office, the Embassy here. And they relay their stuff to Hanoi. And I wouldn’t want them to think that I—he was pressuring me and that I was weakening.

Yeah.

Because I think it would keep them from ever doing business with us at a conference table if they think they can do it without—if they can beat the boys here in Washington by making me crumble, there’s no use in beating them out there, you know.

That’s right.

And this is a difficult thing to do to a president in time of war. I don’t guess it’s ever been done before. I haven’t written my book, but I want to be as patient as Rusk was yesterday. The wires are just overwhelming. I guess 236 to 8 we got today on Rusk’s appearance on television.[note 31] Secretary of State Dean Rusk had undergone two days of questioning by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during televised hearings. Murrey Marder, “Rusk Shuns Any Pledge on Troops,” Washington Post, 13 March 1968.

Mm-hmm. Well, I’ll call him then and make that suggestion. And unless you want me to, I won’t bother you; I won’t call you back, or—

Well, I’d be happy for you to. I wish you would [Daley acknowledges] because I—

I’ll tell him that I think it’d be the better part of judgment if he sees Clifford in the morning and then sit down and find out through Clifford just exactly what—

And tell him if you want to, that you’ll have Clifford call him.

Fine.

And—

And then I’ll call you back.

And—but you tell him this other thing is crazy, ‘cause we’ll just have a knock-down, drag-out, and he can’t ever make it. Don’t give him any encouragement.

OK.

Bye.

Bye, now.

Bye.