You want to go ahead and [unclear]?

Well, I think that you may wish to glance through it first, Mr. President, [President Kennedy acknowledges] [unclear].

[Pause.] What about the press out there?

Miserable.

Are they? All this—

Oh, I spent an hour—

I saw the way they tried to make [Arthur “Art”] Sylvester—[note 1] Arthur “Art” Sylvester was U.S. assistant secretary of defense for public affairs from January 1961 to February 1967.

[speaking over President Kennedy] I spent an hour with them yesterday. Oh, yes. It’s—

They’re sons of bitches—

They’re trying to make something out of nothing, that [unclear].

But I mean they’re impossible, are they? They’re—

Terribly difficult. There’s two or three good ones. The best is the Frenchman. The next best is Father [Patrick] O’Connor, who’s representing the Catholic press.[note 2] Rev. Patrick O’Connor covered the war in Vietnam for NC News Service. Then there are two or three other reliable ones. But [David] Halberstam and [Cornelius M. “Neil”] Sheehan are the ones that are—[note 3] David Halberstam was a New York Times journalist in the 1960s. Cornelius M. “Neil” Sheehan was a New York Times journalist who published the Pentagon Papers leaked by Daniel Ellsberg.

Causing a lot of trouble.

Just causing a lot of trouble. They’re allowing an idealistic philosophy to get—color all their writing.

How old is Halberstam?

[speaking over McGeorge Bundy] About 25.

Class of ‘55.

He at Harvard [University]?

Mac was his teacher. [Unclear.]

At Harvard?

Must have been a heck of a [unclear].

I want you to know that he was a reporter even when he was in college, and I dealt with him in the Harvard Crimson [student newspaper] for two years, so I know exactly what you’ve been up against. [Chuckles.]

Is he one of these—

A very gifted boy who has—gets all steamed up. No doubt about it. That was 10 years ago. I’m [unclear]. [Unclear.]

Is he one of those liberal Harvard Crimson types?[note 4] President Kennedy might well be poking fun at himself, as he had worked for the Crimson while attending Harvard University.

Yes, sir.

Used to harass—

Yes.

Not a tough Yale [University] man.[note 5] Harriman graduated from Yale University in 1913. [Chuckles.] [Unclear exchange.]

[Unclear.] That’s an unkind flank attack. [Chuckles.]

[Unclear] University of California [unclear].

[Unclear] government [unclear]. Well, they take quite a licking. That’s a real war, isn’t it?

It is.

Five hundred and—what? Three hundred in total of—

That number of killed on both sides.

Yeah, but 2,500 a month!

And the—

I believe that’s more than we lost in Korea, isn’t it [unclear]?[note 6] The Congressional Research Service cites the number of total U.S. deaths in the Korean War as 36,574, with the number of battle deaths as 33,739. See "American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics,” Congressional Research Service. A tally of total U.S. deaths in the Korean War, divided over the roughly 36 months of the conflict, would equate to 1,116 per month.

Of great concern to us is they’re able to replace those losses. Now, as you see down at the bottom, Mr. President, we think that their irregular strength has declined. I caution that—these figures are all subject to many qualifications, but they’re the best indicators we—

The more I see of this, Mr. President, the more unsure I am of the figures, [McNamara acknowledges] especially the Vietcong. All we’re sure of are the killed. They’re now actually counting the bodies. And that’s the only firm data we have here in the whole [unclear].

Well, we presumably know our own losses.

Well—well, I’m talking about the enemy.

Who’s this Colonel [John Paul] Vann who’s running around and getting to be a publicity hound—trying to interview the Chiefs of Staff, and say . . .[note 7] Col. John Paul Vann (né John Paul Tripp) was a lieutenant colonel in the United States Army; an adviser to Colonel Huỳnh Văn Cao in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam from 1962 to March 1963; an officer for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in the late 1960s; deputy for civil operations and rural development support (CORDS) in the Third Corps Tactical Zone of Vietnam from March 1965 to November 1968; deputy for CORDS in the Fourth Corps until the early 1970s; the only civilian recipient of the Distinguished Service Cross in Vietnam; and a posthumous recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1972. See Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Vintage, 1988).

He’s a former adviser to the 7th Division. He came to our attention by making press comments [President Kennedy acknowledges] at the time of the helicopter losses.[note 8] Taylor is referring to the Battle of Ấp Bắc, which took place in early January 1963. A poor showing by the South Vietnamese forces received extensive publicity in the United States, including disparaging remarks from U.S. advisers about the fighting spirit of Saigon’s forces. Casualty reports from the incident vary, particularly with respect to ARVN and PLAF losses, but U.S. sources all find that three Americans died in the engagement, with six U.S. soldiers wounded and five helicopters shot down. See David M. Toczek, The Battle of Ấp Bắc, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from It (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 117–18. He came home shortly thereafter and was interviewed all through the Pentagon. And made the point that he didn’t—the Chiefs didn’t see him. Actually, we agreed to see him one day, and then I scheduled to meet with him, and then we agreed that [Earle G. “Bus”] Wheeler would talk to him.[note 9] Gen. Earle G. “Bus” Wheeler was chief of staff of the U.S. Army from October 1962 to July 1964, and chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1964 to July 1970. [President Kennedy acknowledges throughout.] So he was thoroughly talked to by the seniors at the time.[note 10] Having served as an adviser to the 7th Division of III Corps beginning in May 1962, Vann returned to the United States in April 1963, taking up a new post as the Pentagon’s director of special warfare in late May. Over the next several weeks, he spoke with hundreds of officers, including numerous generals, leading one of them, Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, to schedule a meeting for Vann with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The meeting was slated to take place on 8 July, but it was canceled just hours prior to its scheduled start time. Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie, 336–42.

The problem, Mr. President, is he came from a division that was in the [Mekong] Delta area.

Yeah.

And particularly in an area where the Strategic Hamlet Program had expanded too rapidly, and there were some deficiencies in that area.

I was very much impressed—there’s such variety throughout this whole war that a man assigned to one spot [President Kennedy acknowledges] and staying there could see almost anything and honestly report almost anything.

[Pause.] You think this thousand reduction can really . . .[note 11] President Kennedy raises a question about the proposal to withdraw 1,000 U.S. military advisers then serving in South Vietnam by the end of 1963. The proposal originated with British counterinsurgency specialist Robert G. K. Thompson, who had been suggesting since April 1962 that the United States make a token withdrawal of U.S. forces. During his visit to Washington in April 1963, Thompson repeated his suggestion in meetings with civilian and military officials, including President Kennedy. For Thompson’s 1962 recommendation, see Ormsby-Gore to Home, 17 April 1962, FO 371/166722, DV 103145/110, National Archives, United Kingdom; Warner to Ledward, 1 June 1962, FO 371/166722, DV 103145/110, National Archives, United Kingdom; Ledward to Warner, 7 June 1962, FO 371/166722, DV 103145/110, National Archives, United Kingdom. American sources fail to make specific reference to his call for withdrawing troops, though they do reference Thompson’s concern, expressed in meetings with State and Defense officials, that the U.S. profile in Vietnam was becoming too elevated. See Bagley to Taylor, 5 April 1962, in Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], Vietnam: 1962, ed. Edward C. Keefer (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), 2:307–8, doc. 147. For Thompson’s meeting with President Kennedy, see “Memorandum of a Conversation,” 4 April 1963, in FRUS, 1961–1963, 3:198–200, doc. 77.

Yes, sir. We—

Is that going to be an assumption that it’s going well, but if it doesn’t go well [unclear]?

No. No, sir. One of the major premises—two major premises we have. First, we believe we can complete the military campaign in the first three corps in ‘64, and the fourth corps in ‘65.[note 12] The U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) had divided South Vietnam into Corps I through IV. The greatest amount of insurgent activity was taking place in IV Corps, a region that included the Mekong Delta and the Ca Mẫu Peninsula. But secondly, if it extends beyond that period, we believe we can train the Vietnamese to take over the essential functions and withdraw the bulk of our forces. And this thousand is in conjunction with that, and I have a list of the units here that are represented by that thousand.

Bob, have they—

What’s the point of doing it?

We need a way to get out of Vietnam. This is a way of doing it. And to leave forces there when they’re not needed, I think, is wasteful, and it complicates both their problems and ours.

Why can’t the North Vietnamese continue to just supply? Do you think there’s a real limitation on their supply?

Yes. And as the [South] Vietnamese control the countryside and shut off the food supply of the Vietcong, it becomes more and more difficult for them to live.[note 13] The Vietcong, or VC for short, was the term Diệm used initially to refer to all enemies of his government and which the United States later used to refer to Vietnamese Communists, whether they were members of the National Liberation Front or the People’s Liberation Armed Forces. Jessica M. Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance: Ngô Đình Diệm, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 175 And this is particularly true in the north.

And this is a costly, painful operation for them. They must be getting awfully tired.

Vietcong—you mean the North Vietnamese?

North Vietnamese.

Why is it so costly?

Simply because of the losses they’re taking and the fact that they’re—

Their losses are locals.

The strategic hamlets are building up, and the recruiting locally is running out, at least it seems to me.

Well, when you say “costly,” it’s not necessarily costly to North Vietnam in terms of money. But it’s costly to the Vietcong.

Oh, yes. I understand that.

In terms of lives.

But I—it was not clear that it was costly to the North Vietnamese.

Well, I think that the ability to get any of them to come down now is getting harder.

Yeah.

We could find very little proof of infiltration all the—except with arms. We found in the Delta that certain heavier weapons are coming in.

Where are they coming? How do they get in?

Down the Mekong River or by sea. We’re not sure.

They get down into those bayous, and they get down into the Delta into the bayous, the canals [unclear].

They do. And we’re seeing [unclear] caliber machine guns and recoilless rifles. Things of that sort.

It’s hard to do a strategic hamlets down there because there isn’t very much land.

[Unclear.]

Villages are all strung up and down the [unclear].[note 14] McCone may have said “canals.”

That’s the construction problem [unclear].

Did you see [Ngô Đình] Nhu out there?[note 15] Ngô Đình Nhu was the younger brother of and chief political adviser to South Vietnamese president Ngô Đình Diệm until their assassinations in November 1963.

No. He didn’t contact us, and we didn’t contact him. He was the only person of importance we didn’t see. It’s possible that he contacted us through [Dương Văn] Big Minh and [Trần Văn] Đôn, both of whom asked to see us privately.[note 16] Dương Văn Minh, also known as Big Minh, was a leader of the coup against Ngô Đình Diệm in November 1963, and chair of the Military Revolutionary Council from November 1963 to October 1964. Big Minh’s own government was toppled in a coup in late January 1964. He later served as president of the Republic of Vietnam for three days in April 1975. Gen. Trần Văn Đôn was chief of staff of the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN) and commander of the I-Corps in the early 1960s; a participant in the 1963 South Vietnamese coup against Ngô Đình Diệm; and South Vietnamese minister of defense for the Military Revolutionary Council. [President Kennedy acknowledges.]

[quietly] And you did see Minh [unclear]?

I spent several days with Đôn and also saw him privately. Me and Max saw Big Minh.

Max, did you run into that Australian report?[note 17] Col. F. P. “Ted” Serong, an Australian expert in counterinsurgency who ran a team of 30 Australians supporting the counterinsurgency, was an adviser to MACV chief Paul D. Harkins. Dương Văn Mai Elliot, RAND in Southeast Asia: A History of the Vietnam War Era (New York: RAND, 2010), 38–39.

Yes. Yes, I did. I had Harkins comment on it. In fact, got all the records out. It’s not correct unless you just take one week or one very narrow period.

He’s not a strong officer.

The indicators are, as he mentioned, are generally favorable if you take any [unclear].[note 18] Taylor may have said “if you take any period of time.”

I talked to the Australian ambassador, and . . . who just generally supports us.[note 19] The Australian ambassador to South Vietnam was Brian Clarence Hill.

Is the . . . Diệm obviously doesn’t want the situation to deteriorate, [tape skips] relations to deteriorate. He just thinks that he has to in order to maintain his own power. Do we get more out of him by being conciliatory or by putting pinpricks into him?

It’s my personal belief we’ll get more out by putting the pressure on. I wouldn’t call them pinpricks, because some of them are rather extensive.

I don’t think we ought to unnecessarily irritate. And some of the things we’re doing do so. Some of the Voice of America broadcasts might fall in that category. I really think on most of these, we’re going to have to rely on the advice of the ambassador [Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.].[note 20] Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. was the Republican vice presidential nominee in 1960; U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam from August 1963 to June 1964 and August 1965 to April 1967; and U.S. ambassador to West Germany from May 1968 to January 1969. He’s recommending, for example, some change in the Voice of America broadcasts to put even greater pressure on Diệm. I think it may well lead to USIS [United States Information Service] being thrown out of the country. But even in such a situation as that, I think we’re going to have to rely on the ambassador. We just—

The object of all this is to what—for him to try to conciliate this . . . the middle class in the cities?

The object of it is for him to deal more cleverly with them, with less public visibility to the—with the force that he has to use. I thought probably the most sophisticated analysis of the situation I received out there was from a [University of] Cambridge professor who’s had considerable contact with the area over a long period of time—two decades.[note 21] McNamara is likely referring to Irish-born P. J. Honey, who taught at London University and had been visiting Vietnam since 1951. And he said that in his opinion, any other regime that replaces Diệm would have to follow much the same program of repression, but that they would do it, he felt, in a much more sophisticated fashion without Madame Nhu and brother Nhu and the others constantly pushing it into the public view. And this is about the—

We’re going to have an authoritarian regime, and the question is [McNamara acknowledges throughout] whether they make asses [chuckling] of themselves.

Exactly. What our pressure would be designed to do, would be to force them to do this in less visible ways.

Well, I think we work toward it. I don’t think we can force it. The kind of pressures we’ve got aren’t strong enough to do anything more than drive home that indeed we take this very seriously. And if you add sanctions it becomes very uncertain, and he has—that, of course, is a very strong argument. I think Bob made it very clear in the meeting we had with him. We didn’t try to negotiate anything, but simply to drive home the fact that indeed that this was [unclear] the United States. But what I would hope is that in a short period of time, that we can get him to realize that he must enter into the kind of program we’re suggesting here militarily, at the same time never let the [unclear] took place in the last two months [unclear].

You may not have seen what we said to him, Mr. President. This is the substance of it.

The monologue went on, did it?

Two and a half hours before [President Kennedy acknowledges] I could get a word in.

[Unclear.]

How does he get any work done, though? How does he get any work done? There is—seems to be some evidence of real work being done in that country—

Oh, this man spends 24 hours a day on the job. [President Kennedy acknowledges.] And he knows [unclear]. [Pause.] [Unclear.] [Pause.]

[Unclear.]

[Unclear.]

Well, there wasn’t much to it. You made—make any impression on him?

Well, at night, we came back to dinner, as I walked in the room, he said, “Well, we have much work to do in view of the suggestions you made this afternoon.” It’s been General Harkins’s . . . impression that he will react to something like this over a period of time.[note 22] Gen. Paul D. Harkins was deputy chief of staff to Gen. George Patton during World War II; deputy commandant of cadets at West Point from 1946 to 1961; a U.S. Army officer during the Korean War; and commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), from January 1962 to June 1964. May take two weeks, a month to two months, and [unclear].

Well, let’s go through this now. What is the—what are the matters we have to . . .

Mr. President—

Both of you are in agreement on these? This is pretty much a—

Yes, sir. We agree.

The crux of the matter are the recommendations, Mr. President.

Well, there really are two kinds of things. There’s a policy analysis at the back and the recommendations at the front, and they interlock, as I understand it. The most immediate question, Mr. President, in a way, is in paragraph 6, pages 3 and 4, but does [unclear] public posture.

That’s right. That is what we would propose to say to the Congress and the public.

And give to the ambassador as the new guidance. [Pause.]

This would become public, (a), (b), (c)?

Yes.

Which page is this on?

Pages 3 and 4.

Paragraph 6 on page 3.

See, I don’t know about that sentence: “Although we are deeply concerned by repressive practice, effective performance in the conduct [of the war] should be the determining factor.” Don’t you—might—That could be reworded if we’re going to make that public. “We’re deeply concerned by repressive practice.” That sounds . . . I think we might—

We could drop out the introductory clause.

Yeah. I think “effective performance [mumbles] should be the determining” . . . drop the clause out. [Unclear comment in the background.] Yeah. Would you say “must be”? We say, “Effective performance [unclear]—" [McNamara acknowledges.]

The question that occurs to me is whether we want to get publicly pinned to a date in 6(a)?

Well, that goes back to paragraph 2, Mac.

Yes, it does. It’s . . .

Well, it’s something we debated [McNamara acknowledges] very strongly. I think it is a major question. I will just say this: that we talked to 174 officers, [South] Vietnamese and U.S., and in the case of the U.S., I always asked the question, “When can you finish this job, in the sense that you will reduce this insurgency to little more than sporadic incidents?” Inevitably, except for the Delta, they would say “’64 would be ample time.” I realize that’s not necessarily . . . I assume there’s no major factors—new factors entering [unclear]. I realize that’s . . .

Well, let’s say it anyway. And then ‘65, if it doesn’t work out, we’ll get a new date.

Sixty-five for the Delta.

I think, Mr. President, we must have a means of disengaging from this area. We must show our country that means. The only slightest difference between Max and me in this entire report is in this one estimate of whether or not we can win the war in ‘64 in the upper three territories and ‘65 in the fourth. I’m not entirely sure of that. But I am sure that if we don’t meet those dates, in the sense of ending the major military campaigns, we nonetheless can withdraw the bulk of our U.S. forces, according to the schedule we’ve laid out—worked out—because we can train the Vietnamese to do the job.

To illustrate the point: we have two L-19 squadrons over there.[note 23] The Cessna L-19 “Bird Dog” was a light, two seat aircraft used by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps for scouting and low-level reconnaissance roles. These are very important. They’re the artillery observers and the fire control observers. But it’s very simple to train Vietnamese to fly L-19s. Now, why should we leave our L-19 squadrons there? At the present time, we set up a training program to give them seven weeks of language training, four months of flying school, three weeks of transition training with the L-19s, and they can go out and do L-19 work. And we’ve set it up in Vietnam. It’s being run by U.S. officers. It’s working very well. Now, I think we ought to do that for every one of our major elements. We’ve talked to [unclear]—

How much does our presence there contribute to sort of stiffening—

Very important. Very important.

The report itself says.

Very important. But this is at the battalion level. There are 90 battalions, and 3 men per battalion are the stiffeners. That’s 270 men out of 17,000. [President Kennedy acknowledges.] And we might well want to keep those there for an extended period. General Đôn has told me three times that contrary to his first impression—he was rather cool for putting these U.S. advisers at battalion level—the U.S. advisers were stiffening the backs of the Vietnamese officers and men, and frequently turned them into fire when they would otherwise have turned away from it. That’s quite an admission from the head of their army.[note 24] Maj. Gen. Trần Văn Đôn was chief of staff of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

I would think if we take these dates, Mr. President, it ought to be very clear that—what we mean by victory or success. That doesn’t mean that every Vietcong comes in with a white flag. But we do suppress this insurgency to the point that the national security forces of Vietnam can [unclear].

It doesn’t quite mean that every American officer comes out of there, either.

No.

[Unclear.]

We have about 3,500 left at the end of the period. We worked out a preliminary plan of how to do this.

You want to word that “with the major U.S. part of the task?”

Yes. Yes. I think so, Mr. President.

[Unclear]—

We said “essential,” but I think—

Also, wouldn’t it be wise to put in there reference to this training aspect? That’s very important.[note 25] This speaker might be William P. “Bill” Bundy.

That’s number—that’s Arabic “2.”

I know, but as I understand it, 6 (a), (b), (c), and (d) are supposed to constitute a self-contained summary.[note 26] Section (b), paragraph 2, states, “A program be established to train Vietnamese so that essential functions now performed by U.S. military personnel can be carried out by Vietnamese by the end of 1965. It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time.” “Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) and the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President,” 2 October 1963, in FRUS, 1961–1963, 4: doc. 167.

Public summary.

A public statement.

All right, yeah.

Seems to me that the training idea belongs in there.

Yeah.

The difficulty is that this whole thing could be upset by a little greater effort by the North Vietnamese [unclear].

I don’t think so.

Not on the withdrawal of U.S. forces. There’s no reason to leave L-19 squadrons [unclear].

Well, you’re really talking two different things. What—you’re saying that the U.S. advice and stiffening function you may want to continue, but that the large use of U.S. troops, who can be replaced by properly trained Vietnamese, can end. I wonder if it isn’t worth separating those two.

Well, just say, “While there may continue to be a requirement for special training forces, we believe that the major United States part of the task will be completed by 1965.” [An unidentified speaker acknowledges.] Or “advisory forces.”

Yeah.

This question of reinforcements John [McCone] raised. If this program of strategic hamlets is as successful as intended, where you have virtually all the rural population within these defended hamlets. It’s impossible to maintain, because of food and other supplies and recruiting difficulties, any large increase in forces. So that you’re really creating an obstacle to any great addition to the North.

Mm-hmm. But you do have the Delta problem still.

That’s the dirty one. [McCone acknowledges.] That’s the dirty one.

Now, this—”has expressed its disapproval and will do so again. Our policy is to seek to bring about abandonment [reading quickly, skipping over words] popular—Our means consist of—We should use these means.” In a sense, this is a recommendation of policy, isn’t it?

It’s a statement of policy more than a recommendation.

It’s really a statement.

It’s a rec—the recommendation is that this be the statement.

That’s right.

I noticed that this is the view of Secretary McNamara and General Taylor.

Recommendation six, Mr. President, says we recommend—the recommendation is that these following statements—

We—

We are recommending to you that [unclear]—

Now, you may take this without it—without [unclear]—themselves.

Well, I think that this ought to—let me just say I think this ought to be their statement. That . . . I think it’s sort of . . . and I will support it then at—in the press conference, and so on. Therefore, I think it ought to say, “We should use these means as required.” I think that’s the way it ought to be put.

“We rec”—but then, Mr. President, why don’t we then rewrite 6 to be: “We recommend the following as current—[unclear].”

I think it’s better than saying “We will use these means as re—[unclear].” I don’t know. It just seemed to me that “we will use these means” is a—gives our hand away a little. What you’re talking about is withholding support from him.

I really think, Mr. President, perhaps it’s wrong to be thinking of this as a public release in this language. We’d like to get this to be the policy and then—

[speaking over Taylor] We can organize a statement.

We can organize—

We probably ought to—if that’s—then this won’t become the public statement.

We—well, something based on this, [President Kennedy acknowledges throughout] which would—then we’d all say is agreed becomes [unclear]. We could do it that way.

All right. OK. When will they go up to the Hill? I’d rather have an official statement come out from them, though, than have some senator interpret it.

Oh, I think it’s very important, Mr. President—

[Unclear]—

If this is not the wording, that there be some wording.

And I think what we need to do, Mr. President, is to . . . I think we can do this quite readily. Take this wording and simply make sure that it does say “we should,” and this is what you go up and say. And then the President—then [unclear] asked, “Is that the way the administration [President Kennedy acknowledges] feels?” “Yes, it is.” [Unclear.]

They want us to come up Monday or Tuesday. I have to go to that [unclear]. [Unclear.]

What day is that?

I think it’s Tuesday [unclear].[note 27] McNamara and Taylor would appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Tuesday, 8 October 1963.

I think the quicker, the better, because this—whatever you do is—you’re going to leak all over town between Wednesday and Monday.

I don’t see any reason why we can’t do it at the end of this week.

I don’t see any reason why—I hoped it would be Thursday or Friday.

I don’t see any reason why it shouldn’t be.

Well, let’s find out—

What I’d like to do, Mr. President, is to get it clear that we’ve had this—as I—as we all know, there’s been a tension about what we’re doing, and if we can get it to come out of this meeting . . . the McNamara-Taylor report, with basic recommendations has been reviewed, possibly have an NSC [National Security Council] meeting on Friday and get [unclear] that sense of government policy, and have the two—have the missionaries go up Friday afternoon.

We can try to have an NSC meeting tomorrow if you possibly could.

We can’t because the President’s away.[note 28] President Kennedy was scheduled to attend several events in Arkansas the following day.

[Unclear] Arkansas tomorrow.

All right, well, let’s do it Friday morning, and we’ll go up Friday afternoon.

[Unclear] the NSC meeting is—it’s crucial we get all—

Well, if we have it agreed in this company, we have the government here as far as that goes.

It seems to me that the quicker that it’s done, and it’s known that we’ve got a common purpose—it’s going to stop a whole lot of things [an unidentified speaker acknowledges] [unclear] look very bad.

Otherwise, this is going to start leaking in Saigon. That place is just full of leaks. [McCone acknowledges.] While we were there—

Was there a piece of paper left in Saigon?

No, they don’t have it, but they’re going to start leaking anyhow.

[Unclear.] [Laughter.]

Well, I think what’s important is to have a . . . have this government in agreement—State Department, CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], Defense [Department], and the White House by Friday, because we have other—it’s more damaging to have us appear as divided as we are than it is to come to—I’d rather agree on policy, which is pretty close to what most of us—there may be shades of difference, but John McCone may have some question about whether the military ought to administer some of this border stuff or it ought to be CIA. But those are—

Those are operational differences.

That’s right. But I think if we could get some general agreement, in which the State would endorse, as well as the Defense and White House, we’d be much better off.

Could it be done by tomorrow, sir?

Well, let’s ask ourselves, leaving aside whether it’s “will” or “should,” Mr. President, whether this statement—a, b, c, and d—six here is all right. With the revision of one sentence, which we have.

[Unclear.]

I’d like to have Governor Harriman, I think—unless he’s had a chance to read this beforehand. He ought to be [unclear]—

I saw a preliminary one—Bill Foster—[William H.] Bill Sullivan gave it to me at breakfast [President Kennedy acknowledges] this morning, and it seemed to me that it was—I haven’t had a chance to go over it with George [W. Ball], ’cause he’s been making speeches this morning, but we ought to be able to do this today.[note 29] William H. “Bill” Sullivan was U.N. adviser to the State Department Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs from 1960 to 1964; special assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1963 to 1964; U.S. ambassador to Laos from December 1964 to March 1969; U.S. ambassador to the Philippines from August 1973 to April 1977; and U.S. ambassador to Iran from June 1977 to April 1979. George W. Ball was a Washington lawyer with an international practice; an adviser to Adlai E. Stevenson II in 1952, 1956, and 1960; U.S. under secretary of state for economic affairs in 1961; U.S. under secretary of state from 1961 to 1966; and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in 1968. In an oral history interview, Sullivan noted that during a breakfast at Harriman’s house, he told both Harriman and Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman that he had convinced Taylor not to include the 1965 withdrawal date in the trip report. William H. Sullivan Oral History, 16 June 1970, p. 47, John F. Kennedy Library. Thus, according to Sullivan, the copy that Harriman saw at breakfast included neither the 1965 nor the 1963 withdrawal dates, which McNamara and Taylor likely reinserted that morning prior to this meeting with President Kennedy. Taylor and McNamara had met in Taylor’s office at the Pentagon to speak about a “change in [the] draft trip report for the President,” before motoring to the White House to brief Kennedy at 11:00 a.m. See Maxwell D. Taylor Papers, Box 21, Diary, 1963, National Defense University. [President Kennedy attempts to interject.] And if we have any changes, we ought to be able to [unclear].

[speaking over Harriman] The other thing we could do, Mr. President, is have a meeting at the end of the day.

This was entirely in accordance with [President Kennedy acknowledges] [unclear] request to a reporter.

We could meet again—

[speaking over Harriman] I’d like to meet again today, Mr. President.

[speaking over Harriman] The only disadvantage of that, Mr. President, is that Secretary of State [unclear] come down.[note 30] Secretary of State Dean Rusk was in New York attending meetings with assorted diplomats at the United Nations. See, for instance, “Memorandum of Conversation,” 2 October 1963, in FRUS, 1961–1963, 4:347–49, doc. 168. There’s some symbolic advantage in his being here. That could be done the [unclear] morning.

Or we can have the NSC thing Friday. I just think we can get this thing pretty well [unclear]. [speaking over Bundy] George can describe it to the Secretary.

There’s another advantage in that, which is that it gives everybody that’s—there’s one other group of people involved in this, as we all know, and that’s the next two echelons down in the government. If they all have a chance to be—to go over this with their own principals, and we all come back, in essentially this group this afternoon, and we agree on a piece of paper, we really are going to have the government pretty well locked on.

Bob, I came in late, but you may have said it. Is Lodge and General [unclear] informed?

We read—Yes, he is. I read this report in an earlier draft, but essentially [unclear]—

What’s my schedule this afternoon?

You have Haile Selassie [I] at four [o’clock] and [unclear] much after that.[note 31] Haile Selassie I was emperor of Ethiopia from April 1930 to September 1974, and chair of the Organization of African Unity from May 1963 to July 1964 and November 1966 to September 1967.

How about having an NSC meeting at five [o’clock]?

We’ve gone over this with Lodge, [Harry D.] Felt, and Harkins.[note 32] Adm. Harry D. “Don” Felt was a U.S. Navy officer during World War II; vice chief of naval operations from 1956 to 1958; and commander in chief of Pacific Command (CINCPAC) from 1958 to 1964. I think it’s fair to say they agree with—well, they saw earlier drafts, but they haven’t changed materially.

I don’t know . . .

What?

Our people—I had about an hour with them, and they’re quite in agreement with one little point about whether there should be some covert unofficial relationships.

I put [William E.] Bill [Colby]’s extended footnote on that.[note 33] William E. Colby was an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Sweden and Italy in the 1950s; deputy chief and later chief of station in Saigon, South Vietnam, from 1959 to 1962; deputy and later chief of the CIA Far East Division from 1962 to 1968; head of the rural pacification program in Vietnam from 1968 to 1971; executive director of the CIA from 1971 to 1973; and director of central intelligence from 1973 to 1975. [Unclear] relatively minor [unclear].

I want to talk to you about—that’s a relatively minor point. Otherwise, we’re in agreement.

Well, let’s set an NSC at five o’clock. In the meanwhile, if the Sec—[unclear]—the State Department could go over this, and Mr. McCone, in some more detail [unclear].

Do you want to [unclear] Rusk? If he can come back, it would be great.

He’s coming down tonight, you know, on the . . .

He’s coming on the [unclear].

From where?

From New York. So as to be with Haile Selassie tomorrow, going to be here for lunch.[note 34] Rusk had been involved in meetings with diplomats at the United Nations, including sessions with British and Soviet diplomats in an effort to reach several East-West accords. See AP, “Big 3 Meet in Wrap-up of U.N. Talks,” Washington Post, 4 October 1963. Rusk did not make it back in time for a lunch with the Ethiopian leader.

[speaking over Bundy] Well, I think that’s all right. As long as George can tell him what he needs to know. I think he won’t be—if you and Averell are in agreement. [Harriman acknowledges.] Now, what are the—how much . . . I think we ought to consider maybe having a statement come out at the end of the NSC meeting, so then—because otherwise, we’re going to be all [unclear]—what it is they’re recommending. This statement we’re now talking about, why don’t we put that out from the NSC?

I think then, Mr. President, I really believe the language as it stands, the “wills” are better than “shoulds.” [President Kennedy acknowledges.]

Then it’s no longer just a recommendation. It’s a general policy.

In some ways, isn’t it better to have this recommendation and first accept it? This question of the President being back on these dates is a . . . [President Kennedy acknowledges.] This is a military judgment that comes into him. And it seems to me—

Then it would be—sure. Yes.

—it would be better to come as a recommendation, and then you accept the recommendation.

“The following recommendations were made to the NSC this afternoon by General—by Secretary McNamara and General Taylor. With the advice of the NSC, the President approved a recommendation,” which would—then you put the paper out.

I’d like to see it done that way.

Huh?

[speaking over Harriman] I’d like to see it done that—I think it [unclear] it all down.[note 35] McNamara does not enunciate, but he likely means to say “ties it all down.”

It’s best to do it that way and then there’s some doubts and [unclear].

Any question about congressional attitudes under those circumstances?

Would they expect to be consulted before the President makes up his mind?

Well, I think that . . . the . . . I don’t see anything in here that requires, really, their—

No, I don’t think so, either.

I think what we ought to do, Mac, is get . . . say that they’re ready to go before these congressional committees as soon as the committees want them. The key ones: Armed Services, Foreign Relations, both bodies. And so, therefore, they’ll be told that today.

Is there any advantage in a special sess—offering them a special session, or it better be committees? And they ought to be—

Committees . . . at their convenience.

Why don’t we have [Lawrence F. “Larry”] O’Brien [Jr.] communicate that to the [President Kennedy acknowledges] Majority Leader, and then let him take it from there.[note 36] Lawrence F. “Larry” O’Brien Jr. was special assistant to the president for congressional affairs from 1961 to 1965; U.S. postmaster general from November 1965 to April 1968; and chair of the Democratic National Committee from 1968 to 1969 and 1970 to 1972. The only time you can’t come is the NSC meeting.

All right. Well, let’s—in the meanwhile, let’s us all read this thing with a little more care, and—but at five o’clock, we’ll get this—we’ll have this statement done, and we better approve that in advance.

Now, who are we . . . who will, in the government, other than the people here, will we go over this report with and will see it? We have—we’ve got certain recommendations with regard to what we’re going to do with a cutoff of funds, and so on, which we don’t want to have particularly [unclear].

[speaking over President Kennedy] My advice would be, Mr. President, that we make each man here—we have the head or the acting head of the agencies principally concerned right here—responsible for, and have listed in my office the names of the people with whom this report was discussed during the remainder of the day. But we have at the NSC meeting—we must have, statutorily, the . . . [unclear]. We ought to have the Vice President [Lyndon B. Johnson] and the Attorney General [Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy].[note 37] Lyndon B. Johnson was a U.S. representative [D-Texas] from April 1937 to January 1949; a U.S. senator [D-Texas] from January 1949 to January 1961; Senate Majority Whip from January 1951 to January 1953; Senate Minority Leader from January 1953 to January 1955; Senate Majority Leader from January 1955 to January 1961; vice president of the United States from January 1961 to November 1963, and president of the United States from November 1963 to January 1969. Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy was U.S. attorney general from January 1961 to September 1964, and a U.S. senator [D–New York] from January 1965 until his assassination in June 1968.

And then I think we [unclear].

The Secretary of the Treasury [C. Douglas “Doug” Dillon].[note 38] C. Douglas “Doug” Dillon was U.S. ambassador to France from March 1953 to January 1957; U.S. under secretary of state for economic affairs from July 1958 to June 1959; U.S. under secretary of state from June 1959 to January 1961; and U.S. secretary of the treasury from January 1961 to April 1965.

We ought to get Roger Hilsman [Jr.] and Arthur Sylvester in, so that we can give some press guidance, so we don’t have . . .[note 39] Roger Hilsman Jr. was director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research from February 1961 to April 1963, and U.S. assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs from April 1963 to March 1964.

And—well, what about [Robert J. “Bob”] Manning?[note 40] Robert J. “Bob” Manning was a journalist; U.S. assistant secretary of state for public affairs from April 1962 to July 1964; and executive editor of the Atlantic Monthly from 1964 to 1980. [President Kennedy attempts to interject.] [Unclear] at the NSC meeting.

That’s correct.

And . . .

We’d have Bill Bundy and General [Victor H.] Krulak, and we’d want to go over this with the [Joint] Chiefs [of Staff].[note 41] Lt. Gen. Victor H. “Brute” Krulak was a U.S. Marine Corps officer during World War II and the Korean War; special assistant for counter insurgency activities for the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1962 to 1964; and commanding general, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, from March 1964 until his retirement in June 1968.

I’d like to put this before the chiefs [unclear]—

This should go to the Chiefs. [An unidentified speaker acknowledges.] But we should know, if you’d all bring to the NSC meeting, a list of persons with whom [McNamara acknowledges] this has been discussed, then we make it as a decision and a public announcement. But then by the time we hang everybody in every department on to it, the civil war ends. It would be a great [unclear].

Is there any limitation we could . . . on some of this? By then, we’ll be ready to hear them.

Well, I think that would be—I don’t know whether the—I think that the best thing to do would be, as we leave here, for General Taylor, and the Secretary [of Defense], and myself to go down and [McNamara acknowledges] get the thing right.

OK. [speaking over Bundy] Let’s get a picture here.[note 42] President Kennedy might be alluding to the photograph that would appear in newspapers the following day. That picture is available from the John F. Kennedy Library.

Could I . . . [Unclear exchange.] Could I [unclear] one minute on Madame Nhu?

Yeah.

—the State Department refused to guarantee her safety. That the U.S. press is ready to provoke her. Friendly delegations with the United Nations feel we are making fun of them, when, on the one hand, we ask them to act on our behalf, and on the other hand, we send her to sabotage their work, and the ambassador urges that she not come. Now, we had a clandestine contact with her of several hours yesterday in Paris.

It sounds really interesting. [Laughter.]

[Unclear.] [Laughter.] CIA doesn’t participate in that. [Chuckles. Unclear exchange.] The purpose was to try and persuade her not to come. She explained at some length the efforts that have been made by Saigon, by the foreign ministry, to urge her to give up her trip on the basis that she was [unclear] and to return directly to Saigon. The conclusion is that—

—it was extremely doubtful that anything short of a direct order from her husband would persuade Madame Nhu to cancel her voyage to Cuba, not—or, to USA. Now, the question is, that I raise, is whether in view of this, we should go out to Lodge or whether, if we didn’t, to have Lodge arrange—

—get him to do this or whether the situation is such, as you see it, that any kind of contact with the Nhus is ill-advised.

She’ll like her—if we’re going to come out with this with the hope that this sort of puts a cap on everything for a while, then have her arrive three days later and make this whole pot boil again, really, it’s going to be so troublesome that I would go to some length to keep her from coming now.

Adlai [E. Stevenson II] told me that—he was with [unclear] last night.[note 43] Adlai E. Stevenson II was the Democratic governor of Illinois from January 1949 to January 1953; the Democratic U.S. presidential nominee in 1952 and 1956; and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from January 1961 until his death in July 1965. He told me that he is much impressed with Bửu Hội [McCone acknowledges] —is that the name of their man there?[note 44] Bửu Hội (né Prince Nguyễn Phúc Bửu Hội) was a scientist in the field of cancer research; director of the Vietnam Atomic Energy Center; and a South Vietnamese diplomat and ambassador. And that he was terrified that all his work would be undone if she arrived [President Kennedy acknowledges] [unclear]. And so this sounds like this—

Well, this [unclear] both the contact in Paris and Bửu Hội’s actions all tie together now.

The only way to dissuade her is by [unclear] by their Foreign Office, who apparently have sincerely tried to [unclear] her off.

People who [unclear] scared to.

The only person who order [unclear]—the only person to order is her husband. Do we want to try and make that case? That’s the question.

I would hope we would.

It raises the difficulty we have if Lodge won’t handle it [unclear] contact with Nhu was [John H.] Richardson.[note 45] John H. Richardson was an officer for the Central Intelligence Agency, and chief of station in Saigon until 1963 when he was outed by the press. There’s a Lodge-Richardson problem, which we’re all well aware of.

Well, we can—

[Unclear] Richardson go [unclear]? [Unclear] Richardson—Richardson, as I understood it, would—is going to be thinking about transferring, but he might as well be used. Why doesn’t he go see Nhu? Say this is the best judgment of United States government. She shouldn’t come because we’re trying to do this thing.

[speaking over President Kennedy] Well, I’m not sure Richardson would be the person to do it. He has other . . .

What about Harkins?

Well, now, Harkins would—he has other . . . Richardson has other people that he can use. It wouldn’t be quite as official. At some time, I want to discuss that whole Richardson situation, because . . . but that’s another subject; we’re not going to talk about that now. But I’m not—I wouldn’t suggest that perhaps Richardson see Nhu. But it might be that Richardson could arrange for—

I don’t believe that the price of seeing Nhu and being turned down is too high. I don’t believe we’d be successful in either gaining Nhu’s—

You say that the price would be—

Would not be. [Unclear.]

I don’t believe the price of failure would be high, and therefore I’m willing to do it. I think it’s going to fail, but if it fails [unclear].

[Unclear] of proposing it and then if it doesn’t work, well, it’s his fault.

It’s well worth trying. Whatever Nhu is, he’s intelligent, and the fact is he’s going to damage American support.

[Unclear] doubt he’d pay some attention to this.

Then we now—who will we have do this?

Well, we’ll work out a wire to Lodge.

A wire to Lodge asking him to do it in a way—at his best discretion.

That’s the answer to it.

I think there ought to be [unclear].

I’ll have our people and your people get out some kind of wire.

Well, how do you tell a fellow to keep his wife home? What grounds does it appeal to him? Because he’s obviously, as you say, he must be either scared or he must be stupid. She’s been running around making inflammatory statements. There [unclear] to be—the press preparing—

[Unclear] eat her alive.

They going to eat her alive.

I think [unclear] point out [unclear] that she already has something like 16 hours of television time she’s signed up for.

Twenty-eight, twenty-nine appearances.

Twenty-nine appearances, now—

[Unclear] gives this man this stuff. Geez, don’t let him see it.

What’s that?

“‘Arrogant’ CIA Disobeys the Orders in Vietnam.”[note 46] See Richard Starnes, “‘Arrogant’ CIA Disobeys Orders in Viet Nam,” Washington Daily News, 2 October 1963.

[Unclear] Secretary McNamara [unclear].

[Unclear.]

What does it say?

[laughing] Can’t believe a word you say.

[laughing] [Unclear] Pierre [E. G. Salinger]![note 47] Pierre E. G. Salinger was White House press secretary from January 1961 to March 1964, and a U.S. senator [D–California] from August 1964 to December 1964.

“Spooks Make Life Miserable for Ambassador Lodge.”[note 48] See Richard Starnes, ‘Arrogant’ CIA Disobeys Orders in Viet Nam,” Washington Daily News, 2 October 1963.

Who does?

[speaking over someone else] “Spooks!"

[reading aloud] “The story of the Central Intelligence Agency’s role in South Vietnam is a dismal chronicle of bureaucratic arrogance, obstinate disregard of orders, and unrestrained thirst for power. Twice the CIA flatly refused to carry out instructions from Ambassador Lodge, according to a high United States source here.”[note 49] See Richard Starnes, ‘Arrogant’ CIA Disobeys Orders in Viet Nam,” Washington Daily News, 2 October 1963. McCone paraphrases the article in places.

Oh, there’s high sources.

Is this a Saigon dateline?

Saigon, yeah.

This must have been what Bob said to the press [unclear]. [Laughter.]

[reading aloud] “This led to a dramatic confrontation between Mr. Lodge and John Richardson. Lodge failed to move Richardson, and the dispute was bucked back to Washington. Secretary of State Rusk and CIA Chief John A. McCone were unable to resolve the conflict, and the matter is now reported to be awaiting settlement by President Kennedy.”[note 50] Richard Starnes, “‘Arrogant’ CIA Disobeys Orders in Viet Nam,” Washington Daily News, 2 October 1963.

What about the relationship between Lodge and Richardson?

It’s not pretty.

It’s pretty bad, Mr. President. Later, when you have time—

I think we ought to talk [unclear] there’s just no sense—there’s no sense— [Unclear exchange.]

I haven’t gotten the whole story [unclear].

I think we can take care of [unclear].

[speaking over a siren approaching in the distance] Going over Richardson’s reporting over 15 months, as I’ve done, has been—it’s been remarkably accurate. He’s been right with respect to the tarnishing of the Diệm regime’s image. He’s been right with respect to the coup plotting and the fact that they wouldn’t [unclear]. And he has been—his recommendation has been to work with Diệm until means of disposing him were apparent and a new regime was organized.

Now, Lodge on September the 11th took an entirely different position. He said [unclear] send people in to get rid of this fellow. [By] September the 19th he had reversed himself and said the only thing we could do is work along with him.[note 51] Lodge wrote, “Agree that no good opportunity for action to remove present government in immediate future is apparent and that we should, therefore, do whatever we can as an interim measure pending such an eventuality.” See “Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State,” 19 September 1963, in FRUS, 1961–1963, 4: doc. 130. So as of September 19th and 20th, Lodge and Richardson were on exactly the same wavelength, although there may be a personality . . .

Well, now [unclear] let’s go talk privately. Now, let’s go ahead on this, Mac. Let’s everybody study it and let’s have something that we can put out as United States public policy and somebody be prepared to brief the press so we don’t have it briefed by some . . . fellow. It may be you or it may be Roger Hilsman at the end of the Security Council meeting. [An unidentified speaker acknowledges.] And perhaps [unclear] John McCone and Bob and I [Bundy attempts to interject] [unclear].

[David E.] Dave Bell asked again, Mr. President, whether you want to get firmly committed to a public statement at the—or released at the end of an NSC meeting with no actual congressional consultation before that point.[note 52] David E. “Dave” Bell was director of the Bureau of the Budget from January 1961 to December 1962; director of the U.S. Agency for International Development from December 1962 to June 1966; and executive vice president of the Ford Foundation from 1966 to 1980. He’s been—he’s, of course, got a deeper, direct interest in this. He’s . . .

Well, I’ll tell you what to do, the best way to do it. [speaking over Bundy] Let’s get a statement. Let’s call up the leaders—[J. William “Bill”] Fulbright [D–Arkansas], Everett [M.] Dirksen [R–Illinois]—on the phone—[note 53] J. William “Bill” Fulbright was a U.S. senator [D–Arkansas] from January 1945 to December 1974, and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from January 1959 to December 1974. Everett M. Dirksen was a U.S. senator [R–Illinois] from January 1951 until his death in September 1969, and Senate Minority Leader from January 1959 to September 1969.

That’s exactly—got to do that much. I could get four or five guys that [unclear] or have security that—

[Unclear.] Then at least they know what we’re going to say. Then just say, “This is what we’re going to say,” and at the same time, you can say they’re available [unclear].

Well, I’ll check with [unclear]. That ought to be [unclear].

And the group that was with us was—behaved [unclear]. [Unclear] worked hard, kept their mouths shut. Threw people together [unclear]. I hope [unclear].

[Unclear.]

I spent an hour with [unclear]. The invitation—they were told if they want to come sit down, tell them about [unclear]. I have nothing to say [unclear] I reported to you. So they all came with that specific understanding [unclear] open the meeting. Halberstam said [unclear], in effect—he didn’t put it quite this way—but subsequently, “If you haven’t read my dispatches, that’s your fault. And if you have read them, I’ve said everything I know [unclear].” [President Kennedy acknowledges.] Very bright, very bright. Once they got talking I could get away, but—get a word in edgewise for an hour, and I told them [unclear]. But he and Sheehan are both [unclear] he more than Sheehan.

But they’re for Cabot?

Oh, yes. Very much so. [Unclear.]

Cabot [unclear]?

Very much so.

Well, I’ve got to get [unclear]. [Unclear exchange.] [Unclear] you can’t have Cabot have the respons—[unclear]. [Unclear exchange.] Can I—I want to get Dave in here, Mrs. [Evelyn M.] Lincoln.[note 54] Evelyn M. Lincoln was personal secretary to President Kennedy from 1952 to 1963.