—[unclear]?

Yes.

This is Dean Rusk. I have here on my end a conference call with [Cyrus R.] Cy Vance, General [Earle G. “Bus”] Wheeler, John [A.] McCone, George [W.] Ball, [W.] Averell Harriman, and myself.[note 2] Cyrus R. “Cy” Vance was secretary of the U.S. Army from 1962 to 1963; U.S. deputy secretary of defense from 1964 to 1967; special representative of the president to Cyprus in 1967 and to Korea in 1968; and U.S. negotiator at the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam from 1968 to 1969. Gen. Earle G. “Bus” Wheeler was chief of staff of the U.S. Army from October 1962 to July 1964, and chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1964 to July 1970. John A. McCone was a California businessman; chair of the Atomic Energy Commission from July 1958 to January 1961; and director of the Central Intelligence Agency from November 1961 to April 1965. George W. Ball was a Washington lawyer with an international practice; an adviser to Adlai E. Stevenson II in 1952, 1956, and 1960; U.S. under secretary of state for economic affairs in 1961; U.S. under secretary of state from 1961 to 1966; and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in 1968. W. Averell Harriman was U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union from October 1943 to January 1946; U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom from April 1946 to October 1946; U.S. secretary of commerce from October 1946 to April 1948; director of the Mutual Security Agency from October 1951 to January 1953; a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1952 and 1956; the Democratic governor of New York from January 1955 to December 1958; U.S. ambassador-at-large from January 1961 to November 1961; U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs from December 1961 to April 1963; U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs from April 1963 to March 1965; and ambassador-at-large and chief U.S. delegate to the Paris Peace Talks from May 1968 to January 1969. We want to talk a moment about the Congo situation. I think you were informed earlier today that the situation in Stanleyville apparently deteriorated somewhat further. The leadership that we’ve been trying to bicker with apparently is not in the city. [Antoine] Gizenga is apparently over on the border of Uganda.[note 3] Antoine Gizenga was deputy prime minister of Congo-Léopoldville from June 1960 to September 1960; prime minister of Congo-Stanleyville from December 1960 to August 1961; secretary-general of the Unified Lumumbist Party; and prime minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from December 2006 to October 2008. The military man, [Nicholas] Olenga apparently is up on the border of the Sudan.[note 4] Gen. Nicholas Olenga was a Congolese rebel leader and commander-in-chief of the Popular Liberation Army during the Simba Rebellion from 1963 to 1964. And the elements in Stanleyville appear to be the most irresponsible group there, the so-called Jeunesse, the rebel private personnel; that is, the troops.[note 5] See Donald H. Louchheim, “Stanleyville Fall Lifts Curtain on Key Rebel Figures,” Washington Post, 26 November 1964.

Now, we’ve been talking about this operation that you’re familiar with, and we would like to send a message tonight, saying that upon arrival at Kamina, the aircraft and forces should prepare to execute the operation at first light on Monday morning, November 23rd, that: [seeming to read aloud] “Do not execute unless directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The order to execute will be sent prior to a given hour here unless developments in the next 18 hours indicate the desirability of further postponement.” Then we would tell them in a second paragraph that [reading aloud again] “the aircraft should be refueled immediately upon arrival in Kamina, in case a further marked deterioration in Stanleyville requires us to have them go earlier,” that is, the afternoon before.

Now, [clears throat] this coincides with the views of the Belgians, who are taking the major burden here and have the major responsibility. We have had a thorough discussion here. [Clears throat.] The Chiefs of Staff are fully on board with this line of action; so is Cy Vance. There is one—

Where is [Robert S. “Bob”] McNamara?[note 6] Robert S. “Bob” McNamara was president of Ford Motor Company from November 1960 to January 1961; U.S. secretary of defense from January 1961 to February 1968; and president of the World Bank from April 1968 to July 1981.

He is in town, but I talked to him before I came over here, sir.

All right. Is he on board?

Yes, sir.

Where has he been all day, Cy?

He has been here. He’s been in budget meetings over at the Pentagon.

Yeah, OK. All right.

There’s some difference down the line in the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] that I think John McCone ought to mention to you. John, would you speak to that point?

Yes, Mr. President, the difference in CIA is there is one group that feel that probably the consequences on the hostages would be lessened if the particular operation were held up and moved only in the event that things broke out before the [Frédéric] Vandewalle column went in.[note 7] Col. Frédéric Vandewalle was a Belgian colonial military leader in the Congo from 1937 to 1957, and head of state security forces from 1957 to 1960; an organizer of the Katangese secession from the Congo; and leader of Operation Ommegang against the Simba Rebellion during the Congo Crisis from 1963 to 1965. They feel that the most advantageous situation from the standpoint of the hostages would be for the column to take Stanleyville rather than to resort to this drop. Now, there is a difference within the agency on this point, and really it’s a matter of opinion in it, more than anything that you can really prove.

Mr. President, I think that all of us feel that we should say to you that we can’t think of any line of action here that would be sure to pick up live hostages throughout. That if we don’t do anything, we’ll find corpses, some corpses; if we take an action of this sort by execution order tomorrow, that we’re likely to find some corpses. But we don’t have any feeling at all that there’s any responsible authority in Stanleyville that can give anybody any protection.

Now, our embassy in Brussels will be talking with [Paul-Henri C.] Spaak tomorrow to get his final judgment before we recommend whether we push the button for an actual move.[note 8] Paul-Henri C. Spaak was prime minister of Belgium from May 1938 to February 1939, in March 1946, and from March 1947 to August 1949; Belgian foreign minister from 1939 to 1966; president of the U.N. General Assembly from March 1946 to March 1947; president of the Common Assembly from September 1952 to May 1954; and secretary-general of NATO from May 1957 to April 1961. But this would get us in a position to move quickly if we had to move with the least possible warning and to get them thoroughly prepared to move at first light on Monday.

Now, what does this do, Dean? Move them up a few hours?

Well, all that this does is to give them, in effect, an alert time for the most probable hour of commitment. But it does not—it specifically says, “Do not execute unless directed by JCS.”

Does it move—does it physically move them from where they are?

It doesn’t move them [another speaker says “no” in the background] from where we’ve already ordered them. That is in Kamina.

Mm-hmm. All this does is just say, “Get ready.”

That’s right. [Another speaker says, “That’s right.”] But I—

Now, John, do you agree this ought to be done?

Yes, sir. I do. I agree with [unclear]—

[speaking over McCone] You—then you got a minority opinion in your own outfit?

Yes, that’s correct. [President Johnson attempts to interject.] But that is based on their appraisal of the situation—

But you don’t share their view?

—[unclear] the intelligence.

But you don’t share their view?

No, but I can’t ignore it.

No, I’m not saying you ignore it, but you don’t agree with it.

No, I cannot agree with it totally, no.

You agree with what Dean’s saying.

Yes, I do.

All right. OK, go ahead, Dean.

Well, I do think that we ought to give as much weight as we can to the Belgian problem here. They have several hundred hostages, and they’re putting in the paratroopers and going to take the casualties. And Spaak seems to feel that it is important to move. I think the Belgians—

How many people—how many paratroopers are they putting in?

Approximately a thousand, sir.

Mm-hmm. Now, we—all we’re doing is furnishing the planes?

That’s right, sir.

How many—

There will be 200 American military air crews on those planes. In other words, we’re running some risk ourselves.

Now, wait a minute, repeat that. How many Americans?

There’ll be about 200 military air crews on those planes . . . but no combat troops.

Well, how are they going to—they’re going to shoot the planes down, you mean, that’s the danger?

Well, we could lose some Americans if they shot the planes down. That’s right.

That’s right, sir.

But these will be given cover with T-28s and B-26s that are already in the Congo, and they would use these planes to go ahead of the drop and also to help them deliver suppressive fire, if anything comes out of the ground at them.[note 9] T-28s were used for counterinsurgency missions, including in the Congo. See Richard L. Holm, “A Plane Crash, Rescue, and Recovery: A Close Call in Africa,” Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1999–2000), 17–28.

Do they have any antiaircraft?

We’re not absolutely certain what is at Stanleyville at this point. They had some. Some of the antiaircraft that they had at Stanleyville turned up in Bukavu, so we know that some of it was moved away. But we don’t know what is there or who’s there to man it. [President Johnson acknowledges.] But these planes should—these T-28s and B-26s—should be able to find that out before the paratroop-carrying planes actually arrive on the scene.

Mmm. There are a thousand men in the paratroop group?

That’s right, sir.

Mm-hmm.

Now, this is a highly trained, elite group; it’s actually the palace guard in Belgium. [President Johnson acknowledges.] This is the best outfit they’ve got. The Belgians are very confident that if they get down, and if they get there, that they will not run into serious problems. They’ve had a lot of experience in the Congo, and they feel certain that if it is necessary to commit these troops, that the troops themselves will take care of themselves.

Where is Harriman?

He’s sitting right here.

Does he agree?

[speaking aside to Harriman] Do you agree, [unclear]? [Harriman responds faintly in the background.] [to President Johnson] Yes, he agrees very much.

All right. I’d go on, then.

All right, sir.

Good night.

We’ll call you tomorrow.

Yeah. Bob McNamara agrees with this?

Yes, he does, sir.

OK, go ahead.

Thank you, sir.