Yeah.

One of the real Johnson devotees and who has more ideas about the Great Society, probably, than anyone else that I know of.

Physically, would you object if we hide him in the EOB [Executive Office Building] and begin using him for just that purpose?

No, but I think the best place to hide him is [Department of] Defense. I think that [Robert S. “Bob”] McNamara is the most popular man in government, and I think that he’s hid better with him than he is ever at the White House, [where] he becomes a whipping boy like [Thomas G.] Tommy Corcoran and [Benjamin V.] Ben Cohen.[note 1] Robert S. “Bob” McNamara was president of Ford Motor Company from November 1960 to January 1961; U.S. secretary of defense from January 1961 to February 1968; and president of the World Bank from April 1968 to July 1981. Thomas G. “Tommy the Cork” Corcoran was a legal and political adviser to Franklin D. Roosevelt and Lyndon B. Johnson. Benjamin V. Cohen was a close adviser to Franklin D. Roosevelt.

That is a risk. I grant you that.

And—there’s no question about it. He’ll be the number-one whipping boy. And he looks likes in heat to get whipped.

[Laughs.]

You don’t have any objection to our using him, though?

Not at all. I’d like to use him every way in the world I could, and I’d like for McNamara to make him his top man and lend him to me like [Richard N.] Dick Goodwin’s lent to us by State.[note 2] Richard N. “Dick” Goodwin was U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs from 1961 to 1963; a special assistant to the president from 1964 to 1965; and a chief speechwriter for Johnson who coined the phrase “Great Society.” But I’d like for—if he gets in stuff, stay out of the papers. [Bundy acknowledges.] I’ve got people—the trouble is, most of them just got to run, get in the papers about what they did. That’s what I don’t like about [Horace W.] Buzz [Busby Jr.].[note 3] Horace W. “Buzz” Busby Jr. was a longtime aide and speechwriter for Lyndon B. Johnson, and Cabinet secretary and special assistant to the president from 1964 to 1965. He’s been backgrounding people for two weeks about writing some speech. Let me see, the Mormon Tabernacle speech, and he never has got caught up with it yet. He just been so busy with appointments telling them. And [Malcolm M.] Mac Kilduff, when he fills a teleprompter, he goes out and calls a press conference.[note 4] Malcolm M. “Mac” Kilduff was a State Department staffer prior to 1962; an assistant press secretary in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations from 1962 to 1965; a public relations consultant from 1965 to 1977; and information director in the 1968 Democratic presidential campaign. Says, “I’ve got a press conference, here. Now, I want to tell you that I filled a teleprompter, here.” And about 45 minutes later, and if they just keep their big mouths shut, they’d be so much more valuable. But they’re not. I don’t know why.

And I don’t know about [Adam] Yarmolinsky in that respect.[note 5] Adam Yarmolinsky was a Defense Department official during the Kennedy administration, and worked under R. Sargent Shriver in designing the War on Poverty programming during the Johnson administration. I thought that Yarmolinsky bound to have had something to do with that flack that we got on the other thing, because I just didn’t believe [R. Sargent] Shriver could be that hypocritical.[note 6] R. Sargent Shriver was director of the Peace Corps from March 1961 to February 1966; director of the Office of Economic Opportunity from October 1964 to March 1968; and U.S. ambassador to France from April 1968 to March 1970. Shriver called me and told me that here’s what he was recommending. And I just agreed to his recommendation. The next day, I saw Shriver was at home in bed asleep and his wife and the priest around him, and he was purified, and I was the damn thug that did the dirty work. And I just—I knew [Robert F.] Bobby [Kennedy] could do that, but I didn’t think Shriver would do that.[note 7] Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy was U.S. attorney general from January 1961 to September 1964, and a U.S. senator [D–New York] from January 1965 until his assassination in June 1968. So I just don’t know. I don’t know about Yarmolinsky.

Well, we [unclear] talk with him—

I’m for—I think he’s competent, and I—but I don’t want to get so overboard with him that I ruin him. And I think he damn near ruined your staff in this fight which was totally unnecessary. He just didn’t need to get involved in that debate up there at all. He didn’t need to be up there with the radio corps. And that’s a big problem with both Buzz and Dick Goodwin. Dick has been a little better about it, but he got to come up to Jack [Valenti]‘s office, sit on parade, watch everybody, hold a speech in his hand and tell them about what all he’s doing on it.[note 8] Jack Valenti was a partner at Weekley and Valenti, a political and advertising consulting agency, from 1952 to 1963; special assistant to the president from 1963 to 1966; and president of the Motion Picture Association of America from 1966 to 2004. And that’s—destroys a good deal of his effectiveness—for the reason is that a Rowland Evans [Jr.] then will say, “Here’s what he’s doing.”[note 9] Rowland Evans Jr. was a prominent syndicated columnist. Together with Robert D. S. Novak, Evans wrote the political column “Inside Report” since 1963. And then the farmers will move in on him, and he’ll get chewed up. And the man that’s got a passion for anonymity usually is a man that comes out on top. If you want to see how to run Washington, if y’all just want to know the pitfalls and learn that par excellence, just look at Mr. Clark [M.] Clifford.[note 10] Clark M. Clifford was a Washington lawyer; an adviser to presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson; a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1961 to 1968; chair of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from April 1963 to February 1968; and U.S. secretary of defense from March 1968 to January 1969.

There’s no question [unclear]—

He will not be on the record. He will not be seen with the President. He doesn’t even want to play golf with him. He’s willing to be with him every hour of the day and advise him every night. He won’t ask a favor of him. And he just stays in the background, and when you say, “Won’t you go over to the [Democratic] Party and give some advice?" He says, “Well, I will do anything that you want me to, but let me tell you the reasons why it’s so much better that John [M.] Bailey do it.”[note 11] John M. Bailey was chair of the Democratic National Committee from 1961 to 1968.

Mm-hmm. In fact, I think Clark agrees that his—that he’s been somewhat hurt by the fact that the press got out that he had tried to help Walter [W. Jenkins] that day.[note 12] Walter W. Jenkins was Lyndon B. Johnson’s office manager, personnel chief, and administrative assistant from 1939 to 1963, and special assistant to the president from 1963 to 1964, making him Johnson’s longest-serving employee. In October 1964, Jenkins was arrested for disorderly conduct and implicated in a morals charge scandal that resulted in his resignation from the White House.

I think it has.

Yeah, [unclear].

Yeah. And [unclear].

Well, he is tremendously valuable, and I would say, on many of these things, and especially when you get to the question of appointments that are not the kind that Ralph [A.] Dungan’s office handles, I think Clark’s the wisest man in the city.[note 13] Ralph A. Dungan was White House special assistant to the president from 1961 to 1964, and U.S. ambassador to Chile from December 1964 to August 1967.

On strategy, on general policy, on right or wrong, or how things will be accepted, there’s just not anybody that’s equal to him. And I differ with him frequently, but—

He doesn’t mind your differing, and he wants to talk about it.

He’s the best. But just follow his example if we can get the Yarmolinskys to do it. Now, if you put him in the EOB, I’m afraid he’ll just be right over there like a little rat terrier feist—

We hear your message. And I cannot tell you that I think that it’s risk-free, because he both in terms of people having to zero in on him [unclear] and in terms of his ego, it is a problem.

The third one is that we wanted to take this opportunity to give the highest possible recommendation to Lee [C.] White.[note 14] Lee C. White was assistant special counsel to the president from 1961 to 1963; associate counsel to the president from 1963 to 1965; special counsel to the president from 1965 to 1966; and chair of the Federal Power Commission from 1966 to 1969. [President Johnson acknowledges.] Mac feels this way, and I do, too.

Yeah, I do, too.

He is chafing to leave. He should—and he was chafing before this, however. He should—he should be prevailed upon, if at all possible, to stay here, and if not, we ought to try to keep him in the government. Awfully good man. Do you think so? Do you think [unclear]—

I [unclear]—

I think we’ve got—

He’s got a first-rate ability, and he’s a man of absolutely first-rate character.

Yes, I think he has character and loyalty. And I don’t think he’s exceptional in ability, but I think he’s good. And I think that we ought to keep him there. And I[‘m] thinking we adjust these pay scales and give him a little more responsibility and give him a little—

Yes, we’ve got to tend to this pocket of poverty in the White House, before we go bust [unclear]. [Laughs.]

We’ll do it, now, soon as we can. And we just—the only reason we haven’t is the man that was handling all the administrative matters, [Bundy attempts to interject] he wasn’t my greatest counselor. I never talked to him about Cambodia, but he was—he was a wonderful person, and he was watching the administrative thing. And we just waited till after the election. But our story’s got to be that he just got mixed up in this, and everybody sympathized with him, and we just didn’t press our individual cases, and it can all be retroactive through July.

Sure, sure. The . . . Well, that’s really all I have.

That’s all.

Thank you, Mr. President.

All right. I’d take Yarmolinsky. McNamara may kick over his heels, but . . .

Well, I’ll talk to Bob—

My general feeling is that if you could ever . . . if you could ever get yourself to where you could get you some real good writers, in number, that would do things. I think Buzz comes up with an A and then a C and then more frequently, an F, because he doesn’t get it to you. So I want to urge him to stay if he can, but I don’t want to be—I haven’t got any time to spend a lot of stuff with him. But I’d try to get the Goodwins, and I’d try to get any of the—

I think that I would let Buzz follow his own inclination and make it be his decision, but I don’t believe he’s ever going to be the kind of fellow that will grind out honors work, day in, day out, in terms of working as a member of a staff.

There are a lot of those damn, little, old ticky statements, though, that he’s been writing.

That’s different, Mr. President. And if he were going to be happy doing those little statements, that would be fine. But that’s a hell of a way to spend your life, and I don’t think he’ll do that.

Well, who’s going to do it?

Well, there are people who could do that. I think [Frederick L. “Fred”] Holborn could do that kind of thing.[note 15] Frederick L. “Fred” Holborn was a legislative assistant to John F. Kennedy from 1959 to 1961; special assistant at the White House from 1961 to 1966; and a professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies from 1971 until his death in 2005.

Who?

Dick—Fred Holborn does the written ones that you never see, you know, probably signs your name to a message to some collection of Polish voters.

Well—

[Unclear.]

We’ll work on finding some young [unclear].

I think we got to get younger people, and they got to be team players. You’re dealing with a man who’s an old, old friend of yours, and he’s not about to be Bill’s second assistant.

All right. One other point I have on my desk here, [Luther H.] Hodges’s resignation, dated the 30th.[note 16] Luther H. Hodges was U.S. secretary of commerce from January 1961 to January 1965. He wanted me to know—let you know that he feels this is what he really wants to do and has to do, and he said you can announce it anytime you want to.

Don’t you want resignations, Mr. President, from all [unclear] appointees?

Yeah, yeah. Yeah. Yeah, I do.

This one is not just perfunctory. This one was brought to me, oh, four or five days ago, dated October 30th.

Well, I feel awfully close to all that Cabinet, for sentimental reasons, for [John F. “Jack”] Kennedy and other things.[note 17] John F. “Jack” Kennedy was a U.S. representative [D–Massachusetts] from January 1947 to January 1953; a U.S. senator [D–Massachusetts] from January 1953 to December 1960; and president of the United States from January 1961 until his assassination on 22 November 1963. I just don’t want to—I want to be damn sure they want to resign before I want them to go, and I think they all been outstandingly loyal.

The man that talked to me about this the other day is [C. Douglas] Doug Dillon.[note 18] C. Douglas “Doug” Dillon was U.S. ambassador to France from March 1953 to January 1957; U.S. under secretary of state for economic affairs from July 1958 to June 1959; U.S. under secretary of state from June 1959 to January 1961; and U.S. secretary of the treasury from January 1961 to April 1965.

Well, now, he’s not—just not going to go. We just can’t spare him.

Well—

What does he want to do?

His father is 82. I suppose the Dillon family interests are worth a quarter of a billion dollars, and there’s no one in charge and hasn’t been anyone in charge for 12 years. He’s the only man in his generation or even the next generation, and his mother died, and his father is dying, and he feels that he’s got to go and [unclear]. I said to him that I thought it was just terrible to have him go, that it broke up a winning club, and that the [Department of the] Treasury had never had better leadership. And an additional very powerful danger here, which is that [Robert V. “Bob”] Roosa, the defender of the dollar, is about to go.[note 19] Robert V. “Bob” Roosa was an economist; a proponent of the American dollar as the standard for all currency; U.S. undersecretary of the treasury for Monetary Affairs from 1961 to 1964; a partner at the Wall Street firm of Brown Brothers Harriman from 1965 to 1991; and a director of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1966 to 1981. And Roosa is probably, in a technical sense, more indispensable than Dillon without any question, the grand plan Knute [K.] Rockne of how the hell do you defend the dollar.[note 20] Knute K. Rockne was a college and professional football player, and head football coach at the University of Notre Dame from 1918 until his death on 31 March 1931. And between them they’ve made a hell of a team. Because Douglas is not just a front man; he’s a real leader to a very difficult department, a strong man. There’s only one man in the government that could even come close to persuading him to stay, and that’s yourself.

Well, I just got to do it, ‘cause I sure don’t want to lose him. And I’ve been hearing this mouthing around. I guess that’s been coming from him.

It has nothing to do with dissatisfaction in the administration or a lack of sense of confidence or a lack of respect and loyalty and affection for you. It’s a genuine internal, personal thing, which I only found out the other day while we were standing around waiting for you to take off. And I know the family well. I know something about this background. [Unclear] who gave money to Harvard [University]. This all rings true to me, and the only way in the world to persuade him to stay is if you persuade him.

Well, I’m a—

There are some other angles to it that I hope to talk to you about in the next few days sometime, but that’s [unclear].

Well, I’m going to—has he got anybody cutting at him in government?

Uh-uh. I don’t think so.

Of course, this is just like a third-stringer saying something to the first-string quarterback, but—and you don’t need it said—but the most important one from the standpoint of your public image is the Attorney General appointment. It’s got to be a man of unquestionable integrity, who everyone says, “Well, that’s exactly the one he should appoint—put there.” That’s the one that the [James B. “Scotty”] Restons and the [Walter] Lippmanns and the others are going to be watching for, and [President Johnson acknowledges] [unclear].[note 21] James B. “Scotty” Reston was a columnist and Washington, D.C., bureau chief of the New York Times from 1953 to 1964; associate editor of the New York Times from 1964 to 1968; executive editor of the New York Times from 1968 to 1969; vice president of the New York Times from 1969 to 1974; and recipient of the Pulitzer Prize for National Reporting in 1945 and 1957. Walter Lippmann was the editor of the New York Herald Tribune from 1931 to 1963; a columnist at the Washington Post from 1963 to 1967; a columnist at Newsweek magazine from 1963 to 1971; and a recipient of Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1964. Mr. Lippmann told me this yesterday.

I think so. What do you think they’d think about Clifford?

Well, until—

The ones who really know, Mr. President, would think it was fine, but that goddamn day in the newspaper offices makes it, in my judgment, impossible. I think it would start—both Clark and you would start with a . . . with a pour-out of smog and smudge on that basis; that is exactly the opposite of what we need. I say that about a man that I respect, if anything, more highly than you do. I just admire him so. [Pause.] But he is the man who spent the day trying to prevent the Jenkins story from happening.

Well, don’t the Lippmanns and the Restons respect him?

No question about it.

No question they do. [Pause.] Although, the [New York] Times, as I remember, when we put him in as the head of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, wrote a very disagreeable editorial saying that we’d replaced a great statesman, Dr. [James R. “Jim”] Killian [Jr.], by a Washington fixer, with Clifford.[note 22] James R. “Jim” Killian Jr. was president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from 1948 to 1959; special assistant to the president for science and technology from 1957 to 1959; and chair of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from January 1956 to March 1958 and May 1961 to April 1963. Of course, there never were two sillier remarks, because (a) Killian is not a great statesman, and (b) Clark was just what the doctor ordered. [Unclear.] But this is the kind of thing we’d get. I mean, that’s a fact of life. I think, moreover, Mr. President, I think that—I don’t know whether Clark wants it, but I think that he is more valuable to you doing what he’s doing.

My judgment is, he doesn’t want it and wouldn’t have it. But I think you could make him. And I don’t know of anybody else that I feel has the balance between the North and the South that would enforce the law, but would do it with a moderation and a judgment that would permit it to be enforced. And I just think that that takes a lot of political savvy and walking a tightrope. And with Georgia going the way it does and with the [Richard B. “Dick”] Russell [Jr.]s [D–Georgia] and folks of that type, that are going to control the Congress.[note 23] Richard B. “Dick” Russell Jr. was a U.S. senator [D–Georgia] from January 1933 to January 1971; chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee from January 1951 to January 1953 and January 1955 to January 1969; and chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee from January 1969 to January 1971. Russell’s going to be chairman of Appropriations.

Let me throw one out that I got from nowhere. What would you think of [W. Willard] Bill Wirtz [Jr.]?[note 24] W. Willard “Bill” Wirtz Jr. was U.S. secretary of labor from September 1962 to January 1969. [Unclear]—

I would think very highly of him. I don’t think there’s a better man in the Cabinet. And I like him. And I like him very much where he is. I thought he did a wonderful job in the campaign. I don’t think he has the political savvy to deal with this bunch of thugs. And I think that’s the big problem. I think that [Nicholas deB. “Nick”] Katzenbach has more of it.[note 25] Nicholas deB. “Nick” Katzenbach was assistant U.S. attorney general from 1961 to 1962; deputy U.S. attorney general from April 1962 to January 1965; acting U.S. attorney general from September 1964 to January 1965; U.S. attorney general from February 1965 to October 1966; and U.S. under secretary of state from October 1966 to January 1969. He has done a remarkable job dealing with [James O. “Jim”] Eastland [D–Mississippi] and Russell and those people.[note 26] James O. “Jim” Eastland was a U.S. senator [D–Mississippi] from January 1943 to December 1978, and chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1956 to December 1978.

You could do worse than Nick.

Yes, I think so.

There’s a lot of people who are—I think that would have an advantage in silencing—not that you haven’t silenced it effectively for people who know anything—but the people who think that you’re just waiting for the election to come around. I guess the New Frontiersman [unclear].

Well, I’m going to keep all of them.

Of course, you are.

If . . . that’ll stay.

[Chuckles.]

And I thought I’d satisfied everybody on the New Frontier with Bobby in New York, because if I had kept my mouth shut he’d have been beat.

I should have thought, myself, Mr.—I’m not talking really about that—

And very frankly, though, I thought last night it took him a long time to get around to admit the President had anything to do with it. And there’s a thousand people in the room. And they kept thinking about he got county judge so-and-so and county surrogate so-and-so and county so-and-so, but the guy that campaigned up there through 33 miles of Brooklyn [New York] and all the places and carried it over 2 million, he just never could find it while I was out bragging on his brother [John F. Kennedy]. And I just—I just don’t—I just guess he can’t bring himself to it. Did y’all see his victory statement?

No, I did not.

I saw it.

Did you feel that way, Bill?

No, I really didn’t. I thought he saved the best for the last [unclear]—

Everybody in the room—everybody in the room just sat there, including Lady Bird [Johnson], and just couldn’t believe that he wouldn’t acknowledge that the President had had anything to do with this landslide victory in the world—country.[note 27] Lady Bird Johnson (née Claudia Alta Taylor) was the wife of Lyndon B. Johnson since 1934; second lady of the United States from January 1961 to November 1963; and first lady of the United States from November 1963 to January 1969. But he just couldn’t do it. He had [William H.] Billy McKeon, and he had Mayor [Robert F. “Bob”] Wagner [Jr.], and he just had [W.] Averell Harriman was the hero of the deal.[note 28] William H. “Bill” McKeon was a lawyer; New York Democratic Party county chair from 1953 to 1974, and state chair from 1962 to 1965; a longtime delegate to the Democratic National Convention; and counsel to committees of the New York State Legislature from 1967 to 1973. Robert F. “Bob” Wagner Jr. was the Democratic mayor of New York City from January 1954 to December 1965. W. Averell Harriman was U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union from October 1943 to January 1946; U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom from April 1946 to October 1946; U.S. secretary of commerce from October 1946 to April 1948; director of the Mutual Security Agency from October 1951 to January 1953; a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1952 and 1956; the Democratic governor of New York from January 1955 to December 1958; U.S. ambassador-at-large from January 1961 to November 1961; U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs from December 1961 to April 1963; U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs from April 1963 to March 1965; and ambassador-at-large and chief U.S. delegate to the Paris Peace Talks from May 1968 to January 1969.

Well, Mr. President, he didn’t realize you were in that room and all those other sons of bitches were, [chuckling] you know?

[Chuckles.] He called me and thanked me and privately said to me as strong as he could, but if I had been making a statement, I would have said, like I did in my statement, that we carried on John Kennedy’s program. And I would have made a statement that I think that President Johnson and Senator [Hubert H.] Humphrey [Jr.] [DFL–Minnesota]—[note 29] Hubert H. Humphrey Jr. was the Democratic mayor of Minneapolis, Minnesota, from July 1945 to November 1948; a U.S. senator [DFL–Minnesota] from January 1949 to December 1964 and January 1971 to January 1978; Senate Majority Whip from January 1961 to December 1964; vice president of the United States from January 1965 to January 1969; and the Democratic U.S. presidential candidate in 1968.

Well, Mr. President, the way I heard it from their headquarters, and I haven’t talked to Bob myself for two or three weeks, but I think they know who was in Brooklyn on those 33 miles, and I think they’re damn grateful, and I don’t believe—let’s not start up that war in the morning. OK? [Laughs.]

Well, we ought to—we ought to try to get along. Well . . .

That’s all we’ve got.

You talk—I think the Attorney General is an awfully—

Oh, crucial.

But I think it has been run pretty well, pretty satisfactory, as far as I’m concerned.

You can’t really leave a man acting without getting [unclear].

Well, I think that—I think that—well, I’m talking about thinking about it permanently.

From a political—

Yeah. That would be good.

From the standpoint of protecting your interest, I don’t think any—I think Nick would be extremely devoted. For example, five minutes after he got ahold of this IT＆T document he called me, and he said, “I want to bring something over to you.” And he did. And that kind of expeditious devotion to the interests of the President is what you want there. The thing—

The other thing is, he’s got just a tremendously kind character, and everybody knows he has, and courage [unclear]. Bill was saying earlier that this is a job where a man can make more trouble than even the White House staff for a President down through the years.

Over a period of 150 years, Mr. President, the Attorney General—more Attorneys General having gotten more Presidents in trouble than any other group of people together.

Yeah, I know that. I’ve watched them.

I know it.

All we really need’s a Harold [L.] Ickes or a [Thomas J.] Tom Walsh.[note 30] Harold L. Ickes was U.S. secretary of the interior from March 1933 to February 1946. Thomas J. “Tom” Walsh was a U.S. senator [D–Montana] from March 1913 to March 1933, and a prosecutor in the Teapot Dome Scandal during the Harding administration. In early 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt nominated him to be Attorney General, but Walsh died under suspicious circumstances on a train in North Carolina while en route from Florida to Washington for Roosevelt’s inauguration. Kim Briggeman, “Sen. Thomas Walsh: Montana’s Last Cabinet Appointee Never Made It to D.C.,” Missoulian, 31 January 2017.

[Laughs.]

That’s right. Tom Walsh is what you need.

Yeah.

[Unclear] trouble is you don’t have any lame ducks, not of that quality. [Unclear.]

What do y’all think about how would [Donald C.] Don Cook be accepted in a Cabinet post?[note 31] Donald C. “Don” Cook was a longtime friend and adviser to Lyndon Johnson; chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1952 to 1953; and president of the American Electric Power Company (AEP) from 1962 to 1971 and chair until 1976.

I think good. He’s unknown, but he’s a man of integrity. He’s a hard worker. And he’s a successful man in the world of private enterprise, and I think he’d bring—he’d be unknown, but in time, I think he would have their respect.

I haven’t done any business with him, Mr. President. I’m sure the question would be entirely, you know, has he got it? Could he do it?

He’d be a good man for Treasury or, you know, Commerce or something like that. Now, the one that concerns me from the standpoint of your domestic program, about 65 percent of your program in building the Great Society is going to fall within the domain of HEW [Department of Health, Education, and Welfare]. And that man has to—what we need there is a Bob McNamara to make a department out of a group of suburbs.

Y’all better talk to Bob McNamara and find some of these young folks like that. I think that—I think he has the best potentialities of helping on the [Bundy attempts to interject] top level than anybody. He—I thought his recommendations on that COMSAT thing were super with Clark Kerr, president of General Motors, and president of the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations].[note 32] Clark Kerr was an economist; chancellor of the University of California, Berkeley, from 1952 to 1957; president of the University of California from 1958 to 1967; a member of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education until 1973; and chair of the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education from 1974 to 1979. And it was the most highly politically explosive thing in Washington, and it just—you never heard another word about it.

We’ll do that.

Right. Talk to my wife.

Let’s see. I’ve always thought [Frank N.] Stanton would be good for something like Commerce.[note 33] Frank N. Stanton was president of the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) from 1946 to 1971, and chair of the RAND Corporation from 1961 to 1967.

No question about it.

Stanton would be good for Health, Education, and Welfare, which is a much more important job. [Pause.] I agree with Bill. That’s the unmanaged department. It’s an absolutely fascinating challenge, you know. [If] you’re about to fire me out of the White House, I’d ask you about that job. I think it’s just a tremendous—

Same here. If I were ten years older I’d be pounding on the door.

All right. Well, before y’all start pounding I better hang up.

Good-bye.

[Laughs.]

Bye.