Could I suggest one thing that might be helpful? It’s a rather devious thing to do, but it works many times with others, to . . . well, to go in and see [Nguyen Van] Thieu and say, “Look, your proposal that you have made about two elections will not work, period. You claim that what we have suggested will not work, period. Now, we want you to use your mind and for you to suggest what will work. And to take as much of these points—the President insists some must be taken. Now, what will you suggest?” [Kissinger attempts to interject.] What I meant is, I’d like to get him on line on a few things that he’s agreed to previously.

Right.

Is that worth trying, or not?

That’s absolutely worth trying.

And then if you could do that, I’d . . . [unclear]. I think that, well . . .

Now, on security, what we can—what we will try for is to get international control on all the infiltration routes.

Yeah.

A cease-fire in Laos. [President Nixon acknowledges.] In Cambodia, it’s hard to arrange, but—because there are no formal parties—a commitment by the North Vietnamese to withdraw from Laos and Cambodia. A—

I’d get the commitment. I wouldn’t worry about it. They’re never going to withdraw.

No, but I’ll get it in writing and we’ll—

Right, right, right.

They withdraw from—some of their units from the South.

Some of their units, right.

They won’t withdraw them all, I mean—

Some [unclear].

And . . . as I look at it from a historical point of view, what did [Charles] de Gaulle do in Algeria, who everyone thinks a great man? Basically, he made a settlement that turned the country over to the—to his enemies.

Fedayeen—[unclear] the rebels.

Yes, the Fedayeen.

That’s not what they were called. Well, anyway—

In fact, that’s what they were called. They were called the Fedayeen.

Right. [Sighs.]

Now . . . why . . . still, he’s considered a great man.

That’s right.

Because he left under his own steam. Our settlement—I’d better not say now—not the next two weeks, necessarily. It can be the next four—three months. I would say a settlement any time before Inauguration [Day] . . . would mean that you have done exactly what you’ve said you’d do, that you [unclear]—

Let’s come another way.

And you can come out as an act of policy—

And let it—let me gallivant around in a different way. . . . Vietnam is important because, of course, of our prisoners and, of course, because we don’t want 17 million people to come under Communists, but . . . However, those, basically, are not the really important issues. The important issue is how the United States comes out in two ways.

One: whether or not the United States in all parts of the world—whether our enemies, the neutrals, and our allies after we finish—are convinced that the United States went the extra mile in standing by its friends. That doesn’t mean we have to succeed. It does mean that we have to have done that.

Second point: Now, the historical process moves extremely slowly. Sure, somebody can retire, is going to be exiled. There could be a coup. Somebody could be shot. Et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. And so, those things will happen. They are not as likely to happen, I think, as even Thieu thinks they’re likely to happen. Because if there’s one thing I’m convinced of, I think the North Vietnamese are hurting one hell of a lot more than the CIA indicates. I think our whole bureaucracy previously overestimated how badly they were hurting and now they’re underestimating how badly they’re hurting, because we’re doing it. The mining has had to hurt them. The bombing has had to hurt them. It’s supposed to be pretty good. It’s just got to have done it. And frankly, the South Vietnamese have not been hurt. The South Vietnamese can’t be taking 2[00] to 300 killed in action every week. Let’s assume that the North Vietnamese are taking only an equal amount. Leave out the bombing. Leave out everything else. Well, goddamn it, that’s a hell of a lot of people. Now, they’re hurting and hurting badly. [Unclear.]

Now, we come to another thing. How it comes out . . . let us suppose, putting it quite coldly, that we face a situation here where South Vietnam simply, over the long haul, cannot survive on its own as an independent entity. I don’t mean like Thailand, where we can get a guarantee. I don’t mean like [unclear]. But that South Vietnam, because of its—the nature of the South Vietnamese people, the nature of the struggle with the North and so forth, that inevitably, unless the United States can stay in there indefinitely, South Vietnam is going to fall.

All right, if that is the case, then what we have to look to is the bigger subject: How does the United States look in the way it handles this goddamn thing? So as I see it, the thing to do is to look as well as we can and hope and pray for the best. And then use our influence with the Russians and with the Chinese, which should be considerable at this point, and say, “Now, damn it, you push us here, you know, we contribute—we just cannot be pushed too far.” Understand?

Yes.

I almost think that that’s what we’re looking at. My own view is this: that when Defense is planning for three more years of bombing, when they want to keep two more carriers out there, three more air wings and all that sort of thing, it makes me think that the military isn’t particularly interested in finishing this goddamn war.

The military are a bunch of selfish bastards.

They screwed up everything we’ve done, [Kissinger attempts to interject] except they did the mining OK.

If they had fought Laos well, we wouldn’t have this problem. If they had done their bombing this summer better, we’d be that much ahead.

We’ve done well, but let me say, that mining and that bombing, by—without that, South Vietnam would be under the [unclear] right now.

Of course, no question.

[Unclear.]

No question.

I’m tired of having them knock the mining and the bombing. The sons of bitches—

Well, you handled that beautifully yesterday.

Well, Henry, it’s true, isn’t it?

Absolutely beautifully.