Pretty good, hope you are.

Oh, I’m doing all right. [Michael J. “Mike”] Mansfield [D–Montana] and [Everett M.] Dirksen [R–Illinois] came down and dumped this CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] stuff in my lap.[note 3] Michael J. “Mike” Mansfield was a U.S. senator [D–Montana] from January 1953 to January 1977, and Senate Majority Leader from January 1961 to January 1977. Everett M. Dirksen was a U.S. senator [R–Illinois] from January 1951 until his death in September 1969, and Senate Minority Leader from January 1959 to September 1969. The damnedest fool [unclear]—

I [unclear] see what you had to do with it, but they said they were going to.

It was the damnedest fool thing I ever saw. I told them that I didn’t ever want to order anybody to tell any secrets to anyone that they didn’t trust.

[Pause.] Well, the rumors are saying take care of the situation. Fact of the matter, why, you—it’s not in your domain.

[Pause.] I wanted to talk to you about it before I give them an answer. I told them that I wasn’t supposed to give any such instruction, and I wanted to think it over. Dirksen said he didn’t think I ought to. Mansfield, I just—I asked him, I said, “What would you do if you were in my shoe?" “Oh,” he said, “I—it’s a very difficult matter.” He wouldn’t take a position.

Oh, well, he’s taking a strong position. He’s told me he was strongly in favor of doing it this way and all. [Clears throat.] And I—I said, well—he brought this up—I said, “Well, of course, you’ve got something now that I don’t have any control over. If [J. William “Bill”] Fulbright [D–Arkansas] wants to appoint a subcommittee, he can appoint it.[note 4] J. William “Bill” Fulbright was a U.S. senator [D–Arkansas] from January 1945 to December 1974, and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from January 1959 to December 1974. And if the President wants to order the CIA to spill its guts to anybody in the world, why, he’s got a right to do that. [President Johnson acknowledges.] So it’s out of my hands. I got no control of it.”

What do you think about giving it—this Clark [M.] Clifford committee, they’ve been doing it.[note 5] Clark M. Clifford was a Washington lawyer; an adviser to presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson; a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1961 to 1968; chair of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from April 1963 to February 1968; and U.S. secretary of defense from March 1968 to January 1969. Would you—Clifford’s going to come in the administration, I think. I could just abolish that committee and just tell them I don’t think that—I think the trouble is there are too many got supervision now. Could leave it up to the ones that got it under the rules of the Congress.

[Pause.] Well, we got the votes finally. I’ve had to operate a lot around, but I’ve got enough to beat the ass off of them [unclear]. They’ve just had that little disarmament crowd of [Gaylord A.] Nelson [D–Wisconsin], [George S.] McGovern [D–South Dakota], Fulbright, [Wayne L.] Morse [D–Oregon].[note 6] Gaylord A. Nelson was the Democratic governor of Wisconsin from January 1959 to January 1963; a U.S. senator [D–Wisconsin] from January 1963 to January 1981; chair of the Senate Employment, Manpower, and Poverty Subcommittee; and founder of Earth Day. George S. McGovern was a U.S. representative [D–South Dakota] from January 1957 to January 1961; director of Food for Peace from January 1961 to July 1962; a U.S. senator [D–South Dakota] from January 1963 to January 1981; and the Democratic U.S. presidential nominee in 1972. Wayne L. Morse was a U.S. senator [Oregon], who served as a Republican from 1945 to 1952, an Independent from 1953 to 1956, and a Democrat from 1957 to 1969. Along with Ernest Gruening [D–Alaska], he was one of only two senators to vote against the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Oh, they got 25 votes, I reckon. Maybe 35. But I’ve got plenty to beat them. [Pause.] I think you’re the one on high ground when you just say that’s an internal matter in the Senate, and you just don’t feel at liberty to . . . invade the procedures of the Senate. You, of course, press legislation there under the Senate procedure, but you don’t [coughs] feel that you should undertake the [unclear]. It’s an invasion by the executive of the legislative; legislative don’t want to invade the executive. [Pause.] Dirksen scared Mansfield off. Mansfield was red-hot on it till he talked to Dirksen.

[Pause.] What’s happening in Georgia?

It’s the damnedest mess down there I have ever seen. It is the worst mess, that governor’s business, that I have ever seen in my life. When he announced it, sort of shocked them when he came out three days later and said he wasn’t going to run—couldn’t run. So it is a—true they left him in a mess, and I wish—I mean, if I were a young man about 35 years old down there in the state legislature, I could just clean that whole crowd out, one end to the other. They got a lot of them running, but none of them are very strong.

Hmm.

None of them have any great popular appeal.

Mm-hmm. We got a pretty disastrous poll coming up on Vietnam. It’s about 35, [3]6 percent want to get out. About 40 percent approve what we’re doing, the way I’m handling it. About 41 percent approve the way I’m doing it, and about 36 percent are “disapprove.” [Snorts.]

Well, you’re going to have to do something different out there. If you don’t, you’re going to eventually get in trouble. [Robert S. “Bob”] McNamara gave you some good advice on that.[note 7] Robert S. “Bob” McNamara was president of Ford Motor Company from November 1960 to January 1961; U.S. secretary of defense from January 1961 to February 1968; and president of the World Bank from April 1968 to July 1981.

[Pause.] What’s that?

About pushing a little bit harder.

Well, he’s not advising that now. We’ve got until we get a government— [laughs] —till we get propped up. Nobody really has—

I think the government straightened itself out pretty well out there.

Well, not yet. Not yet. It’s on its way to doing it, but it’s . . . it’s not [unclear].

Well, I don’t think it ever will, they clamp down and be a real government any more than I think you’re going to have one in San Domingo [Dominican Republic]. You may have one for a year—

Well, we did a pretty good job there.

Did a hell of a good job. I’m sure it cost us a lot of money, but we did a good job.

Well, it cost us as much as it cost us had it been done in Cuba. You know, it’s not costing us as much. It’s the best investment we’ve made. These goddamn Washington Post, New York Times won’t ever say so. Just like they don’t in Panama or Brazil or Chile, any other place that we’ve saved from the shape they got it in. But what happened there—

Mm-hmm.

And, of course, the Russians know more about our military system than I do.

They know more about everything that happens than we do.

And they know that we’ve got a very strong system. But it’s weakening greatly the way they’re running it. It’s going to be [coughs] sort of a hodgepodge.

Don’t you believe that this system is stronger than it was when we came into office? A hell of a lot?

Yes, but [unclear]—

What do you mean it’s being weakened?

—it’s losing ground now.

Well, of course, it’s losing ground.

It’s losing ground awfully, because of your rigid position on reserves, Mr. President. These reserves—you’re picking—pulling all the people out of Europe and sending them over there and filling them up with [unclear]—

We ain’t got a shirttail fell out of Europe. Not a shirttail.

Well, [unclear].

Fifteen. That don’t amount to a damn thing.

Well, Mr. President—

See, we exchanged them, we moved them around, back in and out.

I know, I know. But you put a lot of draftees in there. But why in the world you don’t put some of those people from Europe in these reserve divisions and take these reservists out, and let them go to fight is something I can’t understand. Because there’s nothing in—

Oh, you may get a request up there some morning. [Unclear]—

There’s nothing in combat like having a man that knows what he’s doing somewhere along with those 478 green men.

Our boys know what they’re doing. They’re doing it damn well.

[speaking over President Johnson] Well, I’m [unclear] these reserves that don’t know. Because—

These—

—by golly, and McNamara just sits up there and testifies like he thinks these six reserve divisions and twelve reserve brigades are just equal to anything in the United States or in the world or anywhere else. And I know damn well they aren’t, because I’ve been out with them. [Unclear]—

First place, if we tried to call them up, by God, we’d have to kiss you all around and hug you for weeks.

[speaking over President Johnson] I wouldn’t—I’m not in favor of calling them all up. I’m in favor of calling them up selectively, according to their MOS [military occupational specialty]—

And we wouldn’t any more than get them up until, by God, they’d have to go back, and we just [Russell coughs] —all we do is satisfy old Jay Carleton, and that’d be the only one we’d do, and everybody else would be [unclear]—[note 8] “Jay Carleton” is unidentified.

I didn’t know [unclear] Carleton—I didn’t even know his position.

Oh, hell. You know, by God, he and [John C.] Stennis [D–Mississippi] have been hammering us over the head about that [unclear]—[note 9] John C. Stennis was a U.S. senator [D–Mississippi] from November 1947 to January 1989, and chair of the Senate Select Committee on Standards and Conduct from 1965 to 1975.

I know, but they’re [unclear] about—they’ve been doing it about keeping the reserves compartmentalized like they are now. [Unclear]—

[speaking over Russell] They tell me that they only got—

—[unclear] mixed up with the regular establishment.

They got one old man over there, Johnson, and thought he couldn’t get along without them for a while, until they showed him what he had, and waked him up. And now he—I think he’s happy and satisfied. He doesn’t think it, and if we called them up, we’d—you’d have to give us legislation, wouldn’t you?

Well, I—we can get legislation, but we—

Yeah, yeah.

—don’t have to because you can just proclaim a limited emergency.

Yeah, I could. Yeah, I could get us in a hell of a big war when I go to messing around there, too. I don’t know what kind of agreements these folks got with the Russians. I want to be awful careful about—

Well, I agree with you on that, as far as making a declaration of war, but—

That’s right.

—anything short of that I don’t think is dangerous. No, I’m—

We may have to call them up, but when I do, I’m going to make y’all run like turkeys. You’re going to say, “Well, we can’t do it. [Unclear] 12 months and 14 months.” [speaking over Russell] And I’ll just have one goddamn constant—

[speaking under President Johnson] I’m not going to [unclear], because I knew that was all a fraud. There wasn’t any need of calling them up. And I put that 12 months in there. But it’s going to be 24 months now, just like the draftee [unclear] if I have anything to do with it.

Well, you can write your ticket on it, and you better give us plenty of time, because I may—you know about the fellow, don’t you, that made the speech on sex, and—

Well, that’s all I can do now is make a speech on it.

Well—

I don’t remember that far back, but [unclear]—

[attempting to speak over Russell] —you did—did you ever—did I ever tell—

[speaking simultaneously] —[unclear] alive [unclear].

Did I ever tell you that story?

No.

Well, a fellow came home one night, and he’s late. And his wife’s laying up waiting for him about midnight, said, “Where in the hell have you been?" And he’s about half drunk, and he apologized and said, “Well, honey, I stopped off at the club.” And said, “They all got to drinking and asked me to make them a speech. And I made them a speech.” She said, “What did you talk about?" He said, “Aviation.” He said, “We’re talking about putting an aviation service in the company, and I talked to them about aviation.” She turned over and went on to sleep.

Next day, she’s down at the grocery store and a woman came up and said, “Oh God,” said, “your husband must have made a wonderful speech last night.” Said, “My husband came home midnight, waked me up, turned me over.” And said, “Oh, we had a wonderful evening.” [Unclear.]

[Laughs.]

Then when she got down to the checker and started to check out her groceries, she said, “Oh, your husband,” said, “he must have made a wonderful speech last night.” Said, “My husband says the most inspiring speech here.” And the third one, she got in the car, told her the same thing. She said, “I don’t know why it was such a damn good speech.” Said, “He knows very little about the subject.”

[Laughs.]

Said, “Only experience”—said, “the only experience he’s ever had in his whole damn life—he’s just had two experiences.”

[Laughs.]

And said, “The first time he got sick of his stomach. The second time his hat blew off.” [Both laugh heartily.] Said, “He’s just—just had two experiences. He’s just been up in a plane twice.” And said, “The first time he got sick to his stomach.” [Laughs.]

Well, I’ve had more experiences than that, but it is been and has been in the past.

Well, now you better hold on to your hat. Your hat’s going to blow off one day you go to recommending what we do out there, because [snorts] we may have to have—

[Unclear]—

—we may have to have 10 or 15—we may have to have 10 or 15 billion dollars. We may—

[Unclear] spend 30 billion, Mr. President.

We may have to have 10 or 15 billion more.

I know it. [Unclear]—

We may have to have reserve legislation. We may have to have a big tax bill.

I’m ready right now to bring in the appropriations for it, and I think it’d be better than using that damned old law that Mac—Mr. McNamara’s going to use, but I’m willing to go either way. We can get the appropriation. I can get it through. And I’ve talked to George Mahon; he says he can get it through the House.

Don’t you—don’t you think I’d be in a hell of a shape, though, if I called up the reserves between now and . . . the—

I don’t mean to call them up as organization, Mr. President. I wouldn’t do that at all. I wouldn’t call up this division or that brigade. I would just mix up a lot of these people. I’d call them up as individuals under the MOS, just like you calling up these draftees, because you’ve got a sanctuary there for all of these—oh, there’s 400,000 of them really that are in these reserve organizations. And they’re the best brains, and they’re the best boys physically. They all came up when you wasn’t having to scrap—scrape the bottom of the barrel. And we ought to mix them up and send some of these—bring me some of these boys that have done their 12 months back from Vietnam, and put them in these divisions where these divisions will be ready to fight.

[speaking over Russell] I’ll tell you what I’ll do, I’ll make—

[Unclear] in these divisions are [unclear], and it’s just poppycock to say that they can get out here and hold down with anybody, because they haven’t got any experienced people with them.

Let me make a deal with you. I’ll work on the reserve thing, and . . . give—follow your suggestions on that if you’ll follow mine on letting me call up everybody. And letting me draft all of them. Give me a little step program like you promised me one time. You made me a firm commitment [Russell laughs or coughs] and then ran out on me.

Twelve thousand, five hundred.

That’s right. That’s what you told me [unclear], 12,500. But you just let me call up these damn folks and get them off the marijuana and out of the jungles and out of the rats eating on them, and let me put them out in these damn camps and work the hell out of them.

[speaking under President Johnson] You can do whatever you want to.

Work the hell out of them and feed them. I’m going to do it. [Unclear]—

You can call them up today, and I won’t—

But I—I don’t want you fussing at me [unclear].

I won’t say a critical word. Not one.

And—

I think you’re going to waste a lot of money on them, though, but it’s all right.

Well, I won’t waste—I won’t—Army don’t cost as much as [R. Sargent] Shriver.[note 10] R. Sargent Shriver was director of the Peace Corps from March 1961 to February 1966; director of the Office of Economic Opportunity from October 1964 to March 1968; and U.S. ambassador to France from April 1968 to March 1970.

As what?

As Shriver.

Oh, of course not.

Well . . .

Shriver’s the most extravagant man ever ran an agency of the national government. He’s—is the most visionary [unclear]—

Are you and Dirksen going to keep my budget in term this year?

Keep what?

Keep my budget within bounds this year?

No, I don’t think it’s going to be possible to do that, Mr. President.

Well, I think you could. You’ve got—they got about 4 billion, they’ve raised it now with the committees, and I know some of it you can’t touch. One of it, you can’t touch this G.I. bill, ‘cause all of them are running about it. You just got scared to death.

Oh, I was ready to vote against that—

You just got—

—[unclear] change at all.

You just got scared to death somebody running against you down there.

Didn’t a damn thing scare me [unclear]—

[speaking over Russell] You’re just as bad as—

—[unclear] whether you’d veto it or not.

You are a state—

When I found out it wasn’t going to be vetoed, I voted for it.

You are a statesman, but, by God, you’re worse than Ralph [W.] Yarborough [D–Texas] on election year.[note 11] Ralph W. Yarborough was a U.S. senator [D–Texas] from April 1957 to January 1971.

[Laughs.]

You’re like old man—

Maybe so, but I—

[Laughs.]

—I voted—when I found out that old [Dwight D.] Eisenhower was going to veto the federal pay raise, I voted against it, and then I voted to sustain his veto.[note 12] Dwight D. Eisenhower was a five-star general of the U.S. Army; governor of the American Zone of Occupied Germany from May 1945 to November 1945; chief of staff of the U.S. Army from November 1945 to February 1948; Supreme Allied Commander in Europe from April 1951 to May 1952; president of Columbia University from 1948 to 1953; and president of the United States from January 1953 to January 1961. But I’m not going to just sacrifice myself needlessly when the President’s going to sign the bill.

Well, now, are you ready to vote against this military pay and civilian pay if I veto them both?

Yes, sir. If you do it with both of them.

Yeah. Now, what about—

If you do it with both of them, I’ll vote against them [unclear]—

[speaking over Russell] What about the health, education bills, 500 million [dollars] in that?

I’d just impound that. I’ll vote against it, but that—

Well, that’s impact—

You don’t realize the power you’ve got as President down there. If you’d just impound that and say, “Well, we can’t . . . we can’t spend it [at] this time.”

What about the impacted school bill? It’s 200 million [dollars] there.

I’d leave that alone. I wouldn’t fool with that. That’s part of this school system in this country and has been for 15 years. It’s all wrong—

Yes, but a third of it goes to the rich people.

I know. It’s all wrong. It [unclear]—

It goes—it’s not to the poor districts. It’s out to these goddamn place—districts where they got [unclear]—

Lots of districts where the people have the highest per capita income [unclear]—

Alexandria and Arlington get a third of it.

That’s right.

It’s just outra[geous]—

Well, if you just impound a third of it you’ll get away with it, and you won’t hurt a school district, and you won’t lose more than 15[000], 20,000 votes over the country.

And what about agriculture? You got 500 million [dollars] in the House bill over that.

Well, I haven’t studied that carefully. I don’t know what it is. Our school lunch program—you can’t get away with that. You’re going to have to keep that going like it is now. You know, the thing that causes our trouble over—

REA [Rural Electrification Administration] has got 150 million [dollars].

[Pause.] REA.

Are you going to go with REA or the power company?

I’m not going [with] either one of them. I’m not going—

Well, we got a—

I’m going to support the administration—

We got—well, I got an REA bill up there, creates a bank and makes them quit this 2 percent.

[speaking under President Johnson] I’m going to support that . . . I’m going to support that.

Makes them quit this—

No! Hell, you ain’t got that 2 percent in there, have you?

No, I got 2 percent just for the poor ones until transition period. We’ll make them—

No, that’s too low. I didn’t know that. I thought there was REA bill [that] had the 2 percent in there.

Well, I did. The REA’s got—we both got 2 percent, but one of them wanted longer than mine. Mine cuts it off, and mine—

I’ll vote for the administration bill, but I don’t think you ought to have 2 percent at all. I think it’s ridiculous.

That’s just for the [speaking over Russell] poor co-ops.

These power companies are—these co-ops are making more money than anybody now. Down in my state, they’re paying their managers 27,500 [dollars] a year.

All of them that can do—all of them can do it. They pay the regular rate. Everybody—no, only the insolvent ones can get the low rate. Only the poor one[s].[note 13] The Rural Electrification Administration (REA) had been established as part of the New Deal in order to promote the electrification of isolated rural sections of the United States through low-cost federal loans. Many of the loans had gone to electric cooperatives. The program had proved to be one of the most effective economic development measures implemented by the federal government and, indirectly, a key policy tool against rural poverty. Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation 1945–1964: A Review of Government and Politics in the Postwar Years (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965), 751; Jordan A. Schwartz, The New Dealers: Power Politics in the Age of Roosevelt (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 255–63. All I’m interested in, though—

There ain’t any poor ones in my state.

If—there are not many, but all—there are a few in the United States. But all I’m interested in is your viewpoint whether it’s public power or . . . whether you’re for the REA or—the power companies are fighting us now.

I’m not for either one of them.

Well, I’m in the middle.

I think the REA is going too far on their side, and I know the power companies are going too far on theirs.

That’s what I—all right. But they—power companies that come up here—

[speaking over President Johnson] And I’m hoping that you would get us sort of a middle ground, [unclear] all set.

[speaking over Russell] That’s what I’ve got, that’s what I’ve got. And the power companies won’t do it, though, and we—

Well, how about the REA?

We can make them do it. We can make them do it. They won’t have any choice.

Well, we’ll whip the hell out of them [and] out of the power companies.

Yeah, that’s what we got to do. That’s what we got—

But I wouldn’t give the REA too much, ‘cause they’re in good shape, Mr. President. They’re making money!

I’m not giving them—I’m not giving them much. We—they’re raising—

Understand, I’m the original REA [unclear].

They’re opposing me. They’re opposing me, you see?

I have fought for the REA when, in the Senate, when they said I was crazy.

Oh, I used to go over and get you [Russell attempts to interject] to put in 200 million at a time when I was in the House. You’ve forgotten.

Yes, and I’m still for it. But they’re all flourishing now. They’re doing well.

Isn’t everybody doing well?

Yeah, apparently, I think so, yes. [Unclear.]

[speaking over Russell] Are you scared about—are you scared about inflation?

Well, yes, I think all of us have some concern about it. Don’t you?

Every economist I got tells me we’ve got to have a tax bill.

Well, I don’t agree with that.

I don’t, either. The unemployment’s going up to about—

I don’t agree with that, but I must say I’m concerned about inflation. It’s very high.

Unemployment’s going up to 3.9, 4 percent now.

But I wouldn’t, I wouldn’t . . .

Well, they say that’s the only way to drain it off. They say that we can’t cut the expenditure. I thought you and [Everett M.] Dirksen [R–Illinois] would have an agreement, and you’d deliver the southerners, he’d deliver the Republicans.[note 14] Everett M. Dirksen was a U.S. senator [R–Illinois] from January 1951 until his death in September 1969, and Senate Minority Leader from January 1959 to September 1969. And I told Henry [H. “Joe”] Fowler to go talk to both of you.[note 15] Henry H. “Joe” Fowler was U.S. under secretary of the treasury from February 1961 to April 1964, and U.S. secretary of the treasury from April 1965 to December 1968. And that you would keep the budget down, keep the Senate bills down to what the budget called for, and take it out—

I can’t do all of these [unclear].

You may have to take some of it out in poverty. You may have to [in] foreign aid, you may have to take it, but just don’t put anything in unless you take it out some other place. [Snorts.] The budget’s 112 billion [dollars]—that’s a hell of a lot of money.

That’s a hell of a big budget, it sure is, but [unclear]—

But don’t tell me that we ought to cut—

—there’s a war and all going on.

We can’t have [wage and price] controls, so we got to cut expenditures or put a tax bill in to take off this surplus, because we’re overheating.

Well, we have—eventually—I don’t know about right now.

Well, I’m hoping that I can wait till—

I think you are eventually going to have to do one of [unclear].

I’m hoping that I can do till January, but I was hoping y’all could kind of hold things until then.

Well, I’m going to vote to cut a lot of it. And if you can get any organized opposition to this pay raise—

No.

—army and civilian.

You can’t, you can’t, you can’t get any. You can’t get any at all.

But if you’re going to raise civilian, you got to raise the army, too.

That’s right, and you can’t do it. You can’t get any opposition to either, and you can’t get into health-education. I can cut out—

Well, there’s too much money in that health-education bill.

I agree with you. But it’s—you know what it is: 200 million [dollars] of it’s impacted school. That’s the first. It’s got 400-odd million [dollars] in it; 200 [million dollars] of it’s impacted school.

Well, they put too much in there—well, at least they’re going to in the Senate. I don’t know what they’re—the House bill; I haven’t checked it. But they’re going to put too much in there for this medical research.

Yes, they’re—

[Unclear] haven’t got the people to do the work.

They have.[note 16] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary. They’ve got too much for nearly everything, Dick. We’re spending—we’re appropriating about 10 billion [dollars] more for health and education than we did when I became president. And that’s going fast enough. That’s going fast enough.

That’s too fast. Too fast. You haven’t got scientists to handle it.

And this Community Action Program, poverty, is a wasteful thing; they ought to cut it out.

It’s terrible.

It’s a dangerous thing, too. These folks are liable to—

It is terrible, and the way they handle it is just like that they got a gift from on high, and then there’s no accounting for it. And all [unclear]—

What do you think about the elections? How many seats you think I’m going to lose in the House?

The House? About 28.[note 17] End of 2021 revisions. [Coughs.]

Our boys say that we’re going to pick up 8 or 10, going to lose 10 or 12.

Well, I think you’ll lose about 27, [2]8 seats in the House, and I don’t think you’re going to lose anything in the Senate.

Won’t we gain a little?

Yeah, you may gain one or two in the Senate. You got too big of a majority in the House. It’s not—

Our poll is dropping like hell, though. I’ve got the—I had—the last Gallup, I had exactly what Eisenhower had when he beat [Adlai E.] Stevenson [II] in ‘52 in the election.[note 18] Adlai E. Stevenson II was the Democratic governor of Illinois from January 1949 to January 1953; the Democratic U.S. presidential nominee in 1952 and 1956; and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from January 1961 until his death in July 1965. He won by 55 percent, and I had 55. I’ve been so high that everybody said when you get 55 it’s terrible. It dropped from 55 to 47.

On what?

That’s eight points since the last poll, just the last three or four weeks.

On what?

On how I’m doing my job as president.

“Is he doing a good job?”

Yeah. There are 30, 30 . . . I believe there’s 40-some-odd, that disapprove. No, there’s 36 or [3]7 that disapprove of the job I’m doing, and only 45—only 47 approve of me.

Well, half of that is parts of your poverty program. These camps are causing you—they’re hurting you like hell. They talk about them everywhere. And the other half is Vietnam, and there’s nothing you can do about that. We got to see it through, and you’re going to see it through, and when it comes down to election, the American people are going to see it through.

Now, what’s poverty giving us so much trouble—

[speaking simultaneously] They might bellyache like hell about it.

What’s poverty giving us so much trouble about?

Oh, poverty’s not giving you too much, or all of it isn’t. The Head Start program is pretty popular. The—your corps camps—

The Job Corps camps?

Job Corps camps like they had down in St. Petersburg, and one out here somewhere in Kentucky, Indiana.[note 19] Russell referred to a series of high-profile cases that had embarrassed the Job Corps, and by extension OEO, during 1965 and 1966. In St. Petersburg, Florida, the first Job Corps center for women had suffered a series of problems ranging from the placement of the center in an unair-conditioned hotel in the midst of a senior citizen community, to charges of financial irregularities, to claims of drunkenness and promiscuity among the participants enrolled in the center. In 1966, a new site had been selected, but it turned out to be in the middle of an urban renewal project. Furthermore, more serious problems had occurred at the Job Corps center in Breckenridge, Kentucky, in 1965. At that center, a lack of program planning, training equipment, and administrative control, in conjunction with racial tensions among the corpsmen, produced “a general riot in which thirteen people were injured” before the situation was brought under control by the FBI, the U.S. Marshalls, and the Kentucky State Police. The center in Atterbury, Indiana, had also seen internal conflicts, administrative upheavals, and tensions with the local community. All of these cases received extensive coverage in the media. The Chicago Tribune published an extended series of critical articles about the Women’s Job Corps. For a representative sample, see Mary Pakenham, “Florida Job Corps Center Isn’t Vacation Resort or Dating Bureau: But Many Girls Seem to Think It Is Both,” Chicago Tribune, 3 June 1965; “Board Washes Hands of Girl Operation: Votes to End Contract at St. Petersburg,” Chicago Tribune, 24 June 1965; Mary Pakenham, “Value Soars on Old Job Corps Hotel: Appraised at 2 to 5 Times, Cost,” Chicago Tribune, 23 August 1965; “Women’s Job Corps Gives Up Florida Base: St. Petersburg Center Opposed from Start,” Chicago Tribune, 8 June 1966. For an overview of these and other Job Corps problems, see Christopher Weeks, Job Corps: Dollars and Dropouts (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 204–29. Why, I get more letters about those. They pick up a little piece out of the paper.

Well, but they just—

The way it’s costing 6[000] or even 7,000 dollars, and they’ve all got into town some night and had 18 of them arrested for getting drunk, and they just raise hell about that.

[Chuckles.] Well, that’s right, but you can’t keep a boy from getting drunk. It’s—

Well, I didn’t—I’m not trying to keep them from getting drunk. I’m just telling you [President Johnson acknowledges] about what I’ve got in my mail.

[Laughs.] Well, I—

I never was for the camps. I thought the CCC [Civilian Conservation Corps] camps were outdated. I think they’re outmoded. I don’t think that—they’re harming the Great Society.

[speaking over Russell] Well, if you’re going—I’m going to tell McNamara tomorrow. He’s got a plan for taking some, anyway.[note 20] In August 1966, Secretary of Defense Robert S. “Bob” McNamara would announce a plan to enroll draft rejects in a remedial training program that would enable them to reach the military’s enlistment standards. The program would initially enroll 40,000 rejected draftees, and expand to 100,000 in its second year. Fred M Hechinger, “Education: What Mark for Army as Educator,” New York Times, 28 August 1966; “McNamara Sees Corps Unaffected,” Washington Post, 28 August 1966; Jean M. White, “McNamara Plan Sends Job Corps to Barricades,” Washington Post, 25 August 1966. But I’m going to tell him that the rubs are off now. And you said every man that’s got a hard pecker, and a strong back, and a weak mind, far as you’re concerned, he can get him up at daylight and work him to death.

Yes, yes. Yes, yes. He can draft him.

Well, I’m going to go home tomorrow, and I’ll see you when I get back. And I just wanted to kind of get my marching orders.

[Laughs.] Yes, oh, yes, of course, I understand.

[laughing] I enjoy all—

You’re the damn greatest prober that the world’s ever seen.

I always enjoy talking to you.

You just poke around and then say, “Well, I just want to get an idea. I want to pick his brains a little bit.”

Well, that’s right, I do, I do. [Russell laughs.] And I’m picking a good one now. I know—

No, no.

Old stud duck.

Mine’s all worn out. I’m no good.

I’ve been benefiting by your wisdom for many, many years, Mr. Russell.

Mine is all worn out, Mr. President.

No, no.

Don’t depend on it at all.

Thank you, my friend. I’ll call you.

Have a nice time in Texas.

I’ll call you when I get back. I want you to go down on the boat with me some night, too. [Russell acknowledges.] You can go out on the boat now when it gets warm, can’t you?

Yes, sir. I’d be happy to.

All right. Good-bye.

Bye.

Waiting.