Let me say that in that connection, just so we can have a . . . I’ve been—I’ve done a lot of analysis of . . . we’ve got about 97 days left [unclear] the election. Now . . . we have [background noise] [unclear] the record that you’re making on this, which is enormously important, is important only if we put it out before the election.

Oh, yeah.

In the meantime, I don’t want to use it. Second, and therefore, I think you’re setting it up in the proper way. Also, I think it’s important to have in mind that to the extent you can in the next meetings, anything that you can possibly get that will bear out what we are going to have to use if the talks break down publicly to put the blame on the other side, [unclear] the [George S.] McGovern crew, the Senate doves, and so forth and so on.[note 1] George S. McGovern was a Democratic senator from South Dakota, January 1963–January 1981, and his party’s 1972 presidential nominee. That’s about the only way we can make out. It isn’t going to serve us if we are—it isn’t going to serve us [unclear], very, you know, forthcoming and the rest, and that the North Vietnamese are bastards. What it’s got—what we’ve got to do is to set it up so that—I mean, it’s a very subtle thing to handle but it’ll have to get across that the aid and comfort that these clowns have been giving to these people has destroyed a very, very serious effort which we’ve been making at very great length to settle this thing. I hope the record doesn’t have to come out. [Unclear] but I meant—that is—that should be our thrust.

I agree completely, Mr. President.

[speaking over Kissinger] I [unclear], I wouldn’t be too damn responsible if I were you.

Well—

[Unclear] except—in your talks, except to appear to be. Appear to be.

Well, I—

Because I think you can make, like, for example, you—one point that I have mentioned before when we’ve said—I told you the only thing that concerns me is the possibility that McGovern, you know, he was the one that floated, you may remember a year ago, that idea that the North Vietnamese would agree to a prisoners-for-withdrawal.

No chance.

Good. I just want to [unclear]—

I’ve got that—I’ve got that nailed.

You got it [in?].

Yeah, I’ve got it nailed. Because I—

All right. You could see what I mean. I could hear that. I could hear that, for example, two weeks before the election—

Not a chance.

And the North Vietnamese saying yes.

Not a chance.

And that makes—OK. Good.

Not a chance.

That’s the only [unclear]—

And you’ll see that yourself when I [speaking over President Nixon] go through the meeting today.

But now go ahead.

Now, my recommendation to you until yesterday would have been—but I must admit, they’ve seen that strategy, too, and they’ve made it a little tougher. But my recommendation is still that if these talks—that we should string these talks through September [President Nixon attempts to interject] while Congress is in session, because otherwise we’ll be hit with 50 resolutions.

They’re having one today again.

But if on October, say, on October 1st, or whenever they get out of session, we then break up the talks a few days later and say, “We’ll resume them November 9th. This son of a bitch is making it impossible for us,” you can bet your bottom dollar he’s going to say major irresponsible things. The guy is—

Yeah. He’s [unclear]—

He’s just—he’s incompetent, Mr. President.

You know—