Hello?

Hi.

Everett, how are you?

All right.

I want to talk to you as a friend and very confidentially, because I think that we’re skirting on dangerous ground [Dirksen acknowledges] and I thought I ought to give you the facts and you ought to pass them on if you choose. If you don’t, why, then I will a little later.

Yeah.

We have on October the 13th, an agreement with [Nguyễn Văn] Thiệu and [Nguyen Cao] Ky concerning the bombing halt.[note 2] Nguyễn Văn Thiệu was president of South Vietnam from June 1965 to April 1975. Nguyen Cao Ky was prime minister of South Vietnam from 1965 to 1967.

Yeah.

At that time, President Thiệu stressed, “There must not be a long delay.”

Yeah.

That is, a delay between the halt and the conference.

Yeah.

On October the 15th, Thiệu agreed to a proposal that we had worked out, of 36 hours.

Yeah.

On October the 23rd, after the North Vietnamese demanded two or three weeks [Dirksen acknowledges] , Thiệu reluctantly agreed to three days’ delay. On October the 28th, we agreed on a joint announcement.

Yeah.

[Ellsworth F.] Bunker and [Creighton W.] Abrams reached an explicit agreement with Thiệu that the gap between the bombing and the talks would be two or three days.[note 3] Ellsworth F. Bunker was U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam from April 1967 to May 1973. General Creighton W. Abrams served as vice chief of staff of the Army from 1964 to 1967; deputy commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, from June 1967 to July 1968; commander of MACV from July 1968 to June 1972; and Army chief of staff from October 1972 to September 1974.

Yeah.

With three days the outer limit.

Yeah.

Both Thiệu and Ky stressed on us the importance of a minimum delay.

Yeah.

Then we got some of our friends involved.

Uh-huh.

Some of it your old China crowd.[note 4] The China Lobby was an informal group of American politicians and activists, as well as Chinese Nationalists, who claimed that the 1949 Communist revolution could have been avoided if the Truman administration had given more support to the anti-Communist Chinese Nationalist forces.

Yeah.[note 5] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary.

And here is the latest information we got. The agent says that she’s just—they just talked to the boss in New Mexico.

Uh-huh.

And that he says that you must hold out . . . that just hold on until after the election. Now, we know what [Nguyễn Văn] Thiệu is saying to them out there.[note 6] The CIA had bugged the South Vietnamese president’s office.

Yeah.

We’re pretty well informed on both ends.

Yeah.

[Richard M. "Dick"] Nixon’s man traveling with him today said, quote, "that he did not understand that Thiệu was not aboard."

Yeah.

Did you see that? Did you see that . . . ?

No, I don’t think I did. Who was that? [Bryce N.] Harlow?[note 7] Bryce N. Harlow was special assistant to the president for congressional affairs from 1969 to 1970, and counselor to the president from 1970 to 1971 and June 1973 to August 1974.

We don’t know.[note 8] By the next day, the New York Times identified the source as Robert H. Finch, California’s lieutenant governor and a senior aide to Nixon. Robert B. Semple, Jr., “Nixon Willing to Go to Saigon or Paris,” New York Times, 3 November 1968. We have no idea. [Snorts.] He speaks through these unknown people.

Yeah.

Now, we told Nixon, as we told you, that . . . well, let me get the transcript. [paraphrasing] "While this was going on, we went out to Thiệu and talked to him and all of our allied countries. And they all tentatively agreed."

Yeah.

"Now, since that agreement, we have had problems develop. First, there’s been speeches that we ought to withdraw troops."

Yeah.

That was [Hubert H.] Humphrey [Jr.] and [McGeorge "Mac"] Bundy.[note 9] On 30 September 1968, Vice President Humphrey, who was also the Democratic presidential nominee, had announced that, if elected, he would halt the bombing of North Vietnam as a peace initiative. “I would place key importance on evidence—direct or indirect—by deed or word—of Communist willingness to restore the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam.” R.W. Apple, Jr., “Humphrey Vows Halt in Bombing if Hanoi Reacts,” New York Times, 1 October 1968. McGeorge Bundy, national security adviser when Johnson had first deployed U.S. combat troops to Vietnam in 1965, had made a speech at DePauw University on 12 October 1968, calling for the steady and systematic withdrawal of U.S. forces even in the absence of truce. The speech broke Bundy’s long silence on the war dating back to his departure from the White House in February 1966. Homer Bigart, “Bundy Proposes Troop Reduction and Bombing Halt; Former White House Aide Alters Stand on Vietnam Policy He Helped Make,” New York Times, 13 October 1968.

Yeah.

"Or that we stop bombing without any . . . obtaining anything in return."

Yeah.

"Or some of our folks, including some of the old China Lobby, are going to the [South] Vietnamese embassy and saying, 'Please notify the President that if he’ll hold out till November the 2nd they could get a better deal.'”

Uh-huh.

Now, I’m reading their hand, Everett. I don’t want to get this in the campaign.

That’s right.

And they oughtn’t to be doing this. This is treason.

I know.[note 10] End of 2021 revisions.

I don’t know whether it’s [Melvin R.] Laird, I don’t know who it is that is putting it out.[note 11] Melvin R. Laird was secretary of defense from January 1969 to January 1973, and counselor to the president for domestic affairs from June 1973 to February 1974. But here is the UPI 48 that came in tonight.

Yeah.

And I’m calling you only after talking to [Dean] Rusk, and [Clark M.] Clifford, and all of them, who thought that somebody ought to be notified as to what’s happening.[note 12] Dean Rusk was secretary of state from 1961 to 1969. Clark M. Clifford was a Washington lawyer; adviser to presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson; and chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1963 to 1968. Clifford served as secretary of defense from March 1968 to January 1969.

Yeah.

Here’s the Nixon release: “A highly placed aide to Nixon said today the South Vietnamese decision to boycott the Paris talks did not jibe with the confidential assurances given the three major candidates by Johnson.”

Uh-huh.

“‘We had the impression that all the diplomatic ducks were in a row,’ said the Nixon associate.”

Yeah.

Now, I just read you what I told them. [Dirksen acknowledges.] And I told you that and I told everybody else. “Johnson got Nixon, Democratic candidate Humphrey and third party hopeful [George C.] Wallace on a conference call about the bombing.”[note 13] George C. Wallace was governor of Alabama from January 1963 to January 1967, January 1971 to January 1979, and January 1983 to January 1987.

Yeah.

“The adviser”—Nixon’s adviser—“volunteered the GOP candidate’s reaction on the condition that he not be identified.”

Uh-huh.

“Nixon, said the advisor, felt that Saigon’s refusal to attend the negotiation could jeopardize the military and the diplomatic situation in Vietnam [Dirksen acknowledges] and reflect [on] the credibility of this administration.”

Yeah.

Now, I can identify them, because I know who’s doing this. [Dirksen attempts to interject.] I don’t want to identify it. I think it would shock America if a principal candidate was playing with a source like this on a matter this important.

Yeah.

I don’t want to do that.

Yeah.

But if they’re going to put this kind of stuff out, they ought to know that we know what they’re doing. I know who they’re talking to and I know what they’re saying.

Yeah.

And my judgment is that Nixon ought to play it just like he has all along: that I want to see peace come the first day we can, that it’s not going to affect the election one way or the other. The conference is not even going to be held until after the election.

Yeah.

They have stopped shelling the cities. [Dirksen acknowledges throughout.] They have stopped going across the DMZ. We’ve had 24 hours of relative peace. Now, if Nixon keeps the South Vietnamese away from the conference, well, that’s going to be his responsibility. Up to this point, that’s why they’re not there. I had them signed on board until this happened.

Yeah. [Pause.] OK.

Well, now, what do you think we ought to do about it?

Well, I better get in touch with him, I think, and tell him about it.

I think you better tell him that his people are saying to these folks that they oughtn’t to go through with this meeting. Now, if they don’t go through with the meeting, it’s not going to be me that’s hurt. I think it’s going to be whoever’s elected, and it’d be, my guess, him.

Yeah.

And I think they’re making a very serious mistake, and I don’t want to—I don’t want to say this.

Yeah.

And you’re the only one I’m going to say it to.

Yeah. I understood they were in Texas tonight or today.

I don’t know. All I know is that I read you what I told him—the three candidates, just as I told you.

Yeah.

I said, “Now, there has been speeches, that—some we ought to withdraw troops, and including some of the old China crowd that are going in implying to the embassies.

Yeah.

Now, Everett, I know what happens there, you see what I mean?

Yeah—I do.

And I’m looking at his hole card.

Yeah.

Now, I don’t want to get in a fight with him there. I think Nixon’s going to be elected.

Yeah.

And I think we ought to have peace and I’m going to work with him. [Dirksen acknowledges throughout.] I’ve worked with you. But I don’t want these sons of bitches like Laird giving out announcements like this that Johnson gave them the wrong impression.

Yeah.

I gave him the right impression, except I gave it to him decently [Dirksen acknowledges] , when I said, that you ought to keep the Mrs. Chennaults and all the rest of them from running around here.

Yeah.

Now, you see, I know what Thiệu says to his people out there.

Yeah. I haven’t seen Laird.

Well, I don’t know who it is that’s with Nixon. It may be Laird, it may be Harlow, it may be [John N.] Mitchell.[note 14] John N. Mitchell was campaign chair of the Nixon election committee in 1968. He later served attorney general from January 1969 to February 1972, and as the Nixon re-election campaign chairman from March to July 1972. I don’t know who it is. I know this, that they’re contacting a foreign power in the middle of a war.

That’s a mistake.

And it’s a damn bad mistake.

Oh, it is.

Now, I don’t want to say so, and you’re the only man that I have enough confidence in [Dirksen acknowledges throughout] to tell them. But you better tell them they better quit playing with it, and the day after the election, I’ll sit down with all of you and try to work it out and be helpful. But they oughtn’t to knock out this conference.

Wherever they are, I’ll try to get a hold of them tonight.

Well, there are two things that they ought to do. One is, they ought to stop this business about trying to keep the conference from taking place. [Dirksen acknowledges.] It takes place the day after the election.

Exactly.

The second thing is, we can all sit down and talk about it after that time. [Dirksen acknowledges throughout.] And I’m not a bitter partisan here, and you know it.

I know. Well, I’ll try to find them, wherever they are tonight.

Well, you just tell them that their people are messing around in this thing and if they don’t want it on the front pages [Dirksen acknowledges throughout] , they better quit it, number one. Number two, the—we better sit down and talk about it as soon as this thing’s over with, and we’ll try to work a—

That’s right.

And they ought to tell their people that are contacting these embassies [Dirksen acknowledges] to go on with the conference.

Right.

OK.

I agree.

Bye.