Just a moment, sir, for the President.

Miss McCammon.

Yes, Speaker [John W.] McCormack [D–Massachusetts] is on.[note 1] John W. McCormack was a U.S. representative [D–Massachusetts] from January 1928 to January 1971, and Speaker of the House of Representatives from January 1961 to January 1971.

Thank you very much.

Hello?

[chuckling] Hello, Mr. President!

How are you, my beloved?

How am I? Oh, I’m very, very happy. Boy, well, you know how I feel.

Well, Lady Bird [Johnson] and I were just thinking of you and Mrs. [Harriet J.] McCormack, and thinking about how much we loved you and how wonderful you’d been to us.[note 2] Lady Bird Johnson (née Claudia Alta Taylor) was the wife of Lyndon B. Johnson since 1934; second lady of the United States from January 1961 to November 1963; and first lady of the United States from November 1963 to January 1969. Harriet J. McCormack was the wife of John W. McCormack since 1920. And we owe the Good Lord a lot, but I guess that he’s been unusually generous in his friendships like yours.

Well, you know how much the McCormacks think of you and Mrs. Johnson all through the years. Not as president, but before that.

Tell Miss Harriet—I’m going to—I haven’t got anything but a big campaign deficit, but I’m going down before I leave and get her some pralines.

[Laughs.] Oh, get her some pralines.

Tell her old [W. Homer] Thornberry’s not looking after her like he ought to.[note 3] W. Homer Thornberry was a U.S. representative [D–Texas] from 1949 to December 1963; a district judge in the Western District of Texas from December 1963 to 1965; and a circuit judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Judicial Circuit from 1965 to 1995.

[Laughs.] Oh, I’ll tell her that. She’s just—well, I’ll call her up after we get through.

John, you had a wonderful meeting in Boston [Massachusetts]. You had a wonderful meeting.

Oh, it was great.

I was glad that you made me go up there. I feel better, because I knew how they felt, but I wanted them to know how I felt about them.

Yeah, well, you made that impression, all right.

I didn’t think we needed to go, but—I mean, for the votes—but I thought it was a mighty good thing to—for the family.

Well, I was—[a telephone rings in the background] it made me very, very happy when you came up, and you helped a tremendous deal. Too bad [Francis X.] Bellotti just failed to get through, but that’s due to some local conditions over which you or I had no control.[note 4] Francis X. Bellotti was an attorney; the Democratic lieutenant governor of Massachusetts from January 1963 to January 1965; and the Democratic candidate for governor of Massachusetts in 1964.

Well, it’s a great victory. It’s a great tribute to you and what you did in the House of Representatives and your program, and it’s going to be easier, I think, on you now.

Well, much easier, thank God. And much easier on your program, and . . . You’re not calling a special session, are you?

No, no, no.

Good, ‘cause I think, you see, it’d be about a month, and then we’d get the—we’d be better off next January with these new boys in.

Yeah, I think that’s right.

We’d be better off and be in a much better shape.

Yeah, I think that’s right. I think that’s right. We got rid of our Republicans in Texas. We cleaned them out of the legislature, and we cleaned them out of the Congress.

I’d say so. Tremendous! You remember many months—many weeks, oh, some months ago, I said that [Barry M.] Goldwater [Sr.] [R–Arizona] wouldn’t get more than eight states.[note 5] Barry M. Goldwater Sr. was a U.S. senator [R–Arizona] from January 1953 to January 1965 and January 1969 to January 1987, and the Republican U.S. presidential candidate in 1964.

Yeah.

More.

That’s right.

Say he’d get eight, but more—now, he wouldn’t get more than eight states.

Yeah, that’s right. Well, I guess he’s going to get Arizona. It’s wobbling. They haven’t counted the absentees, but we listed him in our poll sheets; they showed him six, and that’s what it looks like he’s going to get.

Yes.

Our polls were remarkably accurate, John.

Amazingly so.

Just unbelievable. They had Texas 63 [percent], and it’s 63.1 [percent].

Amazingly so. And you showed us the polls when you were up in Boston, remember?

Yeah, yeah.

And you had them all listed, [President Johnson acknowledges] right down—Where are you now?

I’m at the [LBJ] Ranch.

Good! How long are you going to stay there?

Oh, as long as they’ll let me. As long as I don’t get in trouble—I guess this week.

Well, that’s good. You need it.

I’m going to—I just thought I’d call a few friends today and get out and get some sunshine after a while.

Well—

Looks like you’re going to pick up about 40 in the House.

We’re—at the present time, we’re 37 ahead.

Thirty-seven. Well, I thought—

I just talked with [Kenneth R.] Ken Harding.[note 6] Kenneth R. “Ken” Harding was executive director of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee from 1954 to 1972, and sergeant at arms of the U.S. House of Representatives from October 1972 to February 1980.

I thought the paper said 39.

Well, he said 37, and there are three seats uncertain.

Yeah . . . uh-huh. Well—

That’s what I—well, the most we ever predicted. Well, most of those figures were not more than 20.

Yeah.

Here’s 37. That’ll probably go one or two higher, but that’s an amazing [unclear]—

Well, now, [Charles A.] Charlie’s [Halleck] got a bunch of—he’s got 10 or 15, like Connie and John [V.] Lindsay [R–New York] and them over there, and his outfit that you can get, hasn’t he?[note 7] Charles A. “Charlie” Halleck was a U.S. representative [R–Indiana] from January 1935 to January 1969; House Majority Leader from January 1947 to January 1948 and January 1953 to January 1954; and House Minority Leader from January 1959 to January 1965. “Connie” is unidentified. John V. Lindsay was a U.S. representative [R–New York] from January 1959 to December 1965, and mayor of New York from January 1966 to December 1973. In 1971, Lindsay became a Democrat.

Oh, yes. Furthermore, there’s going to be a lot of those fellows now are going to change their tune. [President Johnson acknowledges throughout.] Because the ones who are—good part of the ones who are licked among them were those . . . what they call “the Young Turks,” you know. They were bitter.

Yeah. I’m glad we cleaned out Iowa like we did.

Yes, yes, and [Harold R. “H. R.”] Gross [R–Iowa] is only a few hundred votes ahead.[note 8] Harold R. “H. R.” Gross was a U.S. representative [R–Iowa] from January 1949 to January 1975.

Yeah.

Yeah, and they’re going—they’re hopeful of picking up his seat on the—when there’s a recapitulation next week.

Yeah.

It’s only, I guess, about 260 votes ahead, he is.

They got old [Benton F.] Ben Jensen [R–Iowa], didn’t they?[note 9] Benton F. “Ben” Jensen was a U.S. representative [R–Iowa] from January 1939 to January 1965.

Yeah, they got them all! I just talked with Neal [E.] Smith [D–Iowa] a little while ago.[note 10] Neal E. Smith was a U.S. representative [D–Iowa] from January 1959 to January 1995.

Yeah. Well, you know, we had more million-states than we ever had. I guess we carried Massachusetts by a million, didn’t we?

Over a million. A million and a hundred and some-odd thousand.

We got over a million in Illinois, and a million in Ohio, and a million-four in Pennsylvania. And I guess New York’s close to 3 million now.

Yes. But you carried Massachusetts by a million and a hundred and some-odd thousand votes.

How did [Edward M.] Teddy [Kennedy] [D–Massachusetts] run?[note 11] Edward M. “Teddy” Kennedy was a U.S. senator [D–Massachusetts] from November 1962 until his death on 25 August 2009, and Senate Democratic Whip from January 1969 to January 1971. Did I run up with Teddy?

Oh yes, you ran ahead of Teddy. [President Johnson acknowledges.] Yeah, you ran a couple of hundred thousand votes ahead of him.

Is that right?

[speaking aside to Edward McCormack] How many? [to President Johnson] about 150,000 votes ahead. [Edward J.] Eddie [McCormack Jr.]‘s with me, sitting with me.[note 12] Edward J. “Eddie” McCormack Jr. was attorney general of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts from 1958 to 1963; the Democratic gubernatorial candidate for Massachusetts in 1966; and the nephew of John W. McCormack.

Tell him I—let me to talk to him.

[speaking aside to Edward McCormack] Wait a minute, he wants to—the President wants to talk with you, Eddie.

Congratulations, Mr. President.

Eddie, how you doing, my friend?

Oh, we were all thrilled with that great, great endorsement of yours for the [unclear].

Well, I loved that visit I had with you up there, and [Edward McCormack laughs] that Boston is a pretty good town, isn’t it?

Well, it’s a good town for you. As you’ve often said, “Austin to Boston.” They think highly of you.

Well, you’re mighty wonderful. Take good care of John, now.

Oh, yes. Tremendous endorsement all over.

I’ll see you.

Hold on a minute, now.

Yes, Mr. President.

John, what was your margin?

Well, I was—the last reports I got, I was 82,000 votes ahead with about 30 precincts still in. [President Johnson chuckles.] I—My ratio was about 75 percent. I had—You know, the funny thing about . . . they didn’t bother me, but I did the work to roll up the vote without campaigning openly. But the . . . it was a great tribute, you know, of confidence, and I got probably about 75 percent of the vote.

That’s wonderful.

And that they had a Negro running against me! Can you imagine that?[note 13] McCormack referred to the independent candidate Noel A. Day, a Boston civil rights activist and cochair of the Massachusetts Freedom Movement. Day received 5.0 percent of the vote, finishing third behind McCormack with 80.3 percent and Republican Jack E. Moleswoth with 14.6 percent. “Obituary—Noel Day,” SF Gate, 6 September 1995.

I’ll be damned.

[Unclear.]

Well, you and John Connally get such margins they’re vulnerable.[note 14] John B. Connally was secretary of the U.S. Navy from January 1961 to December 1961; Democratic governor of Texas from January 1963 to January 1969, during which time he was wounded in the assassination of President Kennedy; and U.S. secretary of the treasury from February 1971 to May 1972. Connally was one of Lyndon Johnson’s closest advisers, joining Johnson’s congressional staff in 1938 and managing Johnson’s campaign for the 1960 Democratic presidential nomination. He got about 70 percent.

Yeah, well, in my district, they’re very kind. They gave me—I got about 75 percent of the vote.

Give Harriet my love.

I certainly shall, Mr. President, and I’m looking forward to seeing you.

You figure out, now, how we can get these administration measures up without having to the—Howard [W. “Judge”] Smith [D–Virginia] wreck us.[note 15] Howard W. “Judge” Smith was a U.S. representative [D–Virginia] from March 1931 to January 1967, and chair of the House Rules Committee from January 1955 to January 1967.

Don’t worry. I’ll level on that.

We got to figure out some way where you’re the boss up there and not Howard Smith.

Now, listen, [unclear] confidence.

Yeah?

There’s two men who deserted: [Albert W.] Watson [Sr.] [D–South Carolina] of South Carolina, and John Bell Williams of South Car—Watson of North Carolina . . . [John Bell] Williams [D–Mississippi] of Mississippi—[note 16] Albert W. Watson Sr. was a U.S. representative [D–South Carolina] from January 1963 to February 1965, and a U.S. representative [R–South Carolina] from June 1965 to January 1971. John Bell Williams was a U.S. representative [D–Mississippi] from January 1947 to January 1968, and the Democratic governor of Mississippi from January 1968 to January 1972.

Yeah.

Now, personally, I don’t think they ought to have the privileges of a Democratic member.

No, I wouldn’t. If they didn’t support the ticket, I’d—

They’d—Listen, it’s one thing if a fellow looked out for himself, but they went out and supported Goldwater.

I just put them with Goldwater’s crowd.

Well, I’m glad to hear, because four years ago, I wanted [Samuel T.] Sam [Rayburn] to do that with the ones then, you know, on the Rules Committee fight.[note 17] Samuel T. “Sam” Rayburn was a U.S. representative [D–Texas] from March 1913 until his death in November 1961; Speaker of the House from September 1940 to November 1961; and one of Lyndon Johnson’s political mentors.

Yeah. Yeah.

And while I agreed with his judgment then—I went along—nevertheless, I don’t know why we should—we can deny them the privileges of a Democrat!

You just got to do that. You can’t be letting people have a premium on treason.

In other words, they’re treasonable, and [unclear]—and here’s Williams, who’s the next man on Interstate and Foreign Commerce [Committee]. In other words, if we just simply treat them as being as the same as a third party member, then all they do is get whatever little committee we want to give them, and they go to the bottom.

That’s exactly what I’d do.

Now, that’s what—that—I’m telling you—I’m glad that—I had it in mind, because I’m—You really ought to know, and—but I wanted you to know just how my thoughts were running on that. And I think we ought to get the 21-day rule back.[note 18] For background on the 21-Day Rule, see “House Votes 233–185 to Repeal 21-Day Rule; Senate Defeats Move to Revise Cloture Rule,” Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1967, 23rd ed., 02-180-02-185 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1968), http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal67-1314031.

I’d sure get something where I could get things up in that House. I wouldn’t be having to curry with Judge Smith all the time.

The 21-day rule was very helpful.

Well—

And we ought to have—do something on—where we don’t have to get unanimous consent to send a bill to conference.

That’s right.

And there’s one or two other things there, but the 21-day rule will have a very strengthening effect.

I’d just sure get that list up, and let’s talk about it next week or so, ‘cause I think if you get these 40 new men in there, I guess you’ll lose 40 in the South, and you can probably [a telephone rings in the background]—Charlie [Halleck] can keep 100 of his, but you can outvote him, and we ought to—when you adopt those rules, we ought to stop all this foolishness about not getting a bill to conference without Howard Smith’s consent.

Exactly.

And we just oughtn’t to have to go around begging like me and you did this last year. It’s just not [John McCormack acknowledges]—the President and the Speaker are above that, and we just might as well put it on the line or get out.

Exactly, I—

Ain’t no use having the people vote for you and then turn it over to him without a fight.

I agree.

So I just think that—I know what [Lewis] Lew [Deschler] and some of these boys are awful cautious, and so forth.[note 19] Lewis “Lew” Deschler was parliamentarian of the U.S. House of Representatives from February 1927 to June 1974. But I just feel like that . . . Mr. Rayburn used to say to me, about the Senate, he said that you, “I like you to be deliberate, and I know that you think that you ought to be allowed to talk.” But he said, “The body has got to be able to work its will. And it may not work it in an hour, but it’s got to be able to work it in a day or a week.”

Now, we’ve got to work our will, and you can’t work your will when Howard Smith can keep a bill from going to conference, or Gross can stop it. You can’t work your will when the free people of the United States give you a 15 million mandate and you can’t even get up a bill, and the Speaker has to go around and beg and pat backs, and the President has to call and talk to Mrs. [Katharine Price Collier] St. George [R–New York], and stuff like that.[note 20] Katharine Price Collier St. George was a U.S. representative [R–New York] from January 1947 to January 1965. It’s just not right, and we ought to get a three-weeks rule, or a two-weeks calendar, or something else, and you got to—whoever you put on that Rules Committee, I’d put old Claude [D.] Pepper [D–Florida], ‘cause, by God, he’s a fighter, and I was in Florida with him, and he helped us carry Florida.[note 21] Claude D. Pepper was a U.S. senator [D–Florida] from November 1936 to January 1951, and a U.S. representative [D–Florida] from January 1963 to January 1989.

Well, I told you—

Yeah, I know, we talked about it.

—who I had in mind.

Yeah, I know, we talked about it.

That’s agreeable to you?

Yes, sir, you’re damn right. It’s wonderful to me. He’s a McCormack man; he’s a Johnson man; he’s a Democrat.

He is. And he’s American.

Yes, he bet he is, and . . . I’d just get it all done at one time—these people in these 45 states, now, 44 states, the District of Columbia, they didn’t vote for Howard Smith.

No.

And they—he’s a good man, and he’s an able man, but he’s representing another century, and Goldwater represented his viewpoint. And they got six states.

Exactly.

And the people, 15 million of them, say they want to move ahead.

That’s correct.

And if we don’t move with them, they’re going to move over us.

That’s right.

And so you ought to just lift one, two, three, four—how to get your bill up, how to get your bill to conference, what you’re going to do with John Bell Williams if something happens to Oren Harris; we don’t want him chairman of that committee.[note 22] Oren Harris was a U.S. representative [D–Arkansas] from January 1941 to February 1966; chair of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce from 1957 to 1966; a judge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas from February 1966 to February 1976; and chief judge for the Western District from 1967 to 1973. Harris assumed senior status in February 1976. We don’t want others to think they can get out here and quit us and get rewarded for it. We got to set an example, and let’s get it done and talk about it in a week or so, just me and you, keep it quiet, and then we’ll go out and get the votes to do it.

All right, Mr. President.

Bye.

Bye.