Hello.

Dr. [Henry A.] Kissinger.[note 1] Henry A. Kissinger was U.S. national security adviser from January 1969 to November 1975, and U.S. secretary of state from September 1973 to January 1977. [President Nixon clears his throat. The call connects.] There you are.

Hello?

Mr. President, a happy New Year.

Yeah—

Good, good. You’re back in New York now?

Yeah, I’m back in New York. Yeah.[note 2] Kissinger had been in Florida for talks between President Nixon and West German chancellor Willy Brandt on 28 December 1971. Suffering with the flu, Kissinger did not attend those talks and stayed in his hotel. Since Kissinger had used illness as a cover story to explain his absence while on his secret trip to the People’s Republic of China the previous July, White House press secretary Ronald L. “Ron” Ziegler felt compelled to insist that Kissinger really was ill on this occasion.

Right, right. OK, well, anything new?

No. Well, [slight chuckle] to tell you the truth, I just woke up about half an hour ago—

That’s good.

—but I will check right away.

No, I read the papers. There’s not anything in there.

But last night, when I checked last, there wasn’t anything new. There was this fellow, [Dominic “Dom”] Mintoff.[note 3] The Honorable Dominic “Dom” Mintoff was leader of the Maltese Labor Party from 1949 to 1984, and prime minister of Malta from June 1971 to December 1984. I didn’t bother you with all the—

Oh, you mean the—that—

—permutations of Malta—[note 4] Dominic Mintoff, the prime minister of Malta, had been a leader in the island’s movement to achieve independence from Great Britain, which occurred in 1964. Since then, Britain and other NATO nations, including the United States and Italy, had been allowed to retain military forces or access to facilities on the island, but Mintoff had ended docking privileges for the U.S. Sixth Fleet and had issued an ultimatum for Britain’s departure by 1 January 1972. (The deadline was later extended.) The United States and its allies were concerned that the Soviet Union would later obtain those facilities, either directly or through the agency of the radical government in Libya.

Oh, the hell with that.

He tried to get you on the phone, and we didn’t put him through, because there was—whatever you would have said, you would have been in the middle of it. And we put him on to [Robert F. “Bob”] Ellsworth, who had been out there as your ambassador—[note 5] Robert F. “Bob” Ellsworth was a U.S. representative [R–Kansas] from January 1961 to January 1967; U.S. permanent representative to NATO from May 1969 to June 1971; and assistant to the president during the Nixon administration. He had been tasked by the White House to encourage a solution between the British government and Malta.

Who?

Bob Ellsworth—we sent out on a special mission—

Oh, yeah.

—to Malta in December. And so now he’s extended his ultimatum by two weeks. He can’t throw the British out; it would be mass unemployment on the island.

He’d kill himself, won’t he?

Oh, yeah.

And he’s just trying to drive the British to a—too hard a bargain.

And if he gets the Libyan money—even if he got Libyan money, that wouldn’t get him 10,000 jobs.[note 6] Mintoff had just returned from talks with Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi, who had pledged the necessary financial assistance to allow Mintoff to remove Britain and NATO from Malta.

Mm-hmm.

He can’t put the whole island on the dole.

[Slight chuckle.] Yeah. Well, I don’t know. I suppose Ellsworth talked to him—about all that to him, yeah.

And what he—the result of all of that is that he has extended his deadline. And [President Nixon acknowledges throughout] we have said we would—we didn’t say we could mediate, but we said we would keep an eye on the negotiations.

Yeah.

And we’ve told [Sir Edward R. G. “Ted”] Heath we would up the ante a little bit.[note 7] The Right Honorable Sir Edward R. G. “Ted” Heath was prime minister of the United Kingdom from June 1970 to March 1974.

That we would help Heath with the ante.

With the ante. That’s right.

Yeah.

We are not talking to him ourselves.

Yeah. No, never talk to Mintoff. Let the British do the—do it and—

That’s right, but we have sent a message from you to him [President Nixon acknowledges throughout] saying we are prepared to up the . . . the an—to help them in upping the ante.

Yeah, yeah. Right, right. OK.

But that’s the only thing [President Nixon acknowledges] of any consequence that’s been going on.

I was noting—I just noted Mrs. [Indira] Gandhi made a speech to the parliament, and that she . . . still takes her line that foreign aid has really never aided them, that they’d paid back every bit that they’d ever gotten and [Kissinger acknowledges] . . . [chuckles] and that she’s . . . going to take this line about the—what she’s going to do, and so forth, and so on.[note 8] Indira Gandhi was prime minister of India from January 1966 to March 1977 and January 1980 to October 1984. Gandhi had a particularly antagonistic personal relationship with Richard Nixon.

Yeah, but—

But—

—on the other hand, when she doesn’t talk to parliament—her parliament is very—

I know.

It’s combined of—

Hawklike.

—radicals on both sides.

Right.

She’s put all—out all sorts of signals.

Right.

And she’s—

Well, she’s taking the public line that we don’t understand her and [clears throat] all that. That . . .

Yeah, but the Indians are master psychologists. They’ve got to deal with us. They’ve got—literally now they’re in worse shape than ever.

I guess they must be.

Because now, when people say—first of all, they put themselves on the Soviets’ side. It’s—John [H.] Freeman told [O.] Henry Brandon when he was there—and Freeman, you know, was—[note 9] Major John H. Freeman was British High Commissioner to India from 1965 to 1968, and British ambassador to the United States from 1969 to 1971. O. Henry Brandon was the Washington correspondent for the London Sunday Times from 1950 to 1983.

Ambassador, yeah.

—ambassador for four years [President Nixon acknowledges] —that they in ‘67 cold-bloodedly decided they needed the Russians to deal with the Pakistanis.[note 10] After independence, India proclaimed that it was following a policy of nonalignment in the Cold War. In August 1971, however, India signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, which Nixon and Kissinger regarded as giving the Indians the green light to go to war in December 1971 to support the independence movement in East Pakistan. Here, Kissinger indicated the belief that New Delhi had made the decision to seek Soviet support years earlier. The United States considered Pakistan a Cold War ally and a critical go-between in developing relations with the People’s Republic of China. The White House had supported, diplomatically and militarily through covert assistance, the Pakistani central government’s unsuccessful efforts to retain sovereignty over East Pakistan.

Yeah.

And that we just weren’t enough of a factor in that area. That’s when they made their move.

Yeah.

But now their problem is they cannot permit, for their own domestic reasons—if the Russians [President Nixon sighs] become too influential in India, the Communist Party becomes too strong. [Pause.] And—

I know. That’s a real problem for them.

—and they can’t have that. Secondly, they—this problem of East Bengal is going to become harder and harder for them. Now, they have the problem that Pakistan used to have.[note 11] East Bengal was the predominantly Muslim portion of the eastern Indian subcontinent, which eventually became East Pakistan after the partition of 1947. (West Pakistan dominated the country’s government and military.) In 1971, after months of violent agitation and brutal efforts by the central Pakistani government to suppress resistance to its rule, and with the military assistance of India, the territory claimed its independence as the nation of Bangladesh. Here, Kissinger is suggesting that Bangladesh, which bordered on the predominantly Hindu lands of eastern India (West Bengal), would either be absorbed by India because of ethnic affinities or become an Indian protectorate.

How the hell to feed them and govern them.

How to feed them and how to govern. They can’t govern their own Bengalis.

That’s right.

People keep forgetting that they have martial law in Calcutta.

That’s right.

That they kept call—yakking about martial law in Dacca, but there’s martial law in Calcutta also.

Mm-hmm. [Pause.] Yep. With regard to the question of recognition of Bangladesh, I think it should—the answer should simply be very—“Well, listen, it’s premature to talk about that.” Isn’t that about what we say?[note 12] For Nixon and Kissinger, U.S. recognition of Bangladesh was a sensitive diplomatic subject. To do so at this point, in their minds, would alienate the government in East Pakistan, as well as the Chinese. Their preferred strategy was to wait for the Pakistani government to offer recognition first. This would make recognition a moot point, assuming that India did not absorb Bangladesh directly.

First, Mr. President, no one has recognized Bangladesh except Bhutan and India. No one, not even Russia.

Yeah. Well, I think we should just say, “It’s premature to talk about it.”

That’s right. We should say—

And not go into it any longer—any further.

That’s right.

Or unless we—I don’t think we ought to hang out the idea, well, it might get into Pakistan, and all the rest. I don’t think we should reject it, but . . .

No. No, the fact of the matter is that, at this point, the Chinese would take violent objection, because of their parallels to Tibet and Manchukuo.[note 13] Kissinger’s point is that the Chinese were particularly sensitive to foreign support for independence movements in territories they considered historically Chinese, such as Tibet and Manchuria. The dismemberment of Pakistan by India, supported by China’s Communist antagonist, the Soviet Union, hit too close to home. Manchukuo was the puppet government established by Japan in Manchuria from 1932 to 1945.

Yeah.

But . . . that’s just something to keep in the back of the mind. But if you say no more than “it’s premature,” that’s fine.

Oh, yes, to just say, “Well, I have—we have nothing on that. We—premature and we haven’t—can’t yet determine. Only India and Russia—this—have recommended them. Bhutan—"

No, Russia hasn’t.

Russia hasn’t. That’s right. That’s right.

You—I would just say, “Up to now there are only two countries that have recognized it; this is not an acute issue.”

Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.

Of course, we have a [U.S.] consul in Dacca who’s already put up a map calling—he’s calling it Bangladesh.

Yeah, I know. The same bastard that was there before, isn’t it?[note 14] Nixon and Kissinger are presumably referring to Archer Blood, a Foreign Service officer posted as American consul general in Dacca (present-day Dhaka), the city that became the capital of Bangladesh. Over the preceding months, Blood had issued a number of missives to the State Department warning about genocidal actions being carried out by the Pakistani army against the population of East Pakistan, particularly its educated elite. These dispatches—and particularly leaks to the media, presumably made by Blood—about the atrocities and Blood’s protests, had raised the White House’s ire because they went against U.S. policy of quiet support for Pakistan. Gary J. Bass, a professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University, detailed these events in The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013).

Yeah.

He’s really an all-out Indian lover, isn’t he?

That’s right.

And poor [Kenneth B.] Keating in the other place.[note 15] Kenneth B. Keating was a U.S. representative [R–New York] from January 1947 to January 1959; a U.S. senator [R–New York] from January 1959 to January 1965; U.S. ambassador to India from 1969 to 1972; and U.S. ambassador to Israel from August 1973 to May 1975. [Laughs.] We really have—

Well, I have to say this for Keating: He’s pleaded, and he’s wept and cried, but he hasn’t actually leaked to the press against you.[note 16] Keating, a moderate Republican and former U.S. senator from New York, had been appointed by Nixon as U.S. ambassador to India in 1969. He had echoed Blood’s warnings about horrific developments in East Pakistan perpetrated by the Pakistani army. Nixon and Kissinger regarded him as a second-rate politician who had become captive to the State Department’s reflexive sympathy for India.

Good. Well, he probably knows that there’s problems. Well, it’s difficult. You know, the Indians just are—just smother you out there when you come, you know, [Kissinger acknowledges] with all their devious, tricky things. They are really something. Yeah.

The most difficult questions that we’re—that I’m going to have are, I think, going to be on Vietnam.[note 17] The President was preparing for a live, televised interview with CBS White House correspondent Dan Rather the following evening. Not in terms of the bombing, so forth. That’s no problem. But in terms of . . . POW [prisoners of war], when it ends, and so forth. You see, we’ve—we’re now coming to the moment of truth in terms of—we’ve been able to put the press off and say, “Well, we’ll have another announcement, and we’ll do this, and this, and this, and this, and this.” But then they, I know, we’re—because some of the POW wives have put in a question for [Daniel I. “Dan”] Rather [Jr.] to ask—that we’re going to get a tough one on that.[note 18] Daniel I. “Dan” Rather Jr. was a television news journalist and White House correspondent for CBS News during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations.

But why don’t you talk just a little bit about how we can—how we can say something on this without saying anything. This is the tough problem. I don’t—it isn’t a question now where we can go back and argue about what a good job we’ve done. What I meant is that there’s got to be—I mean, I’ll make that point, of course. I’ll . . . yes, we’ve withdrawn 400,000 and our casualties are down, and [Kissinger attempts to interject] we’ve made a peace offer, and—

Couldn’t we say that “the first thing that one has to remember is that these—that the other side is using”—I mean, with some indignation against the other side—“that they are using them brutally, using the prisoners brutally—"

I know. Yeah. I will say that, but then, of course, Henry, the question is: “Now, what are you going to do about it?" See?

Secondly, we have made every reasonable offer that can be made.

Now, they say we’re now—we—all those offers haven’t been—they don’t stop there. “All those offers have been turned down, and they don’t expect them—what are you going to do?"

Well, but then what I have always said to the wives is—I don’t know whether one can say that to a national audience—I have always said to the wives that “I don’t believe your husbands want you to have America just surrender.” That we’ve made any—that we’ve gone nine-tenths of the way . . . towards the other side.

[Clears throat.] It’ll work with them, because they’re still basically patriots. It will not work now with a national audience. I mean, putting it in—

I’m not so sure.

—putting it in terms—Oh, we’ve—it’s been very, very heavily polled in the last couple months. That is, you see, that’s the thing—the new factor we’ve got here as to what we can wheel, and they’re quite aware of this. The—you know, the—it’s just the attrition of the support for the war, it’s that—that’s the basic thing, the problem which is—

But I think the problem—

—changes.

—is also what the Australian prime minister said to me. That the—not the prime minister there—the ambassador said as he goes around the country, he’s the only guy that’s speaking for the war.

I know.

And no one ever speaks up for it, and the people get confused.

True, but don’t get any—we can’t be under any illusions that we can do this before certain intelligent audiences and the rest, but—and my line, of course, will always be more hawkish than others, but we are in a position now where just saying, “Well, we can just wheel it up like we did in November of ‘69,” is—that time is gone, you see?[note 19] The 3 November 1969 “Silent Majority” address defending the administration’s announced policy of “Vietnamization and negotiation” had increased President Nixon’s standing in public opinion polls to the highest level of his presidency.

No, I’m not saying that.

It can’t be done. It can’t even be done in terms of the Cambodian period.[note 20] President Nixon’s decision to send American troops into Cambodia to disrupt North Vietnamese supply lines had ignited the largest antiwar demonstrations to date, but nevertheless it garnered the support of a bare majority in public opinion polls. We’re in a different period. But be that as it may, the . . . the question of . . . of air power—how long it’s used, and so forth . . . What’s your suggestion as to how to handle that? Other words, the point is that we get back fundamentally to the question that we’ll—that everybody knows. We come to an election. And then the question is not how much we have reduced American casualties and how many less Americans there are there, but did we or did we not end the American involvement. See, that’s what we’re—

Well, of course, Mr. President, I believe if you want—if I have to give my honest conviction—if you watch the history of the war, the opponents have always focused on one thing. I don’t happen to believe, but you have—may have polled it, that the use of air power upsets the American people.

It does some. It’s not the use of air power; it has nothing to do with that. It’s just the fact that it’s the war, you see? They—because the media puts it in terms of the continuation of the war. No, I don’t think you could say that you could just continue air power for four or five years.

No, you can’t say—

Yeah. It’s not going to end—it’s not going to work—won’t wheel. I mean, you just—that means that then you have failed in an effort to end—to bring the war to an end, and you’ve left them . . .

Well, I just don’t have the benefit of these polls. I don’t have the sense that Vietnam is that much of an issue in people’s minds.

It’s not a big issue in the people’s mind, but it’s a very negative issue to the extent that it is now. That’s the problem and will continue to be. And will—it will become one more as these guys—see, this is stuff, not polls that we’ve taken, but that [Louis P. “Lou”] Harris and [George H.] Gallup have taken.[note 21] Louis P. “Lou” Harris was head of the polling firm Louis P. Harris and Associates, and became the first presidential pollster in 1960. George H. Gallup was a statistician, public opinion pollster, and inventor of the Gallup poll. They’ll all be—our Democratic friends, that’s why they’re jumping on this at this point, you see. And they’ll do their best to make it an issue. Well, be that as it may, the—

Well, the fact—on—the fact is that the Soviets—that the other side is getting close to a billion dollars’ worth of military aid a year. And it’s invading all of the surrounding countries.

That’s correct.

I mean, that is the fact. And that all we’re trying to do is to interdict the movement of the supplies. Besides, if we promise to end the war, to end the bombing—if we do all the things which our opponents now drive, then, within three months, you will be in a debate of overthrowing [Nguyễn Văn] Thiệu.[note 22] Nguyễn Văn Thiệu was president of South Vietnam from June 1965 to April 1975. One of Hanoi’s negotiating demands at the time was the replacement of the South Vietnamese government headed by President Thiệu with a coalition government that included Communists. And that one is going to be harder to conduct.

Yeah.

Because no one gives a damn about him.

That’s correct. I’m not suggesting that for now; I’m trying to set the stage of where we’re going to be in June as, you know, the thing we were talking about yesterday.[note 23] The President and Kissinger were both in Key Biscayne, Florida, when they spoke on 31 December 1971, so there is no tape recording of the call.

Yes. I—

So that we—

I’ve given that a lot of thought—

So that we can—so that we can—

I’m trying to figure out—

Basically, so that we have a way to just take the issue out of the debate for about three months; that’s what we’re really trying to do. It’ll be a very, very clever move if we can do it.

[Pause.] Well, it’s certainly a very intriguing idea, and I’ve given it a lot of thought—

[speaking over Kissinger] Let’s face it. Let’s face it, Henry: The bombing halt was a totally political move.[note 24] On 31 October 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson had announced a total halt to American bombing of North Vietnam. Contrary to President Nixon’s assertion that it was a political move, the timing of the halt was the result of North Vietnam’s decision in October 1968 to finally accept all three of LBJ’s conditions for a halt, following several months of refusing to accept any of them. Similarly, when the North finally accepted President Nixon’s negotiating demands in October 1972, he, too, would be accused of reaching an agreement at that time for political reasons. In both cases—the bombing halt of October 1968 and the settlement of October 1972—the timing was the result of Hanoi’s decision to accept the demands of the American presidents. You know, it had—didn’t mean a goddamn thing in terms of that, and it damn near won the election for [Hubert H.] Humphrey [Jr.] [DFL–Minnesota].[note 25] Hubert H. Humphrey Jr. was the Democratic mayor of Minneapolis, Minnesota, from July 1945 to November 1948; a U.S. senator [DFL–Minnesota] from January 1949 to December 1964 and January 1971 to January 1978; Senate Majority Whip from January 1961 to December 1964; vice president of the United States from January 1965 to January 1969; and the Democratic U.S. presidential candidate in 1968. Now, we’ve got to be smart enough to do something. [chuckling] I mean, when we—

But that was at a time when Vietnam was the only foreign policy issue.

I know. Don’t make any mistake, though. It’s a question, though, that—it’s—that anything, anything may change 1 percent, see? That’s what we’re talking about here. So we’re . . . And as I said, gives our people a positive rather than simply a defensive—an offensive rather than a defensive thing.

Well, we don’t have to answer that now, but . . . With regard to the dates, incidentally, we’re—

But that will be after the Moscow summit, so we—then we will be in a much better position to judge what the necessities are.

Yeah. The dates for the—the date for the next announcement, we’ve—we’re trying—I walk—talking to [H. R. “Bob”] Haldeman, he’s going to get me the report later today.[note 26] H. R. “Bob” Haldeman was White House chief of staff from January 1969 to April 1973. It’s—we’ve got to work it out in terms of Humphrey’s going to make an announcement, and I don’t want to do it too close to that.[note 27] Senator Humphrey, the Democrats’ 1968 presidential nominee, was about to announce that he would seek the nomination again in 1972. And I have to accept the New Hampshire delegation’s letter, and—which, of course, will be tantamount to a formal announcement.[note 28] President Nixon would announce his candidacy for reelection in a 7 January 1972 letter to the leader of his New Hampshire campaign, former governor S. Lane Dwinell. William Chapman, “President Formally Declares,” Washington Post, 8 January 1972. And I got to put it in that category, but in terms of playing it around, what’s the earliest that you can have—are we talking about now?

Mr. President, first we have to get Thiệu aboard.[note 29] In other words, before President Nixon could reveal the secret talks, he needed the South Vietnamese president’s agreement.

Yeah.

Secondly, this peace program, I have thought a lot about it. It’s going to set off a shock wave in Asia again, because it’s absolutely sweeping. [President Nixon acknowledges.] It may kick over Thailand completely. Now, my—

Well, then we won’t do it if it goes that far.

Well, no, I think it’s a good one to do, but it shouldn’t be sprung very suddenly. Now—

No, I’m speaking in terms of the period between the 10th and the 18th. It’s—that’s really the ballpark.

Oh, I see. I thought you wanted it even earlier than the 12th when we spoke yesterday.

No, no. The 12th is out, because I think that’s Humphrey’s date.[note 30] Humphrey announced his presidential candidacy on 10 January 1972.

But one of the things I wanted to suggest—

I don’t want to do it the same date one of those are moving, you see?

No, no.

We have to move all of these away from the political stuff.

But one of the things I wanted to suggest for your consideration, Mr. President, I have already wired the whole program to [Ellsworth F.] Bunker, and I’ve asked Bunker to take it up with Thiệu so we will know Monday or Tuesday how we stand there.[note 31] Ellsworth F. Bunker was U.S. ambassador to Argentina from March 1951 to March 1952; U.S. ambassador to Italy from May 1952 to April 1953; U.S. ambassador to India from November 1956 to March 1961; U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States from 1964 to 1965; U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam from April 1967 to May 1973; and recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1963 and 1967. If he approves it, and if we don’t have to spend any time there modifying it, we can go literally any day you say from the 10th on. [Pause.] The thing that I was going—so the date is, in itself, not so crucial if it isn’t [President Nixon acknowledges] before the 10th. Because before the 10th would be next week.

We can’t go—no, I don’t expect to before the 10th, but I—we might have to go— [clears throat] we might have to consider that early in—if—in the—depending upon what my own New Hampshire thing turns out to be.

Well, what I wanted to put before your consideration, Mr. President, is whether going anyway in the period before the Congress goes back isn’t a mistake. Sure, they may put in a lot of odd-and-end resolutions, although they probably won’t do it the first two or—

Well, Henry, there’s another reason we have to do it: I cannot have it left at the time of the State of the Union, because I can’t get up and make the State of the Union address and—if I haven’t said something on Vietnam by that time, I will have—which is on the 20th—I will be—I will have to spend, you know, a good part of my time on it there.

[Pause.] You couldn’t just have a paragraph and say you’ll discuss it more fully in the—

No.

—following weeks?

That won’t work. Not on that. [It’d] be a real dud. [Pause.] Now, I want to—it has to be done before then.[note 32] In the end, the President made his Vietnam speech on 25 January 1972, five days after the State of the Union address.

Well, then, we’ll do it whenever you say. We’ll be ready.

[Of] course, if they don’t get ready there, then we’ll have to make it a different kind of a proposal. We’ll just make the announcement, or whatever we’re going to do.

[Pause.] No, we’ll have—we can do it anytime. [Pause.] My instinct is that the later, the better. Because once it’s out there, then they have something to react to. Then they can frame all their proposals in reaction to what you’ve put on the table.

They’ll do—

None of their proposals are going to go anywhere near as far as what this has gone.

They’re going to do it anyway, Henry. I mean, whenever we put it out. If we put it out the 22nd, then on the 24th—

[speaking under President Nixon] Well, the later it is, then the closer it comes to China.[note 33] President Nixon was referring to his upcoming trip to the People’s Republic of China, which would take place 21–28 February 1972.

True, but they’ll still [slight chuckle] —they’ll still have—

Well, this way—

—a month.

—all the restraints will be off once this proposal is on the table. They’ll pass—

It won’t make that much difference, Henry. A week, whatever the case might be, isn’t going to make that much difference here.

Well, two weeks would gain us two weeks closer to China.

Yeah, yeah. [Pause.] Well, we’ll have to do it before the State of the Union switch, so that’s the latest, the 20th. And we can move back in that period of time anytime we want. We’ve got—I’m going to get the dates from Haldeman that all these people are going to be filing, then we’ll try to fit one that—fit this in.

But, OK, so let’s figure anyplace between the 10th and the . . .

No, we can be ready—

Between the 10th and the 20th.

The 10th and the 20th?

Yeah, the 10th and the 20th. Wait a minute, 9th, 10th . . . Well, actually, the 11th would be the first day. I can’t do the 10th, because I won’t be back in time. The 11th. Between the 11th and the 20th. That’s what we’re—that’s the game we have to play.

That’s right.

[Pause.] OK. OK. We’ve—It’ll be interesting to see what Thiệu reacts at the long last now. He may be in a position where he feels he’s too strong to get—

Well, it’s a hell of a thing to have public.

Yep. And if he doesn’t want to do it, we won’t do it. We’ll just do something else. You know? Put in what we’ve already done, or . . . it’s a pretty good proposal without that.

Yeah, yeah.

Yeah. I think it is, I mean, it isn’t—I don’t think his agreeing to get out is all that big.[note 34] Under Nixon’s settlement proposal, President Thiệu would agree to resign one month prior to South Vietnamese elections.

Well, it’s—the risk factor [unclear]—

It’s a symbolic thing, yeah.

But there are a lot of factors in their proposal, like agreeing to curtail military aid.

Yeah.

If they do.

Yep, yep.

Like agreeing that South Vietnam should have a foreign policy of neutrality.

Right. I know, it’s really great. Well, OK, we’ll—I’ll be in touch with you when I get any more specific questions on the book. OK?

Right. OK.

Fine.