Hello?

Mr. President?

Yeah.

Several things to report. First of all, I got a copy of Newsweek, and then I called [Charles W.] Chuck Roberts.[note 1] Charles W. “Chuck” Roberts was a White House correspondent for Newsweek from 1951 to 1972. And he said the following: first of all, he said that their public—Newsweek‘s public relations man had put out a release yesterday saying that this was based upon an exclusive interview with you and that, when Newsweek—the reporter heard—the editors heard about it, they called that back, because it wasn’t based on an exclusive interview. I said, “My point, Chuck, is that it sounds as if it were.” And sure enough, I’ve talked to three or four people here this morning who say that they’ve read Newsweek or read the AP [Associated Press] stories of it, and it seems—it sounds like direct quotes from the President. Do you have a minute to let me read you the pertinent sections from the magazine article?

Yes. But I’m not more interested in that as I am as to what he’s done and where he got it and why he would be attributing—

He says, quote, “I talked to people to whom the President talked, and I am confident of the information that we received.”

Well, tell him that’s wrong. Tell him the President’s—

I did.

I didn’t know [Godfrey T.] McHugh was on the plane.[note 2] Brig. Gen. Godfrey T. McHugh was an Air Force officer, and military aide to President John F. Kennedy from 1961 until Kennedy’s assassination on 22 November 1963. McHugh was aboard Air Force One on that day in Dallas.

For—yeah, that’s one story. I said, “Chuck, that one story in itself is enough to refute it.” And then they go on, and they keep saying—they have a long two paragraphs [President Johnson acknowledges] about your memories of the day that [Harry S.] Truman was killed—[note 3] Harry S. Truman was a U.S. senator [D–Missouri] from January 1935 to January 1945; vice president of the United States from January 1945 to April 1945; and president of the United States from April 1945 to January 1953.

I never heard of that.

—I mean, when Truman became president.

Was Truman killed?

I mean, that—well, the day when Truman became president, when [Franklin D.] Roosevelt died.[note 4] Franklin D. Roosevelt was assistant secretary of the U.S. Navy from March 1913 to August 1920; the Democratic governor of New York from January 1929 to December 1932; and president of the United States from March 1933 until his death on 12 April 1945.

Well, the only thing I know there is I told [William S.] Bill White that night.[note 5] William S. “Bill” White was a Pulitzer Prize–winning author and syndicated newspaper columnist; a longtime friend of Lyndon Johnson; and author of the 1964 biography The Professional: Lyndon B. Johnson. He wrote a story from [Samuel T. “Sam”] Rayburn’s office.[note 6] Samuel T. “Sam” Rayburn was a U.S. representative [D–Texas] from March 1913 until his death in November 1961; Speaker of the House from September 1940 to November 1961; and one of Lyndon Johnson’s political mentors.

Mm-hmm.

But none of this stuff that I see in the paper is true. I think we better write a nice paragraph and say we’ve had—I’ve had no interviews on the subject at all. And this is completely inaccurate and untrue and unfair. That I’ve asked my staff not to discuss it. I’ve asked my former associates not to discuss it. And ask them to publish it and ask [Katharine] Kay [Graham] and just say, “This is just murdering us, and you got headlines . . .”[note 7] Katharine “Kay” Graham was the daughter of Eugene Meyer, who was the owner and publisher of the Washington Post from 1934 to 1946; the wife of Philip L. Graham, who was the publisher of the Washington Post from 1946 to 1963; and president of the Washington Post Co. from 1963 to 1973. I read you the headlines, didn’t I?

Yes, sir.

“LBJ Differs on Kennedy Friction.” That’s eight columns! That’s like a war story.

The Washington Post has “LBJ Version on ‘63 Oath Is Reported.”

“LBJ Version Clashes with Book Details.” They’re trying to build up the story, you see, by using the presidency. The Dallas News, I haven’t seen it yet, but . . . the Austin American didn’t use anything. [Snorts.] But these others do it. Go ahead, now. What does he say? He’s talked to people who have talked to the President?

Yes. He says, “I have”—he said, “We talked to a number of people—"

“Johnson’s Recollection Reported Different.”

That’s right.

Newsweek says, “LBJ remembers intercepting McHugh,” and—I did tell him off. Now, I never heard of that. I don’t remember intercepting him at all! He says, “It’s a word that comes easy as a Texan.” You know, I—some guy’s office, and he isn’t in, I’ll say [to] his secretary, “Honey, have him call me.”

Once—when he comes in.

Yeah. Now, those are their ideas, you see. That’s kind of their idea of you all.

[Pause.] That’s right. Well, of course, he won’t—I said, “Chuck, it would help history to be righted if you could tell me where you got this.” And he said, “Well, I can’t do that.” He said, “I’m not the only one who worked on the story, obviously,” he said, “but we talked to a number of people who had talked to the President.”

But, Mr. President, here’s some—let me find this one . . . “‘I wasn’t going to let Mrs. [Jacqueline B. “Jackie”] Kennedy fly back alone with the body,’ he explained to intimates.[note 8] Jacqueline B. “Jackie” Kennedy was the wife of John F. Kennedy from September 1953 until his assassination in November 1963, and first lady of the United States from January 1961 to November 1963. By Mr. Johnson’s memory, Robert [F. “Bobby”] Kennedy [D–New York] was not noncommittal.[note 9] Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy was U.S. attorney general from January 1961 to September 1964, and a U.S. senator [D–New York] from January 1965 until his assassination in June 1968. He recalls telephoning Bobby.”

But there’s one sentence I wanted to say . . . I wanted . . . I wanted to read you. Just one minute. [Pause.] “The morale—the moral Mr. Johnson seemed to be drawing last week, without spelling it out, was that no one at the time suggested that Truman had shown unseemly haste in promptly taking the presidential oath.” That is, as if you had spent a specific period of your time last week talking to somebody about this.

Now, I said to Roberts, I said, “This means, Chuck, that the President, who was at the [LBJ] Ranch all of last week would have had to be doing this talking down there.” And he said, “That’s what we understand.”

Well, that’s not true, is it?

It’s just . . . it’s just totally fictitious. Uh . . .

And I never heard of Truman. I’ve never discussed it with a human.

There are two paragraphs in there: “By coincidence, President Johnson recalls he and House Speaker Sam Rayburn had planned a party for Truman that very day, mainly as a morale booster for a man lost in the limbo of the vice presidency. ‘He doesn’t think anybody likes him,’ Rayburn told Mr. Johnson. As it happened, before LBJ arrived, the guest of honor was suddenly and mysteriously summoned to the White House and told to come in the front door. What Truman didn’t know was that FDR had just died in Warm Springs, Georgia. But as Truman [unclear] told Rayburn, ‘They never tell me anything.’ Rayburn followed Truman to the White House and later filled Mr. Johnson in on the scene there: Harry Truman, taking charge, thanking everyone for arriving so quickly. The oath-taking, administered by Chief Justice [Harlan F.] Stone, was carried off as soon as [Elizabeth V.] Bess and [M.] Margaret Truman arrived.[note 10] Harlan F. Stone was U.S. attorney general from April 1924 to March 1925; associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from March 1925 to July 1941; and chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from July 1941 until his death on 22 April 1946. Elizabeth V. “Bess” Truman was the wife of Harry S. Truman since 1919, and the first lady of the United States from April 1945 to January 1953. M. Margaret Truman was the daughter of Harry S. and Elizabeth V. Truman, and a singer, actress, and author. The moral Mr. Johnson seemed to be drawing last week, without spelling it out, was that no one at the time suggested that Truman had shown unseemly haste in promptly taking the presidential oath.”

Well, I’ve drawn it one way or the other. I think that the moment a president dies, the vice president becomes president.

Yes, sir.

And . . . [snorts] And I have not discussed it with anyone, to my knowledge. I’ve never discussed the Truman oath-taking last week or last month. I’ve talked a good many times following it, during the years, about the party that we had given Truman—not because nobody liked him, but because Rayburn had heard from an admiral that the President was dying, and he felt that we should meet with Truman and get to know him and try to be helpful to him in case the problem came up. But it was not that nobody liked him. I think everybody liked him. I didn’t know anybody that didn’t like Truman as vice president. But I have said none of it, and none of it is true, and I don’t know what to do about it under those circumstances. I’m not—

Well, a telegram I had—George [E. Christian Jr.] will probably be asked it at his briefing.[note 11] George E. Christian Jr. was White House press secretary from February 1967 to January 1969. I think maybe by then we would—we can either do it two ways. Just say we have no comment on it, or, second . . . We can do it two ways: one, send a telegram and then let George have no comment, or, two, send a telegram to Newsweek and let George just use the quote that—use the telegram as his reply to the questions.

Well, don’t you send a telegram—don’t you open it then to debate again?

[speaking under President Johnson] Yes, sir. Yes, sir, you do. No question about it. But Roberts seemed very disturbed that we would challenge him so hard, and I think—

I think you ought to challenge Kay, too.

Right.

Just tell her that we have not been interviewed. That I asked the staff some time ago in great confidence not to speak on it, not to debate it. We’ve taken the position whatever the Kennedys wanted. That I took the position when [William R.] Manchester was selected that he was a fraud.[note 12] William R. Manchester was a journalist and author who wrote The Death of a President (1967), a best-selling book that examined the circumstances surrounding President Kennedy’s assassination. I refused to see him. [Moyers acknowledges.] I’d asked my people not to see him. And the only ones I know is you and [Lady] Bird [Johnson] and probably Jack Valenti, who were never under my orders, really—didn’t pay much attention to them—did see him.[note 13] Lady Bird Johnson (née Claudia Alta Taylor) was the wife of Lyndon B. Johnson since 1934, and first lady of the United States from November 1963 to January 1969. Jack Valenti was a partner at Weekley and Valenti, a political and advertising consulting agency, from 1952 to 1963; special assistant to the president from 1963 to 1966; and president of the Motion Picture Association of America from 1966 to 2004.

But I asked everybody not to, just as I asked them not to see [Theodore H.] Teddy White.[note 14] Theodore H. “Teddy” White was a political journalist and historian, and author of The Making of the President series. I think they’re agents of the people who want to destroy me. And I hate for them to use my friends to do it. But they do do it. But my friends don’t know it, and they want to be popular, and they just do it. And I don’t say it’s so much popular; I don’t think my wife wants to be popular, but I think she wants to be—accommodating would be a good word. And I think in the case of White, and I think in the case of Manchester, and I think in the case of [Charles L. “Charlie”] Bartlett, and I think in the case of [James B.] Scotty Reston, and I think in the case of [Thomas G.] Tom Wicker, and I think in the case of Chuck Roberts, and I think in the case of Peter Lisagor, and in the case of Rowland Evans [Jr.], and in the case of those people, I think that they have people who, (a) are former associates of mine, are (b) people who know me that I like, or (c) people who work for me and want to be accommodating and feel that they ought to.[note 15] Charles L. “Charlie” Bartlett was a Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist; a columnist for the Chicago Daily News; and the man who introduced John F. Kennedy to Jacqueline Lee Bouvier. James B. “Scotty” Reston was a columnist and Washington, D.C., bureau chief of the New York Times from 1953 to 1964; associate editor of the New York Times from 1964 to 1968; executive editor of the New York Times from 1968 to 1969; vice president of the New York Times from 1969 to 1974; and recipient of the Pulitzer Prize for National Reporting in 1945 and 1957. Thomas G. “Tom” Wicker was a journalist and columnist for the New York Times, writing the “In the Nation” column from 1966 to 1992. Peter Lisagor was the Washington bureau chief of the Chicago Daily News from 1959 to 1976, and president of the White House Correspondents’ Association from 1971 to 1972. Rowland Evans Jr. was a prominent syndicated columnist. Together with Robert D. S. Novak, Evans wrote the political column “Inside Report” since 1963. I think they use those to hurt me with. And I think that the people don’t recognize it and don’t realize it. But I have continuously asked them, and I wish you’d hear, if I could recall for you, what I hear that my people say from you to Jack [Valenti] to [Horace] Buzz [Busby Jr.] to George [E. Reedy] to Walter [W. Jenkins]—I don’t guess Walter’s ever said much.[note 16] Horace “Buzz” Busby Jr. was a longtime aide and speechwriter for Lyndon Johnson, and Cabinet secretary and special assistant to the president from 1964 to 1965. George E. Reedy was an aide to Lyndon Johnson from 1960 to 1964; White House press secretary from March 1964 to July 1965; and a special consultant to the president from 1968 to 1969. Walter W. Jenkins was Lyndon Johnson’s office manager, personnel chief, and administrative assistant from 1939 to 1963, and special assistant to the president from 1963 to 1964, making him Johnson’s longest-serving employee. But all of them constantly—somebody coming to me every day and saying that these people say this and that. And it’s their impressions of what happens. And I honestly believe that they feel that they have a right and a duty, first, to defend me. And second, to give their knowledge of a situation. And (c) to comment on others. And you have no idea how troublesome it is, but they do.

But I have asked them all—I’ve told [Robert E.] Bob Kintner to ask everybody—he’s brought it to my attention three or four times—that nobody on the staff should discuss Manchester in any way.[note 17] Robert E. “Bob” Kintner was president of the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) from 1949 to 1956; president of the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) from 1958 to 1965; and President Johnson’s Cabinet secretary from 1966 to 1967. First thing I heard about it was . . . I understood that . . . there’s some felt we ought to put out a statement. And [Abraham] Abe [Fortas] called me.[note 18] Abraham “Abe” Fortas was an associate justice on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1965 to 1969, and a longtime friend and adviser to Lyndon Johnson. And I said, “Abe, I don’t think we ought to have a statement of any kind. Now, if you want to have the facts, and get the facts, and—put together ours . . . I took every precaution I knew. I asked . . . Marie [Fehmer], and I asked [Clifton C.] Cliff Carter, and I asked [W.] Homer Thornberry to all take notes.[note 19] Marie Fehmer was secretary to Vice President Lyndon Johnson from 1962 to 1963, and secretary to the president from 1963 to 1969. Clifton C. “Cliff” Carter was a longtime friend of Lyndon Johnson; one of Johnson’s administrative assistants from 1937 to 1966; and executive director of the Democratic National Committee from 1965 to 1966. W. Homer Thornberry was a U.S. representative [D–Texas] from 1949 to December 1963; a district judge in the Western District of Texas from December 1963 to 1965; and a circuit judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Judicial Circuit from 1965 to 1995. And I think they did. I’ve never looked at them. I’ve never discussed them. But I would try to put those together, and I’d take any questions that the leaks show in the papers that are uncomplimentary to me and try to get the facts.” And just—and he said, “That’d be fine.” So that is what’s done.

Now, that’s all I’ve done. And I’ve asked them all not to discuss the Manchester book. I’ve told George this morning to just say that—this. Now, maybe we ought to change it and make it different. I think that you ought to think about it and try to write something that would be one sentence and not get it—but I’d say that, “The President tells me that he’s had many requests to—for an interview in connection with the book and the events it relates to, and he has refused every one. And has asked all of his staff to do likewise.” [Pause.] Then, I think, if they’d say, “Well, does that mean he refused him with the . . . Newsweek?" And say, “The statement speaks for itself.” Because it does. And you have to give consideration to that.

I think I would probably be a little harder on Newsweek, a little more emphatic.

“He said, ‘I hate to bother you at a time like this,’ to Bobby.” Now, I don’t think anything like this. I never thought of “a time like this.” I thought the most important thing in the world was to decide who was president of this country at that moment. I was fearful that the Communists were trying to take us over. “‘I think you should be sworn in there,’ Bobby said.” I don’t think that Bobby said that at all. I don’t think Bobby took any initiative or any direction. I think that Bobby agreed that it would be all right to be sworn in and said he wanted [to] look into it, and he would get back to me, which he did. I think that after they found out there’s no recording—and there may be one—I think that they—when McHugh went out and thought there was none—and I think they have leaked some of this.

Newsweek said, “There was an instance when Johnson had to exert authority. According to Newsweek‘s Chuck Roberts, one of the two—[Kenneth P. “Ken”] O’Donnell did it.”[note 20] Kenneth P. “Ken” O’Donnell was White House appointments secretary from January 1961 to November 1963; aide to the president from 1963 to 1965; and executive director of the Democratic National Committee from 1964 to 1965. I don’t know about that. I didn’t know it. I didn’t know—I thought O’Donnell and Mrs. Kennedy were drinking a good deal back there, and he was looking kind of sad and wild-eyed. But I did not think that he was issuing orders to countermand mine. But he could have been; I don’t know it. “LBJ remembers intercepting McHugh”—I do not. I didn’t know he was on the plane. I hardly knew McHugh. “Telling him he would tell the pilot when to take off. ‘I did tell him off,’ Johnson conceded.” I haven’t said that to any human. I don’t think I did. I don’t think I had a conversation with him.

“He agreed that he probably did call Mrs. Kennedy ‘honey.’ It’s a word that comes easy as a Texan. ‘You know, if I called some guy’s office and he isn’t in, I say to his secretary, “Honey, have him call in.“'” Now, I don’t think that I said that to anybody. And I don’t think I called Mrs. Kennedy “honey.” I think that’s their idea of a “you all” and “comin’”—c-o-m-i-n—and this stuff they write about Texas. [Moyers acknowledges.]

Now, Norma Milligan says that she’s been working on it up there.[note 21] Norma Milligan was a journalist and White House correspondent for Newsweek in the 1960s. And she says that she’s from Oklahoma, and she thinks she understands Texans better. So she’s been talking to some people on our staff there. I don’t know who. Chuck Roberts has been talking to some. I don’t know who. But—

Well—

—these are not the facts as I remember them. [Pause.] And my feeling on the Manchester book is the best thing we can do is I do not believe that we are equipped by experience, by tradition, by personality, or financially to cope with this. I just do not believe we know how to handle public relations, and how to handle advertising agencies, and how to handle manuscripts, how to handle book writers. And then I don’t believe that we’re . . . I just don’t think we’re equipped for it. So I think they’re going to write history as they want it written. And as they can buy it written. And I think the best way we can write it is to try to refrain from getting in an argument or a fight or a knockdown and go on and do our job every day as best we can. If I’m—if I just got Marie doing it with me. And I do that. I stay all—every hour. And it damn near causes you divorces, and it almost causes you troubles, and we’ve got everybody calling around on different things, and gossip pouring in, and pipelines of it, because everybody likes to show that they’re close to the President.

And I said to someone the other day that I don’t know of but four people that have left me that I know of that were my people that are brought in after Walter Jenkins was forced to leave. He didn’t leave of his own volition. But I think that you and Jack and Buzz and George Reedy. And I don’t believe any of them did better before they came in the White House than they did in the White House. I don’t think George had the fringes and the prestige and the car and the 30,000 [dollars] and anything. I don’t think Buzz did. Jack may have. My judgment is the three years he preceded, that he didn’t have 100,000[-dollar] income like he had there. And—but he may have had a little more. But all of them came in, and all of them left to get money, to make money, because of their money requirement. And they all left with my consent and with my knowledge and, generally speaking, with my desire. That was not true of all of them. But I thought that they had problems. I thought Buzz was stood to be a great problem to us, like Myer [“Mike”] Feldman.[note 22] Myer “Mike” Feldman was deputy special counsel to the president from 1961 to 1964, and counsel to the president from April 1964 to January 1965. He hadn’t even paid his income tax. And I thought Jack, on account of Mary Margaret [Valenti]‘s tastes and other things, and the fact that he had been demeaned to the press, and the press looked down on him, and so forth, I thought it would be better.[note 23] Mary Margaret Valenti was a White House secretary, and the wife of Jack Valenti since 1962. So I didn’t object. George Reedy, I thought it had to come because of his health, and because of the way the press treated him, and so on, and so forth. In your case, you know how I felt. But these particular instances, I think, they’ve drawn them up to where they have nine or ten. And I assume they give me credit for [Richard “Dick”] Goodwin, who was the Kennedy man, and [McGeorge “Mac”] Bundy, who was the Kennedy man, and Feldman, who was the Kennedy man.[note 24] McGeorge “Mac” Bundy was dean of the faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University from 1953 to 1961, and special assistant to the president for National Security Affairs from 1961 to 1966.

Now, I’m helpless to describe that. But I’m rather glad all of them left. I encouraged Feldman to leave. And Bundy asked me, and I told Bundy just what I told you: that I thought he’d be very helpful, I’d like for him to stay, I’d try to work out anything I could for him, but, if he felt that he ought to go on account of financial considerations and this opportunity, that I would not object, and he’d go with my blessing, and he did. And to be honest with you, I was rather glad he did. My days have been much relieved. I mean, I’m not angry with anybody, but I’m not unhappy. But I think they get different impressions. And I think we just have to—the best thing we can say is as little as we can, because you can see that you are the most truthful, the closest, the ablest, the finest man that’s ever been there. But still, they claim, our press relations are terrible.

Now, if that is true, and . . . then I can’t expect someone to be as good when you’re gone. So the best thing for us to do is just to keep it as limited as we can and as little. And my thought would be—and I’m not sure that I’m right; I’d like for you to think about it—my thought would be that George could say, “I’ve had several requests for interviews with the President, or members of the staff, on this question. They have all been declined. The President has said—has stated—has refused to have any interviews on it. And . . . any . . . purported statements of his are not only inaccurate, but untrue.” Now, maybe that’s a little too strong. You had in mind that you’d go a little stronger than my original one. What did you have?

Here—Newsweek said, “LBJ’s own recollection of”—frankly, Mr. President, if you read this whole piece, it is a sympathetic piece to you and to your position. But it’s based upon total fabrication. But it says, “LBJ’s own recollections of that fateful day, as he has recounted them to friends, have a touching quality all their own. What raced through his mind when he learned that the President was dead was no personal thrust for power, but rather the memory of the day Harry Truman suddenly inherited the presidency from Franklin Roosevelt more than 18 years ago.”

Now, that was not true. I don’t remember that at all.

[speaking under President Johnson] I never heard you say that.

I never thought of it. What raced through my mind was that, if they had shot our President, driving down there, who would they shoot next? And what would they—what was going on in Washington? And when would the missiles be coming? And I thought that it was a conspiracy, and I raised that question. And nearly everybody that was with me raised it. Go ahead.

All right, so, well, that’s it. So to say that “the President’s had no interviews” doesn’t really answer Newsweek, because Newsweek is saying it picked this up from people with whom you [unclear]—

Well, I think nearly everybody thinks, though, it’s LBJ’s interview.

Yes. Then it goes on to use the—

It says, “Johnson Differs on Kennedy Friction.”

Right.

“Johnson Version Clashes with Book Details.” I don’t know my version. I haven’t given it. I guess, though, they—by friends, they do do that. Then what would you say?

Well, I would say . . . I’d consider putting this in a telegram to Kay Graham, which said, "Newsweek‘s account of the President’s recollections is not consistent with any fact known here.”

I wouldn’t say that, ‘cause they’ll find, in my statement, that I said something . . . or something. We’ve got to be very careful. They have deliberately built this credibility by picking up the Communist line on it, and so that any difference I have with Bobby, Bill, I think this has been carefully constructed through the months to prove that I cannot be believed. So I’m disarmed. And I think what we’ve got to be very careful is that we don’t say anything that they could possibly . . . attribute. Do you get my point?

Yes. Well, "Newsweek‘s account of the President’s recollections is not based on any”—something, you know, “the President has had no interviews with anyone. The recollections attributed to him in Newsweek do not represent the facts.”

Well, why don’t we just say “are untrue.”

All right. "Newsweek‘s account of the President’s recollections is untrue.”

“The President has consistently refused to give any interview on this subject. And the statements attributed to him are false.” [Pause.] Not all of them are, but some of them are. The McHugh thing is false. The “honey” thing is false. The Truman thing is false.

All right, sir. And . . . I think I have it here. Let me finish taking your notes here. [Pause.] "Newsweek‘s account of the President’s recollections is untrue. The President has consistently refused to give any interviews on the subject, and statements”—leave out “the”—“and statements attributed to him in this account are false.”

[Pause.] Now, does that make us go further and debate it further? And . . . “by so-called . . . friends”?

Well, that—

“Statements attributed to him by so-called friends are false.”

[Sighs.] Well, you know, it all depends on who they talk to, Mr. President.

“So-called friends and alleged intimates.”

Mm-hmm.

That’s what I’d say: “By so-called friends and alleged intimates.”

“So-called friends . . .”

“And alleged intimates are false.”

[Unclear.] All right, sir. I think that would do it as far as Newsweek. I think we have to ask ourselves whether or not we did want to—maybe not release a telegram, but just have George say—without mentioning the telegram—just say that, “I talked to the President about that this morning, and he said that that account is just not true. That he has consistently refused to give any interviews. That he finds the statements attributed to him by so-called friends and alleged intimates to be false.”

[Pause.] Well, talk to Abe about it—

All right, sir.

—see what he thinks. I don’t want to get in a full debate on it. I don’t want to blow up their story and sell any more of their articles. And you might say, “As was the Post story on the AF of L [American Federation of Labor] this week.”

All right.

I guess that takes on the Post and Newsweek [unclear].

I called Rowland Evans this morning, Mr. President, but—and I’ve got a recording of it, which I want to send to you. Because he has a very, I think, damaging story. But that’s the next point. The first point is that I said to him, “Rowland, don’t you ever consider the veracity of your sources, particularly when they are second- or third-removed from the incident?" I said, “I read the letter yesterday to the Post on the editorial page, and you were just mislaid—misled.” And he said, “Well, we do consider our sources.” I called him, and he said, “We consider that to be a true story, because the man who gave it to us had breakfast with me the morning that he and [George] Meany were to see the President.”[note 25] George Meany was president of the American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL–CIO) from 1955 to 1979. And I said, “Rowland, I’d be very surprised if that were true, because usually the President sees Mr. Meany alone.” And he said, “Well, anyway, that was the source of my information.” He said—

Now, wait a minute. Slack was to have a breakfast with . . . Slack [Stack] had breakfast with Rowland the morning he and Meany were to see me?[note 26] President Johnson misidentifies “Stack” as “Slack.” “Stack” is unidentified.

According to Evans this morning, he said that this fellow was to have breakfast with—this fellow had breakfast with Evans the morning that he, his source, and Meany were to see you.

That means Slack, or whatever his name was?

Stack.

Stack?

Stack.

Now, I’ve never seen Stack in my life. Never heard of him.

I haven’t either.

I never had an appointment with him to see him. I never had a request! At any time. [Pause.] Well, does he think that he’s done anything wrong, or does he think we’re wrong?

Evans thinks that—Evans says he’s out to—he’s got a very, very strong bias toward Marvin [Watson], Mr. President, for—I think the reason is, which I’ll spell out in just a minute, goes back to the copy of the letter that Marvin wrote to Evans, which we sent to Kay Graham. This morning, Evans said—and I’ve got all this in the conversation—Evans said, “Only twice”—well, first of all, he said that “last week, George Meany wrote a very bitter letter to Kay Graham about my—about this column.” He says, “Only twice in my whole history of writing has anyone taken an issue to the publisher of the paper, which carried it, about my column. One was the time that Marvin Watson wrote me a letter and marked it personally and sent it to Kay Graham. And the second was last week, when George Meany sent this to Kay Graham.” He says, “It is not just a coincidence, in my judgment, that that happens. I believe the President said—that either Watson or the President called Meany in and told Meany to go see Kay Graham.”

Well, I’ll tell—you ought—the first thing you ought to tell him: both of them are in Texas. [Chuckles.] And have been all during the period.

Right. Well, I will. I said, “I do not believe that is so, because I just don’t believe that that’s the way it works.” And then he said, “Well, I have reason to believe that it is.”

Well, I have no reason why I shouldn’t. I certainly feel that that’s my obligation to do it if it’s untrue. I think that’s the question at issue. Is it untrue? And if it is untrue, the people that publish it are responsible, aren’t they?

Yes, sir.

I don’t know how I can go to—whoever does this on Newsweek will say Norma Milligan told George that she’d been working on this. And she’s from Oklahoma, and she’s—she said that’s what she was doing in Washington. She’d just come down here. So she and Chuck Roberts wrote the story.

[Pause.] Well, and there’s no question but that they’ve talked to people who’ve told them these things. I’m sure that Roberts and Milligan didn’t make it up. They talked to people who told them that this is what you said. And then they reported that. I do not believe, Mr. President, that a reporter just makes this up. I don’t believe Evans and [Robert D. S.] Novak make it up.[note 27] Robert D. S. Novak was a prominent syndicated columnist. Together with Rowland Evans, Novak wrote the political column “Inside Report” since 1963. I think they hear it, as in the case of the Meany story, from a second-, third-, or even fourth-hand source, and then they carry it, and it’s their source who is wrong. Or—and, in that extent, the author or the columnist or the reporter for not checking it with someone who is in the know. Just like last week, as I mentioned to you, the New York Times and the Washington Post almost carried a story based about a call I was alleged to have made to Arthur [M.] Schlesinger [Jr.] when they did not even check with Schlesinger or me.[note 28] Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. was a Democratic Party campaign speechwriter; special assistant to the president from 1961 to 1964; and the Pulitzer Prize–winning author of A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. And they had a source in New York.

Now, this morning is Evans’s and Novak’s column. I’ll read it to you in just a minute. And I want to preface it by saying, Mr. President, that it doesn’t bother me if anyone disbelieves me, because I know in my own heart it’s true: I have not talked to anyone about the subjects mentioned in Evans and Novak this morning. Not to anyone except you. Not to anyone else in the White House. Not to my wife. I called Jack this morning and asked him if he had talked to them. He said, “No, only to Mary Margaret.” Well, I haven’t even talked to Judith [S. Moyers] about it.[note 29] Judith S. Moyers was the wife of Bill Moyers since 1954.

But let me read you the column. “Serious Democratic politicians here, both inside and outside the Johnson camp, are alarmed over the political impact of the Manchester book on their party and, consequently, on the 1968 presidential election. President Johnson himself has displayed no signs of distress to his intimates over the prepublication of juicy bits and pieces alleged to be in the book, The Death of a President, by William Manchester. And yet, these disembodied excerpts put Mr. Johnson in a highly unflattering light in the immediate aftermath of the tragedy at Dallas. Showing no concern, the President himself—instead has confided to intimates that,” quote, “the ultimate record will be clear,” end quote.

“If those words mean what they imply, they mean only one thing: that a massive refutation of the Manchester version, almost all of it gathered in interviews with Kennedy intimates, is in the offing. One predictable effect of any such refutation would be to heighten the tensions between the Johnson and Kennedy wings of the Democratic Party. Because, fairly or not, all the anti-Johnson overtones found in the Manchester book are automatically going to be attributed to allies of the Kennedys who gave the author most of the material. Mr. Johnson himself refused to see Manchester. It would be only natural for Johnson allies to strike back at the Manchester book and hint at the Kennedys with their own version of the traumatic events during those fateful hours after the assassination.

“Moreover, despite the fact that the White House has told this column that no precise reconstruction of events has even been thought of”—Now, that’s the note that I had Mary Katherine read Evans when he called on Friday, and I refused to talk to him, as I refused last week to talk to any reporters.[note 30] “Mary Katherine” is unidentified. I simply said, “Told—tell him that he is wrong. That the White House does not have any idea of putting together a refutation of the Manchester book.”

It says, “Moreover, despite the fact that the White House has told this column that no precise reconstructions have ever been thought of, there are indications that close friends of Mr. Johnson, including Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas, may now be compiling the record. For example, in the President’s personal files today are notes dictated on the spot and recollections put down months later by members of the Johnson official family. A minute-by-minute account of what Mr. Johnson did, and of much of what he was heard to say, was dictated by Clifford C. Carter, a longtime Johnson intimate, on the flight back to Washington.”

Well, I called Cliff this morning, and he said he did talk to Evans last week, but that he didn’t tell him anything that he hasn’t told anyone else, publicly, or talked about. “Jack Valenti, the President’s man Friday, from the moment of the assassination until he quit the White House earlier this year, was never interviewed by author Manchester. But Valenti also has a set of notes giving his version of the new President’s conduct from Love Field until late that night in the new President’s temporary quarters in the Executive Office Building. Valenti took time out in the rush of events the following week to replenish his record. A note written on November 25, for example, recalled that ‘despite the emotional tensions of the moment, Mr. Johnson had reached for a glass of water on the flight back from Dallas with a steady hand.’”

I talked to Jack this morning, and he says that he had talked to—

He’s upset. He said that you told him—and I had called you and asked you to get ahold of him about this call. I told him I never had heard of it, and I hadn’t asked you to get ahold of him.

No, Mr. President. I told him that you had asked me to call him about the—and talk to different people about the Newsweek thing and see if they’d talked to him. And I’ve called a number of people. I had not read this at that time, and then—when you talked to me. Then when I came to the office, I read this thing, too, and I just coupled both of them with Jack, and he said he didn’t talk to Newsweek, but that he had talked to Evans more than a week ago, but he didn’t tell him this.

“Beyond this, reliable politicians now report that verbatim transcripts of telephone and other conversations between the President and others in the post-assassination period have been carefully filed for future use.” Well, that’s wrong, because there are no verbatim transcripts.

Oh, no, there are. There are a good many.

I thought—

They don’t think so, but there are a good many.

I thought that Juanita [Roberts] had said that we didn’t have the equipment in those days—[note 31] Juanita Roberts was a longtime personal secretary to Lyndon Johnson, and a colonel in the Women’s Army Corps.

Well, there are a good many. But—

Well, he’s talking here about between you and other people.

Well, there are. [Moyers acknowledges.] There are a good many.

“All those—these—although these reports cannot be confirmed, they suggest that ammunition for a counterattack against the Manchester book, if one is needed, has been stored up for use at any time. All of this gives Democrats who aren’t principal actors in the drama a distinctly uneasy feeling. And no wonder: if the Manchester book does, in fact, portray Mr. Johnson in the unflattering hue suggested by the advanced publicity, Johnson allies are certain to attack the book’s authenticity and produce their own version. And that, without question, could start a vicious round of recrimination.

“Already, for example, some Johnson allies are saying Senator Robert Kennedy of New York advanced the Manchester publication date from post–election 1968 to post–election 1966 to embarrass the President.[note 32] Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy was U.S. attorney general from January 1961 to September 1964, and a U.S. senator [D–New York] from January 1965 until his assassination in June 1968. In fact, the earlier date was picked for only one reason: that Kennedy is completely out of the 1968 presidential picture, but very much in the 1972 picture. If publication were delayed until 1969, he could be charged with using the book to help his political prospects. But this kind of charge will continue. And if Johnson intimates do decide that the Manchester book is really harmful to the President, and come up with their own version of what really happened, discord will shake the party to the benefit of the high-flying Republicans.”

Now, I—when I talked to Evans, he said—he admitted he had talked to nobody in the White House, that he had talked to six people. Two of them—two of whom had told him that Abe Fortas and Clark [M.] Clifford and others might be working on this.[note 33] Clark M. Clifford was a Washington lawyer; an adviser to presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson; a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1961 to 1968; chair of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from April 1963 to February 1968; and U.S. secretary of defense from March 1968 to January 1969. They weren’t as sure about Clifford as they were about Fortas. One of them, he said, was in New York, and the other one was in Washington. Neither of them, he said, was—is either working for you or had worked for you. He said he talked to one wife of a very close friend of yours. And I said, “Was this wife the friend of someone who is working at the White House or has worked at the White House?" And he said, “No, it is not.” He said, “But I consider the information fairly good.” That’s another case, six people talking to a fellow. And I’m surprised that they knew what they knew.

Now, I talked to [Benjamin C.] Ben Bradlee this morning.[note 34] Benjamin C. “Ben” Bradlee was executive editor of the Washington Post from 1968 to 1991. Here, they’ve got in the Washington Post a little postscript, which says, “Senator Robert F. Kennedy remains eager to defuse his feud with FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] director J. Edgar Hoover over who authorized the use of electronic bugs in the years that Kennedy served as Attorney General.[note 35] J. Edgar Hoover was director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1924 until his death on 2 May 1972. Accordingly, a Kennedy operative last week discreetly approached two highly placed White House staff members to elicit their aid in dampening the controversy. The Johnson men offered their sympathy, but said the President, quote, ‘can’t control,’ quote, Hoover. Now, the senator is awaiting fresh charges from Hoover, that his former boss knew all about the, quote, ‘bugging,’ quote.”

Well, I told Bradlee—I talked to Bradlee for a long time. And he told me—he gave me reason to believe that that had come from [Andrew J.] Andy Glass via Dick Goodwin.[note 36] Andrew J. “Andy” Glass was a finance reporter for the New York Herald Tribune from 1959 to 1962 and a chief congressional correspondent from 1963 to 1966; a journalist for the Washington Post from 1966 to 1968; executive assistant to Sen. Charles Percy from 1968 to 1970; and senior editor of the National Journal from 1970 to 1974. So I called Goodwin, and Goodwin admitted that he had talked to Glass last Thursday in New York and had—he said, “Probably I mentioned it. I thought it would be helpful.” And I said, “Dick, this is exactly what”—and I have this conversation recorded, too—I said, “Dick, this is exactly what makes it difficult to deal with you and makes it very difficult to keep the air clean between . . . the White House and the senator. Not because the President or the senator are talking, but because people who call us.” And then I said, “You told me you would tell no one that you had sent me a transcript of the Look piece. And I didn’t even tell anybody where I got it. I didn’t even tell the President where I got this copy of Look magazine.” And I said, “But then Arthur Schlesinger tells Jack Valenti that he knows that we have a copy.”

So this is another example of what you were talking about earlier, Mr. President, or what bothers you earlier, is that these papers and these reporters use sources that appear to know, or do know, but are second- or third-removed from the scene.

[Pause.] Well, this is your department. You’re much more experienced in it than I am. And . . .

No, I’m really not, Mr. President. I haven’t had any—you can’t control what is uncontrollable. These people [unclear]—

No, but I mean you’ve known—I never did know Goodwin well at all. I hardly knew him when he came [to] us. I never did know Schlesinger well. I never did know even Jack well. I just—he just came in there, and . . . we’d do it. I think that it would be very good if you and Jack and George and Buzz and Cliff would get together, and if y’all wouldn’t talk to these people, either while you’re working there with them on these discussions or after you leave. And I think it would be good if we could have the feeling . . . that I have—we’ll say, when you have a personal difficulty with your mother or your wife or your brother, that these things—that you have knowledge of because of your—because of my confidence in all of you—were treated with the same sanctity as you would—the same—the secretiveness—the same confidence as if you saw me making love to Lady Bird in the bed. I don’t believe you’d go out and talk about how we made love. And I believe that a man’s obligation in the White House is equal to that.

Now, I know that Schlesinger and Goodwin and [Theodore C. “Ted”] Sorensen don’t feel that way.[note 37] Theodore C. “Ted” Sorensen was a speechwriter and special assistant to the president from 1961 to 1964; author of a best-selling biography of John F. Kennedy in 1965; an adviser for Robert F. Kennedy’s presidential campaign in 1968; and an attorney and senior counsel at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison in New York City from 1966 until his death in 2010. But I never felt very close to them. And I always had grave doubts about them. But I have felt close to George. And I do know that a good many people tell me they go to talk to him. And I do know that there’s a lot of slashing. They tell me everyday what you say about somebody and what somebody says about you. [Moyers acknowledges.] And these reporters just come in—they send people in—they got everybody from A. W. [“Judge” Moursund] to Melvin [C.] Winters coming in with stories, because I’m not seeing anybody else.[note 38] Albert W. “Judge” Moursund was a Johnson City, Texas, attorney and former judge; a business partner and friend of the Johnsons; and codirector of the trust managing the Johnsons’ financial and business interests. Melvin C. Winters was a Texas businessman, and a friend and political supporter of Lyndon Johnson. And I don’t even discuss them with them. But they’re doing it. And [Mary Elizabeth S.] Liz [Carpenter] is back and forth with people, and you just have no idea the humming that’s taking place.[note 39] Mary Elizabeth S. “Liz” Carpenter was staff director and press secretary for Lady Bird Johnson from 1963 to 1968.

You talking about George Christian or George Reedy?

George Reedy. I’m—then I’m talking about when Christian, too, but mostly Reedy. I think it’d be the same thing with Busby. Busby has the feeling that all the time, that he was slashed at, and he was cut at, and he constantly has the feeling that he can sit down and talk confidentially with Evans or with Lisagor or with [Charles W.] Chuck Bailey or with Charlie Bartlett.[note 40] Charles W. “Chuck” Bailey was a reporter, Washington correspondent, and later bureau chief of the Minneapolis Tribune from 1950 to 1982, and coauthor of Seven Days in May in 1962. I don’t know, specifically, those names. I’m illustrating. But I know some of them.

Now, he has never told me this, but they tell me that. It comes back when I check it. The Wall Street Journal, some of the things they just—all these trails run into you. And then I hear from some of the folks that Hoover’s—that Kennedy’s fighting with, that these are some of the sources. The Schlesingers and the Bartletts and the [Arthur “Art”] Buchwalds and the [Truman G.] Capote crowd, and so forth, they feel like, that they can talk to Jack.[note 41] Arthur “Art” Buchwald was a syndicated newspaper columnist and satirist. Truman G. Capote (née Truman Streckfus Persons) was a novelist, screenwriter, and actor. Capote authored numerous well-known works, including Breakfast at Tiffany’s in 1958 and In Cold Blood in 1965. And they’ll say that Johnson was caught screwing a hog. And Jack will say, “No, he wasn’t screwing a hog. There was not any hog there. Let me tell you how that happened.” And then they feel that that is an intimate.

So I think—and Carter, I don’t know what Carter thinks. I don’t know what he would say. But I know that Evans and Novak do not like Carter, and I know they do not like Marvin. I think that you and Harry [C. McPherson Jr.] and Bundy really worked on Marvin with your displeasures on taking calls.[note 42] Harry C. McPherson Jr. was assistant U.S. secretary of state for educational and cultural affairs from August 1964 to August 1965; special assistant and counsel to the president from 1965 to 1966; and special counsel and speechwriter to the president from 1966 to 1969. And I—

That’s not true, Mr. President. I didn’t work on Marvin.

I mean, well . . . Anyway, a good many people quoted y’all’s displeasure at him, and it got in the paper. And I believe that had the effect of working on him. And . . . the—and I believe that the displeasure was expressed to others besides me. And I think that, if you expressed it to Bundy, which I believe you did, and if you expressed it to Harry, which I believe you did—and either—any of those exchanges, they do get in, you see. And I don’t believe that any of these folks would do anything to harm me. But I don’t think they did it to harm Harding.[note 43] Here, President Johnson may have referred to Warren G. Harding and his scandal-plagued presidential administration. I don’t think Harding ever did a dishonest act, any more than I have.

But they have me building a roadway through our ranch property, which is the last thing we would like to see done. But there was a road built through it, and now they’re widening it and making it more travelable. But we don’t want it. We wish it didn’t happen. It just kills our cattle, and it just keeps—has to hire extry labor.[note 44] Here, President Johnson uses the colloquial form of “extra.” And we don’t have a house. And it’s not going to any place we have. It’s going to Sunrise Beach [Texas]. But they say that, the New York Times does. And all the front page of the papers. And they have a lot of stories about how we have gotten rich off of the land, and, of course, we—that’s not true at all. Made huge profits.

Now, we still got the land and haven’t made any huge profits. It’s true we’ve sold a few lots. And it’s true that it will be, I think, a profitable venture. But it has nothing to do with the road. The road was there when we bought it! [Slight chuckle.] And now they’re putting a new one, but they say the road between the Johnson City and the Ranch—well, that is true. It is being improved. It’s being widened, because of a lot of wrecks and a lot of dangers, and four people got killed last year on it. But they did it six years ago, from Johnson City to Griffin Springs. In the next three years, they did it from Griffin Springs to Johnson City. And then they did it from Fredericksburg to Stonewall. Now, they’ve done it [from] Stonewall to [the] Franco County line. This is the thing they do normally, where they have a count that justifies it. But we don’t care. I would much prefer that they not have so many people coming to the house. We would like to see Ranch Road 1 closed. But they write these things, and they talk to our people, and so forth. So we just have to do that with the press.

But the question is, what do we do about Newsweek and George [Christian], who’s briefing right now? And—

Well, I’ll call you back with—

How simple can we make it? I would think that I ought to ask him to just not brief for a moment, and you talk to Abe. And Abe, I imagine, is in Connecticut.

No, sir, he’s in town. I talked to him this morning. I buzzed my secretary and gave her a note and told her to call George and ask him to hold up briefing till you and I finished talking—

All right.

—and so that’s taken care of.

OK, then I would think that you ought to give them one sentence and say that the . . . “I’ve had a number of requests—I’ve had requests from news magazines and others, for interviews with the President and members of the staff about the Manchester book. The President refused to be interviewed by—refused to see Mr. Manchester and has refused to give any interviews on this subject and has asked the staff to do likewise. I believe the ques—the statements attributed to hi[m]—the statements attributed to friends and to alleged intimates . . . are inaccurate and untrue.” Now, that’s what I would say. What’s wrong with that?

I think it’s fine.

I think that Christian saying that, that doesn’t quote me, but he ought to know, you see, by his intimacy with me. Then I think it’d be very good, if Abe is still there, if you could get Abe to get all of y’all together. And ask them to please not discuss their experiences in the White House, even acknowledging they’re there. Just change the subject.

All right.

Don’t you think that’s good with Carter and with Busby and with Reedy and with you and with Jack?

Yes, sir.

And see if we can kind of get a little pact on men’s honors, and just say, “Now, we don’t discuss those things.” If we don’t, I think you’re all going to be fully discredited. My judgment is after a year or two or three years, you’re going to be almost like Donald [S.] Dawson and Harry [H.] Vaughan were during that period, because they are turning it into something like this.[note 45] Maj. Gen. Donald S. Dawson was a lawyer; an officer of the U.S. Air Force Reserve until 1970; and a presidential aide and advance man during the Truman administration. Maj. Gen. Harry H. Vaughan was an officer of the U.S. Army Reserve; vice presidential aide in 1945; presidential aide from 1945 to 1953; and a close adviser to Harry S. Truman. And I fully expect to, but I don’t think that y’all ought to, and I think you will, because I told Jack this morning, “If I have to, damned if I won’t destroy everybody, to get the facts known.” And if people are just going to rear back and say, “Well, now, here’s my version of it; I’m defending him,” even with the best of intention, and give somebody like Rowland Evans or Chuck Roberts or some of them, or Art Buchwald or . . . those things—I want my posture to be, and I’ve insisted on this with Abe, that we know what happened from our own knowledge of what happened, but we’re not to let another human know it. I don’t want to debate with him. I don’t think the President of this country, at this time, ought to. I think it’s just unthinkable that my whole morning would not be spent on the Vietnam or anything else, but be spent on this kind of stuff.

Yes, sir.

And I think that we’ve had a bunch of traitors and kids and things in there that just have brought it about. And I think that practically nearly every one of the Kennedy folks have contributed to it. But I think the worst ones are Dick Goodwin. And I wouldn’t—I think Dick Goodwin planted that transcript with you. I think he did it for a purpose. You don’t believe so, do you?

Oh, I think it’s quite possible that he did.

And I wouldn’t trust that fellow.

Mr. President, I don’t.

[speaking over Moyers] I just don’t believe I’d have any contact with him. And I don’t know what to do about it.

Now, the [R. Sargent] Shriver thing before you leave.[note 46] R. Sargent Shriver was director of the Peace Corps from March 1961 to February 1966; director of the Office of Economic Opportunity from October 1964 to March 1968; and U.S. ambassador to France from April 1968 to March 1970. I think that I’ll stay here. I gather that’s your feeling, [that] I ought to. And you can send down the [Moyers acknowledges] State of the Union and let me look at it, and then we can meet together and go over it—

Right.

—after I’ve had a chance to study it.

Right.

Now, I have told him that I would see him this week through you and through [Robert S. “Bob”] McNamara.[note 47] Robert S. “Bob” McNamara was president of Ford Motor Company from November 1960 to January 1961; U.S. secretary of defense from January 1961 to February 1968; and president of the World Bank from April 1968 to July 1981. I would gather—I do not want to debate the budget with him, because I don’t want to think about this budget or talk about it till I get through with the other decisions in their logical order. And I’m going to hold back education, and I’m going to hold back HEW [Health, Education, and Welfare], and I’m going to hold back . . . I’ve got letters from them, and they’re wanting to appeal, and things and that. I’m going to hold back poverty until I can get my other things. I’ve got to see what we’ve got to do about the war. I’ve got to see what I’m going to do with advanced missiles, antimissile missile, and so forth.

Now, I want to see him, if he wants to see me. So you find out if he wants to come to see me and when he would like to and whether he would like to wait till I get back, or whether he would like to do it this week. If he would like to do it, and come here and talk to me about whatever he wants to, I have nothing I need to talk to him about, nothing I want to talk to him about, other than to be available to him and to see him if he needs to see me. You find that out, and then I’ll make it Wednesday or Thursday. But I do not want it connected with the budget, because I know that [Joseph A.] Loftus will have a story the next day, saying that Shriver recommended 2 billion or 3 billion or 4 billion [dollars], and that Johnson is against poverty.[note 48] Joseph A. Loftus was a New York Times reporter from 1944 to 1969, and a special assistant for communications to Secretary of Labor (and later Treasury) George P. Shultz since 1969. “Joseph A. Loftus, 82; Was Times Reporter and a Cabinet Aide,” New York Times, 4 January 1990. I don’t think Shriver will tell him that, but I think that others, as you say, that are not connected will. So if we could, let’s find that out. I think it would be better for he and I both, if he just decided that we had the fight of our lives, and we had to go in and slug on this thing. That he had to build his case, and he had to say what he was going to do about these things and worked on that. But if he wants to, I want him to know that I’m ready and receptive. I told his wife, I’ve told you, and I told somebody else—oh, McNamara—I’d be glad to see him.

So we’ll set aside, say, Thursday for him to come here if he wants to do that. And if we can do it without getting in a public debate! And his wife says he doesn’t want to, and certainly I don’t want to. And I think that not only so far as the country is concerned, but so far as the Congress is concerned, and so far as I’m concerned, that his decision to quit will be the signal that the Congress will not pass it. Because I don’t believe he will quit if he thinks they’ll pass it. And I think he tells people that. And if he quits, then I don’t think they will.

Now, I’m not anxious for him to stay, more than I am Bundy. I would like for him to, and I think he’s the best one for it. And he has my support and my confidence, and so forth. And I will, whatever figure I give in the budget, I will fight for it, as I did last year. But I cannot keep him from being the victim of Bobby [Kennedy] and [Abraham A. “Abe”] Ribicoff [D–Connecticut] and [Joseph S.] Joe Clark [Jr.] [D–Pennsylvania] and [Wayne L.] Morse [D–Oregon].[note 49] Abraham A. “Abe” Ribicoff was a U.S. senator [D–Connecticut] from January 1963 to January 1981, and a member of the Finance Committee. Joseph S. “Joe” Clark Jr. was the Democratic mayor of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, from January 1952 to January 1956, and a U.S. senator [D–Pennsylvania] from January 1957 to January 1969. Wayne L. Morse was a U.S. senator [Oregon], who served as a Republican from 1945 to 1952, an Independent from 1953 to 1956, and a Democrat from 1957 to 1969. Along with Ernest Gruening [D–Alaska], he was one of only two senators to vote against the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. And I cannot keep him from being victim to the Commies who were out here yesterday and said, “Give the money to poverty, not Vietnam.” And I think that’s hurt poverty more than anything in the world is that these Commies are parading, and these kids, long-hairs, saying, you know, that they want poverty instead of Vietnam, and the Negroes. And I think that’s what the people regard as the Great Society.

So you look into that and call the signal; make the decision. And if he comes, maybe you come with him, or if you don’t want to be involved in that kind of discussion, suggest to him what the agenda is, what we [will] talk about.

All right.

I do not want to debate the budget now, because I’m going to send up my budget late.[note 50] For fiscal year 1968, the administration would request a 25 percent increase in funding for the War on Poverty, bringing the total to $2.06 billion. Congress would ultimately appropriate $1.773 billion. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, vol. 23 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1968), 1058–63. And I cannot tell till I make the tax decisions how far I dare go. And I think . . . I don’t think he knows this and I don’t think he thinks this—[Henry H. “Joe”] Fowler’s calling me now—but, in my judgment, the bigger request I make for poverty, the more danger it is of being killed.[note 51] Henry H. “Joe” Fowler was U.S. under secretary of the treasury from February 1961 to April 1964, and U.S. secretary of the treasury from April 1965 to December 1968. I don’t think they’re just going to cut it. I don’t think—I think the same thing about [foreign] aid. I think if I ask for 2 billion or 3 billion [dollars] for poverty, when I got 3 billion jobs, and I’m spending 24 billion in other fields, I think they’d say, “Good God, it goes up every time he gets somebody a job; it costs you more.” I think if we increase it a reasonable amount, that we have a much better chance of fighting and holding it.

But I think that those boys over there who don’t know anything about legislative procedure, and these kids that give out these interviews—[Charles L. “Charlie”] Schultze tells me he doesn’t believe Shriver knows them, but he doesn’t believe Shriver can control them.[note 52] Charles L. “Charlie” Schultze was assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget from 1961 to 1965, and director of the Bureau of the Budget from June 1965 to January 1968. Harry tells me that he believes that other people in CAP [Community Action Program] do this, and they override Shriver.[note 53] Community Action Program, or CAP, was part of the Office of Economic Opportunity.

Now, you know, that’s what happens in my case, don’t you, in Newsweek and things?

Yes, here, Mr. President—a good example of this: In Newsweek, has a big story on—two examples. Newsweek has a big story this week on Clark Clifford. And it says, “No mission Clark McAdams Clifford has undertaken for any president is more important than his current one: Mapping a strategy to get LBJ reelected in 1968. That job naturally has only barely begun and dozens of unforeseeable contingencies remain to be sorted before Clifford delivers to Mr. Johnson, as he did to Truman in 1947, a detailed strategic memo. But White House sources who have seen the working plan say it will follow roughly these lines.” And then it goes on and outlines it.

Well, this, I read this this morning. It was totally new; I’d never even heard of any such thing, and I called Clark. And he said, “No,” he said, “I don’t know what.” He said, “I haven’t sent anything over to the President. I haven’t sent anything to the White House. I haven’t talked to anybody at the White House about it. I have no idea,” he says, “where it comes from. It doesn’t even exist.”

Well, now, could he call Kay and tell her that?

Yes, sir. I’ll get him to.

Think he ought to?

I’ll get him to.

Did you hear about the [Dean] Rusk call this week?[note 54] Dean Rusk was U.S. deputy under secretary of state from 1949 to 1950; U.S. assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs from March 1950 to December 1951; a trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation from 1950 to 1961, and president from 1952 to 1961; U.S. secretary of state from January 1961 to January 1969; recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom, with distinction, in 1969; and professor of international law at the University of Georgia School of Law from 1970 to 1984.

All right, sir.

Did you hear about the Rusk call this week?

Oh, no, sir.

Rusk called me up and said that . . . [Marquis W.] Marq Childs had gone to his man and told him that “Clifford was to be secretary of state” and “Should he accept it?"[note 55] Marquis W. Childs was a journalist and winner of the Pulitzer Prize for distinguished commentary in 1970. And he was considering accepting it. I never heard of it, so I told him I never had heard of it. It wasn’t true. While he’s gone—first call he made when he got back. So I went to Clifford, and Clifford had never heard of it. But Marq Childs was peddling it. But that’s a sample, you see. That’s how they’re undermining the government. I think it’s a deliberate effort.

Well, they mean—their story ends by saying, “He means the question to be rhetorical, but if and when Dean Rusk should decide to quit, Lyndon-ologists would not be a wit surprised if Clark Clifford started turning up at Cabinet meetings with portfolio as U.S. Secretary of State.” But there is a good example of their attributing something to the White House, which doesn’t even exist, and about which Clark has not talked to anything.

Another good example of it is in the Periscope this week. It says, [reading aloud] “Moyers’s first big move as the new publisher of Newsday may be to close a deal to buy the Sunday Literary Review Bookweek from New York’s recently merged World Journal Telegram.” I don’t even know what Bookweek is; I’ve never even seen it. This is the first I’ve ever even heard of it. It’s just . . . it’s just all of it comes so often from people who appear to be knowledgeable and who talk rather—

Well, Bill, I wonder—I guess you’d be afraid of it on account of the Evans reaction—why don’t you take each one of those and say, “I never heard of Bookweek; nobody talked to me”?

Now, on the Clark Clifford thing, “The President has never discussed with a human being anything about ‘68. The fact that the Committee has not engaged in this, he thought he would try to appear nonpartisan and not to be fighting and not to be taking over congressional campaigns and committees. Never been in congressional campaigns, but he’s been severely criticized. But he hasn’t talked one bit to anybody about ‘68. He’s not planning it, never has planned it, and Clifford would not be the man if he were. Clifford is not supposed to be the politician and the national chairman type. He might have talked to John [B.] Connally or somebody.[note 56] John B. Connally was secretary of the U.S. Navy from January 1961 to December 1961; Democratic governor of Texas from January 1963 to January 1969, during which time he was wounded in the assassination of President Kennedy; and U.S. secretary of the treasury from February 1971 to May 1972. Connally was one of Lyndon Johnson’s closest advisers, joining Johnson’s congressional staff in 1938 and managing Johnson’s campaign for the 1960 Democratic presidential nomination. But he hasn’t talked to any of them.” That’s number two.

Number three, here’s the [William] Manchester thing. “Now, we know that you’re a good lady [Kay Graham], and we know your husband met with a misfortune, but Good God Almighty, how many of these things have to happen?"

Now, Elliott wants to come in and see me about Vietnam.[note 57] Here, President Johnson may have referred to Elliott V. Bell, who was a financial reporter for the New York Times from 1929 to 1939; a friend, economic adviser, and campaign supporter of Thomas E. Dewey; chair of the executive committee at McGraw-Hill Publishing Company since 1950; editor and publisher of BusinessWeek from 1950 to 1967; and a founding member of the New York Financial Writers’ Association. I told him last night I didn’t think I ought to see him, because I don’t believe in him, don’t trust him. I don’t know how you do; I guess you see people that you hate and distrust—have to in your job. But I don’t think I hate—have to, and I don’t think I ought to. And I don’t think it would do any good; I think it would hurt us.

Now, what’s your feeling?

My feeling is that he is going to Moscow, and he wants to see you before he goes, and I suspect that it may be that in order to build his credi—his entrée in Moscow.

I think just like Carl [T.] Rowan.[note 58] Carl T. Rowan was deputy assistant U.S. secretary of state in 1961; a delegate to the United Nations in 1962; U.S. ambassador to Finland in 1963; and director of the United States Information Agency from 1964 to 1965.

Yes.

I think it’s a terrible thing to do, don’t you?

Yes, sir. I agree, Mr. President, I . . . If he wanted to come down and talk to you about Vietnam, that’s another matter. But if he wants to come and see you before he goes [unclear]—

Well, I don’t know whether I ought to be talking to all these folks [in] these individual interviews. I think what I would do, if I were you, is just tell Kay, “Now, here’s a question on it. Carl Rowan came in, and we didn’t talk to him about any mission, but a lot of people got the impression that he was his emissary.”

Yes, sir.

“And our people don’t want to give that impression. Now, if he wants to talk about Vietnam, there’s not anything the President could tell him, if it’s just not prestige he’s looking for, that Bill Bundy couldn’t tell him. And that’s the man for him to see.”

Mm-hmm. Here’s another example—let me get my notes here from this long conversation I had with Evans I wanted to ask you about. Or Evans, at the last of the interview said, “Do you know anything about the President’s meeting with the governors last week?" And I said, “No, I was not there, and I haven’t talked to anybody who was.” He said, “Well, two of the governors told me personally that the President told them he had no intention of building up the Democratic National Committee [DNC], and that, in fact, he planned to ask [John M.] Bailey to stay on through ‘68.[note 59] John M. Bailey was chair of the Democratic National Committee from 1961 to 1968. And that they said the President talked very disparagingly about the value of the Democratic National Committee, and that in his judgment he didn’t see the need for spending all of that money on something that was as useless as the DNC.”

Well, that’s not discussed at all. That was not the fact. Now, I talked about the thought that these folks, these experts in politics, have about the DNC’s connection in congressional campaigns. The general organization always has been—you’ve had to rely on two things: one is the Senatorial and Congressional Committee; two is the Democratic organization within the state headed by the governor. So I told them that I had been there 35 years, and I’d been rather intimate with it. I had been on the Congressional Committee when I was a member of the House. That I had selected the Senatorial Committee during all the period I was in the Senate. That I had never known of the committee to do anything in congressional races. That the only time that it had ever allowed anything to be done was in 1940 when [Franklin D.] Roosevelt asked [Edward J.] Ed Flynn and Sam Rayburn, and I made him ask both of them, if he—they would have any objection to my raising some money, and my writing some speeches, and my getting some projects, and my giving a little encouragement to congressmen who said that [Henry A.] Wallace had been booed off the platform in Iowa, and they were afraid they’d lose the Congress and win with Roosevelt.[note 60] Edward J. “Ed” Flynn was New York secretary of state from 1929 to 1939; a member of the Democratic National Committee from 1930 to 1953 and chair from 1940 to 1943; and a political supporter of both Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman. Henry A. Wallace was U.S. secretary of agriculture from March 1933 to September 1940; vice president of the United States from January 1941 to January 1945; and U.S. secretary of commerce from March 1945 to September 1946. And he urged me to do it. And I told him he’d have to get Ed Flynn to do it and have to get Rayburn. They both agreed to it. Now, if it has ever been active in any other congressional campaign, I’m not aware of it. I don’t believe it has.

Now, Kennedy slipped them, without reporting it, 250,000 dollars—125[000] House and 125[000] Senate—in 1962. But not through the National Committee, but through the White House. And it was not an official act of theirs. And far as I know, Bailey didn’t go out to any states, didn’t perform any organization, didn’t do anything. I told them—not that he gave them this money—but I told him that that was it. I said, “Now, this year, I got them all together in January, and we interviewed every congressman that had a 5 percent thing, and I booked it up. And had staff do it. Then I took their problem [snorts], and one of them was going home, and one of them was getting literature out to them, and one of them was recording, and one of them was finances, and so forth.” So then I sat down with the Speaker and the congressmen and said, “Now, we give you 20,000 [dollars] a month. And we guarantee to give you 500,000 [dollars], the committee, to give to them so the National Committee wouldn’t be in it! That’s Kennedy’s agreement.”

“Now, instead of doing that . . . I think because Evans and Novak are out after us, to destroy us and the President’s Club and all this kind of stuff, I think it would be better if y’all put on the dinner. And if we helped you and went to your dinner instead of your coming to our dinner. And that is the way it’s been handled. And I wonder if that isn’t better way than just Kennedy guaranteeing you 500,000 [dollars] to spend.” They all agreed it was.

So we said, “OK, now, you put up the man that would handle the dinner if we ran it”—which would be Neil Roach—“and then we’ll all come, and I’ll come, and the Vice President will come.[note 61] “Neil Roach” is unidentified. We’ll make speeches. All the Cabinet will come, except McNamara and Rusk. And we’ll get you 500[000 dollars].” Now, we got them 700[000 dollars]. And it went out to them.

In addition, I went around and raised a good deal of money for them. Like in Chicago, I raised money and got them to give [Paul H.] Douglas [D–Illinois] 25,000 [dollars].[note 62] Paul H. Douglas was a U.S. senator [D–Illinois] from January 1949 to January 1967. Iowa, I raised 100,000, and got them to help out there. Texas, I raised money and got them to help here. In New York, I raised money, and we helped them there. And most of the New Yorkers and most of the folks that won thought we were responsible for it.

But, in addition to that, we spent a million dollars on F—IBM machines and on radio and on telephone lines. And we did more than any National Committee’s ever done. But the National Committee is made up of people they’ve appointed. I said, “Who are the national committeeman and woman in this state, John?" He said, “Frank [C.] Erwin [Jr.] and [Beryl Ann] B. A. Bentsen.”[note 63] Frank C. Erwin Jr. was secretary of the Democratic Executive Committee of Texas from 1962 to 1963 and chair from 1963 to 1964; a member of the Democratic National Committee from 1964 to 1968; vice chair of the Texas delegation to the Democratic National Convention (DNC) in 1964; a member of the Texas delegation to the DNC in 1968; a member of the board of directors of the LBJ Family Foundation from 1972 until his death in 1980; and a close friend of John B. Connally and Lyndon B. Johnson. Beryl Ann “B. A.” Bentsen was the wife of Texas senator Lloyd M. Bentsen since 1943, and a Texas delegate to the Democratic National Convention in 1968. I didn’t even know. I said, “Who selected them?" He said, “I did.” I said, “Then why am I being blamed for their inactivity in Texas? I called you and asked you to do everything you could for these two Republican districts.” And he said he did, and he agreed I shouldn’t be blamed, but the press was doing it. They’d already in Evans and Novak!

Mm-hmm.

Now, that’s what I said. I didn’t say that the committee wasn’t any good. I think we’ve got to have a strong committee for ‘68, just the opposite. But I think that’s for the President. I don’t think it’s for Congress. Because . . . Mr. Rayburn wouldn’t even meet with Adlai [E.] Stevenson [II] and Mrs. [Eleanor] Roosevelt when they wanted to project the Democratic National Committee into the affairs of the Congressional Committee.[note 64] Adlai E. Stevenson II was the Democratic governor of Illinois from January 1949 to January 1953; the Democratic U.S. presidential nominee in 1952 and 1956; and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from January 1961 until his death in July 1965. Eleanor Roosevelt was the wife of President Franklin D. Roosevelt; first lady of the United States from March 1933 to April 1945; and chair of the Presidential Commission on the Status of Women from January 1961 to November 1962. And that has been a rule ever since I’ve been in Congress. And I think [Michael W.] Mike Kerwin, if I started telling him what to do and gave him money knowingly, he would be outraged.[note 65] Michael W. “Mike” Kerwin was a five-time delegate to the Democratic National Convention from Michigan. I think the things—but these kids do not know that! So they write it. So those are the facts. Now, is that a clear story?

Yes, sir. And I’ll—I’m going to call him back and tell him that that [unclear]—

And not only do we not think that, but we think that the National Committee—I don’t have their opinion of the National Committee. I’ve looked at their results. And Hugh said, “My God, you came out to our state”—You see, Kennedy made four speeches; I made 11. We’ve raised more money. We’ve done more. We’ve had radio broadcasts. I read from Governor [William A. “Bill”] Egan last night.[note 66] William A. “Bill” Egan was the Democratic governor of Alaska from January 1959 to December 1966 and December 1970 to December 1974. I read from Richard [D. “Max”] McCarthy![note 67] Richard D. “Max” McCarthy was a U.S. representative [D–New York] from January 1965 to January 1971. And I wished you’d listen—I’ll read you later in the day, after you talk to these other things.

All right.

You check with Abe—

And I’ll call you right back.

—and then—and call me right back. And what I would say—what do you think we ought to say? Now, what’s that sentence? Let me get it clear in mind so I approve it.

All right, sir. “The President has consistently refused to grant any interviews to anyone concerning the subjects mentioned in Mr. Manchester’s book. Newsweek‘s account—and he has instructed his staff to also refrain from any such discussions. Newsweek‘s account of the President’s recollections is untrue. The statement—"

I—all right. Go ahead. I would say the—"Newsweek‘s account of the statements of friends and alleged intimates is untrue.” So that the friends are saying it. But they’re telling untruths. If Newsweek‘s saying it, they’re telling untruths.

That is saying that their account of their statements is not true, and they may be verbatim right. [President Johnson acknowledges.] I mean, they may be correct in quoting those—these people.

All right.

But it’s “the statements attributed to the President by so-called friends and alleged intimates are false.”

All right. OK.

I’ll call you right back.

Waiting. Waiting.