Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger on 1 January 1972


Transcript

Edited by Ken Hughes, with Patrick J. Garrity, Erin R. Mahan, Kieran K. Matthews, and Marc J. Selverstone

In their first conversation of 1972, President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger discussed both the day’s issues and their plans for a year that would include unprecedented summit meetings in China and Russia. The President was also planning a nationally televised speech later this month to reveal that Kissinger and the North Vietnamese had been engaged in secret negotiations for three years.

President Nixon

Hello.

White House Operator

Dr. [Henry A.] Kissinger.[note 1] Henry A. Kissinger was U.S. national security adviser from January 1969 to November 1975, and U.S. secretary of state from September 1973 to January 1977. [President Nixon clears his throat. The call connects.] There you are.

President Nixon

Hello?

Henry A. Kissinger

Mr. President, a happy New Year.

President Nixon

Yeah—

Nine seconds excised by the National Archives and Records Administration as private information.
President Nixon

Good, good. You’re back in New York now?

Kissinger

Yeah, I’m back in New York. Yeah.[note 2] Kissinger had been in Florida for talks between President Nixon and West German chancellor Willy Brandt on 28 December 1971. Suffering with the flu, Kissinger did not attend those talks and stayed in his hotel. Since Kissinger had used illness as a cover story to explain his absence while on his secret trip to the People’s Republic of China the previous July, White House press secretary Ronald L. “Ron” Ziegler felt compelled to insist that Kissinger really was ill on this occasion.

President Nixon

Right, right. OK, well, anything new?

Kissinger

No. Well, [slight chuckle] to tell you the truth, I just woke up about half an hour ago—

President Nixon

That’s good.

Kissinger

—but I will check right away.

President Nixon

No, I read the papers. There’s not anything in there.

Kissinger

But last night, when I checked last, there wasn’t anything new. There was this fellow, [Dominic “Dom”] Mintoff.[note 3] The Honorable Dominic “Dom” Mintoff was leader of the Maltese Labor Party from 1949 to 1984, and prime minister of Malta from June 1971 to December 1984. I didn’t bother you with all the—

President Nixon

Oh, you mean the—that—

Kissinger

—permutations of Malta—[note 4] Dominic Mintoff, the prime minister of Malta, had been a leader in the island’s movement to achieve independence from Great Britain, which occurred in 1964. Since then, Britain and other NATO nations, including the United States and Italy, had been allowed to retain military forces or access to facilities on the island, but Mintoff had ended docking privileges for the U.S. Sixth Fleet and had issued an ultimatum for Britain’s departure by 1 January 1972. (The deadline was later extended.) The United States and its allies were concerned that the Soviet Union would later obtain those facilities, either directly or through the agency of the radical government in Libya.

President Nixon

Oh, the hell with that.

Kissinger

He tried to get you on the phone, and we didn’t put him through, because there was—whatever you would have said, you would have been in the middle of it. And we put him on to [Robert F. “Bob”] Ellsworth, who had been out there as your ambassador—[note 5] Robert F. “Bob” Ellsworth was a U.S. representative [R–Kansas] from January 1961 to January 1967; U.S. permanent representative to NATO from May 1969 to June 1971; and assistant to the president during the Nixon administration. He had been tasked by the White House to encourage a solution between the British government and Malta.

President Nixon

Who?

Kissinger

Bob Ellsworth—we sent out on a special mission—

President Nixon

Oh, yeah.

Kissinger

—to Malta in December. And so now he’s extended his ultimatum by two weeks. He can’t throw the British out; it would be mass unemployment on the island.

President Nixon

He’d kill himself, won’t he?

Kissinger

Oh, yeah.

President Nixon

And he’s just trying to drive the British to a—too hard a bargain.

Kissinger

And if he gets the Libyan money—even if he got Libyan money, that wouldn’t get him 10,000 jobs.[note 6] Mintoff had just returned from talks with Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi, who had pledged the necessary financial assistance to allow Mintoff to remove Britain and NATO from Malta.

President Nixon

Mm-hmm.

Kissinger

He can’t put the whole island on the dole.

President Nixon

[Slight chuckle.] Yeah. Well, I don’t know. I suppose Ellsworth talked to him—about all that to him, yeah.

Kissinger

And what he—the result of all of that is that he has extended his deadline. And [President Nixon acknowledges throughout] we have said we would—we didn’t say we could mediate, but we said we would keep an eye on the negotiations.

President Nixon

Yeah.

Kissinger

And we’ve told [Sir Edward R. G. “Ted”] Heath we would up the ante a little bit.[note 7] The Right Honorable Sir Edward R. G. “Ted” Heath was prime minister of the United Kingdom from June 1970 to March 1974.

President Nixon

That we would help Heath with the ante.

Kissinger

With the ante. That’s right.

President Nixon

Yeah.

Kissinger

We are not talking to him ourselves.

President Nixon

Yeah. No, never talk to Mintoff. Let the British do the—do it and—

Kissinger

That’s right, but we have sent a message from you to him [President Nixon acknowledges throughout] saying we are prepared to up the . . . the an—to help them in upping the ante.

President Nixon

Yeah, yeah. Right, right. OK.

Kissinger

But that’s the only thing [President Nixon acknowledges] of any consequence that’s been going on.

President Nixon

I was noting—I just noted Mrs. [Indira] Gandhi made a speech to the parliament, and that she . . . still takes her line that foreign aid has really never aided them, that they’d paid back every bit that they’d ever gotten and [Kissinger acknowledges] . . . [chuckles] and that she’s . . . going to take this line about the—what she’s going to do, and so forth, and so on.[note 8] Indira Gandhi was prime minister of India from January 1966 to March 1977 and January 1980 to October 1984. Gandhi had a particularly antagonistic personal relationship with Richard Nixon.

Kissinger

Yeah, but—

President Nixon

But—

Kissinger

—on the other hand, when she doesn’t talk to parliament—her parliament is very—

President Nixon

I know.

Kissinger

It’s combined of—

President Nixon

Hawklike.

Kissinger

—radicals on both sides.

President Nixon

Right.

Kissinger

She’s put all—out all sorts of signals.

President Nixon

Right.

Kissinger

And she’s—

President Nixon

Well, she’s taking the public line that we don’t understand her and [clears throat] all that. That . . .

Kissinger

Yeah, but the Indians are master psychologists. They’ve got to deal with us. They’ve got—literally now they’re in worse shape than ever.

President Nixon

I guess they must be.

Kissinger

Because now, when people say—first of all, they put themselves on the Soviets’ side. It’s—John [H.] Freeman told [O.] Henry Brandon when he was there—and Freeman, you know, was—[note 9] Major John H. Freeman was British High Commissioner to India from 1965 to 1968, and British ambassador to the United States from 1969 to 1971. O. Henry Brandon was the Washington correspondent for the London Sunday Times from 1950 to 1983.

President Nixon

Ambassador, yeah.

Kissinger

—ambassador for four years [President Nixon acknowledges]—that they in ‘67 cold-bloodedly decided they needed the Russians to deal with the Pakistanis.[note 10] After independence, India proclaimed that it was following a policy of nonalignment in the Cold War. In August 1971, however, India signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, which Nixon and Kissinger regarded as giving the Indians the green light to go to war in December 1971 to support the independence movement in East Pakistan. Here, Kissinger indicated the belief that New Delhi had made the decision to seek Soviet support years earlier. The United States considered Pakistan a Cold War ally and a critical go-between in developing relations with the People’s Republic of China. The White House had supported, diplomatically and militarily through covert assistance, the Pakistani central government’s unsuccessful efforts to retain sovereignty over East Pakistan.

President Nixon

Yeah.

Kissinger

And that we just weren’t enough of a factor in that area. That’s when they made their move.

President Nixon

Yeah.

Kissinger

But now their problem is they cannot permit, for their own domestic reasons—if the Russians [President Nixon sighs] become too influential in India, the Communist Party becomes too strong. [Pause.] And—

President Nixon

I know. That’s a real problem for them.

Kissinger

—and they can’t have that. Secondly, they—this problem of East Bengal is going to become harder and harder for them. Now, they have the problem that Pakistan used to have.[note 11] East Bengal was the predominantly Muslim portion of the eastern Indian subcontinent, which eventually became East Pakistan after the partition of 1947. (West Pakistan dominated the country’s government and military.) In 1971, after months of violent agitation and brutal efforts by the central Pakistani government to suppress resistance to its rule, and with the military assistance of India, the territory claimed its independence as the nation of Bangladesh. Here, Kissinger is suggesting that Bangladesh, which bordered on the predominantly Hindu lands of eastern India (West Bengal), would either be absorbed by India because of ethnic affinities or become an Indian protectorate.

President Nixon

How the hell to feed them and govern them.

Kissinger

How to feed them and how to govern. They can’t govern their own Bengalis.

President Nixon

That’s right.

Kissinger

People keep forgetting that they have martial law in Calcutta.

President Nixon

That’s right.

Kissinger

That they kept call—yakking about martial law in Dacca, but there’s martial law in Calcutta also.

President Nixon

Mm-hmm. [Pause.] Yep. With regard to the question of recognition of Bangladesh, I think it should—the answer should simply be very—“Well, listen, it’s premature to talk about that.” Isn’t that about what we say?[note 12] For Nixon and Kissinger, U.S. recognition of Bangladesh was a sensitive diplomatic subject. To do so at this point, in their minds, would alienate the government in East Pakistan, as well as the Chinese. Their preferred strategy was to wait for the Pakistani government to offer recognition first. This would make recognition a moot point, assuming that India did not absorb Bangladesh directly.

Kissinger

First, Mr. President, no one has recognized Bangladesh except Bhutan and India. No one, not even Russia.

President Nixon

Yeah. Well, I think we should just say, “It’s premature to talk about it.”

Kissinger

That’s right. We should say—

President Nixon

And not go into it any longer—any further.

Kissinger

That’s right.

President Nixon

Or unless we—I don’t think we ought to hang out the idea, well, it might get into Pakistan, and all the rest. I don’t think we should reject it, but . . .

Kissinger

No. No, the fact of the matter is that, at this point, the Chinese would take violent objection, because of their parallels to Tibet and Manchukuo.[note 13] Kissinger’s point is that the Chinese were particularly sensitive to foreign support for independence movements in territories they considered historically Chinese, such as Tibet and Manchuria. The dismemberment of Pakistan by India, supported by China’s Communist antagonist, the Soviet Union, hit too close to home. Manchukuo was the puppet government established by Japan in Manchuria from 1932 to 1945.

President Nixon

Yeah.

Kissinger

But . . . that’s just something to keep in the back of the mind. But if you say no more than “it’s premature,” that’s fine.

President Nixon

Oh, yes, to just say, “Well, I have—we have nothing on that. We—premature and we haven’t—can’t yet determine. Only India and Russia—this—have recommended them. Bhutan—"

Kissinger

No, Russia hasn’t.

President Nixon

Russia hasn’t. That’s right. That’s right.

Kissinger

You—I would just say, “Up to now there are only two countries that have recognized it; this is not an acute issue.”

President Nixon

Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.

Kissinger

Of course, we have a [U.S.] consul in Dacca who’s already put up a map calling—he’s calling it Bangladesh.

President Nixon

Yeah, I know. The same bastard that was there before, isn’t it?[note 14] Nixon and Kissinger are presumably referring to Archer Blood, a Foreign Service officer posted as American consul general in Dacca (present-day Dhaka), the city that became the capital of Bangladesh. Over the preceding months, Blood had issued a number of missives to the State Department warning about genocidal actions being carried out by the Pakistani army against the population of East Pakistan, particularly its educated elite. These dispatches—and particularly leaks to the media, presumably made by Blood—about the atrocities and Blood’s protests, had raised the White House’s ire because they went against U.S. policy of quiet support for Pakistan. Gary J. Bass, a professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University, detailed these events in The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013).

Kissinger

Yeah.

President Nixon

He’s really an all-out Indian lover, isn’t he?

Kissinger

That’s right.

President Nixon

And poor [Kenneth B.] Keating in the other place.[note 15] Kenneth B. Keating was a U.S. representative [R–New York] from January 1947 to January 1959; a U.S. senator [R–New York] from January 1959 to January 1965; U.S. ambassador to India from 1969 to 1972; and U.S. ambassador to Israel from August 1973 to May 1975. [Laughs.] We really have—

Kissinger

Well, I have to say this for Keating: He’s pleaded, and he’s wept and cried, but he hasn’t actually leaked to the press against you.[note 16] Keating, a moderate Republican and former U.S. senator from New York, had been appointed by Nixon as U.S. ambassador to India in 1969. He had echoed Blood’s warnings about horrific developments in East Pakistan perpetrated by the Pakistani army. Nixon and Kissinger regarded him as a second-rate politician who had become captive to the State Department’s reflexive sympathy for India.

President Nixon

Good. Well, he probably knows that there’s problems. Well, it’s difficult. You know, the Indians just are—just smother you out there when you come, you know, [Kissinger acknowledges] with all their devious, tricky things. They are really something. Yeah.

The most difficult questions that we’re—that I’m going to have are, I think, going to be on Vietnam.[note 17] The President was preparing for a live, televised interview with CBS White House correspondent Dan Rather the following evening. Not in terms of the bombing, so forth. That’s no problem. But in terms of . . . POW [prisoners of war], when it ends, and so forth. You see, we’ve—we’re now coming to the moment of truth in terms of—we’ve been able to put the press off and say, “Well, we’ll have another announcement, and we’ll do this, and this, and this, and this, and this.” But then they, I know, we’re—because some of the POW wives have put in a question for [Daniel I. “Dan”] Rather [Jr.] to ask—that we’re going to get a tough one on that.[note 18] Daniel I. “Dan” Rather Jr. was a television news journalist and White House correspondent for CBS News during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations.

But why don’t you talk just a little bit about how we can—how we can say something on this without saying anything. This is the tough problem. I don’t—it isn’t a question now where we can go back and argue about what a good job we’ve done. What I meant is that there’s got to be—I mean, I’ll make that point, of course. I’ll . . . yes, we’ve withdrawn 400,000 and our casualties are down, and [Kissinger attempts to interject] we’ve made a peace offer, and—

Kissinger

Couldn’t we say that “the first thing that one has to remember is that these—that the other side is using”—I mean, with some indignation against the other side—“that they are using them brutally, using the prisoners brutally—"

President Nixon

I know. Yeah. I will say that, but then, of course, Henry, the question is: “Now, what are you going to do about it?" See?

Kissinger

Secondly, we have made every reasonable offer that can be made.

President Nixon

Now, they say we’re now—we—all those offers haven’t been—they don’t stop there. “All those offers have been turned down, and they don’t expect them—what are you going to do?"

Kissinger

Well, but then what I have always said to the wives is—I don’t know whether one can say that to a national audience—I have always said to the wives that “I don’t believe your husbands want you to have America just surrender.” That we’ve made any—that we’ve gone nine-tenths of the way . . . towards the other side.

President Nixon

[Clears throat.] It’ll work with them, because they’re still basically patriots. It will not work now with a national audience. I mean, putting it in—

Kissinger

I’m not so sure.

President Nixon

—putting it in terms—Oh, we’ve—it’s been very, very heavily polled in the last couple months. That is, you see, that’s the thing—the new factor we’ve got here as to what we can wheel, and they’re quite aware of this. The—you know, the—it’s just the attrition of the support for the war, it’s that—that’s the basic thing, the problem which is—

Kissinger

But I think the problem—

President Nixon

—changes.

Kissinger

—is also what the Australian prime minister said to me. That the—not the prime minister there—the ambassador said as he goes around the country, he’s the only guy that’s speaking for the war.

President Nixon

I know.

Kissinger

And no one ever speaks up for it, and the people get confused.

President Nixon

True, but don’t get any—we can’t be under any illusions that we can do this before certain intelligent audiences and the rest, but—and my line, of course, will always be more hawkish than others, but we are in a position now where just saying, “Well, we can just wheel it up like we did in November of ‘69,” is—that time is gone, you see?[note 19] The 3 November 1969 “Silent Majority” address defending the administration’s announced policy of “Vietnamization and negotiation” had increased President Nixon’s standing in public opinion polls to the highest level of his presidency.

Kissinger

No, I’m not saying that.

President Nixon

It can’t be done. It can’t even be done in terms of the Cambodian period.[note 20] President Nixon’s decision to send American troops into Cambodia to disrupt North Vietnamese supply lines had ignited the largest antiwar demonstrations to date, but nevertheless it garnered the support of a bare majority in public opinion polls. We’re in a different period. But be that as it may, the . . . the question of . . . of air power—how long it’s used, and so forth . . . What’s your suggestion as to how to handle that? Other words, the point is that we get back fundamentally to the question that we’ll—that everybody knows. We come to an election. And then the question is not how much we have reduced American casualties and how many less Americans there are there, but did we or did we not end the American involvement. See, that’s what we’re—

Kissinger

Well, of course, Mr. President, I believe if you want—if I have to give my honest conviction—if you watch the history of the war, the opponents have always focused on one thing. I don’t happen to believe, but you have—may have polled it, that the use of air power upsets the American people.

President Nixon

It does some. It’s not the use of air power; it has nothing to do with that. It’s just the fact that it’s the war, you see? They—because the media puts it in terms of the continuation of the war. No, I don’t think you could say that you could just continue air power for four or five years.

Kissinger

No, you can’t say—

President Nixon

Yeah. It’s not going to end—it’s not going to work—won’t wheel. I mean, you just—that means that then you have failed in an effort to end—to bring the war to an end, and you’ve left them . . .

Kissinger

Well, I just don’t have the benefit of these polls. I don’t have the sense that Vietnam is that much of an issue in people’s minds.

President Nixon

It’s not a big issue in the people’s mind, but it’s a very negative issue to the extent that it is now. That’s the problem and will continue to be. And will—it will become one more as these guys—see, this is stuff, not polls that we’ve taken, but that [Louis P. “Lou”] Harris and [George H.] Gallup have taken.[note 21] Louis P. “Lou” Harris was head of the polling firm Louis P. Harris and Associates, and became the first presidential pollster in 1960. George H. Gallup was a statistician, public opinion pollster, and inventor of the Gallup poll. They’ll all be—our Democratic friends, that’s why they’re jumping on this at this point, you see. And they’ll do their best to make it an issue. Well, be that as it may, the—

Kissinger

Well, the fact—on—the fact is that the Soviets—that the other side is getting close to a billion dollars’ worth of military aid a year. And it’s invading all of the surrounding countries.

President Nixon

That’s correct.

Kissinger

I mean, that is the fact. And that all we’re trying to do is to interdict the movement of the supplies. Besides, if we promise to end the war, to end the bombing—if we do all the things which our opponents now drive, then, within three months, you will be in a debate of overthrowing [Nguyễn Văn] Thiệu.[note 22] Nguyễn Văn Thiệu was president of South Vietnam from June 1965 to April 1975. One of Hanoi’s negotiating demands at the time was the replacement of the South Vietnamese government headed by President Thiệu with a coalition government that included Communists. And that one is going to be harder to conduct.

President Nixon

Yeah.

Kissinger

Because no one gives a damn about him.

President Nixon

That’s correct. I’m not suggesting that for now; I’m trying to set the stage of where we’re going to be in June as, you know, the thing we were talking about yesterday.[note 23] The President and Kissinger were both in Key Biscayne, Florida, when they spoke on 31 December 1971, so there is no tape recording of the call.

Kissinger

Yes. I—

President Nixon

So that we—

Kissinger

I’ve given that a lot of thought—

President Nixon

So that we can—so that we can—

Kissinger

I’m trying to figure out—

President Nixon

Basically, so that we have a way to just take the issue out of the debate for about three months; that’s what we’re really trying to do. It’ll be a very, very clever move if we can do it.

Kissinger

[Pause.] Well, it’s certainly a very intriguing idea, and I’ve given it a lot of thought—

President Nixon

[speaking over Kissinger] Let’s face it. Let’s face it, Henry: The bombing halt was a totally political move.[note 24] On 31 October 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson had announced a total halt to American bombing of North Vietnam. Contrary to President Nixon’s assertion that it was a political move, the timing of the halt was the result of North Vietnam’s decision in October 1968 to finally accept all three of LBJ’s conditions for a halt, following several months of refusing to accept any of them. Similarly, when the North finally accepted President Nixon’s negotiating demands in October 1972, he, too, would be accused of reaching an agreement at that time for political reasons. In both cases—the bombing halt of October 1968 and the settlement of October 1972—the timing was the result of Hanoi’s decision to accept the demands of the American presidents. You know, it had—didn’t mean a goddamn thing in terms of that, and it damn near won the election for [Hubert H.] Humphrey [Jr.] [DFL–Minnesota].[note 25] Hubert H. Humphrey Jr. was the Democratic mayor of Minneapolis, Minnesota, from July 1945 to November 1948; a U.S. senator [DFL–Minnesota] from January 1949 to December 1964 and January 1971 to January 1978; Senate Majority Whip from January 1961 to December 1964; vice president of the United States from January 1965 to January 1969; and the Democratic U.S. presidential candidate in 1968. Now, we’ve got to be smart enough to do something. [chuckling] I mean, when we—

Kissinger

But that was at a time when Vietnam was the only foreign policy issue.

President Nixon

I know. Don’t make any mistake, though. It’s a question, though, that—it’s—that anything, anything may change 1 percent, see? That’s what we’re talking about here. So we’re . . . And as I said, gives our people a positive rather than simply a defensive—an offensive rather than a defensive thing.

Well, we don’t have to answer that now, but . . . With regard to the dates, incidentally, we’re—

Kissinger

But that will be after the Moscow summit, so we—then we will be in a much better position to judge what the necessities are.

President Nixon

Yeah. The dates for the—the date for the next announcement, we’ve—we’re trying—I walk—talking to [H. R. “Bob”] Haldeman, he’s going to get me the report later today.[note 26] H. R. “Bob” Haldeman was White House chief of staff from January 1969 to April 1973. It’s—we’ve got to work it out in terms of Humphrey’s going to make an announcement, and I don’t want to do it too close to that.[note 27] Senator Humphrey, the Democrats’ 1968 presidential nominee, was about to announce that he would seek the nomination again in 1972. And I have to accept the New Hampshire delegation’s letter, and—which, of course, will be tantamount to a formal announcement.[note 28] President Nixon would announce his candidacy for reelection in a 7 January 1972 letter to the leader of his New Hampshire campaign, former governor S. Lane Dwinell. William Chapman, “President Formally Declares,” Washington Post, 8 January 1972. And I got to put it in that category, but in terms of playing it around, what’s the earliest that you can have—are we talking about now?

Kissinger

Mr. President, first we have to get Thiệu aboard.[note 29] In other words, before President Nixon could reveal the secret talks, he needed the South Vietnamese president’s agreement.

President Nixon

Yeah.

Kissinger

Secondly, this peace program, I have thought a lot about it. It’s going to set off a shock wave in Asia again, because it’s absolutely sweeping. [President Nixon acknowledges.] It may kick over Thailand completely. Now, my—

President Nixon

Well, then we won’t do it if it goes that far.

Kissinger

Well, no, I think it’s a good one to do, but it shouldn’t be sprung very suddenly. Now—

President Nixon

No, I’m speaking in terms of the period between the 10th and the 18th. It’s—that’s really the ballpark.

Kissinger

Oh, I see. I thought you wanted it even earlier than the 12th when we spoke yesterday.

President Nixon

No, no. The 12th is out, because I think that’s Humphrey’s date.[note 30] Humphrey announced his presidential candidacy on 10 January 1972.

Kissinger

But one of the things I wanted to suggest—

President Nixon

I don’t want to do it the same date one of those are moving, you see?

Kissinger

No, no.

President Nixon

We have to move all of these away from the political stuff.

Kissinger

But one of the things I wanted to suggest for your consideration, Mr. President, I have already wired the whole program to [Ellsworth F.] Bunker, and I’ve asked Bunker to take it up with Thiệu so we will know Monday or Tuesday how we stand there.[note 31] Ellsworth F. Bunker was U.S. ambassador to Argentina from March 1951 to March 1952; U.S. ambassador to Italy from May 1952 to April 1953; U.S. ambassador to India from November 1956 to March 1961; U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States from 1964 to 1965; U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam from April 1967 to May 1973; and recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1963 and 1967. If he approves it, and if we don’t have to spend any time there modifying it, we can go literally any day you say from the 10th on. [Pause.] The thing that I was going—so the date is, in itself, not so crucial if it isn’t [President Nixon acknowledges] before the 10th. Because before the 10th would be next week.

President Nixon

We can’t go—no, I don’t expect to before the 10th, but I—we might have to go—[clears throat] we might have to consider that early in—if—in the—depending upon what my own New Hampshire thing turns out to be.

Kissinger

Well, what I wanted to put before your consideration, Mr. President, is whether going anyway in the period before the Congress goes back isn’t a mistake. Sure, they may put in a lot of odd-and-end resolutions, although they probably won’t do it the first two or—

President Nixon

Well, Henry, there’s another reason we have to do it: I cannot have it left at the time of the State of the Union, because I can’t get up and make the State of the Union address and—if I haven’t said something on Vietnam by that time, I will have—which is on the 20th—I will be—I will have to spend, you know, a good part of my time on it there.

Kissinger

[Pause.] You couldn’t just have a paragraph and say you’ll discuss it more fully in the—

President Nixon

No.

Kissinger

—following weeks?

President Nixon

That won’t work. Not on that. [It’d] be a real dud. [Pause.] Now, I want to—it has to be done before then.[note 32] In the end, the President made his Vietnam speech on 25 January 1972, five days after the State of the Union address.

Kissinger

Well, then, we’ll do it whenever you say. We’ll be ready.

President Nixon

[Of] course, if they don’t get ready there, then we’ll have to make it a different kind of a proposal. We’ll just make the announcement, or whatever we’re going to do.

Kissinger

[Pause.] No, we’ll have—we can do it anytime. [Pause.] My instinct is that the later, the better. Because once it’s out there, then they have something to react to. Then they can frame all their proposals in reaction to what you’ve put on the table.

President Nixon

They’ll do—

Kissinger

None of their proposals are going to go anywhere near as far as what this has gone.

President Nixon

They’re going to do it anyway, Henry. I mean, whenever we put it out. If we put it out the 22nd, then on the 24th—

Kissinger

[speaking under President Nixon] Well, the later it is, then the closer it comes to China.[note 33] President Nixon was referring to his upcoming trip to the People’s Republic of China, which would take place 21–28 February 1972.

President Nixon

True, but they’ll still [slight chuckle]—they’ll still have—

Kissinger

Well, this way—

President Nixon

—a month.

Kissinger

—all the restraints will be off once this proposal is on the table. They’ll pass—

President Nixon

It won’t make that much difference, Henry. A week, whatever the case might be, isn’t going to make that much difference here.

Kissinger

Well, two weeks would gain us two weeks closer to China.

President Nixon

Yeah, yeah. [Pause.] Well, we’ll have to do it before the State of the Union switch, so that’s the latest, the 20th. And we can move back in that period of time anytime we want. We’ve got—I’m going to get the dates from Haldeman that all these people are going to be filing, then we’ll try to fit one that—fit this in.

Sixteen seconds excised by the National Archives and Records Administration as personal returnable information.
President Nixon

But, OK, so let’s figure anyplace between the 10th and the . . .

Kissinger

No, we can be ready—

President Nixon

Between the 10th and the 20th.

Kissinger

The 10th and the 20th?

President Nixon

Yeah, the 10th and the 20th. Wait a minute, 9th, 10th . . . Well, actually, the 11th would be the first day. I can’t do the 10th, because I won’t be back in time. The 11th. Between the 11th and the 20th. That’s what we’re—that’s the game we have to play.

Kissinger

That’s right.

President Nixon

[Pause.] OK. OK. We’ve—It’ll be interesting to see what Thiệu reacts at the long last now. He may be in a position where he feels he’s too strong to get—

Kissinger

Well, it’s a hell of a thing to have public.

President Nixon

Yep. And if he doesn’t want to do it, we won’t do it. We’ll just do something else. You know? Put in what we’ve already done, or . . . it’s a pretty good proposal without that.

Kissinger

Yeah, yeah.

President Nixon

Yeah. I think it is, I mean, it isn’t—I don’t think his agreeing to get out is all that big.[note 34] Under Nixon’s settlement proposal, President Thiệu would agree to resign one month prior to South Vietnamese elections.

Kissinger

Well, it’s—the risk factor [unclear]

President Nixon

It’s a symbolic thing, yeah.

Kissinger

But there are a lot of factors in their proposal, like agreeing to curtail military aid.

President Nixon

Yeah.

Kissinger

If they do.

President Nixon

Yep, yep.

Kissinger

Like agreeing that South Vietnam should have a foreign policy of neutrality.

President Nixon

Right. I know, it’s really great. Well, OK, we’ll—I’ll be in touch with you when I get any more specific questions on the book. OK?

Kissinger

Right. OK.

President Nixon

Fine.

Cite as

“Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger on 1 January 1972,” Conversation 017-125, Presidential Recordings Digital Edition [Nixon Telephone Tapes: 1972, ed. Ken Hughes] (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2014–). URL: http://prde.upress.virginia.edu/conversations/4006752