Yes, please.

Put [Charles S. “Charlie”] Murphy here.[note 2] Charles S. “Charlie” Murphy was White House counsel from January 1950 to January 1953; U.S. under secretary of agriculture from March 1961 to June 1965; chair of the Civil Aeronautics Board from June 1965 to March 1968; and White House coordinator for the transition to the Nixon presidency from 1968 to 1969.

Thank you.[note 3] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary. [Pause.] There you are.

Charlie, I missed that first part. You said you’re working on this thing?

Yeah, working on this thing with [T.] Hale Boggs [Sr.] [D–Louisiana].[note 4] T. Hale Boggs Sr. was a U.S. representative [D–Louisiana] from January 1941 to January 1943 and January 1947 to January 1973; House Majority Whip from January 1962 to January 1971; and House Majority Leader from January 1971 to January 1973. And he has come up with some language that seems to me to be all right, and the Vice President [Hubert H. Humphrey Jr.] will go along with.[note 5] Hubert H. Humphrey Jr. was the Democratic mayor of Minneapolis, Minnesota, from July 1945 to November 1948; a U.S. senator [D–Minnesota] from January 1949 to December 1964 and January 1971 to January 1978; Senate Majority Whip from January 1961 to December 1964; vice president of the United States from January 1965 to January 1969; and the Democratic U.S. presidential candidate in 1968. Humphrey was the the leading contender for the Democratic nomination for the presidency at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, Illinois, which was ongoing at the time of this conversation. And Hale would like to—personally to tell you what the language is, and then he would like to talk to the boss about it if that’s necessary.

[whispering aside to Jones] Get Charlie to tell you. [Unclear.] No, just get Charlie to tell you.

Charlie?

Yeah?

Why don’t you just go ahead and tell me yourself. Let’s just you and I work.

All right. Then this language is: “Stop all bombing of North Vietnam unless this action would endanger the lives of our troops—”

Charlie, it does. We got that positively. Let’s don’t mislead and deceive people. I’d rather be a poor peasant and wear a wooden shoe and be out on the door by myself than to—

Well, in that case, why—

The “unless” is no goddamn meaningful ’cause we know it. Read [Creighton W.] Abrams’s wire in front of you.[note 6] Gen. Creighton W. Abrams was assistant deputy chief of staff and director of operations at the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations from 1962 to 1963; deputy commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from May 1967 to June 1968; and commander of MACV from June 1968 to June 1972. [Murphy attempts to interject.] He says that it does.

Well, in that case, the language would not call for the bombing to be stopped.

Well, [chuckling] that’s right, but why do you want to imply that you’re going to stop it?

Uh . . .

You just say to Hanoi something it’d take me a year to explain, and then, they’ll say I’m running away from it.

Well, I suppose one consideration is, there’s really a critical situation here at the convention. And looks like that the chairman of the platform committee, who’s sitting here, might not be able to go to his platform committee, except with a disagreement between the President and the Vice President. That he thinks that would be a terrible situation.

Well, the President’s not going to agree to stop all the bombing, Charlie. Period.

Uh—

Now, I just hate to say that. I’m just like you. I’d rather vote for [Richard M. “Dick”] Nixon than to kill my boy.[note 7] Richard M. “Dick” Nixon was a U.S. representative [R–California] from January 1947 to December 1950; a U.S. senator [R–California] from January 1951 to January 1953; U.S. vice president from January 1953 to January 1961; GOP nominee for president in 1960; GOP candidate for governor of California in 1962; and U.S. president from January 1969 to August 1974.

Well, I’m with you. [chuckling] I’m with you. Goddamn it, you don’t want it. But I just don’t think [unclear].

Now, Hale is here, and he would like to talk to you.

I don’t want to get into that, [Murphy acknowledges] because I don’t want to talk to anybody at the convention. I don’t care what they’d like to do.

All right, sir.

I just positively don’t want to do it, and I think you better just say you’re talking to Jim Jones.

All right, sir.

That’s why I asked you to go out there. If I wanted to negotiate with each one of these individuals, I’d go out there. I just can’t do it. But I would say to them, if they won’t go for the language that we suggested, which I don’t—I think puts Hanoi off bad enough, then they have to go on their own responsibility, but—which I will not accept and which I—[note 8] End of 2021 revisions.

This—

—we can do here is go in three directions.

Well, we asked him this last night, if he had said this, and it’s just not something that we can live with.

Well, you can’t live with the other one because what you’ve said is when the action doesn’t hurt a troop. That means that as long as any general over there says that if you do that, you going to endanger two people . . .

No, I don’t think that’s it at all, but based on all the information he gets when his judgment is that that wouldn’t endanger.

No, no. His judgment is, it says “when!” We just, just agreed to the word “when.”

But the President makes that decision.

I understand! The President makes all of these decisions, Jim. Every one of them.

Mm-hmm.

[Long pause.] [reading aloud] “In the quest for peace—no solution but calculated risk—recognizing events—the negotiations in Paris may affect the timing and the actions we recommend—the actions we recommend. We support our government!”

Mm-hmm. Well, who do you pick up—who are you negotiating with by putting “the prospects of” and “timing,” and [unclear]—does these dreamworld words—who do you pick up? How much strength?

Well, it may be; I don’t know what you’d pick up. I know what—I know—it’s very simple. I know that if I go into this drafting committee, which is waiting right now, and say there’s disagreement between the President [chuckling] and the Vice President—

[speaking in the background to Jones] There is [unclear].

—the whole thing collapses. That’s what happens.

Mm-hmm.

I’m just looking at it from a practical point of view, and frankly, I don’t know whether I can preside over the goddamn thing.

Have you talked to the Vice President? There is a disagreement, but I can’t imagine if he had to make these decisions if he were President and had the same facts before him, which he has most of it, I can’t imagine that—

The Vice President said yesterday that he supported the President’s position completely and totally.

I know! Why can’t—

That was the front-page line in the New York Times this morning.

That’s right. I thought he did very well. And all you’re saying here in this changed language is really what he said already. So why don’t you get it in the platform? There doesn’t seem to be any disagreement in regard to his news interview. The—

Well, [unclear] prospect.

[speaking over Boggs] But there is a definite disagreement on this language. Do what?

[speaking aside] David, Charlie, hold on here a minute. “Stop all bombing in North Vietnam when [unclear].” What do you got now? [Boggs speaks aside to people in the background for nearly a minute.] Well, what . . . what we‘re thinking is . . .

[Long pause.] [speaking in the background] [Unclear] too nebulous thing to say nothing to this action, that they’re talking about a prospect [unclear] we’d stop something. We can’t do it on a prospect. We’re going to do it on some actions [unclear] in. Otherwise, they send 20 divisions to DMZ. [Pause.] This action and its timing—the timing’s got to be in there. Just ought to say, this action taken into account [unclear]. That doesn’t mean it has to be [unclear].

—likelihood, would that go?

Where is this now?

“And this action will take into account the likelihood of a positive response from Hanoi.”

No, I just don’t—I don’t think so. You got men’s lives there that—

I know. As far as the lives are concerned, nothing happens. You won’t stop bombing whatsoever, if you do anything on earth to endanger the man—the life of a man. That’s number one. That’s spelled out specifically. That’s a separate clause. And that is the first condition. The first condition is that if anything on earth happens to any man, you won’t do it. But, you also say, assuming that nothing happens to endanger the life of a man, you will do it—

[Unclear]—

—if there’s some prospect of Hanoi acting reasonably. That’s what the President’s been saying, Jim. The first condition—you must read it in light of the first condition. The first condition is flat, unequivocable [sic], “when,” and “when” means when General Abrams or whoever it is says, “Look, there’s no danger to anybody there now.” Now, I suspect the prospect of him saying that is absolutely nil.

Hmm. Mm-hmm.

And the rest of it is identically what the President has been saying!

Well, I took this up last night just to see what has been—

I know, but, you see, the difference is that you’ve changed it. You have said “when” now, which was quite different from what you were talking about last night.

No. No, we were saying “when” last night. The difference we’re talking about is over “the prospects of” or “the likelihood of.”

Well, “likelihood,” “prospect,” I don’t think that makes much difference. That’s—

What’s the big problem with just stating it as it is? “This action should be—should take into account a positive response from Hanoi?”

Well, the big problem is that I can’t get people to agree on it. That’s the problem. [Chuckles.]

Well—

It’s simple.

—as I understand it, you’ve got—you’ve got about a 80–30, something like that now.

No, I haven’t.

That’s—that was—

Not in that language. If the Vice President’s forces cut loose on the other side, which I, of course, would not expect them to do, [Jones acknowledges] but the convention would break up. There wouldn’t be any convention. It would end. You may as well not even start it. I’m not—listen, I’m not arguing any personal position. Christ knows I support the President. But I know and—I know what’s happening here. And I know it better than any human being because I’ve been in the middle of it.

Mm-hmm.

And I’ve been in the middle of it more than anybody. That includes anybody in the State Department, anywhere else.

Mm-hmm. Well—

And if I go in this thing this morning and I’m right—mind you, this platform today is all full of beautiful compliments to the President, [Jones acknowledges] about how—his domestic program, and so forth.

Well—

These backers want to come in here with a platform condemning the President, condemning action in Vietnam, and, as a matter of fact, we start off the very first thing: “We strongly”—[speaking aside] where’s that?

All I can—all I can—

“We strongly support the Paris talks and applaud the initiative of President Johnson, [Jones acknowledges] which brought North Vietnam to the peace table.”

Well, all I can say, about the only authority—the only authority I have is to say what is acceptable to the President.

[speaking over Jones] Well, if it’s not acceptable there’s no point in me taking it in there. I can’t live with—I can’t say that.

The only—

When I’m speaking in there, I’ve got to be speaking for the President. Everybody on earth has said in every column [Jones acknowledges] that’s been written.

Well, this is all I can—I’m authorized to say is, except: “We’ll stop all bombing of North Vietnam when this action would not endanger the lives of our troops in the field.”

Well, we say that. “When this action will not endanger the lives of our troops.” It’s spelled out.

“The action should take into account a positive response from Hanoi.”

Well, the only thing we’re arguing about is the—whether or not we say “the prospects” or “a positive” of it. That’s all. We’re on about two words now, “the prospects of.”

Well, we got two things there. The timing—

Is that all we’re arguing about?

No, we’re arguing about timing and “the prospects of.”

No, I don’t think we’re arguing about timing.

You’ve already taken that out? [President Johnson acknowledges indistinctly in the background.]

Right, I think we took timing out.

Well, it seems like “take into account” just covers both of those, so the only argument is “the prospects of,” and I just can’t accept that. It’s got to be “the action should take into account a positive response from Hanoi,” which is what the facts are.

[Pause.] Well, I don’t see any point in me going down to the goddamn com[mittee]. I’m 20 minutes late now, and I’m—there’s no point in me going down to preside over something that is chaos. So—

Well, you’re on the scene there, and I can’t give any judgment on that.

Pardon?

I said I can’t give any judgment on that because you’re on the scene, and I suppose you’ve talked to the Vice President.

I haven’t talked to him this morning. I talked to him late last night when the word came to me that the matter was being resolved. Now, I’ve got an hour or two before I could have—maybe I got about an hour at the most.

Let me talk to Charlie Murphy just a minute.

Let me impress upon you, Jim, that this thing could divide three ways. And if it divides three ways, it’s utter pandemonium. It’s not—it’s really not 80–30 for just one solid position. It is 80–30 roughly for the President and the Humphrey position. But if there’s a Humphrey position, and if there’s a Johnson position, and if there’s a dove position, then it’s going to divide about 30–30–30. That’s what’s going to happen. It’s going to be sheer murder and pandemonium. I’m telling you. In Pennsylvania, why, you know, [Jones attempts to interject] you know, I don’t have one—you know where I’ve had all my trouble? From the great big Democratic states: [Jones attempts to interject] Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, [a telephone rings in the background, which President Johnson seems to answer] New York, Ohio, California, Illinois, and I’m telling you—

[speaking in the background to Jones] Tell him he’s arguing with [unclear].

I just don’t have any authority to ar—to talk out those points. All I know is, this position that would be acceptable. [President Johnson speaks again to Jones in the background.]

Well, we [unclear]—

[speaking over Boggs] Or it would be an improvement on what we had, anyway.

Otherwise, I’m not going to present it. I’ll have somebody in there present it and say that this is something that’s been presented. I’m not sure that I won’t just resign as chairman of the goddamn thing, to be quite frank with you.

Well, I can’t make any judgment on that. Is Charlie Murphy there?

Charlie’s right here.

Let me talk to him a minute.

[whispering to Jones in the background] Ask if [unclear]—

Hello?

Charlie?

Yeah?

Are you on alone?

Uh . . . yeah, there’s others in the room, but I’m on the phone alone.

You’re on the phone alone. Right.

Charlie?

Yeah.

We are not going to write the platform from down here.

Right.

These are responsible men.

Right.

Humphrey says to me that he is—does not favor “stop the bombing.”

Right.

If he tells the truth, he ought to stay with it. If he doesn’t, he ought to go on his own. Now, it’s that simple. We do not favor any words that say, “Stop the bombing.” Let’s make that clear and repeat it over and over again.

Right.

[speaking deliberately] We do not favor any words that say, “We are ready to stop the bombing.”

Right.

We think that signals Hanoi that the convention has ordered the commander in chief to stop the bombing. That’s number one.

Yeah.

We think it plays politics with the war, number two. [Murphy acknowledges.] We think it puts a bunch of draft dodgers and pacifists who’ve never seen a uniform in charge of telling us that we can’t bomb the people till they get out of the DMZ, or even then.

Right.

Where they can run over our men. So we do not favor anything that says, “Stop the bombing.” Now, is that clear?

Right.

Now, if they’ve got to have that language to satisfy their pacifists, the language ought to say what they mean.

Right.

Now, the language that Dean Rusk and the [National] Security Council people and the President would not find it necessary [to] just get out and denounce—although they might not accept it or follow it, but just might not have to split off from—would be language that says this [Murphy acknowledges]: “Stop all bombing of North Vietnam when this action would not endanger the lives of our troops in the field.”[note 9] Dean Rusk was U.S. secretary of state from January 1961 to January 1969.

Right.

Now, that would mean—what we mean by that is this: the President would determine when. The Security Council would determine when. The Vice President’s a member of it.

Right.

The Secretary of State and the the Secretary of Defense would determine when. Those policy decisions are made in Washington.

Right.

But, we could never stop the bombing if we thought by so doing we would have a bloodbath!

Right.

And no son of a bitch ought to ask us to. That’s number one.

That’s right.

Now, that’s all we’re saying. Now, then, if you want to go further—I don’t see any need to go further at all—but if you want to go further, you could say, “This action—” What? What action? “Stopping the bombing.”

Right.

“This action should take into account [Murphy acknowledges throughout] a positive response from Hanoi,” or if you want to say, “a response from Hanoi.” Now, we’re not going to just take this action unilaterally, as I said on March 31st.[note 10] In a nationally televised address, the President offered to halt all U.S. bombing of North Vietnam “if our restraint is matched by restraint in Hanoi. But I cannot in good conscience stop all bombing so long as to do so would immediately and directly endanger the lives of our men and our allies. Whether a complete bombing halt becomes possible in the future will be determined by events.” “The President’s Address to the Nation Announcing Steps to Limit the War in Vietnam and Reporting His Decision Not to Seek Reelection,” 31 March 1968, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1970), doc. 170.

Right.

We’ve taken the unilateral action at those two big cities because they would not endanger the lives of our men.[note 11] Under the partial bombing halt Johnson had already announced, the United States did not bomb the North Vietnamese cities of Hanoi and Haiphong.

Right.

But if I move it right down to the DMZ where they can come through day and night—instead of only at night—where they can come bumper-to-bumper. A thousand trucks a week were coming in July the 15th. We’ve got them cut down to 150 now. But if we stop the bombing, a thousand would start immediately next week.

Right.

And Abrams said, it would increase their strength fivefold. Now, he said when they increase their strength fivefold, he has to pull out of the northern I Corps area.[note 12] I Corps was the northernmost of the four military regions of South Vietnam, the one adjacent to the demilitarized zone that divided Vietnam in two.

Right.

That means [Charles S.] Chuck Robb and every damn one of them get run over.[note 13] Charles S. “Chuck” Robb was the husband of Lynda Bird Johnson Robb and the son-in-law of Lyndon B. and Lady Bird Johnson.

Right.

They’ve got to retreat! Now, these fools that don’t know anything about it cannot tell us that we’ve got to retreat! Because we’re not going to do it.

Right.

Now, if we have to be against the platform and say that we’re a bunch of idiots and that we can’t have a Republican platform, we can’t even stand for the Democratic war as strong as Nixon does, why, then we just have to say so.

Right.

And let them write what they want to.

Right.

But this business about its timing indicates that they are determined to stop the bombing and then the timing is a matter that they want me to hurry up on, but they give me a week or so. So the words “timing” ought to be out of there, just whatever they say.

All right, [unclear].

Now, we can’t do anything on the prospect of the dream. We did 90 percent of it and said, “If you will match any of it, we’ll take further steps.”[note 14] Since Johnson had limited U.S. bombing to the area directly north of the demilitarized zone, 90 percent of the North Vietnamese population was outside its range.

All right.

But when they put the prospect in there, they just say that I ought to take this action on hope! Now, I just can’t do that!

All right, sir.

And I think that we ought to say to them, “If it’s 30–30–30, if Hale [Boggs] resigns, all these other things, they’re not any of them as important as killing a bunch of men!” Now, we’re just not going to kill the men, and we’re going to say so when that platform’s over with.

All right.

Now, if you’ll give me the language, what I’m going to say, I’ll read it to you, and you can take it down and let Jim see it. Wait a minute. [speaking aside] Give me that language of Rusk’s over there that we’ve [unclear reply by Jones] . . . [Unclear.] You get you a pencil now and take this down. However—the speech, sweetheart. I . . . What we’re going to say in our speech. [speaking to Murphy again] If we have a speech, Charlie, here’s what we’re going to say, and this is going to be the President’s position.

All right.

There’s no use agreeing to something today and unwriting it tomorrow night.

All right.

[reading aloud] “This country’s pledge to freedom is written in the treaties that we Democrats and Republicans have concluded by solemn constitutional process.” Now, you don’t need to copy that, but I just—“They link our safety to the safety of allies in this hemisphere, across the Atlantic, and on the western rim of the Pacific. They were made to prevent World War III and to protect the vital national interests of the United States. There could be no greater disservice to peace than to let those who might become adversaries think that these treaties do not mean what they say. Our fidelity is written in the blood that our sons have shed on battlefields in Korea and Vietnam. For where we had to fight to stop aggression before it led to World War III, we did fight. I know there are well-intentioned people who want to stop our bombing in Vietnam, regardless of the consequences.” Now, I think [C. David] Ginsburg’s one of them.[note 15] C. David Ginsburg was a lawyer and founder of Americans for Democratic Action; executive director of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (also known as the Kerner Commission); and general counsel and platform adviser for the Democratic National Committee and Hubert Humphrey during the 1968 U.S. presidential election. “No American wants peace more than I.”

Now, this is what you ought to take down.

All right.

“Hanoi knows that I am prepared to stop the bombing, dash, I have stopped it eight times.”

I write that slow.

[President Johnson speaks deliberately throughout this section as Murphy takes down the wording.] “Hanoi knows that I am prepared to stop the bombing, dash, I have stopped it eight times. Today—”

OK.

“Today, four-fifths of North Vietnam is free from bombing.” [Long pause.]

OK.

“Although every square mile of South Vietnam is subject to bombing with rockets and mortars.”

[Unclear] . . . [Long pause.]

“Need I remind you . . . that the President . . . is commander in chief?”

[Pause.] All right.

“Those who carry the burden of the battlefield tell me—”

[speaking aside] Give me [unclear]. [Pause.] All right.

“Those who carry the burden of the battlefield tell me—”

“Those who carry—”

“—burden of the battlefield . . . tell me—”

All right.

“—that stopping the bombing—”

All right.

“—of North Vietnam—”

All right.

“—would increase severalfold—”

[Pause.] All right. “Increase severalfold.”

“—the enemy’s capabilities at the DMZ.”

All right.

“And that such action would immediately require—”

All right.

“—allied forces . . . to withdraw . . . from important . . . strategic areas . . . of I Corps.”

[Pause.] All right. “I Corps.”

”—withdraw from important strategic areas—”

What? What? I can’t quite hear.

I’ll read this sentence again. “Those who carry the burden of the battlefield tell me that stopping the bombing in North Vietnam would increase severalfold”—he says fivefold, Charlie.

Right.

We say “severalfold”—“the enemy’s capabilities at the DMZ and that such action would immediately require allied forces to withdraw from important strategic areas of I Corps.”

I’ve got it.

“That is why . . . I have said . . . we cannot substantially increase the dangers to our own men . . . by this action . . . by this unilateral action . . . and why we need—”

Sir, let me catch up a little. “And why we—”

“—need some response from Hanoi.”

All right.

Now, basically there may be a difference between the Vice President and I through Ginsburg. The Vice President told us orally at—from twelve [o’clock] to four o’clock meeting in the morning—that he would not lessen our position on stopping the bombing.[note 16] The Presidential Daily Diary indicates that Johnson met with Humphrey from 11:40 p.m. to 3:40 a.m. on 20–21 August 1968.

Yeah.

He told me he agreed with what I said [a bell or chime rings briefly] at the VFW speech.[note 17] “Remarks in Detroit at the Annual Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars,” 19 August 1968, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1970), doc. 452.

Well, that’s personally his position that he reiterated again on television yesterday and again this morning.

That’s right. And he called down here yesterday. He called down here yesterday and said the same thing.

Right.

Now, then. We are not going to change our position because I’ve got 550,000 men that are there, and I’m not going to do either of two things. One, I’m not going to substantially increase their capability.

Right.

And two, I’m not going to order my men to retreat.

Right.

Now, that’s what “stop the bombing,” according to Ginsburg’s language, does. I don’t think “General” Ginsburg knows it, but that’s true. Now, that’s the point we must make. I don’t think Hale understands it. [Murphy attempts to interject.] Now, I want the convention to get along, but I don’t want it to get along near as much as I want to save these lives. Now, I’m not—I’m going to try to win this war, right up till January the 20th.

Right.

And I made our pitch. Now, they haven’t got a damn thing in there on Hanoi. They just making us cut back some more. Now, I’m not going to cut back.

Right.

Now, if [Theodore C.] Ted Sorensen and if [Edward M.] Ted Kennedy [D–Massachusetts] and if the rest of them take control and want to, that’s all right.[note 18] Theodore C. “Ted” Sorensen was a speechwriter and special assistant to the president from 1961 to 1964; author of a best-selling biography of John F. Kennedy in 1965; an adviser for Robert F. Kennedy’s presidential campaign in 1968; and an attorney and senior counsel at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison in New York City from 1966 until his death in 2010. Edward M. “Teddy” Kennedy was a U.S. senator [D–Massachusetts] from November 1962 until his death on 25 August 2009, and Senate Democratic Whip from January 1969 to January 1971. [Murphy acknowledges.] The people can decide that in November.

Right.

But there’s not a bit of use of us putting in this language, “the prospects.” I’m not going to stop bombing on any prospect.

Right.

They’ve got to make some response. Or they’ve got to tell me. And they’re considering seriously right now whether they would say that they would reinstitute the DMZ.

Right.

But just the prospect, that just leaves them to believe that if they can put some fuzzy prospect up there, that then I’ve been ordered to do it.

Yeah.

Now, the timing is another thing. The word “timing” shows—“this action and timing should take into account.” That means that they imply that they’re ordering it done; it’s just a question for me to determine the timing.

Right.

Now, I’d just cut out the timing—it doesn’t amount to a damn thing—and just say, “This action should take into account—”

All right.

“—a positive response from Hanoi,” or “a response from Hanoi.” [Murphy acknowledges.] But the thing that Hale’s got to do and Humphrey’s got to do—and it’s their decision; it’s not ours. We make ours. We’ve already made it. It’s in the speech. It’s in the speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars at Detroit. It’s there.[note 19] In his 19 August 1968 speech before the VFW, Johnson noted that he had stopped bombing most of North Vietnam and said, “the next move must be theirs.” “Remarks in Detroit at the Annual Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars,” 19 August 1968, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1970), doc. 452.

Right.[note 20] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary.

Now, what they’ve got to take into account—do they want to say “Stop the bombing” when the commander tells them that it increases the enemy fivefold and he—our men must retreat? If they do, they can use their language.

Right.

If they don’t, they ought to use our language.

All right.

Now, we’re not going to approve anything. We’re not going to accept it. Hale says he wants to go and tell them the President’s for this. The President’s not going to be writing that platform; he told them he wouldn’t to begin with.

Right.

This is Humphrey’s convention, and Teddy Kennedy’s, and whoever he wants to be. If I wanted it to be mine, I wouldn’t have withdrawn.

Right.

But I’m telling them what our position is as commander in chief that I’m not about to stop this bombing unless they arrest me. And I—take my power away from me [Murphy acknowledges] and kill these men when I know it kills them!

Right.

Because I’ve got some of my own right there, and I’m not going to shoot them in the heart!

Right.

Not for a bunch of goddamn draft dodgers.

All right.

Now, is that clear? Don’t you tell them you talked to me at all. You just talked to Jim Jones. But I’m not sure that they understand the reasons behind this.[note 21] End of 2021 revisions. Hale’s got this thing there, and he says he has to resign. You heard all that stuff. Well, that’s OK. I can’t determine that. That’s something they have to determine. But I can determine that we’re not going to stop the bombing unless—the unless ain’t worth a damn.

All right.

The “when” is satisfactory.

All right.

And then “this action should take into account a response from Hanoi.” “Positive” is better, but if they had to negotiate it, they could say “a response.”

All right.

OK. Let us know.

Well, Jim?

Yes, Charlie.

I’ll carry on from here, and I think I understand. Wait a minute.

Uh . . . Charlie?

Jim, can you hold just a second?

What for?

Well, wait just a minute and let me see. I don’t know, we—