Transcript
Edited by Kent B. Germany, Nicole Hemmer, and Ken Hughes, with Kieran K. Matthews and Marc J. Selverstone
Senator George A. Smathers [D–Florida] was the rare politician who could claim that he was one of John F. “Jack” Kennedy’s best and most trusted friends, one of Lyndon B. Johnson’s most trusted and valued associates, and one of Richard M. “Dick” Nixon’s oldest friends in Washington. Nixon’s best friend, Charles G. “Bebe” Rebozo, who first met Nixon through an introduction arranged by Smathers almost two decades before this telephone call, lived one house down from Smathers in Key Biscayne, Florida. Recently, Rebozo and Nixon had convinced a reluctant Smathers to sell his home to the President-elect.
In this call, Smathers clarified for Johnson his property’s real value to Nixon: its proximity to Rebozo. Smathers characterized the Florida multimillionaire as the “closest friend [Nixon’s] got in the world . . . far and away. He’s closer than his wife. I never saw anything like it.” The reason, Smathers explained, was that “neither one of them are extroverts. They don’t make friends easily. . . . They don’t trust anybody, very suspicious.” In the coming years, Smathers’s house became better known as Nixon’s “Winter White House.”
This long call was frank and, at times, rollicking, with Smathers explaining why his wife had left him, and with Johnson offering to try to help get them back together. But the main reason for the call was Smathers’s attempt to enlist Johnson’s help in recruiting Hubert H. Humphrey Jr. to become Nixon’s appointee as ambassador to the United Nations. It also revealed Smathers’s growing optimism that peace was at hand in Vietnam, possibly before Nixon’s upcoming inauguration on 20 January. Johnson, however, dismissed that hope and expected a long delay; achieving that peace would fall to Nixon, Johnson explained.
Much of the rest of the call involved Johnson offering advice to Nixon. Johnson said he should appoint good career people in the bureaucracy, surround himself with loyal but able people in the White House, and above all, avoid the press. “The main trouble a man gets in is—really personally—is talking to the press himself,” he lamented to Smathers. “Every mistake I’ve made, nearly, is talking to them myself because, George, they’re very treacherous.”
[Unclear] today?
Couldn’t be better, George. Hope you are.
Feeling pretty good. Had an interesting development last night, which went like this: I was in North Carolina visiting my mother and daddy, working on my father’s will, and I got a call from [Charles G.] Bebe Rebozo saying to me that—well, this was yesterday morning actually—that [Richard M. “Dick”] Nixon had wanted to buy my house.[note 1] Charles G. “Bebe” Rebozo was a Florida businessman and close friend of Richard Nixon. Richard M. “Dick” Nixon was a U.S. representative [R–California] from January 1947 to December 1950; a U.S. senator [R–California] from January 1951 to January 1953; vice president of the United States from January 1953 to January 1961; Republican nominee for president in 1960; Republican candidate for governor of California in 1962; and president of the United States from January 1969 until his resignation on 9 August 1974. And I said, [speaking under his breath] “Oh, shit. I don’t want to sell my house. [speaking normally] I’m glad for him to use it and everything, but I don’t want to sell it. And I’ll—if he wants to fix it up, he can fix it up and just charge it against rent, and so on.” “Well, no, we want to get a compound here. We got to get something like the Kennedys had or like Johnson’s got a ranch, where we have everything on this street so we can block the street off, et cetera and et cetera.” So I said, “Well, what the hell? Where am I going to live, for Christ sakes?” And so he said, “Well, come on down. I want to talk to you anyway, and we’ll show you a house that we think will suit you.”
So anyway, make a long story [short], I went down to the house with Nixon, and we had a nice talk. Anyway, then he came up and said, “You know, I want very much for [Hubert H.] Humphrey [Jr.] to be my spokesman at the United Nations.” [note 2] Hubert H. Humphrey Jr. was the Democratic mayor of Minneapolis, Minnesota, from July 1945 to November 1948; a U.S. senator [DFL–Minnesota] from January 1949 to December 1964 and January 1971 to January 1978; Senate Majority Whip from January 1961 to December 1964; vice president of the United States from January 1965 to January 1969; and the Democratic U.S. presidential candidate in 1968. And he said, “I think he’d do it if the President—if Lyndon Johnson would give him an OK. What do you think about it?”[note 3] President Johnson had mentioned Smathers and Rebozo to Humphrey in a recorded call on 18 November. See Conversation WH6811-06-13747. And I said, “Well, frankly, I think it’s the perfect job for Humphrey. And to be absolutely candid about it, and this is the way I’ve always been with you”—talking to Nixon—“when the peace is achieved—and there will be a peace hopefully next week, and if not that, hopefully before the 20th, and if not that, hopefully by June 1st—I want to see some Democrats sitting around that table, because the truth of the matter is I just don’t want y’all to be Republicans sitting there, whomever your Secretary of State is and Defense Department secretary and you and [Henry] Cabot Lodge [Jr.] all sitting there grinning like Cheshire cats when the fact is that the machinery was started under this administration under Democrats.[note 4] Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. was the Republican vice presidential nominee in 1960; U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam from August 1963 to June 1964 and August 1965 to April 1967; and U.S. ambassador to West Germany from May 1968 to January 1969. So as a Democrat, I think it . . . I would certainly urge Humphrey to take it.” And he said, “Well, truthfully the reason I want Humphrey is because it gives the appearance that I’m trying to unify the party— [correcting himself] unify the country, which I am.”
“Now,” he says, “I have had it reported back to me from Dwayne Andreas and others of Hubert’s friends that the reason that he’s getting a lot of pressure not to take the job because he’s supposed to go out and raise 15 or—they got a deficit of 15 million dollars, and Humphrey’s got the obligation to make speeches and overcome it.”[note 5] Dwayne O. Andreas was a major political campaign donor; one of Hubert Humphrey’s chief fundraisers during the 1968 presidential campaign; and a Minneapolis business executive with the agricultural giant Archer Daniels Midland from 1971 to 1997. I said, “Well, I don’t know anything about that.” He said, “But I’ll just tell you this.” He said, “You can tell—if you’d tell Humphrey from me, tell the President from me that as far as I’m concerned that as long as he doesn’t make a political speech, which he won’t,” he said, “he ought to go to those meetings. Cabot Lodge did that. He went to Republican fundraising dinners. He just sat there, and he made a little speech about the unity—need for peace in the world, and so on,” he said, “and that’s fine!” He said, “I got absolutely no complaint about that. But,” he said, “I think it’d be great. Now,” he said, “if President Johnson, if”—he calls you Lyndon—he said, “if Lyndon would give Humphrey the green light,” he said, “I hear he’ll take it.”
I said, “Now, let me tell you, Dick, I don’t know a goddamn thing about any of this, except what you’re telling me now. But you’ve asked me to mention it to the President to see if he would sort of give Humphrey the green light on it, and I will.” And he just—then Nixon said, “Well, you know, if I don’t give it to Humphrey, then I got to give it to [Nelson A.] Rockefeller.[note 6] Nelson A. Rockefeller was the Republican governor of New York from January 1959 to December 1973, and vice president of the United States from December 1974 to January 1977. And I just really . . .” [chuckling] He just stopped about there and sort of smiled, and I gathered he just wasn’t too happy about that. He said, “The truth of the matter is I can get along with Johnson. I can get along with Humphrey a hell of a lot better than I can with people, some of these folks in my own party.” And that’s pretty understandable. And he said, “I’m sure your President would understand that.” I said, “Well, I’m sure that he would.” So he said, “Will you talk with him?” I said, “Yes, I will.” So I am discharging my duty.
Fine. I would always want to help the President get anybody that he wants, because, on my word of honor, the thing he needs most is troops and good ones. I think Humphrey would be very suitable for that by background, experience. He has the best coordination of mind and tongue of nearly anybody. He’s quick. He understands it. Now, whether he would be interested, I don’t know. No one has ever talked to me about it. I have never heard of it. He would unlikely ever talk to me about it. He doesn’t ask me for approval of this or that. He selected the—all of his officers and threw out all of ours without getting my approval. The—I think maybe some of the [Eugene J. “Gene”] McCarthy [DFL–Minnesota] people were being very influential with him. And he has, I think, been very loyal and very good to me.[note 7] Eugene J. “Gene” McCarthy was a U.S. representative [DFL–Minnesota] from January 1949 to January 1959, and a U.S. senator [DFL–Minnesota] from January 1959 to January 1971. On the other hand, he’s like all the rest of us. He does not want to be regarded as somebody’s poodle dog or stooge or puppet.
Right.
And when they say that about you about 20 times, that you are [Spessard L.] Holland’s [D–Florida] puppet, [Smathers acknowledges] then you go to trying not to be his puppet.[note 8] Spessard L. Holland was a U.S. senator [D–Florida] from 1946 to 1971, and the sponsor of the 24th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution outlawing poll taxes in federal elections. [Chuckles.]
Right.
And so I don’t know. I will be glad to say to him that I saw in the papers that he was being considered for this, and I think he’s ideally equipped for it, and see if he shows any recognition and call you back within a short time so you can plan it from there. [Smathers acknowledges.] I’m very anxious to . . . to help the man get any Cabinet officer or anybody else he can, because I’m telling you from my experience: I kept the Kennedy people, and from my own experience, if I could have made you resign and John [B.] Connally resign and [Richard B.] Dick Russell [Jr.] [D–Georgia] resign, my life would have been a good deal more comfortable.[note 9] John B. Connally was secretary of the U.S. Navy from January 1961 to December 1961; Democratic governor of Texas from January 1963 to January 1969, during which time he was wounded in the assassination of President Kennedy; and U.S. secretary of the treasury from February 1971 to May 1972. Connally was one of Lyndon Johnson’s closest advisers, joining Johnson’s congressional staff in 1938 and managing Johnson’s campaign for the 1960 Democratic presidential nomination. Richard B. “Dick” Russell Jr. was a U.S. senator [D–Georgia] from January 1933 to January 1971; chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee from January 1951 to January 1953 and January 1955 to January 1969; and chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee from January 1969 to January 1971.
Right.
But my people were in those places, and I didn’t want to change a senator or a governor, and I just couldn’t.
Right.
And as a consequence I didn’t want [John F.] Jack Kennedy to think I was disloyal to him.[note 10] John F. “Jack” Kennedy was a U.S. representative [D–Massachusetts] from January 1947 to January 1953; a U.S. senator [D–Massachusetts] from January 1953 to December 1960; and president of the United States from January 1961 until his assassination on 22 November 1963.
Right.
I placed a great deal of weight all through the years on friendships, [Smathers acknowledges throughout] and I just don’t want people to think that when they’re dead that I’m going to rob their widow, or that I’m going to fire their cook, and I just never did do it. And I guess if I had to go back and look at one thing that I’d do, I’d change—in ‘65, I would have changed everybody.
Right.
And that’s the problem. So I want this man to have whoever he wants.
Right.
And I was just telling the aide a while ago—and when you ever—if you talk to him you ought to explain this. I’d give anything in the world if I could spend an hour with Bebe sometime when nobody knew it. There are so many little personal things that he needs to know [Smathers acknowledges throughout] that I think maybe Nixon would think I was just trying to, you know, run his business or something, but if somebody close to him that had confidence in me could tell him on all these things and understand them or even talk to you where you could get it to him. There are so many things where he can handle himself that I have had to learn by trial and error and that have caused me a lot of anguish. I was—he has a . . . a principal aide, and then he has three sub-aides, one for each [military] service. And those people ought to be two things: one, the best friend he has, if he has any. None of them are my good friends. I haven’t known a single one of them. If I had it to do over, I’d try to find a George Smathers from Texas or Florida, or something, because they have such great power. The second thing they ought to be is the best man that he can find in the service so the others in the service respect him, because then he knows what’s going on in every one of those services very, very well, regardless who his Secretary is and regardless who the Chiefs of Staff are.
Right.
That’s one little thing that he ought to do.
I told him [unclear]—
He ought to get a good sergeant from the Air Force or the Navy as his personal man. And he ought to be as close to him as Bebe is. But he ought to be there every morning to give him his clothes and lay them out and take care of him and stay with him and travel with him. I have had those, and they’ve been the greatest comfort I’ve had.[note 11] One of these individuals was Air Force Chief Master Sgt. Paul J. Glynn, who had served in this role throughout the Johnson presidency. He won’t know anything about it. Nobody told me a damn thing about it when I came in.
Right.
They’re little things, though, like that that are emoluments that you can go to.
I told him—
The main trouble a man gets in is really, personally, talking to the press himself.
Right.
If they think you’re too friendly. Every mistake I’ve made, nearly, is talking to them myself because, George, they’re very treacherous.
Right. Well, boy, he knows that.
Well—
I told him what you said about, first, about how you changed the airplane. He said, “Boy, that was great.” He really did appreciate it. I also told him what you said about the press, and he said, “I know that’s right. I just know it’s right, and that’s what I’m doing.” He said, “I don’t even watch Huntley/Brinkley and these [unclear]. I just treat them all with reserve and not necessarily—I just—I don’t really truck with them, and I’m not going to.” He said, “I know that’s right.” He said, “I’ve tried to win them over before and all they did was betray—every confidence I ever placed in one of them was betrayed.”
That’s generally true now. [Unclear]—
And he said it just was—and so he said, “I’m going to do that.” So anyway, we had a very nice visit. So—and I told him, and he said further about that presidential—getting that money that’s equal to that of the senator from the state where you come. He said, “Christ, I’d be for that a hundred times.” He said, “My turn will come, but,” he said, “it makes sense, it ought to be done.” He said, “I know from visiting with [Dwight D.] Eisenhower from time to time that, Christ, the mail’s piling up there and nobody reads it.[note 12] Dwight D. Eisenhower was a five-star general of the U.S. Army; governor of the American Zone of Occupied Germany from May 1945 to November 1945; chief of staff of the U.S. Army from November 1945 to February 1948; Supreme Allied Commander in Europe from April 1951 to May 1952; president of Columbia University from 1948 to 1953; and president of the United States from January 1953 to January 1961. It’s ridiculous.” So, he said, “This ought to be done, too.” And he said, “You can be damn sure that we’ll get that done if it’s not done before I get there.” So the matters that you and I discussed, he was very favorable on all of them.
I’ll talk to Humphrey. My judgment would be—he came in and talked to me yesterday. I’d have given anything in the world if I had known it yesterday. He came—
I thought you knew this, because—
No. No, I never heard of it.
—frankly, Nixon was of the opinion that somebody told him, or Humphrey had indicated to him, that you had wanted him to stay and make up this deficit.
Never had heard of it. Never.
So I talked with Humphrey myself about just 10 minutes ago and told him about this thing. And I didn’t mention you in it at all, because I didn’t think that he ought to—that was intended [President Johnson acknowledges throughout] for him about what Nixon had thought you had it. But Nixon said to me [unclear], “If you really think”—he said, “If you can get the President to do this,” he said, “I believe that they’re trying to put Humphrey in the position that he’s got to be the new leader of the party,” which Nixon says he’ll never be ‘cause he’s 58. He said, “Christ, I was knocked out when I was 47, took me 10 years to get back, and Humphrey doesn’t have that time.” And he said, “If Johnson will not press him to stay on,” he said, “I feel he’ll do it.” I said, “Well, I didn’t—I don’t know anything about it.”
I haven’t pressed him or said a word to him. I haven’t talked to him. [speaking over Smathers] He came in to see me yes[terday]—
[Unclear] didn’t know anything about it.
No, not at all. He came in to see me yesterday, and he said he had called a meeting of the Democratic National Committee, that they would be in here in December, that he would want to talk to me a little bit later about the operations of the Committee and what he would do, that he planned to get around over the country. And I gathered from what he said—I just got this impression that he was asking me how active I was going to be. [Smathers acknowledges throughout.] He didn’t say that at all. He didn’t even imply it, but you get hunches when people talk to you, and I just thought he was trying to feel his way to see if—kind of like my wife would say, “Are you going to that thing? If not, I’ll go.”
Right.
So I said, “Well, Hubert, I—very frankly, I don’t want to run for office, and I don’t want to lead anybody. [Smathers acknowledges.] What I really want to do is spend my few remaining years, if any, with my friends, with folks I love, and I just hope that enough of them love me to want to be around me and to visit with me and be happy.”
Right.
“That’s why I didn’t go through this rumble. I could have gone through it, and [Smathers attempts to interject] that’s why I didn’t.”
But he said, “Well, I thought that’s the way you felt, but I wanted to talk to you about this,” and that was about the extent of our conversation. And I felt real kindly towards him, and I brought him on over. [Smathers acknowledges.] I didn’t feel kindly towards a lot of the things that happened and what they said in the campaign, and I played it pretty neutral all the way through it. And I told John [B. Connally] he ought to meet him and kind of did what you did, and the rest of us of trying to be Democrats and loyal Democrats and helpful Democrats, but not to get into a dog fight and vicious personal thing.
So, I—very frankly, I don’t know what his people at the Committee think of me. He did run up a big debt. I have no idea how much. When Kennedy turned it over to me, they owed a little over 4 million [dollars], and it took me four years in the presidency with all the power of the presidency to get back of it.
Right.
And I’ll tell you, it’s the most ugly thing you go through, because everybody that helps you wants to be helped.
Right. [Both chuckle.] Right. Right. Exactly.
And so I [Smathers attempts to interject] want to help him. Now, if I should initiate it, I’ll call him. If I should wait till he talks to me, I’ll do what—that. You may feel assured that I would be very glad for him to do it. I think he’s equipped. I’d be very glad to do it if I were president. I think it’s good judgment. I think it’s a good appointment. [Smathers acknowledges.] I think he would be well advised in his position, because he’s regarded somewhat like I am by the press, and the same people that are my enemies are his enemies. Although he has Republican friends that are my enemies, the press feels the same way.
If I were him, I would keep as many career people as I could that are good, and then I would have a few folks like this that would be nonpartisan, and then I’d get me some awfully loyal friends in my key places—State, Defense, Health Education [and Welfare], Labor—all of those are keys to him. Treasury, you got to have a great financial man, but he doesn’t need to be a political man or a loyal friend. [Henry H.] Joe Fowler does an awfully good job for us.[note 13] Henry H. “Joe” Fowler was U.S. under secretary of the treasury from February 1961 to April 1964, and U.S. secretary of the treasury from April 1965 to December 1968. And you helped him more than anybody else. But the things that—I would keep the man in Veterans Administration [William J. Driver].[note 14] William J. Driver was a lawyer, and head of veterans affairs from 1965 to 1969.
[Unclear.]
It’s a strictly technical job, and all the veterans love him. I don’t know where he came from, but they recommended him to me, and I kept him, and I never had one bit of trouble.
Yes.
The man in GSA [General Services Administration] is one of the best men in the country, and he does just what the President tells him. But he’s a merit man. I don’t know where he came from. His name is [Lawson B.] Knott [Jr.].[note 15] Lawson B. Knott Jr. was administrator of the U.S. General Services Administration from December 1965 to February 1969, and a trustee of the National Trust from 1969 to 1972. Be two or three things like that. I would make a big play—
Right.
—that I’m going to [J. Edgar] Hoover.[note 16] J. Edgar Hoover was director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1924 until his death on 2 May 1972. If Hoover wants to stay on, I’d keep him. If I didn’t, I’d put [Cartha D.] Deke DeLoach in.[note 17] Cartha D. “Deke” DeLoach worked for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) from 1928 to 1970; was assistant director of the Crime Records Division from 1959 to 1965; and served as assistant to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover from 1965 to 1970. Hoover’s pretty up in years, and I don’t know how Nixon feels about him. CIA—I’d certainly keep him [Richard M. “Dick” Helms].[note 18] Richard M. “Dick” Helms was deputy director for plans at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from February 1962 to April 1965; deputy director of the CIA from April 1965 to June 1966; and director of the CIA from July 1966 to February 1973. I don’t know this man. He just came [Smathers acknowledges throughout] —he was a merit man. He’s going to keep him. He’s going to keep him. What’s he going to do about Hoover?
He doesn’t know. He thinks—he’d like to keep him, but he says that he’s not well.
Yeah.
And he says he’s got palsy or something.
Yeah. Yes, he has some problems.
And he said it’s a real problem.
Yes, he has.
A man like that or not.
But Deke DeLoach is awfully effective. He’s a good Georgia boy, and he runs it now. He runs the show now every day. Do you know him?
Yeah. I know him. He’s a hell of a nice guy. All right, well, I appreciate that, and I’ll pass this on to him.
Who are his close friends, George?
Nixon?
Yeah.
Of course, his closest friend he’s got in the world is Bebe, far and away. He’s closer than his wife. I never saw anything like it. Now, you see, neither one of them are extroverts. They don’t make friends easily. [Unclear.] They don’t trust anybody, very suspicious. So Bebe is his very closest friend.
Would you sell him your house?
Huh? I’m going to have to. Shit, I don’t know what to do. I mean, the guy says, “Look, I want your house, and I’ll give you a profit.” You just can’t sit there and say, “No, goddamn it, I want to live here myself.” And I said, “I’ll rent it to you.” He said, “No,” he said, “I’m going to invest $100,000 in the house.” But it is a sorry house. He said, “I‘m going to really fix it up nice.” So I say, “Well, I’ll do it for you. It won’t cost you anything. I’ll be making some money, and I’d love to.” “No,” he said, “you’d be, you know, we’ll be criticized even more than we’re going to be criticized anyway, and [Thelma C.] Pat [Nixon] just wants to own the house.”[note 19] Thelma C. “Pat” Nixon was the wife of Richard M. Nixon since 1940; second lady of the United States from January 1953 to January 1961; and first lady of the United States from January 1969 to August 1974. He said, “We’ll give you the lots we got over there in exchange. We got two good lots. We’ll give you those two for this one house.”
Well, you know, pretty soon they made me feel like I was a little stink bomb–thrower at an afternoon tea party. So I said, “No, I’ll tell you what you can do for me. You get me a villa over at the Key Biscayne Hotel, and we’ll work on that.” So Nixon said, “Goddamn right.” Said he called them up and asked if they’d provide me with a villa at a reasonable price. So there wasn’t much else for me to do. I’m going to sell it to him. I don’t want to, but I guess I got to. I told him—I said, “Hell, you mean more to me. And we all got investments over here, and this is a nice place. The publicity is just great. It would mean a great deal to Florida, and we need you. And I—if I was the guy that sent you to Palm Springs to spend those vacations, I’d be the biggest son of a bitch in the world in Florida, and you’ve just got me in a position where I can’t do anything but say no— [correcting himself] but say yes.” So that’s just what they did. Now, we finally finalized it this morning.
Well, that’s good. I think anything you can do to help him.
Yeah.
Are you going to get your lots, or are you going to just live at the hotel?
No, what I’m going to do—he’s going to pay me $125,000 for the house. And I paid 110[000]. I’ve only had it a year. [Unclear.] But I—they’re going to get me the—I don’t want the lots. He’s got two nice lots, but I don’t want the lots. There’s a big house down the street that’s really beautiful. It doesn’t have quite the view Bebe has, but it’s just a beautiful house. I looked at it last night. It’s got panelling in every room, got a big bar and a big study and three bedrooms and a big bath. It’s just beautiful! And I—they got $250,000 in that house. I know that, and I can buy that for 150[000]. So what I’m thinking, if Rosemary [Smathers] makes up with me, which I hope she does, why, I’ll just go ahead and buy that house, which is just down the street about five houses.[note 20] Smathers and his first wife, Rosemary Townley Smathers, divorced in 1971, and the next year he married Carolyn Hyder, a 29-year-old former beauty queen who was 30 years his junior. She had worked as an aide in his Senate office for five years before resigning in 1968. “Smathers Weds Ex-Staff Member,” Washington Post, 16 January 1972. So—
Are you having trouble with Rosemary?
Well, yeah, she got mad at me. You know, talk about a son—this son of a bitch friend of mine. It was—I think it was old Bill [unclear] got drunk one night and started talking to her about “George and some girl.” And I swear to Christ that set off a whole series of things, and she got offended, and she told me she wanted me to move out. I told her, I said, “You’re making a big mistake; don’t do this. Whatever it is you’ve heard I want to tell you it’s not true, and secondly, we’re getting to the time in life where really we sort of need each other more. So don’t make me do this.”
[chuckling and speaking over Smathers] You sure do, George, you sure do.
And she—but she said, “No, I just think we need to be apart for a little while.” So now, we’ve been apart now for about five months. But I think we’re going to get together again Christmas holidays for the boys. The boys [unclear] to effect a reconciliation. I think we—
Wish I could do something.
Well, there really isn’t much to do. She’s—it’s funny, you know—
She wouldn’t come if we invited y’all to dinner or something, would she?
She just wouldn’t come. You all invited us twice, and she just declined, and I’ve come over there by myself.
Well, please let me know, ‘cause I love you, and I love her, and I just want to do anything.
[speaking under President Johnson] Well, I know. I appreciate it.
Now, what should I do on this other? Tell me.
I think you should call Humphrey. He’s going to Minnesota. He’s coming back in the morning, but if you’d just say to him, you want to visit with him, “I heard—George Smathers called me and said Nixon told him that he’d offered you an appointment. I hadn’t heard anything about it, but I think, frankly, you ought to do it.” You give him the reasons why. Truthfully, I think that—I don’t think the Democrats should be left out of this peace, see, and I’m hoping to God as you are and praying it’s going to be accomplished before the 20th and—
No, it’s not going to be. They’re holding it up. They’re not going—it’ll be a long, long ways away from that. The next president can work it out in some way, but I don’t believe we can. We’re going to sure try. But I will do just exactly what you asked, my friend, and I’ll be in touch with you, and [Smathers acknowledges] the first time that you’re down here, let me know.
I appreciate it.
And let me know anything else—let me know anybody else you want me to talk to.
All right.
And I’m working on this other thing that we’ll get together on.
OK.
Bye.
You tell—some day when Joe Fowler gets back, you say, “Joe, I understand Smathers is trying to get you to do one little favor, which you promised him you’d do. I don’t know what it is, and I don’t want to know, but if you can help me, go ahead—”
I sure will. I sure will. He likes you. He’s awfully complimentary to you.
Yeah, well I like him. What I’m asking is not at all unreasonable. [Unclear] these damn bureaucrats do things [unclear] screw you up and then it’s hard to overrule them, and this is just getting old Joe to try to get [unclear] bureaucrats in his department. He doesn’t want to do it. I don’t blame him, frankly.
Thank you, George.
All right, sir.
Cite as
“Lyndon B. Johnson and George A. Smathers on 21 November 1968,” Conversation WH6811-07-13749-13750-13751, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [Johnson Telephone Tapes: 1968, ed. Kent B. Germany, Nicole Hemmer, and Ken Hughes] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL: http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4006145