[talking on speakerphone] I talked to that president [Roberto Chiari].[note 2] The Presidential Recordings Program revised the following section of text in 2021 for inclusion in The LBJ Telephone Tapes, a project produced by the Miller Center in partnership with the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library to commemorate the library's 50th anniversary. I have not talked to you since then, have I?

No, sir.

I told him that the [Thomas C. “Tom”] Mann mission was taking off within 30 minutes. That it included some of my most trusted advisers, including Mann and [Cyrus R.] Cy Vance and Harry [C.] McPherson [Jr.].” That it was a good group. That he must bear in mind that the enemies of both of us were exploiting this thing. That—he immediately said that he wanted to revise all of our agreements and that would have to be done. I told him that we couldn’t get into that. That I wanted to get the facts of what happened. That I understood this occurred on soil that we had in our area. That—

That’s something we just should emphasize at every stage of the proceedings.

That these were students, and that I wanted to get the facts on it, and I didn’t want it to be an excuse. I didn’t want people to have to use these methods in order to—violent methods—in order to work out agreeable arrangements. That I appreciated what he had done to ask for quiet. That I was asking our people to do the same. But that these men could go into the factual situation with him and make a report. But I was cold and hard and tough as hell, so far as—

Well, that is exactly right.

—so far as this is concerned. Then I went back in and told our group here that I thought we had to remember that a week ago—two or three weeks ago—I had to tell them in Bolivia I’d send whatever aid I needed in there to keep—make them release one of our people there.[note 3] In mid-December 1963, Bolivian miners had taken 4 U.S. State Department officials, 2 Europeans, and 13 Bolivians as hostages in retaliation for arrests of labor leaders. One of the Americans was a labor adviser for AID, one was a Peace Corps worker, and two were USIS employees. The allegedly Communist miners released their captives on 16 December. See McGeorge Bundy, “Memorandum for the President,” 8 December 1963, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Box 1, National Security File, Lyndon B. Johnson Library; the conversation between President Johnson and Dean Rusk, 10 December 1963; the conversation between President Johnson and Roswell Gilpatric, 13 December 1963, in The Presidential Recordings, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Kennedy Assassination and the Transfer of Power, November 1963–January 1964, vol. 2, ed. Robert David Johnson and David Shreve (New York: Norton, 2005); the conversation between President Johnson and Richard Russell, 10 January 1964, in this volume; and Houston Post, 17 December 1963. A few days later—A few days earlier, they had someone else locked up [Russell coughs] some other place, and I was damn tired of attacking our flag and our embassy and our USIS [U.S. Information Service] every time somebody got a little emotional outburst down there, so they’d better watch it.

[speaking under President Johnson] I’m so pleased. I’m so pleased. Now, you . . . That’s a great president. That’s a man [who’ll] go down in history.

Now, I just wanted you to know that. And this group has gone. And [Edwin M.] Martin’ll be coming back tomorrow. But the old man finally said, well, he’s glad to be talking to a man that is taking some action. And I said, “Well, they’ll be there.” And I think Cy Vance will be pretty tough, too.

Well, that fellow [Andrew P.] O’Meara down there is a pretty good man.[note 4] General Andrew O’Meara was commander of U.S. forces in the Canal Zone. In a conversation that day with General Maxwell Taylor, he remarked, “I am law and order now.” “Conversation Between General Taylor and General O’Meara,” 10 January 1964, “Panama Riots, Part B, vol. 2” folder, Country File: Panama, Box 64, National Security File, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

Well, he’s—

General O’Meara.

He’s had to order his people to start shooting again.

He has? Well, that’s all right. They got to if they shoot at them. You can’t expect our people to stand there and be killed and not fire back.

Well, I mean it’s a hot [unclear]—

Anywhere in the world.

I’m not trying to unjustify it or justify it. I’m just saying it's a hot—hot as a firecracker.

I realize it is.

All right.

I realize it is, but it’s wholly a mental state as far as we’re concerned, and a national image so far as the United Nations is concerned. I think we can protect both.

Well, I think the position that ought to be on the Hill is we ought to be careful what we say, but, for God’s sakes, if we say anything, say, “We did right acting promptly to send some—the ablest men we got down there.” Now, they tell me that everybody in Latin America is scared of this fellow Mann. They highly regard him, because he’s a tough guy. He’s not the regular . . .

Well, I hope he is. I think he’s much tougher than the ones we’ve had. He has a velvet glove, but I hope he has his little iron fingers under it.

Well, he—I think he does. I think he does.

Well, I’m counting on that.[note 5] End of 2021 revisions.

I don’t know, but that’s my judgment of him. And I think Cy Vance is a pretty straitlaced fellow.

Yes, he’s a practical man. He’s a practical man.

And McNamara doesn’t act to me like he goes much with these State Department policies. He’s the only one that stayed with me on Indonesia.[note 6] Because of his distrust of Indonesian president Achmad Sukarno and his concern about Sukarno’s aggressive policies toward Malaysia, Johnson had pushed for a harder line toward the dictator. Now, we’ve got it [aid to Indonesia] down from 35 million [dollars] to 15 million, and I refused to go under 15 million. They say, well, [that] I’m going to pull out and break away and cause us not to have any relations at all, and [that] we can’t move away from the table if we expect to bid on the pot. So now I turned it all down, though, and concluded that Bobby Kennedy would have to give us [searches for word] . . .

Legal.

A legal opinion on whether I was . . . whether this stuff in the pipeline—[note 7] Johnson was referring to aid already authorized.

[Unclear] not going to let them think . . . just not going to let [unclear] think that thing’s cool for a while. The Russians can’t get in there to help him.

Whether this money in the pipeline constituted a violation of the act of Congress. I don’t think it does.

All right. [Unclear.]

You see, this damn Republican put a prohibition in there unless I made a finding it was in the national interest.[note 8] The July 1963 amendment was sponsored by Representative William Broomfield (R-Michigan); a companion measure, introduced by Ernest Gruening (D-Alaska), passed the Senate in November 1963.

Yeah?

So they want me to make the finding, and I put it off on the theory that I haven’t made any new allocation. And that all that’s going to them was in the pipeline—

Uh-huh.

—and I couldn’t stop that without going out there and sinking the ships. Now I’m going to send Bobby Kennedy to Indonesia and just let him put it right in his lap.[note 9] Kennedy was the choice for the “tough man” that Bundy, three days earlier, had urged the President to send to deal with Sukarno. Summary Record of the National Security Council Meeting, 7 January 1964, NSC Meetings, vol. 1, Tab 2, National Security File, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

Tell him to be tough, too. [Laughs.]

I think he will.

Like he was in Los Angeles.[note 10] Russell is referring to the Democratic National Convention, where Robert Kennedy urged Johnson not to accept his brother’s offer of the vice presidential nod on the Democratic ticket.

He wasn’t so tough the last time he saw Sukarno.[note 11] Kennedy had traveled to Indonesia in February 1962 to negotiate a dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia over West New Guinea. FRUS, 1961–1963, 23:517–35. He took away from the Dutch and he gave [it to] Sukarno, didn’t he?

Yeah. Yes, he sure did.

But I think he’s—I think I’ll just put it in his lap, don’t you think so?

Well, it’s subject to your final decision, of course. You can’t . . . you can’t afford—

Oh, no, I mean just let him go out there at first.

Yes.

Let him determine it’s legal for me to do this.

Yeah.

And number two, let him go out there and have whatever row it is with Sukarno.

I think that’s fine.

Because I don’t think he’d get any good out of Sukarno.

No, I don’t either.

I don’t trust him. I don’t think he’s any good.

No, he isn’t. Not at all.

But if we’re going to have a break, I’ll just let him break it.

That’s it—that’s exactly right.

All right. Good-bye.

Well, I’m proud of you.

Bye.