—they’re all going to be assassinated: her daughter [Madame Nhu], son-in-law [Ngô Đình] Nhu, and the President, [Ngô Đình] Diệm.[note 4] Trần Lệ Xuân, also known as Madame Nhu, was the wife of South Vietnamese political adviser Ngô Đình Nhu, and the first lady of South Vietnam from October 1955 to November 1963. Ngô Đình Nhu was the younger brother of and chief political adviser to South Vietnamese president Ngô Đình Diệm until their assassinations in November 1963. Ngô Đinh Diệm was president of South Vietnam from October 1955 until his assassination in November 1963. And she says their four grandchildren are all going to be assassinated. She doesn’t believe there’s any question about it. The only hope they have is to get out. And she said, “I hope you, Lodge, will advise them to get out.”

Oh, she doesn’t think it can be saved, is that it?

No, it cannot be saved. And she said, “If you’ve advised them to go out, and they refuse to take your advice, let me know and I will come out and try to talk with my daughter.” Now, this daughter, Madame Nhu, has always been violent and impossible—not cra—not stupid, [President Kennedy acknowledges] but crazy.

[Unclear.]

Right, [President Kennedy acknowledges throughout] and violent and willful and angry. When she was here in Washington a couple of years ago, she took an overdose of sleeping pills, and they had to pump out her stomach and all that. And she’s just been a terrible trial to both of them always. She says that she talks like this and is allowed to talk like this because Diệm and Nhu—this is what they really think, and they like to hear her talking like this, which is quite, quite revealing.

She a Buddhist, this woman?

Oh, yes, she’s a Buddhist, and she’s a very devout one. And Madame Nhu was born a Buddhist, and then—

Became a Catholic.

A convert. [President Kennedy acknowledges throughout.] I don’t know how good a Catholic she is, but anyway for the record—

She’s political; she belongs to the Church temple. [Both laugh.]

That’s right. And this is high enough level, so I thought you’d want to know that.

Yeah.

That happened to me last night.

Now, there’s going to be a press conference when I arrive in Saigon, and I wanted to just submit to you some of the answers. See, she’s already taken a crack at me, Madame Nhu.[note 5] “He has his own nature, which is very stubborn,” Madame Nhu said of Lodge in an interview. “If there is stubbornness with us, we shall publish everything and tell all the difference.” David Halberstam, “Charges Threat by Embassy: Mrs. Nhu Accuses U.S. of Blackmail,” New York Times, 8 August 1963.

I heard that.

And I thought if I was asked about that, I’d just say, “No comment.”

Yeah.

I just won’t say anything about it. And my view is, she’s a private citizen. She holds no political—no office.[note 6] Madame Nhu not only held political office as a member of South Vietnam’s legislature but also played a leading role as a lawmaker. In 1956, according to a Time magazine cover story, “She was elected to the National Assembly and immediately began a campaign to upgrade the status of Vietnamese women, who had no legal rights and could be discarded by husbands at will.” Later, in 1958, “She rammed through the Assembly her controversial Family Bill, which made adultery a prison offense and outlawed polygamy, concubinage, and—except by presidential dispensation—divorce.” Charles Mohr, “South Viet Nam; The Queen Bee,” Time, 9 August 1963, 21. If I meet her, well, she’s just a private citizen that I meet. And then if I get a question upon U.S.—“What is the U.S. policy? Has there been a change in the policy?”—I thought I would say, “The policy of the United States is to help the Republic of [South] Vietnam to win and maintain their independence from the—from Communist terrorism. [President Kennedy acknowledges.] Whatever helps that, we’re for. Whatever is against that, we’re against that.” Put it that way and not meet the question of whether there’s been a change or not.

Right, right.

Then another question I think they’ll give me is, “Do you think we can win with Diệm?” Which would be the—that’s about the roughest question I could get.

Yeah.

You always try to think of the rough ones. [President Kennedy acknowledges.] [Lodge speaks with a smile in his voice.] I know you’re expert at that. And my position would be, we’ll win with the Republic of [South] Vietnam and with everybody in it.

So that’s about what I wanted to submit to you. But then when I see him, I want to say to Diệm, when I have a chance to talk with him—this may be over several meetings—I can’t do it all at once—would be, “I want you to be successful. We want you to win. Help you every way that I can. We understand that you don’t want to be a puppet of the United States.” [Unclear] if you’d like to hear me say, “We don’t want to be a puppet of Vietnam,” which—

Yeah, yeah.

Which—“We don’t want to be a tail of Mrs. Nhu’s kite.” [President Kennedy acknowledges throughout.] Because many Americans think that she’s the head of Vietnam. I had a fellow stop me in Beverly the other day, and—right on the street, and he said, “Well, who is this Madame Nhu that’s the head of Vietnam?”[note 7] Beverly, Massachusetts, was Lodge’s hometown and residence. Peter Kihss, “Home Town Is Put in Lodge Column,” New York Times, 11 September 1960. He’d seen her picture on the cover of Time, you know?[note 8] The Time cover photograph was entitled, “South Viet Nam’s Madame Nhu,” with the five-page story itself titled, “South Vietnam: The Queen Bee.” See Charles Mohr, Time, 9 August 1963, 21. And then I thought I would try to get the thought across to him that he thinks he has us hooked, but nobody can hook the United States of America, because nobody can hook U.S. public opinion and nobody can hook the U.S. Congress. And while the President’s word is good, the President’s power is not unlimited.

That’s right. [Unclear.]

And I’m not sure if he realizes that. So those are things I wanted to get across.

Of course, he thinks that [unclear] the press is—out there is really [unclear]. Have you read Roger Hilsman [Jr.]‘s memorandum?[note 9] Roger Hilsman Jr. was director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research from February 1961 to April 1963, and U.S. assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs from April 1963 to March 1964. Although Hilsman drafted a memo roughly one week earlier on the Buddhist Crisis, that document is silent on the matter of press relations. Kennedy is likely referring to a memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Robert J. Manning. "Report from the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Manning) to the President." n.d., U.S. Department of States, Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1961-1963: Vietnam, January–August 1963, ed. Edward C. Keefer (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), 3:331-43, doc. 239. For the Hilsman memo, see “Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to the Acting Secretary of State,” 6 August 1963, in Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1961–1963: Vietnam, January–August 1963, ed. Edward C. Keefer (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), 4: doc. 246.

Oh yes, oh yes.

Well, you know how they can get in those places. They are—they feel they’re doing the job, because they’re trying to get rid of—they’re carrying on a political action to get rid of Diệm, because, they would argue, it’s the only way they can win. I will say that two years ago, they said they were going to collapse in six months, so their record of prophecy is not—

Good.

And in addition, you know, there are a lot of fellows who haven’t had much experience. A lot of them come out there a year or so—have been, you know, they’re not the first-line press even. And about one day after I got back word about their being roughed up out there, we had the story about the American press being roughed up by the police in Rome. Well, it wasn’t anything; I was there. He wasn’t roughed up. So, I mean, you know how reporters are.[note 10] See “U.S. Aides Shoved by Police in Rome,” New York Times, 2 July 1963.

I do. I was one of the [unclear]. [Chuckles.]

And, you know—and, well, you know, so that we do have a problem with them. I mean, that fellow [David Halberstam], the New York Times fellow, I guess, is a bright fellow.[note 11] David Halberstam was a New York Times journalist in the 1960s. He has another story about we’re losing the war and have for the last [unclear]—there’s a real split. Now, you’re going to have a difficult time maintaining a satisfactory relationship with them, because they are in this almost—

Mr. President, I plan—

—neurotic state of mind.

There are three key ones: AP, UPI, and the New York Times. And they’re the only three dailies, every day, [President Kennedy acknowledges throughout] from the United States. And they’re frightened. They’ve been frightened by the Vietnamese police. They’re really afraid physically. They’re mostly sick—got dysentery. They think they’re being lied to, and they have been condescended to socially by some of our embassy people; I’m pretty sure of that. The very first day I’m going to invite one of them to lunch along with my wife and me, and I’m going to ask him his advice. The next day I’m going to ask the second one. The third day I’m going to ask the third one. I’m going to begin right like that—at a time when I’m too fresh there for them to expect to get anything out of me—and try to at least get them into a human frame of mind. And, of course, they must know that I’m not going to be a terribly good news source, but at least I’m not going to lie to them, and anything that—and they can always come in to see me—and anything that they’re entitled to get, I’ll move heaven and earth to see that they get it.

The time may come when we’re going to just have to try to do something about the [unclear], then—and I think that’s going to be an awfully critical period.[note 12] In the unclear passage, President Kennedy may have said “war” or “Diệm,” although his subsequent allusion to finding a possible alternative to Diệm would suggest he said “Diệm.”

Oh, yes.

I don’t know how well prepared we are for that out there or who we would sort of support or who we would—and I think that’s going to be the key—your key problem this year. This woman’s right: You don’t see how the situation can go on without disintegrating further in this place. It may be that he ought to—they ought to go, but it’s just a question of how skillfully that’s done and if we get the right fellow [unclear].[note 13] President Kennedy may have said “who it would be.”

She said that—she used the phrase with me last night—said the type of bloodbath we had in Iraq in 1958. [President Kennedy acknowledges throughout.] Remember when they killed Nūrī [al-]Saʻīd and all that.[note 14] Nūrī al-Saʻīd served as prime minister of Iraq eight times, beginning in March 1930 and ending with his assassination in May 1958. Well, I’ve got a—I’m thinking—and by the way, I want to thank you for the wonderful help and support I’ve had here in the government. Just marvelous.

Of course, we don’t want to make with them—which is a great temptation, particularly in the press—to do what we did with Chiang [Kai-shek].[note 15] Chiang Kai-shek was president of the Republic of China from May 1948 to January 1949 and March 1950 to April 1975. You know, by the—he was—Chiang Kai-shek was so pasted by American reporters—American public opinion was formed that it was hopeless. Well, maybe it was hopeless, but in looking back on it, I think probably we would think that we probably could have—bad as it was, we would have been much better off to have done something about it.

I assume the situation may be hopeless, but I am also conscious of the fact that the American press—they’re anti-government wherever they are, almost, including here, and I just want to be sure that there is somebody who would be better than this fellow. After all, he has sustained himself against the French—in a sense [unclear] against us, but that’s not so much—but against the French and then against the Vietcong and did it for 10 years. That’s a pretty good record. So I don’t like to see us just decide that it’d probably be better, just because we’re getting heat from the press. Now, I don’t know enough about it, but I do remember that all our people always seem to get pasted.

[Chuckles quietly.]

Thailand, Chiang got it. South Korea. Everybody we’re for always is a son of a bitch. So I think that you have to make an independent judgment of it.

You’ve got to say this about Diệm. He’s very courageous. [President Kennedy acknowledges throughout.] Physically courageous. He’s got a lot of stamina. And he has never said, “You do this for me or I’ll go over to the Communists.” He’s never, ever done that. Now, there aren’t too many men like that in the Far East. Maybe there are some others. And, if so, it’s my job to try to find them. There aren’t too many men that are like that. And that’s what [W. Averell] Harriman thinks.[note 16] W. Averell Harriman was the Democratic governor of New York from January 1955 to December 1958; U.S. assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs from 1961 to 1963; U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs from 1963 to 1965; and ambassador-at-large and chief U.S. delegate to the Paris Peace Talks under President Lyndon B. Johnson. [Dean] Rusk has gotten to the point where he says, “Anybody other than Diệm.”[note 17] Dean Rusk was U.S. deputy under secretary of state from 1949 to 1950; U.S. assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs from March 1950 to December 1951; a trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation from 1950 to 1961, and president from 1952 to 1961; U.S. secretary of state from January 1961 to January 1969; recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom, with distinction, in 1969; and professor of international law at the University of Georgia School of Law from 1970 to 1984.

Yeah.

And, well, I think the Vice President is worse than Diệm, from what I understand. [Nguyễn Ngôc] Thơ.[note 18] Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ was vice president of the Republic of Vietnam from November 1956 to November 1963, and prime minister of the Republic of Vietnam from November 1963 to January 1964. I think he’s worse. And there aren’t so many—there’s a labor leader that George [Cabot Lodge II] knows, my son George knows, who’s a fellow called [Trần Quốc] Bửu, who’s the head of the rice growers’ union, who is, everybody says, a top fellow, a superior kind of fellow.[note 19] George Cabot Lodge II was appointed director of information for the Department of Labor in 1954, and U.S. assistant secretary of labor for international affairs in 1958. He campaigned for the vacant Massachusetts Senate seat in the November 1962 mid-term elections but lost to Democrat Edward M. “Teddy” Kennedy. Trần Quốc Bửu was president of the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor, and head of the Farmer-Worker Party. But you can be a top fellow and still not be—

[Unclear.]

—a political leader— [President Kennedy acknowledges] what it takes, you know.

And he has, I say, gone—and I just—you know, everybody always . . . everybody gets attacked. You remember all that stuff about Greece at the end of the war, you know, when the Communists really almost took over Greece. [Lodge acknowledges.] And yet all we read in the American press was the fascist nature of the Greek government. So I don’t think there’s any doubt that the press are instinctively [unclear], and some very, and they [unclear] against any authoritarian regime, they rebel.[note 20] In the first unclear passage, President Kennedy may have said that “the press are instinctively more moderate than liberal.” Then there’s the [unclear]—so I don’t know. I’ve never—I assume that probably this fellow’s in an impossible situation to save, but I just want to be sure we’re not getting our policy made for us by a couple of smart, young reporters.

[Of] course, their viewpoint is entirely different. They’re looking for a story. They’re looking for something sensational, and they’re not—they don’t realize that an authoritarian government is [President Kennedy acknowledges] what people have always had in most parts of the world.

What they have to have. It’s just really— [Lodge attempts to interject] can’t get anybody else to run it. Just this bitch, of course. Well, she’s made it—she’s made—Well, as I say, I just—I think we have to leave it almost completely in your hands, in your judgment. [A police siren rises in the background.] I don’t know whether we’d be better off—whether the alternative would be better. Maybe it will be. If so, then we have to move in that direction. But I think I’d take a good look at it before I’d come to that conclusion. [Lodge acknowledges throughout.] Of course, [Frederick E.] Fritz Nolting [Jr.] had always felt that Diệm was better than anybody [Lodge acknowledges] that we’d get.[note 21] Frederick E. “Fritz” Nolting Jr. was U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam from May 1961 to August 1963; a professor at the University of Virginia (UVA) since 1970; and the first director of UVA’s Miller Center of Public Affairs in 1975. Now, everybody says [unclear] that Nolting was soft on Diệm, and so on. That maybe, however, have been the right policy.

It may very well—

I remember two years ago, everybody was saying we’re all through out there in six months. And I remember, those articles were coming out [saying] we’d have to put American troops in there. Instead, Nolting said, no, he thought it would be all right. So I just figure that we don’t want to get carried away until you’ve had a good chance to look at it.

Well, that’s very helpful. [President Kennedy acknowledges.] That’s very helpful, and I’ll certainly give it my very best.

How does your wife [Emily Sears Lodge] like going out there?[note 22] Emily Sears Lodge was the wife of Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. It turned into the most interesting assignment that there is.

[Unclear.]

[Unclear.]

[President Kennedy acknowledges throughout.] Well, she’s all for it. When you very kindly offered it to me, I went and asked her. Oh, she said, yes, we ought to do it. Simply knowing she’s coming right out with me on Saturday . . . she’s looking forward to it very much, and I think there’s a lot she can do. Of course, we have a big American community there, and some of them, I think, are a little bit scared, afraid of diseases, and being shot at, and so on. I think there’s a lot she can do to pull the American community together, which I’m planning to do.

When will you get there?

Well, I’m taking about a week, because I’m going to go—

Go to Hawaii?

I’m going to Hawaii. I’ll get briefed by Admiral [Harry D.] Felt.[note 23] Adm. Harry D. “Don” Felt was a U.S. Navy officer during World War II; vice chief of naval operations from 1956 to 1958; and commander in chief of Pacific Command (CINCPAC) from 1958 to 1964. And then they want me to—the foreign minister of Japan [Masayoshi Ōhira]wanted me to call on him in Tokyo, so I’m going to do that.[note 24] Masayoshi Ōhira was a member of the Japanese House of Representatives from October 1952 until his death on 12 June 1980; chief cabinet secretary from July 1960 to July 1962; minister for foreign affairs from July 1962 to July 1964; minister of international trade and industry from November 1968 to January 1970; minister for foreign affairs from July 1972 to July 1974; minister of finance from July 1974 to December 1976; and prime minister from December 1978 to June 1980. And then Dean Rusk wanted me to get the briefing by the consul general in Hong Kong on the situation in Communist China. [President Kennedy acknowledges.] So I won’t get there for a little over a week.

Right.

And I’d rather do that because there’s a sleep adjustment. It’s 12 hours difference in time.

Yeah.

And the day I arrive is, the first day on a thing like this is usually a very big day, [President Kennedy acknowledges throughout] when all the people that try to embarrass you are out in full force. I don’t want to—I want to feel fairly good. You know that sleep business. I want to feel fairly fresh when I get there, so that when they talk about me, I can maybe throw a few [unclear] back. [Chuckles.]

Yeah. Well, that sounds fine.

I’m . . . I’d like to see this PL-480 aid, which is distributed through voluntary charitable organizations, distributed through Buddhists—through Buddhist organizations.[note 25] PL-480 was the enacting law for the Food for Peace Program, which allowed the U.S. Department of Agriculture to sell surplus farm products to foreign countries. They run orphanages and refugee camps and all that sort of—

Do we give them any now?

No. No.

Just American . . . ?

American Catholics, Mennonites, and CARE. And I think it would give me—it would give us some leverage. If we can do it, it’ll make us popular with the Buddhists. If the government objects that it’s an interference in internal affairs, I can ask Diệm to ask the Buddhists to name somebody and make him do some things for us [President Kennedy acknowledges throughout] so that we won’t give [unclear]. I want to get some leverage with this man. I think he—he thinks he’s got us on the hook too much. So I wanted to tell you about that.

And then I’d like to see a map, which I’ve never seen—hasn’t ever been made—black-and-white map, no colors—showing the areas under Vietcong domination two years ago and the areas today. A simple map, the kind I used to get made when I was at the U.N. It could be printed in any ordinary newspaper, and you could see the progress. [President Kennedy acknowledges throughout.] I think that would be helpful here and helpful there, too. I think the public relations haven’t been as good as the results have justified.

I noticed the way that fellow in the Times wrote it this morning, about—he talked about the last year, not the last two months, that the war in the [Mekong] delta has been going bad for the last year. You read the story this morning?[note 26] David Halberstam, “Vietnamese Reds Gain in Key Area,” New York Times, 15 August 1963.

Yes.

Yeah. I thought that was a more ominous report than the ones we’ve been getting from [Paul D.] Harkins.[note 27] Gen. Paul D. Harkins was deputy chief of staff to Gen. George Patton during World War II; deputy commandant of cadets at West Point from 1946 to 1961; a U.S. Army officer during the Korean War; and commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), from January 1962 to June 1964. Harkins seems to have done an outstanding job.

Oh yes, he’s—

But this story seemed to paint a pretty dark picture in the delta.

Well, of course, if the Buddhist thing keeps on, it’s bound to get into the army eventually. [President Kennedy acknowledges throughout.] And that’d be bad. That’d be bad. Oh, Harkins is a very superior officer, and I’m glad that they plan to keep him on after his term expires in January. That’ll be a—I’d be very unhappy if he would leave then. He is very, very good.

Well, I think those are the—I’m planning more cultural contacts. They have a great respect for cultural learning in that country, and I’m going to get—try to give some books to the university and get—try to develop that side of things a little bit.

Well, those are about the principal things—

What about the food thing? Is there any problem about arranging that? Can we do that all right?

I’ve been in touch with AID [Agency for International Development], and they’ve told me how to do it. [President Kennedy acknowledges throughout.] And I thought maybe get a memorandum to Hilsman. Harriman thought I didn’t even need to bother, [unclear]. And Hilsman seemed to think he could handle it all right. That could give us some of the—something to do.

Yeah, yeah. I was asking [Michael V. “Mike”] Forrestal—I asked to get a report on the whole Buddhist thing: How much of it is political, and how much religious, and how much is subversive?[note 28] Michael V. “Mike” Forrestal was a member of the National Security Council staff from 1962 to July 1964, and special assistant to the secretary of state for Vietnam Affairs from July 1964 to 1965. How do you judge it?

I think it’s only partly religious. Buddhism isn’t a religion that makes great demands on—It isn’t a religion that has a lot of discipline. A little bit like Episcopalianism.

Yeah. [Both laugh.]

You know, people, they want to have a funeral, or they want to have a wedding, and a man will go sometimes with his wife to keep her happy. [President Kennedy acknowledges.] [Unclear.] [Unclear] go and try to chop her hand off in front of the altar. I think they have a sense of injustice, which is always a powerful thing with [unclear] people. I think they have a feeling that they’re discriminated against. I don’t think there’s been persecution. I don’t think they’ve persecuted the Buddhists. I think [it’s] just a natural thing to give the posts to the best educated people, who were people educated in France, [President Kennedy acknowledges] who naturally happen to be Christians. I think it’s come along that way. And then, of course, there was police stupidity in Huế on the 8th of May. Well, that was—but that could happen anywhere. [President Kennedy acknowledges.] And then there was a comedy of errors because they flew the Vatican flag, and then Diệm said, “Pull down that Vatican flag and put up the Vietnam flag,” and then they started—then a month later they put up the Buddhist flag and then, police remembering that Diệm had ordered the Vatican flag pulled down, told them to pull down the Buddhist flag, and then got stupid and shot into the crowd and, as a matter of fact, killed two Catholics in the crowd.

[Unclear.]

I think the religious angle is very slight. Very slight.

Unfortunate that it’s a Catholic-Buddhist fight, but—

[President Kennedy acknowledges throughout.] And it’s unfortunate that the press has mentioned that all the time. Because the fact that these people are Catholics is purely incidental. The heart of the matter is that they’ve established a police state, and that they’re interfering with the liberties of the people, and that you have a resentment born of that.

That’s right.

Right?

That’s right.

I think that’s what it is. And that’s a damn sight more serious. I think that’s at the bottom of the whole thing. They’re completely—she says to me that—she’s a very impressive person—they’re completely cut off from everything.[note 29] Lodge is likely referring to Madame Chương. It’s very hard to get into the palace. The only people that get in are people that tell them what they want to hear. They don’t have the slightest idea of what’s going on in the country. And if that’s true, it’s very serious. Now, the—[Ngô Đình] Cẩn, the brother who governs the central province, nobody ever sees him.[note 30] Ngô Đình Cẩn was the brother of Ngô Đinh Diệm, and head of a private army and secret police force in Central Vietnam. He’s locked up in his place. And the bishop [Ngô Đình Thục] is—he’s living in the 12th century.[note 31] Pierre Martin Ngô Đình Thục was the Roman Catholic archbishop of Huế, Vietnam, from November 1960 to February 1968, and the brother of Ngô Đinh Diệm and Ngô Đinh Nhu.

He’s another brother, is he?

Yeah, he’s another brother.

Yeah.

The bishop is a brother, the governor of the central province is a brother, the principal adviser is a brother, and the ambassadors to London and Paris is a brother. [President Kennedy acknowledges.] And . . . But the Asians say they are strongly anti-Communist.

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

And I hate to let go with my claws until I’ve got ahold [President Kennedy acknowledges] [unclear].

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

But if they all get assassinated, then you’re going to have to . . .

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Then you’re going to really have to be on top of it all.

What about Madame Nhu? Is she a lesbian or what? She seems like an awful[ly] masculine woman.

Well, I think she probably is a lesbian. [President Kennedy acknowledges.] I think she also was very promiscuous, sort of a nymphomaniac, too.

And she’s had this terrific moral reaction? Is that it?

Yeah, she’s closed up all the dance halls that are [unclear] American soldiers. [President Kennedy acknowledges throughout.] [Unclear.] I’m going to try to give the USO [United Service Organizations] a little encouragement out there. Because if they can’t go to the nightclubs and dance, [unclear] to do something.[note 32] Lodge may have said “they’re going to do something” or “they got to do something.” And she did all that. She has this excess of Puritanism after she’d—

[Unclear.][note 33] President Kennedy may have said, “Becomes a saint.” But for how long? The old sinner!

[Laughs loudly.]

That’s a dangerous combination, isn’t it?

[laughing] Oh, an old sinner is a saint—a new saint. [President Kennedy acknowledges.] That’s very well put. [President Kennedy acknowledges throughout.]

Let’s see. I told you about everything I have in mind. If I can ever get him—if they ever get back on a normal track, I’d like him to turn into a real political meteor and give the country a sense of national purpose. And when we reclaim this land from the Communists, make it possible for the farmer to have a good living. Here is a country where 84 percent of the people are farmers, and yet the policy is adapted to the city dweller. And the farmer doesn’t get the price that he ought to get for his rice and all those things. As the military makes these gains, the farmer ought to be doing better, ’cause then he supports the military. He’ll give them intelligence, and he’ll [unclear]. They don’t do anything like that, because Saigon is all cut off from the farmer, and for generations the tradition is that the capital tells the village what to do, but never anything from the village to the capital.

I’d like to do what they did in the Philippines and have a suggestion system whereby anybody in any of these villages can send a message to Saigon and you have a competent man with a staff to process the messages and throw away all the nut ones and do something about the meritorious ones.

In the Philippines with the Huk thing, that had a great effect on making [Ramon F.] Magsaysay [Sr.] popular and then making the army popular.[note 34] Ramon F. Magsaysay Sr. was Filipino secretary of national defense from September 1950 to February 1953, and president of the Philippines from December 1953 until his death on 17 March 1957. And then have the army—

Do we—anybody could send a message to him?

Yes. [President Kennedy acknowledges throughout.] Magsaysay arranged—anybody in the Philippines could send a message to him. Of course, he never saw them, but he had a very competent man with a very competent staff, who really followed through on the meritorious ones.

And according to General [Edward G.] Lansdale, whom you know—brilliant; he’s a valuable adviser—that created great psychology.[note 35] Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale was an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) officer until 1948; U.S. deputy assistant secretary for special operations and later U.S. assistant secretary of defense for special operations from 1957 to 1963; a U.S. Air Force officer until 1963; and a minister to the U.S. embassy in Saigon from 1965 to 1968. Then they arranged to take care of farmers that got wounded—take care of them in army hospitals. Those farmers have had litigation about their land. They’d take the judge advocates out of the army, and they would litigate for the farmers. And it all made the army popular. Those are all psychological things. I’d like to give him a little lesson in how to be a politician.

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

You could do better than I could. [Both laugh.] But I could do it better—

Than they could.

—than some of the people advising him.

What about—I hear you have a pretty good press man, they all tell me.

[Unclear] is the press man, and then the head of the USIA [United States Information Agency] is a former Time-Life man. He’s from Bonn. [John M.] Mecklin.[note 36] John M. Mecklin was a news reporter during World War II; a journalist for Time from 1948 to 1966; public affairs adviser for the U.S. Mission to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in Paris from 1961 to 1962; USIA public affairs officer at the United States Embassy in Saigon, South Vietnam, from 1962 to 1964; and a journalist for Fortune from 1966 to 1968.

Yeah, I hear he’s—

In fact, I’m told the U.S. government has put the first team out there.

Yeah.

[President Kennedy acknowledges throughout.] And that’s very attractive. The present head of the economic mission is apparently very good. And I think there are no eight balls at all. They’re all very good. And, of course, I get—if somebody is a blabbermouth, if somebody is not satisfactory, I have the authority to—

Send them back.

—send them back. As I understand it.

Good. So when are you leaving?

I’d like to have your photograph, Mr. President.

Yeah, good, fine. When are you going to leave? What time are you going to—

I’m leaving on Saturday. I’m leaving here right now to go to New York. I have some appointments in New York. One of them is the head of the Associated Press. [Unclear.]

Wes Gallagher?[note 37] Wes Gallagher was a journalist for the Associated Press (AP) since 1937; a war correspondent during World War II; AP assistant general manager from 1954 to 1962; and AP general manager from 1962 until his retirement in 1976.

Wes Gallagher, yeah. And then I’m going to—

[Unclear] New York Times people or [unclear]?

I’m seeing Turner Catledge.[note 38] Turner Catledge was a longtime employee of the New York Times, serving as managing editor from 1951 to 1964, executive editor from 1964 to 1968, and vice president from 1968 to 1970.

Did you see that story of Rowland Evans [Jr.]’s this morning?[note 39] Rowland Evans Jr. was a prominent syndicated columnist. Together with Robert D. S. Novak, Evans wrote the political column “Inside Report” since 1963. And [Robert D. S.] Novak?[note 40] Robert D. S. Novak was a prominent syndicated columnist. Together with Rowland Evans, Novak wrote the political column “Inside Report” since 1963. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Inside Report: Goldwater Four-to-One,” Washington Post, 15 August 1963. Columnists Evans and Novak reported the results of a “nonscientific political poll”—i.e., interviews with 60 New Hampshire voters in Concord and Manchester, New Hampshire. Thirty-seven were Republicans, and they were asked who they would vote for if the presidential primary were held tomorrow and the only two Republican candidates were Sen. Barry Goldwater of Arizona and Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York. Goldwater won by a 4-to-1 margin.

Yes.

On that survey up in New Hampshire?

Yeah.

Does that surprise you?

No, no. That isn’t pro-[Barry M.] Goldwater [Sr.] [R–Arizona], that’s anti—[note 41] Barry M. Goldwater Sr. was a U.S. senator [R–Arizona] from January 1953 to January 1965 and January 1969 to January 1987, and the Republican U.S. presidential candidate in 1964.

[Nelson A.] Rockefeller?[note 42] Nelson A. Rockefeller was the Republican governor of New York from January 1959 to December 1973, and vice president of the United States from December 1974 to January 1977.

Anti–Rockefeller’s wife and—

Given the two choices, that that’s what the—Rockefeller can’t—he can’t dig his way out, though.[note 43] Rockefeller had divorced his first wife in 1962 and remarried in 1963. No candidate who had divorced and remarried had ever won the presidency prior to Ronald W. Reagan in 1980. According to Evans and Novak, who recounted the polling in New Hampshire, “No fewer than eight women among the 27 registered Republicans mentioned the remarriage, and six of the eight listed it first among their reasons for opposing Rockefeller. The other two, both of them Goldwater devotees, carefully explained that the governor’s divorce and remarriage were not factors in their preference for the conservative senator from Arizona. All this despite the fact that the pollster scrupulously avoided the issue altogether.” Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Inside Report: Goldwater Four-to-One,” Washington Post, 15 August 1963.

I don’t think so. He’s got to go to the convention. He’s . . . he hasn’t got any trust up there. [The recorder picks up sounds of a someone writing on paper.] He’s . . . he thinks he has the trust, but I don’t think he has it.

I mean, he might pick someplace else? He’d like to—like California?

But that’s [unclear]. New Hampshire comes too early.

Yeah. But Goldwater might not want to get in New Hampshire.

That might very well be. But Rockefeller can’t avoid it.

Who else would be better off, though, in New Hampshire?

If he can’t do it, [unclear] he can’t do it anywhere. But anyway—

That’s right next to New York.

Can’t do that.

[Unclear.]

I remember in ’52, when I campaigned in New Hampshire for [Dwight D.] Ike [Eisenhower].[note 44] Dwight D. Eisenhower was a five-star general of the U.S. Army; governor of the American Zone of Occupied Germany from May 1945 to November 1945; chief of staff of the U.S. Army from November 1945 to February 1948; Supreme Allied Commander in Europe from April 1951 to May 1952; president of Columbia University from 1948 to 1953; and president of the United States from January 1953 to January 1961. Ike was in uniform abroad. And we couldn’t dodge New Hampshire. You had to do it.

Who won that? You won that, didn’t you, or [Robert A. “Bob”] Taft [Sr.] [R–Ohio] did?[note 45] Robert A. “Bob” Taft Sr. was a U.S. senator [R–Ohio] from January 1939 until his death on 31 July 1953; chair of the Senate Republican Policy Committee from March 1944 to January 1953; Senate Majority Leader from January 1953 to July 1953; and a son of William Howard Taft. You won it.

No, we won it. And we almost lost it because, stupidly, we shut them out, and then the Ike people had claimed everything. And we claimed so much that Taft went in, because if he got one delegate, it was a victory.

What did he get? What did he get?

He didn’t get anything, that’s ’cause when Harold [E.] Stassen was in, and I almost got down on my knees to Harold to get out.[note 46] Harold E. Stassen was the Republican governor of Minnesota from January 1939 to April 1943; director of the U.S. Foreign Operations Administration from August 1953 to March 1955; and a nine-time Republican U.S. presidential candidate. And he’s going in this time. [Unclear] Boston airport [unclear]. “Well,” he said, “I’m taking a trip to my [unclear] in New Hampshire.” I said, “Give them a run in New Hampshire.” [Unclear.] And every vote he gets will be a vote for Rockefeller. I think Rockefeller’s the [unclear] favorite. And Goldwater’s doing well, but it’s not entirely because of Goldwater. [Unclear] his marriage. [President Kennedy acknowledges.] So I think the—

[Unclear.]

Hi.

Thank you for this letter. I’ve just had a chance to read it. It’s a very, very nice letter. [The sound of writing is audible.] Very nice idea.

The President agrees. [Laughter. Unclear exchange.]

Well—

Thanks. Well, that’s a loyal staff man, isn’t it? [Laughter.]

No, that sort of thing, [unclear].

Yes, fine.

You want [unclear] to come in?[note 47] President Kennedy’s appointment diary indicates that his meeting with Lodge ended at 11:35 a.m., at which time his meeting with Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, who was retiring from service, began.

Yeah, fine.

You saw that [unclear] about [William W. “Bill”] Scranton and about Rockefeller and . . . [unclear] George [W.] Romney [unclear].[note 48] William W. “Bill” Scranton was a U.S. representative [R–Pennsylvania] from January 1961 to January 1963; the Republican governor of Pennsylvania from January 1963 to January 1967; and chair of the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest in 1970. George W. Romney was president of American Motors Corporation from 1954 to 1962; the Republican governor of Michigan from January 1963 to January 1969; and U.S. secretary of housing and urban development from January 1969 to January 1973.

Barry actually may [unclear].

Think Barry—

Barry may surprise you.

[Unclear] if they end up with Romney and Rockefeller—I mean, Romney and Goldwater. I don’t see Goldwater running second to Romney. Huh? [Unclear.]

[Unclear.]

Barry? [Unclear exchange.] Cabot’s [unclear] nervous as a fucking [unclear]. And actually, probably [unclear] look a little better if that things falls through the fucking roof, [unclear]. [Unclear exchange.] Yeah. Yeah. It won’t bring us down. But he needs to get these things—it’s so fucking outrageous [unclear].[note 49] President Kennedy may have said “about that reform.”

Recognize that, but [unclear].

Yeah, but ordinarily, Cabot [unclear].[note 50] President Kennedy may have said “would be on time.” [speaking aside into the telephone] [Theodore C.] Ted Sorensen, please.[note 51] Theodore C. “Ted” Sorensen was a speechwriter and special assistant to the president from 1961 to 1964; author of a best-selling biography of John F. Kennedy in 1965; an adviser for Robert F. Kennedy’s presidential campaign in 1968; and an attorney and senior counsel at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton, and Garrison in New York City from 1966 until his death in 2010.

[answering the telephone] Hello?